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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 30

JAN-JUNE 1932

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXX

JANUARY TO JUNE 1932

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PART XXX.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 6397/2064/25]

No. 1.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 4, 1932.)

(No. 482.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 13, 1931.

IN my despatch No. 444 of the 17th November, I had the honour to report on the financial situation as affected by the issue of Ibn Saud's proclamation announcing budgetary reform. In my printed letter No. 460 of the 30th November was transmitted a series of announcements which resulted from the proclamation and which were published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 20th; they conveyed the King's commands to reduce expenditure, select a Reorganisation Committee, create a Treasury Department, and appoint a treasurer, and meanwhile to employ the Director-General of Finance and the Vice-President of the Hejazi Legislative Assembly in an inspectional tour of the other side of Nejd.

2. I now have the honour to enclose a translation of a leading article from the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 4th December entitled "Between Two Epochs; Memorable Deeds of His Majesty,"⁽¹⁾ as well as a more restrained but not very illuminating announcement on "The New Budget."⁽¹⁾

3. The two epochs are, of course, the evil past, relieved only by the King's good deeds, and the radiant future in both this world and the next. The memorable deeds of His Majesty are five in number. First and foremost is his constitution of a council of four under-secretaries of State, having collective and individual responsibility under the presidency of his Viceroy; the second is his establishment of a budget; the third, the assessment of the Government's assets and liabilities; the fourth, the concentration of all revenue in a central Treasury and its allotment to various defined objects; and, fifthly, measures of economy in the personnel and expenditure of Government departments. These are not the first proofs which His Majesty has given of his Islamic sincerity, his Arabic zeal, and his devotion to his people, but they now effectively discharge his conscience of his obligations towards Allah and the country. In another extract which is also enclosed, from the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 27th November, the editor deems it worthy of glorification and praise that His Majesty has also commanded the reduction of his personal expenses to an exceeding degree as a further proof of his democratic principles.

4. All this has meant a lot of work for the only Under-Secretary of State in action, Fuad Bey Hamza, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin having returned to Riyadh. He is naturally elated by the success of his efforts to break the Abdullah Suleiman régime, create a budget, and constitute a central organ of responsibility and

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

control. It is still too soon to say that the reforms will work, however. There is such a remarkable lack of adequate men and money, and so little prospect of supplementing either deficiency, that they will certainly have a hard struggle to survive. Pessimism is general. Few believe that the creation of a budget and the establishment of a Treasury under a bankrupt of 35, whom there was not enough money to send as first secretary to The Hague, offer any guarantee of honest or capable financial management. Various and curious arrangements are being come to with the more pushing of the Government's creditors. The budget is to date from the 12th December (the 1st Shaban) but no figures are given, promised or even surmised. When the dust of all this unwonted activity settles, it will probably simply be seen that the landmarks have shifted but the desert is much the same.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 237/164/25]

No. 2.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 15, 1932.)

(No. 486.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 19, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 251 of the 18th December, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the Hejazi Government's communiqué of the 14th December, relative to the negotiations between Hejaz-Nejd and Yemen regarding the Asir frontier, with special reference to the recognition by Ibn Saud of the Imam's right to Mount Arwa. A copy of this communiqué was forwarded to the Legation on the 14th December, the date of issue, under cover of an unnumbered memorandum of a purely formal nature.

2. Mount Arwa has been mentioned on previous occasions in connexion with the frontier dispute. The name would appear to apply to the position or positions occupied by the Imam last August or early in September, when, according to Fuad Bey, his troops advanced at Jabal Razih. The locality may, presumably, be identified with the Arua, shown in the contoured 1: 253,440 map of South-West Arabia, "Saada" section, as a village lying 12 miles up the valley in which Sada is situated, and definitely on the southerly side of a watershed, which may well mark a *de facto* boundary between Yemen and Asir. Razih, which is shown on some maps as a mountain, here appears as a village near the crest of Khaulan-ash-Sham and on what would appear to be the Yemeni side of it. The maps show this massif as standing 50 miles from the sea and due east of Jizan.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's representative at Rome, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, and the Political Resident at Aden, with copies of my telegram under reference and an explanation of the reference.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Official Proclamation.

(Translation.)

THE representatives of the Government of His Majesty the King met those of the Imam Yehya on the 25th Jumada-ath-Thani, 1350 (the 6th November, 1931), at a place called an-Nadhir, near Mount Arw, which was the point in dispute between the two sides. The representatives negotiated regarding the withdrawal of the Yamani troops from Mount Arw, which the latter had occupied as far as the original [*sic*] frontier line, but they could not arrive at a settlement acceptable to both parties owing to insistence of the Yamani representatives on remaining in the places captured by the Yamani troops at Arw and to the

refusal of the representatives of the Government of His Majesty the King to surrender that region of the mountain as it is within the limits of the Idrisi territory. When matters between the representatives had reached a deadlock and each party had referred the matter to its Government, telegraphic messages were exchanged between His Majesty the King and the Imam Yehya, with the result that the latter requested His Majesty the King to arbitrate in the dispute and to settle it in whatever manner His Majesty thought fit. Wherefore, His Majesty, who wished the dispute to be settled by peaceful means, and bloodshed avoided, and who desired to see co-operation prevailing amongst the Arabs, could not but telegraph to His Highness the Imam his judgment against himself (Ibn Saud), namely, the surrender of Mount Arw to the Yemen in settlement of the difficulty. His Highness the Imam telegraphed in reply, accepting that judgment. Both parties then gave instructions to their representatives to consider other minor matters concerning frontier questions and the determination of the allegiance to one side or the other of tribes residing (on the frontier) between the two countries. The difficulty is, therefore, settled in this way, and strong friendly relations have been established between His Majesty the King and His Highness the Imam Yahia on firm foundations, please God Almighty.

Dated, Sha'ban 4, 1350.

(December 14, 1931.)

[E 165/165/25]

No. 3.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 11, 1932.)

(No. 492.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 28, 1931.

SINCE my return to Jedda on the 15th December, I have endeavoured to obtain a general view of the economic and financial situation in this country. Although I can add little to the information already in your possession, I think it worth while to attempt a comprehensive picture of what I find after an absence of five months. In drawing it I have not had the advantage of any contact with high Government circles, for, as you know, the King remains at Riyadh and most of his advisers have been summoned thither, including Fuad Bey Hamza, who left Mecca for Nejd almost simultaneously with my arrival in Jedda. The only Hejazi personage of any consequence whom I have seen is the rich old Governor of Jedda, who hardly counts as an official any longer. Though still to some extent employed as a consultant on great occasions, he now concerns himself little with the current affairs of his office, so that his outlook is less that of a Government servant than of a merchant. It is no secret that, as a business man and an important creditor of the Government, he views the situation in the country with anxiety and ill-concealed hostility to the present régime.

2. It is generally agreed that the economic position in the country as a whole could hardly be worse. The merchants in Jedda and Mecca have been increasingly embarrassed during the past two years. Of late, they have had to cope not only with depression in trade, but with Government demands for contributions in money or in kind, extorted ostensibly on loan but without any definite prospect of repayment of the money or payment for the goods. Some carry large stocks (*e.g.*, of rice) owing to over-importation earlier this year and in 1930. Monetary crises elsewhere have created a feeling of uncertainty, the net result of which is to create further depression, although there have been passing effects of a contrary kind, *e.g.*, the abandonment of the gold standard by His Majesty's Government and consequent depreciation of the rupee gave a temporary fillip to the import trade from India. The prices of most imported goods, reckoned in gold, have risen considerably during my absence, though those of local food-stuffs appear to be fairly steady.

3. I am assured that among the tribes, and especially those in the north of the Hejaz, the utmost misery prevails. It is impossible to sift the information, but it is said that, what with the reaction of world conditions, manifested more

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particularly in the greatly reduced pilgrimage, and the demands of the Government for military purposes, there has been a great depletion of live-stock. I hear of a reduction in the number of camels and of sheep and goats being sold off at ludicrously small prices. Attention is drawn to the influx of half-starved Bedouin into the larger towns, especially, perhaps, Medina, and to the frequent spectacle of hungry tribesmen collecting at the halts on the main road from Jedda to that place. In August I was inclined to doubt the tales of actual starvation, which, it will be remembered, were related by the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London, among others. Early in September the Mecca newspaper "Umm-al-Qura," a Government-inspired organ, thought it worth while to contradict a report of famine in the Hejaz which had been circulated in India. In view of what I now hear, I can no longer disregard the reiterated statements made to me regarding hunger and increased mortality. To give one example, possibly exaggerated, I am told of Bedouin dying in Medina at the rate of thirty-five a day.

4. There is little or no prospect of relief being afforded by the 1932 pilgrimage. Some months ago I thought that the number of overseas pilgrims might attain the 1931 figure of about 40,000, though it was unlikely to exceed it. The Government have exerted themselves to stimulate the flow by propaganda, including the announcement of reduced charges and an almost firm promise that Pilgrimage Day will fall on a Friday. Nevertheless, it now looks as though the total number of overseas pilgrims may be nearer 20,000 than 40,000. It is too soon to make definite estimates, as the number of Indians and Egyptians is always doubtful up to a very short time before the great day, which should fall on or about the 15th April next year. Up to the present, however, only 2,500 pilgrims have arrived from the Dutch East Indies, always first in the field. The Netherlands Legation surmises that this represents about half the total for the season, which would thus be about 5,000 as compared with about 16,000 this year.

5. Hopes are still founded on the possible development of new resources, the recently discovered or rediscovered water, petroleum and gold. The American expert, Mr. Twitchell, followed the procession of high officials to Riyadh on the 15th December. The one concrete result of his efforts so far has been the erection of an undoubtedly fine and happily cheap American windmill at the Waziria wells some miles from Jedda, and some quite useful work on the old conduits connecting them with the town. It seems uncertain whether the water is to be used to supply Jedda or for agricultural purposes. Of the gold and petroleum I know nothing new nor have I heard any more of the separate proposal to employ Swedish experts to investigate the petroleum.

6. I turn to the financial situation of the Government. Mr. Hope Gill has kept you very fully informed on this subject in a series of despatches ending with his No. 482 of the 13th December. I need not therefore go into the details of the reform schemes which have been so greatly advertised. The general opinion is that, even if revenue prospects were steadier and even if Ibn Saud had men capable of running a rational financial system, the scheme has come too late. The revenue from direct taxation of pilgrims must necessarily diminish. There must be a further decline in customs revenue owing to the falling off of pilgrims and general depression. In his despatch No. 346 of the 29th August Mr. Hope Gill gave figures from a well-informed source showing that the customs receipts had fallen from nearly £1,200,000 in the lunar year ending about the 8th June, 1929, to less than £900,000 in that ending about the 18th May, 1931. One of my more pessimistic informants puts the figure as low as £400,000 this year. This may be an underestimate, but I doubt whether a customs revenue of more than half a million can be counted on for the year ending next May. The customs receipts, such as they are, might be used as security for a foreign loan, but only if the lenders could rely on some more or less independent control being established and on a greater prospect of durability than the Saudian régime at present offers. As you are aware, the negotiations with the Dutch Bank broke down and there seems to be no longer any likelihood of a loan being obtained from any European source on commercial lines. Contradictory rumours are in circulation regarding the relations between the Government here and Soviet Russia, which might alone engage in trade or even finance on uneconomic lines. The Russian Minister went on long leave a couple of months ago and may not return, though he is officially due back in April. He has been temporarily replaced by a non-Moslem from Leningrad, a man of intelligence and I gather

some importance in Soviet circles. This gentleman, M. Horace Salkind, is very much out for information, but he cannot go in person to Mecca as the Minister used to do. My impression is that, although the Russians have brought off the coup of selling benzine and petroleum on credit and although there are other Russian goods in the market, *e.g.*, matches, there is little big business doing between the Soviets and the Hejazi Government.

7. The proposal to supplement the reform scheme by employing a European adviser still holds the field. I am told that M. Jacobs, the manager of the Dutch Bank here, now on leave, was offered the post at a salary of £1,000 a year. It was subsequently offered to another Dutchman. It is not yet certain how he has reacted, but the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires thinks it unlikely that he will accept, especially as the present idea is said to be to get someone to undertake the reorganisation of the finances without fixed remuneration, but with the prospect of a fat present from the King when he has accomplished his task.

8. Meanwhile, the reform scheme is there for all to see and to study as far as they can do so without any information as to the budget which has been adopted. The revenue, *x*, is to be divided into percentages assigned to current expenditure, floating debt, reserve and extraordinary expenditure including apparently betterment schemes. The new budget is to operate as from the first day of the current lunar month, *i.e.*, about the 9th December. From this it looks as though the large arrears of salaries due on that date were to go into floating debt, not a very practicable arrangement, if it is contemplated, having regard to the penury among officials.

9. I take the opportunity of giving some account of the repercussion in the Hejaz of the sterling crisis, following on the local currency crisis described in the despatches which I wrote in the spring and early summer. It will be remembered that early in the year the Government concentrated its efforts on an attempt to maintain the recognised elements in the local currency at the official rates, *viz.*, £1 gold = 10 silver riyals = 220 piastres nickel current, and that this attempt broke down as regards the gold-silver parity, although silver did not slump quite as badly as might have been expected. In my despatch No. 286 of the 14th July, I forwarded a communiqué defining to some extent the monetary policy on the basis of maintaining the above rates and fixing corresponding rates for other currencies in general use, which were to be still tolerated, including the Maria Theresa dollar and the rupee. These decisions produced no effect as against market conditions and the communiqué is now mainly of historical interest only. When the United Kingdom went off the gold standard, the curious position arose that the Hejaz possessed an official gold currency in the shape of English sovereigns side by side with its own silver. The Hejazi Government were as incapable as most people of understanding the implications of such a situation, much less devising a policy to deal with it. On the 16th October they announced a prohibition of the export of gold, except by permission of the Government (see Mr. Hope Gill's despatch No. 404 of the 19th October). It was subsequently announced that the authorities empowered to grant permits for the export of gold were the customs authorities and that detailed instructions, which I have not seen, would be issued later. I understand that the principle was to allow gold to leave the country only on a guarantee being given that an equivalent quantity of goods would be imported within three months. Apart from this prohibition, the currency situation was allowed to work itself out under the influence of market conditions. For a time, it was possible in certain transactions, for gold and sterling to be treated as equivalent, but this could obviously be neither general nor lasting. Gold tended to become scarce in the local market. Sterling and Egyptian notes came into increasing use. The respective values, as expressed in riyals, adapted themselves more or less to European exchange conditions, gold at a high premium and the various paper issues at rates determined by their relation to sterling with slight local variations resulting presumably from demand, supply and native ideas as to the confidence they might inspire. At the time of writing the approximate rates in the bazaars here are as follows:—

£ gold = 17½ riyals.
£ sterling = 12½ riyals.
£ Egyptian = 13 riyals.
19 rupees = £1 gold.

10. I can best complete this account of the currency situation by giving a string of isolated facts, not all of which I can interpret, as follows:—

- (a) As already stated gold has tended to disappear from the market. This is in part attributed to hoarding. It is possible that some has been sent to Riyadh, where the King is believed by some to be accumulating a reserve of treasure. Gold has also been taken off the market by the Dutch Bank, which for several weeks past has been buying. This bank normally sends a shipment of gold to Europe after the pilgrimage. Its present policy of buying may be due to a desire on the part of the head office to hold part of their gold reserve in Jedda. Fluid gold is required for various local purposes and the depletion has been sufficiently marked to produce a recent enquiry by a firm here for a quotation for gold sovereigns from abroad delivered in Jedda.
- (b) The Soviet Legation here has been selling sterling notes in considerable quantities. The origin of the notes and the object of the Legation are obscure. Fears have been expressed lest the notes should not be all genuine, but I have not heard it seriously suggested so far that any of the notes here have been forged.
- (c) When the announcement on monetary policy sent home in my above-mentioned despatch No. 286 of the 14th July was made, it was the policy of the Hejazi Government to bolster up the riyal by generalising its use in other parts of Ibn Saud's dominions, like Nejd and Asir, though it was not hoped to oust the Maria Theresa dollar at a stroke. This policy has been pursued by introducing riyals into Nejd for use in out payments, *e.g.*, it was said that Ibn Saud intended to give his largesse to the tribes this year in Hejazi silver, and a plan was apparently devised for creating in Nejd a network of stalls to retail goods bought or borrowed in the Hejazi towns, the transactions to be effected in riyals only. The latter part of the plan is said to have been defeated by local Nejd opposition, with the result that the goods had to be stored or sold wholesale. Riyals, though put into circulation in Nejd, are very unpopular there, partly because the merchants complain that they are no use to them in Koweit and Bahrein. Their gold value in Nejd is consequently much lower than in the Hejaz, though information as to the actual rates are conflicting. One informant, the pessimist, says that they went some little time ago as low as 30 to the £, with the result, he adds, that the King in his anger confiscated the goods of twelve Riyadh merchants and closed down their shops.
- (d) The Government have stultified their previous policy of trying to keep riyals at 10 to the £ gold by their own recent attitude. Where possible they pay them out at that rate, but they accept them only at their market value in gold. This is perhaps reasonable in the case of telegraph charges, having regard to the necessity for providing for external settlements. The same rule is, however, applied in other cases, notably that of customs duty. Unfortunately for the financial authorities they have not been able to carry to its logical conclusion their plan of having it both ways, *i.e.*, paying at 10 and collecting at gold rate. In order to clear off debts to certain commercial houses, they have had to agree to take only a portion of the duty on new imports in cash and to allow the remainder to be written off against the debts. Some, at least, of the commercial houses, *e.g.*, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Company, have successfully asserted the principle that, for this purpose, the writing off should be on the basis of £ gold to £ gold, instead of at the customs rate for riyals, which fluctuates round the fluctuating market rate.
- (e) A curious transaction came to my notice accidentally at Port Sudan. I found that the Hejazi postal authorities had cleared off their debt to the Eastern Telegraph Company up to last May and had subsequently made a single payment which was understood to be on account of the June account. This took the form of a cheque in sterling drawn by Crédit Lyonnais, Paris, on Crédit Lyonnais,

London, on the 26th October last to the order of the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs and endorsed by the latter at Mecca on the 8th December to the Eastern Telegraph Company. I am at a loss to understand how this cheque was bought and can only surmise that it may have something to do with Abdurrahman Qusaibi's activities in Europe.

11. I ought perhaps to apologise for treating so many diverse subjects in a single report. I could not otherwise achieve my object of depicting the general depression and disorganisation which prevail, both for the sake of their intrinsic interest and because of their bearing on the political future. I shall, in later despatches, again deal with the individual subjects separately. In view of the more general character of the present paper, I am sending copies of this to the Department of Overseas Trade, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Transjordan and Iraq, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 166/62/25]

No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 11, 1932.)

(No. 493.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 29, 1931.

I HAVE attempted in my despatch No. 492 of the 28th December to give a general view of the economic and financial situation in this country. I have now the honour to submit some account of the political situation and the conjectures to which it gives rise in connexion with Ibn Saud's foreign policy. The data are meagre, and I am even more hampered in this case than in my endeavour to sum up the economic situation by the fact that I have had no real contact with the Hejazi Government since my return to Jedda on the 15th December. I should, indeed, reserve this report for a later occasion were it not for its bearing on the possibility of trouble on the northern frontiers of the Hejaz.

2. When Ibn Saud went to Riyadh about the beginning of July he was completely "fed up" with the Hejaz and its problems. He doubtless felt, moreover, that the affairs of Nejd required his personal attention. It was significant that before going there he made one spectacular gesture designed to placate extreme Wahhabi opinion by deferring to the opinion of the ulema of Nejd on the impropriety of celebrating annually his accession to the Hejazi Throne. At the same time, he gave another indication of a swing towards the extremists by reviving the machinery for the enforcement of strict religious principles. He did not abandon his schemes for certain improvements on European lines to which fanatics might take exception, like the wireless project. Nevertheless, in the published record of the proceedings of the "National Conference" held in June stress was laid on the principle that economic development should be effected by the instrumentality of Moslems, and the King would not allow the Marconi expert, M. Boucicault, to go to Riyadh to erect the wireless station there.

3. While the King, on the eve of his departure for Nejd, was thus showing himself not only a good Moslem, but a good Wahhabi, he had not despaired of European assistance. In his June conversations with me he made a strong appeal for a good understanding on all subjects with Great Britain, with special reference to his hope of getting His Majesty's Government to give their patronage to himself rather than to the Hashimites and the feasibility of inducing a British bank to give him financial assistance. He took steps to explore the possibility of raising the wind in other European quarters also, notably in Holland. He engaged in dealings with the Bolshevik representative, but there is nothing as yet to show that he was prepared to give much more to the Soviets than the privilege of supplying him with benzine on easy terms, and possibly some relaxation of the restrictions on their trade.

4. The situation in the Hejaz, bad in June, has grown much worse since then. The towns have every reason for discontent, the tribes for disaffection.

[7797]

It is not possible to speak with equal confidence of Nejd, but it is rumoured that there also there is much dissatisfaction. Apart from the usual tales of trouble with the tribes, there are specific allegations of discontent owing to oppressive taxation, non-payment of the wages of Nejd soldiers employed in the neighbourhood of the frontier, *e.g.*, at Tabuk, levies in kind on merchants, attempts to impose the use of the unpopular Hejazi riyal, and the reforms instituted in Hasa by the mission of At-Tawil.

5. Such is the internal situation with which Ibn Saud has to cope, as he sits tight at Riyadh, attempting to deal with the affairs of the Hejaz from a distance with the aid of the advisers summoned in turn to the Nejd capital; uncertain, perhaps, of his hold on Nejd itself, a country which he can only rule with a strong hand and largess, and the population of which are so little impressed by kingly majesty in itself that they are said still to use in speaking to him the address: "Ya, Abdul Aziz!" The King must realise by now that there is little chance of money from Europe or of the kind of positive support from Great Britain for which he begged in June—no British bank, no air force, no backing in his latent struggle with the Hashimites. Over all lies the shadow of a pilgrimage much smaller than that of last year, and worse times to come in consequence.

6. It cannot be wondered at that some observers expect the King to seek salvation in one or both of two things, adventure over the border, or an agreement with the Soviets. He has engaged in military preparations, as he is always doing. The tribes, it is said, have been encouraged to hope, or threatened with the necessity of preparing for Jihad. For a time it was thought that the objective was the Yemen, but since my return it has been announced that the King has composed his difference with the Imam in a spirit of piety and love of peace in Arabia. The observers whom I have just mentioned are all the more disposed to think that he is preparing an onslaught on Transjordan, with the object of gratifying his mingled hatred and fear of the Amir Abdullah and gaining access, perhaps, to richer lands than his own. I cannot myself believe that he would be so foolish as to engage openly in an enterprise which would bring him into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government, but the possibility cannot be dismissed in the case of a man, strong-willed and ambitious, who is already in hard straits and may be desperate in a few months. There is the alternative possibility of the same object being pursued less openly by the promotion of authorised raids.

7. Assuming for the sake of hypothesis that Ibn Saud has some such object in view, three questions, among many others, call for special consideration: What financial resources could he employ for the purposes of his adventure? What is the extent of the reported military preparations? On what outside assistance or sympathy could he rely, from the Soviets or otherwise? I will glance at these in order.

8. No one knows what reserve the King has at Riyadh, despite the impoverishment of the country and the Hejazi Treasury. It has been suggested that he has been collecting treasure there, perhaps not gold or not all gold, but in other forms, *e.g.*, riyals or jewellery. War taxes are said to have been levied on the Hejazi tribes and on the Nejd townsfolk, 10 riyals a head, it is said, from the tribesmen, 400,000 riyals from those in the area round Taif, and further sums from those in the north. According to one account, the latter represented to the Amir Feisal their miserable poverty and offered men with riding camels instead of cash, an offer which the Amir undertook to refer to the King, but which the latter was thought unlikely to accept owing to his lack of confidence in the Hejazi tribesmen. Another tale is that the merchants of Anaiza and Buraida are owed £60,000 and have little chance of payment, though eight of them made their way to Mecca to ventilate their grievance, despite the efforts of the Governor of Medina to prevent them from getting further than that place. I cannot pronounce on the probability or otherwise of the King having collected any substantial liquid reserve at Riyadh by the alleged exactions and other means, but Mr. Hope Gill, who has followed developments during my absence, especially Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's financial policy, believes in it.

9. As regards the extent of the King's military preparations, I can again rely only on distorted rumours and a few items of fact. He has, of course, his garrisons on the frontier and in certain places not far from it, and he could obtain men from Nejd for a definite enterprise promising warfare and loot. Such

troops as there were in Jedda would appear to have been moved to Mecca almost in their entirety. I see in a report from the Political Agent at Bahrein, dated the 23rd November, that an informant newly arrived from the mainland had noted an unusual withdrawal of horsemen towards Nejd, and supposed that they might be intended for an attack on the Yemen. I quote with great reserve a report which has reached me here that the Polish engineer employed in the Government workshop at Mecca has been sent to recruit airmen in Poland. A good deal has been spent during the last year or more on military supplies. It is now said that 24,000 rifles have been repaired in the Mecca workshops, that there were recently 4,000 in hand which the mechanics were being pressed to repair without delay, and that further rifles were expected to be brought from the interior for the same purpose. It is also said that the Soviet representative has been offering rifles, with 1,200 cartridges each, at £2 10s. per rifle, *c.i.f.* Whether this be true or not, my informant, the Indian vice-consul, says that a friend of his who went some little time ago to the Soviet Legation to buy sterling chanced on one of the Al Fadhl family and other Nejdians engaged in inspecting various kinds of rifle.

10. The third question need not be dealt with at length. My Russian colleague here has always struck me as more interested in commerce than in politics, and I see nothing in his burst of activity last summer or its results up to date to make me alter that opinion. I can see the Soviets selling rifles or anything else to Ibn Saud on cheap and easy terms, but not at the present time backing him in a foreign adventure otherwise than by perhaps looking on genially at any attempt he might make to fish in troubled waters. I discard as fantastic a further suggestion by my principal informant that Russia might, in an endeavour to compass the destruction of the British position in the Middle East, draw Ibn Saud into a general alliance comprising Turkey and Persia. I feel that, if Ibn Saud contemplated further adventure, he would work, as he has always done, on his own expansive lines, a raider in the grand *condottiere* manner. There may be more to be said for suggestions that he has sought to gain Islamic sympathy through agents in countries like Transjordan, the Yemen and Hadhramaut, perhaps even further afield.

11. This is not intended to be an alarmist despatch. I am only too conscious that the basis of ascertained fact on which I have built is very slender. In my attempt to produce a balanced superstructure I may have given it too formidable an appearance. While writing I have had before me the extremely interesting paper by Major Fowle enclosed in Mr. Walton's letter to Mr. Rendel of the 18th November. It will be seen that, though Major Fowle pays me too great a compliment in suggesting that I know more about Ibn Saud than anyone else, my mind has been working on the same general lines as his. There is this difference: that looking at the King in the light of the most recent events, I suspect that the test of his success may come *before* he disappears from the scene, and I conceive tentatively the possibility of Ibn Saud himself, rather than his successor, being driven to the course suggested in paragraph 10 (b) of Major Fowle's memorandum, that of launching Wahhabi attacks on the surrounding unbelievers.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Transjordan and Iraq, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 314/314/25]

No. 5.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 20, 1932.

HEJAZI Minister, on instructions from his Government, has made representations regarding recent grant of refuge by His Majesty's Legation to so-called Royal slave, who is stated to have been one of two fugitives from house of Abdullah Suleiman and to have been presented to King by Ibn Musaid.

Please report briefly by telegraph.

[E 365/314/85]

No. 6.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 22, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 4. See my despatch No. 187, 1930, and minutes I wrote at home; also Clayton's conversation with Ibn Saud on 17th May, 1927, of which I was then unaware.

Man now in question claims to have been brought here on pilgrimage as a child many years ago. He was long with Ibn Musaid, who is related to King. He fled to Legation after living eighteen months in house of Abdullah Suleiman, whom he believed to be his master. Minister for Foreign Affairs explains that Abdullah Suleiman procures slaves for King and houses his surplus stock. He has conveyed to me King's assurance that slave is his property. I have accepted this, but said that question of scope of alleged agreement with Clayton must be decided by His Majesty's Government. I am in communication with Fuad regarding records of conversations in 1927.

I have hitherto recognised the probability of the existence of some understanding with Clayton, but held that it could only apply to slaves in actual possession of King or immediately related to princes. Ibn Saud contends that it applies to any slave who is his property.

Fuller report follows by saving telegram.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

[E 366/314/25]

No. 7.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, January 22, 1932.

MY telegram No. 10 of the 22nd January: Alleged Royal slave.

Short of creating an incident, I am unable to repatriate this slave without Ibn Saud's consent. The matter is therefore delicate.

To surrender him would mean an enlargement of the permanent scope of the dubious agreement. Moreover, I am unable to guarantee that the slave will not be punished, or even perhaps put to death. All my efforts to bluff the King have failed.

[E 404/122/91]

No. 8.

M. Fleuriau to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 27.)

PAR note en date du 23 décembre dernier, le Gouvernement britannique avait exprimé le désir de connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement français sur la suggestion faite par le Foreign Office et relative à la ratification de la Convention de Londres sur les phares de la mer Rouge.

En effet, par une note en date du 26 novembre 1931, le Foreign Office faisait savoir qu'il ne lui était pas possible d'engager des négociations avec l'Administration générale des Phares de l'ex-Empire ottoman, au sujet du paiement en or de la rémunération stipulée à l'article 3 de la convention, avant que celle-ci n'eût été ratifiée par au moins quatre Puissances.

Le Gouvernement français a examiné avec grand soin la teneur de cette note. Il ne lui paraît malheureusement pas possible de modifier le point de vue exprimé antérieurement dans sa note du 20 novembre 1931.

L'Administration générale des Phares de l'ex-Empire ottoman, en effet, n'est pas en mesure d'assurer l'exécution de la Convention de Londres, qui a prévu la couverture des dépenses d'exploitation et celle de la rémunération convenue, avant que ne lui ait été confirmée la garantie de change prévue dans l'accord.

Dans ces conditions, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique aux Affaires étrangères sur les démarches que l'Administration des Phares de l'ex-Empire ottoman se propose de faire auprès du Board of Trade, en vue d'aboutir à un arrangement qui, tout en assurant la garantie de change, permettra une prochaine mise en œuvre de la Convention de Londres.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 janvier 1932.*

[E 366/314/25]

No. 9.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 27, 1932.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 10 and 11 of the 22nd January: Alleged Royal slave.

Although I appreciate your difficulty, the question is of very great importance and His Majesty's Government are unable to yield.

I do not ignore the assurance contained in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 10, but the facts speak for themselves and, so far as we can trace, afford no evidence justifying the man's return. He appears to be a kind of probationer on loan, and not one of the King's personal slaves (see "Eastern" Volume, Part XX, p. 78, paragraph 1).

The Hejazi Government should therefore be informed of the view which His Majesty's Government are obliged to take.

The matter is so important in the eyes of His Majesty's Government that, had the senior naval officer not been at present at Jedda, I should have asked the Admiralty to despatch a vessel to embark the slave. As it is, arrangements should at once be made with the senior naval officer for the man to be embarked in His Majesty's ship on your departure for Palestine. Although I realise that practical difficulties may be involved in the man's transfer, I give you the fullest discretion.

The course of action outlined in the immediately preceding paragraph will presumably not be notified to the Hejaz-Nejd Government, but I leave this point also to your discretion.

[E 463/463/25]

No. 10.

Sir John Simon to Sir G. Clerk (Anqora).

(No. 41.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 28, 1932.

FERIT BEY called this afternoon to tell me that the Turkish Government had been asked by the Government of the Hejaz to lend pilots and mechanics for the development of their air service, and to send a military mission to give similar help to the Hejazi army. Before replying to this request the Turkish Government, having regard to the very friendly relations existing between themselves and us, desired to inform us of the request and to consult us about it. The Ambassador indicated that Turkey would not wish to act in the matter otherwise than in accordance with our suggestion, though he made no promise to this effect. He observed that his Government, like ours, was sincerely anxious to promote peace in that part of the world in which we were both so closely interested.

I thanked the Ambassador for his communication, and promised that he should hear from me on the subject very shortly.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 465/314/25]

No. 11.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, January 28, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 7 of the 27th January: Alleged Royal slave.

I consider that the course of the discussion up to date renders it imperative that the Hejazi Government should be informed both of your decision and of the intention to embark the man on board the sloop. Rather than smuggle him on board or use force, I should, in any case, prefer to follow usual procedure and put him on board through port office.

In officially notifying your decision to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I have therefore added that I am taking steps to carry it into effect and requesting that the local authorities may be notified. The commander of the sloop is being consulted as to the action to be taken after adequate time has been given for the note to be delivered to-night and passed on to the King by wireless. There is a possibility that a friendly settlement could be reached if I could be informed at once whether, if the slave had been one of the King's soldiers or private servants, he would have been returned. Should you consider it necessary to await the receipt of the full report in my Saving telegram No. 1, I could, however, leave this point open.

Although every effort will be made to secure the man's embarkation without serious incident, I should be glad to know whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to authorise the landing of an armed party from the sloop in the event of its proving essential to make a show of force.

[E 465/314/25]

No. 12.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 13 of 28th January: Alleged Royal slave.

Hejaz-Nejd Minister was informed on 28th January in sense of paragraphs 1 and 2 of my telegram No. 7 of 27th January.

It is desirable to make no admission regarding Sir G. Clayton's supposed undertaking. It would therefore be preferable to avoid any implication that man would have been returned had he been King's private servant or soldier. If, however, discussion on this point cannot be avoided, you should concentrate on contention that, whatever scope of alleged undertaking may have been, there could be no question of its applying to present case. Distinction between King's "property" and King's "personal service" has already been made in conversation with Hejaz-Nejd Minister.

Answer to last paragraph will be sent to-morrow after consultation with Admiralty.

[E 491/314/25]

No. 13.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 29, 1932.

MY telegram No. 13

Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphed last night refusal to accept your decision or to authorise local authorities to permit departure of slave. I replied this morning that I was sending him to sloop to-day, and that if local authorities raise difficulty responsibility would lie with Hejazi Government. This elicited long further telegram repeating accusation of breach of agreement and refusal to interfere with any action of local authorities to prevent illegal embarkation. Minister for Foreign Affairs threw back responsibility on to us, and said that Hejazi Government considered me personally responsible for precipitating incident and for the future consequences. He said that it would be a further and

still greater aggression to bring sloop into the matter, and expressed hope that I would not make the situation more critical by doing so. Hejazi Government reserved all rights to protest and claim reparation.

I had already arranged to send man to port office in charge of Mr. Hope Gill, who was to embark him in Legation launch unless forced to desist by active opposition. I adhered to this plan. It was carried out without difficulty. Police had apparently had some instructions, but were not alert enough to interfere in time before man was in launch and away. I then telegraphed to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating explicitly that His Majesty's Government did not consider the particular case to be covered by any existing agreement. I said that I had carried out decision of His Majesty's Government, to whom I was responsible.

See my immediately following telegram.

[E 492/314/25]

No. 14.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, January 29, 1932.

MY telegram No. 14 of the 29th January: Alleged Royal slave.

Although this ends the incident, you will realise that, since he claims the slave and was one of the parties to the alleged agreement, King Ibn Saud is very deeply involved personally. Extreme resentment on his part may therefore be regarded as certain, both against His Majesty's Government and against myself. He will regard me as personally responsible for the whole affair.

It may be noted that in dealing with the latest phase of the question the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Fuad Bey Hamza apparently did not require to consult Ibn Saud before taking action.

[E 622/314/25]

No. 15.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 1. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Jedda, January 22, 1932.*

MY telegrams Nos. 10 and 11.

Following is full account:—

Two men, Harun and Bakhit, fled separately from Abdullah Suleiman's house to Legation in second half of December. It was intended to manumit them and send them to Port Sudan on 26th December. Local authorities objected on ground they were Royal slaves.

Harun claimed with apparent truth to be a Nigerian who had come on pilgrimage in 1930 or 1931 with a master and to have been sold by his master in this country. I made strong representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs by telephone on 24th December, and opposition to man's departure on 26th December was withdrawn. Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted in note of 26th December that Harun was a free person wrongfully enslaved, but requested me to hand over Bakhit to the local authorities as being a Royal slave. He said that fact of his having been with Abdullah Suleiman was immaterial as latter bought all King's slaves.

Upon this I personally questioned Bakhit, avoiding leading questions as far as possible. He stated that he knew nothing of his parentage, but believed from hearsay that he had been born at a place in French Equatorial Africa. He could not remember any time at which he had not been Moslem. He had been brought to Jedda as a very young child by a Sudanese named Muhammad. He might have been about 6 years of age. They arrived ten days before the pilgrimage and Muhammad took him to Mecca. After pilgrimage time he was captured by Bedouin while playing with other boys outside Jedda. Captors took him to Yemen and sold him. Some years later his master brought him to Mecca, and he passed into hands of a new master, who after five years sent him with his family

to Medina. When Medina fell to Ibn Saud he was made prisoner, and King's son sent him to Ibn Musaid of Hail, who is related not very closely to King. After six years with Ibn Musaid, latter sent him as present to Abdullah Suleiman about eighteen months before he fled to Legation. Since then he had been slave of Abdullah Suleiman and had nothing to do with King, to whom Abdullah Suleiman sent direct any slaves acquired for King's account. He had fled because when he asked his master for anything it was refused.

Bakhit's story was straightforward, convincing and precise except as regards dates. I sent copies of my *questionnaire* and his replies to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 31st December. I had conversation with Fuad Hamza, acrimonious at one stage, but afterwards friendly, on 16th January. He maintained that I must accept King's word and invoked alleged agreement with Clayton. I said I had no record except mention of King's standpoint in record of conversations of 16th May, 1927. I questioned him as to nature and scope of agreement with Clayton. I urged that King should waive any claim. I said that my only alternative otherwise would be to submit case to you, as I could not admit that person permanently housed by Abdullah Suleiman could be considered "private servant or soldier" of King. I suggested that representations might well be made through Hejazi Minister in London, especially if exception were taken to my conduct.

Short further conversation on 18th January added nothing material except offer on Fuad's part to inform me privately of nature and scope of agreement. I suggested next day that matter could hardly be private between us as agreement had been invoked officially and had been brought to knowledge even of local authorities in Jedda. I received later two communications, one official and one personal, which he had already written on 18th January. Official note conveyed King's assurance that slaves in Abdullah Suleiman's possession did not belong to him, but to His Majesty, and that Bakhit had been sent by Ibn Musaid to King, who had ordered him to be left with Abdullah Suleiman, "the person who takes charge of any unwanted slaves or other property of His Majesty for future disposal." In view of this I was asked to return Bakhit "in accordance with the agreement concluded between His Majesty and Sir Gilbert Clayton during the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Jedda in the year 1927, and in which it is laid down that no slave belonging to His Majesty and seeking refuge in the premises of the British Legation will be accepted." Personal letter insisted that agreement with Clayton on slavery question was subject to understanding that slaves belonging to King would not be allowed to seek refuge in British Agency. No one had raised question of how to distinguish King's slaves, as it was known that King would not request restitution of slaves not his property. Fuad claimed that careful records had been made at the time, whereas British Mission had merely made summaries after the close of the proceedings. He quoted Arabic word used in record as meaning "belonging," and said that King had added the explanation that slaves belonging to him were of two kinds, "either servants or soldiers of ours."

I replied to official note yesterday, accepting without hesitation King's assurance that Bakhit, though resident with Abdullah Suleiman, belonged to His Majesty, but saying that more difficult question remained as to how Bakhit's case was affected by understanding between King and Clayton on question of slave trade and manumission, and that I must consult His Majesty's Government as to nature and scope of any arrangements then made, but not embodied in texts of treaty and attached letter. I said that, as Fuad had wished to deal with this unofficially, I was in communication with him with view to elucidating questions to be submitted to His Majesty's Government.

I made careful statement to Fuad this morning in course of long conversation. I said that I had accepted King's statement unreservedly on question of ownership, which was matter of his domestic concern. Question of arrangement which he believed to have been made with Clayton was international and King was in position of party to a negotiation as to results of which there was room for doubt. When question first engaged my attention in 1930 I had gone into it at home. His Majesty's Government had never formally instructed me to recognise existence of understanding and I could not commit them, but I had been in a position to assume its existence as a working hypothesis. I had since had it well in mind that I should not give asylum to slaves who actually formed part of the King's household or (though I was now uncertain whether this was

not too great an extension) of households of princes immediately related to him. Clayton's record showed maximum demand on morning of 16th May, 1927. I could not admit that term "private servants" included slaves not in King's actual service, but held in a reserve stock by Abdullah Suleiman. We agreed that I must await your views. I tried to tie Fuad down to closer definition of terms of understanding and date, but he was rather elusive in regard to details.

I regret that affair should have assumed these proportions. I feel personally that Clayton must have made some reassuring statement to King on afternoon of 16th May, 1927, but I am most reluctant to accept position that I must hand over slaves having no apparent connexion with King, whom latter declares to be his property. If you think it desirable on grounds of policy to concede point, I might arrange to surrender Bakhit and ask King then to place him at my disposal. He is so keen on establishing his own principle that he might agree to this. Something of sort was apparently arranged in 1929, when a slave belonging to a man in retinue of Emir Feisal took refuge and was left to Mr. Bond to dispose of after formal surrender to Emir. I can trace no other case of surrender by agency of a Royal slave, though Fuad says that Mr. Bird refused asylum in one case.

[E 735/314/25]

No. 16.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 13, 1932.

SIR A. RYAN'S despatch No. 62 of 1st February: Slaves.

Fuad is no ordinary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. All sources of information agree that he gave standing order to kill Bakhit on sight outside Legation, but whether on his own authority or Ibn Saud's orders is not known.

Other slaves mentioned were embarked without difficulty on 6th February.

Another Sudanese recently sold in Jedda for £18 gold has taken refuge in Legation and will be repatriated on 20th February.

[E 793/314/25]

No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 58.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 29, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 13 of the 28th January, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the following correspondence relative to the slave Bakhit:—

- (1) Translation of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of the 26th December, written after I had telephoned a vigorous message to the Ministry on the 24th December regarding the refusal of the local authorities here to consent to the departure of the two men in question.
- (2) Copy of my note of the 31st December, with its enclosure.
- (3) Translation of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of the 18th January.
- (4) Translation of Fuad Bey's personal letter to me of the 19th January.
- (5) Copy of my note of the 21st January, after sending which I had the further conversation with Fuad Bey recorded in the penultimate paragraph of my Savigram No. 1 of the 22nd January.
- (6) Copy of note which I sent to Mecca by post on the 28th January immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 7 of the 27th January, Fuad Bey having left Jedda earlier in the week.
- (7) Translation of telegram from Minister for Foreign Affairs sent on the evening of the 28th January.
- (8) Copy of telegram sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

2. The above is the whole of the correspondence with the Hejazi Government up to this morning. I have given in my Savigram No. 1 of the 22nd January a sufficient account of my conversations with Fuad Bey while he

was still in Jedda. It is only necessary to add, in view of later developments, that, in my conversation of the 16th January, I told him that I might have chosen the course of taking Bakhit to the quay for embarkation under my own auspices and thereby risking an incident, but that I did not intend to do so as I preferred to seek an amicable settlement, or, failing that, to submit the case to you.

3. I will report separately on the procedure at present followed in connexion with the embarkation of slaves manumitted by the Legation.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Mecca, December 26, 1931 (Sha'ban 17, 1350).

WITH reference to the two slaves, Harun and Bakhit, who took refuge at your Legation a few days ago, I am glad to inform you that His Majesty's Government had issued strict orders prohibiting any purchase of slaves brought from abroad into this country. They accordingly consider that the purchase of Harun, which took place during the year 1349, is contrary to their orders; he therefore, in these circumstances, has become free and is in liberty to stay in the Hejaz or to go whether he wishes.

With regard to the other, Bakhit, he is one of His Majesty the King's slaves, and this is not disproved by the fact that he was bought through (*lit.*, from the hand of) Ibn Suliman, for all His Majesty's purchases are made through him. I request your Excellency, therefore, to be good enough to hand him over to Sheikh Ali Taha, Assistant Kaimakam of Jedda, so that he may be sent here at an early date. Instructions have been given to him (Ali Taha) accordingly.

FEISUL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

Your Royal Highness,

(After compliments.)

Jedda, December 31, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 26th December and to thank you for the measures taken to overcome the objection at first raised by the local authorities at Jedda to the departure of the Nigerian British subject, Harun.

I attach great importance to the case of the other man, Bakhit. I have therefore personally examined him, and I enclose a statement showing his replies to the questions put by me. The local authorities here evidently misunderstood my difficulty in regarding this man as a Royal slave. It was not due to the mere fact of his having passed through the hands of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, but to the fact that he had apparently been for a prolonged period a member of Sheikh Abdullah's household.

It seems to me that there may be some mistake as to the identity of Bakhit, similar to that which arose last year when certain slaves who had taken refuge in this Legation were erroneously confused with others who had disappeared from the household of His Majesty the King. Even if there be no such confusion in this case, it is of such a nature that I should find it difficult to surrender the man to the local authorities, as your Royal Highness requests me to do, without the sanction of my Government. I am prepared to obtain the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if your Royal Highness wishes me to do so, but, in view of the delicacy of the matter, I would suggest that I should first take an opportunity of discussing it with Sheikh Fuad Hamza, if, as I hope, he is likely to visit Jedda in the near future.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.

Principal Questions put to Bakhit by Sir A. Ryan on December 29, with his Answers to them, and Supplementary Questions put in the course of the Examination.

Question. What is your name?

Answer. Bakhit, son of Muhammad.

Q. Where were you born?

A. In the Sudan. I do not know in what place, but someone has told me that I was born in Baghirma.

Q. What do you know about your father and mother and about their religion?

A. I was brought here so young that I know nothing about my parents. Muhammad was the name of the man who brought me here. I know nothing about my father and my mother and I do not know what their religion was.

Q. How did you come to the Hejaz?

A. I came from Suakin to Jedda in a steamer.

Q. Who brought you to the Hejaz?

A. Muhammad brought me. I know nothing else about Muhammad. Muhammad came from a place in the Sudan far from Khartum.

Q. At what season did you come? Was it at pilgrimage time?

A. I came fifteen days before the pilgrimage time.

Q. What happened to you after you came to Jedda?

A. I was playing with some other boys near Kandara. Some Bedouin came and took me. They carried me off to Ganuna. They took me all the way by camel. They sold me to somebody in Ganuna. The name of the man who bought me was Ahmed-bin-Ghasin. I remained with him about three years and was all the time at Ganuna. After three years Ahmed brought me to Mecca and sold me to Shakir-abu-Jemal. I remained with Shakir in Mecca about five years. After that Shakir sent me to Medina with his family at the beginning of the war of Ibn Saud. Shakir himself stayed in Mecca. I stayed about one year in Medina with the family of Shakir. Then the Amir Muhammad, son of Ibn Saud, entered Medina and he took me. I remained with him three days. Then he sent me as a gift to Ibn Musaad at Hail. I remained with Ibn Musaad at Hail about six years. Ibn Musaad is the nephew of Ibn Jiluwi, who is in Hasa. Ibn Musaad is the Amir of Hail. After those six years Ibn Musaad sent me to Abdullah-bin-Suleiman at Mecca. I remained with Abdullah-bin-Suleiman about one year and a half. Then I came to Jedda, having escaped from my master. My master was not in Mecca when I ran away, but his brother Hamad-as-Suleiman was there.

Q. In whose house were you just before you came to the Legation?

A. I was in the house of Hamid-as-Suleiman. It is one house with the house of Abdullah. My master was Abdullah.

Q. How long had you been in that house?

A. I was in that house one year and a half.

Q. Did your master buy you from anyone else, or were you given to him as a present?

A. I was given to Abdullah as a present.

Q. Why did you leave your master?

A. I left my master because if I asked him for anything he refused it.

Q. They say that you are a slave of the King. What do you say?

A. I was not sent to the King. I do not know the King and he does not know me. I was never in the King's house. I was never in the house of any of the King's sons or brothers after the Amir Muhammad sent me to Hail.

Q. But they say that Abdullah-bin-Suleiman brings many slaves for the King, and that many of the slaves in the house of Abdullah-bin-Suleiman belong to the King. What do you say?

A. When Abdullah-bin-Suleiman brings slaves for the King he sends them immediately to the King and they are kept in the King's house. The slaves that are kept in the house of Abdullah-as-Suleiman belong to Abdullah-as-Suleiman.

Q. Do you know your age when you came from Suakin to Jedda?

A. I do not know at all my age. Some people tell me that my age was about 6 years.

Q. Were you always a Moslem as long as you remember?

A. I know myself as a Moslem, and I always pray.

Q. But sometimes children who are born in Africa are not Moslems and are made Moslems. If you were circumcised when you were a boy you would remember it, because it hurts.

A. It is true. When I came I was young and I did not know anything about myself. I do not remember anything about it or about being circumcised. When I came to Jedda with Muhammad just before the pilgrimage time we went to Mecca, and we came back to Jedda for about ten days, and then the Bedouin stole me while I was playing.

Enclosure 3 in No. 17.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation.)

Mecca, Ramadhan 10, 1350.

Your Excellency,

(January 18, 1932.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note dated 31st December (21st Sha'ban) regarding the male slave who sought refuge in the British Legation.

Since the writing of your note under reference, you have on two occasions spoken to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on this subject, the last occasion being on the 8th Ramadhan (16th January); he then informed you that he was studying the points which emerged from you not under reference in regard to Sheikh Abdullah-as-Suleiman's ownership of the slave, and that he was communicating with His Majesty the King in order to find out the truth.

I have just received an urgent telegram from His Majesty the King stating that the slaves placed in Abdullah-as-Suleiman's possession do not belong to him but are the property of His Majesty; and that the slave Bakhit, the subject of the present enquiry, was actually sent by Ibn Musaid as a present to His Majesty the King, who ordered that he should be left with Sheikh Abdullah-as-Suleiman, he being, as you are aware, the person who takes charge of any unwanted slave or other property of His Majesty for future disposal.

In view of this fact and in accordance with the agreement concluded between His Majesty and Sir Gilbert Clayton during the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Jedda in the year 1927, and in which it is laid down that no slave belonging to His Majesty and seeking refuge in the premises of the British agency, will be accepted, I trust that your Excellency will see no objection to returning the slave Bakhit to the local Government in order that he may be sent to us. I earnestly hope that you will appreciate this situation and will take steps to remedy it.

With highest respects,
FEISUL.

Enclosure 4 in No. 17.

Fuad Bey to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation.)

Mecca, Ramadhan 11, 1350.

Dear Sir Andrew,

(January 19, 1932.)

IN the official note which his Highness the Minister is sending you to-day, he replies to your official note concerning the case of the slave Bakhit, after it had been ascertained from His Majesty the King himself that the slave is the property of His Majesty.

You asked me on the day of our last meeting, Saturday last, about the nature and the scope of the agreement made on the day of the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda, concerning the refusal to allow His Majesty the King's slaves to take

refuge in the British agency. I have already informed you in the course of conversation that I was present only during the preliminary part of the negotiations and that my illness prevented me from attending the later stages.

I, however, know that, after His Majesty the King had absolutely refused to agree to allow the British consuls the right of manumitting slaves who should seek refuge of their own accord in the consulate, an agreement was reached by which His Majesty, at the pressing request of General Clayton, agreed to the continuance of the then state of affairs, provided that the British agent at Jedda should maintain the spirit (? of co-operation) displayed in remedying the position at that time, and on condition that it should be understood also that the slaves belonging to His Majesty the King would not be allowed to seek refuge in the British agency. No one at that time raised the question as to how the slaves belonging to His Majesty should be distinguished, for it was known that the King would not request the restitution of slaves who were not his property. No one discussed the details of this. His Majesty's statement, however, was written down at the time, in records which have been most carefully preserved by us—in contradistinction to the system employed by the British Mission whereby a summary of the proceedings was made after the meetings had closed. This statement in regard to slaves referred to "those who belong [*sic*] which as you know means 'belonging' (English word used), to His Majesty." His Majesty followed up this statement with an explanation to the effect that the slaves who belong to His Majesty are of two kinds: "either servant or soldier of ours."

From this you will see that the agreement, as we understand it, is a general agreement, to the effect that refuge shall be refused to slaves who belong to His Majesty the King, without any special conditions having been made concerning them.

I hope that this explanation will help you in your consideration of the way in which you may be able to solve the case of the slave Bakhit or any other case which may arise in future.

With highest respects, &c.
FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 5 in No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

Your Royal Highness,
(After Compliments.)

Jedda, January 21, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 10th Ramadhan (the 18th January) relative to the slave Bakhit, who took refuge in this Legation some weeks ago. Before this case arose, I had no knowledge of the special position of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman as regards the buying of slaves for His Majesty the King and their custody, a matter which your Royal Highness and the Under-Secretary of State have been good enough to explain to me. I need hardly say that I accept without hesitation the King's assurance that the slave Bakhit, though resident in the household of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman since he was sent from Hail, belongs to His Majesty.

There remains the more difficult question as to how the case of Bakhit is affected by the understanding reached between His Majesty and the late Sir Gilbert Clayton when the latter was negotiating the questions of the slave trade and manumission in connexion with the Treaty of Jedda. His Majesty the King will readily understand that I must consult my Government as to the nature and scope of any arrangements then made, but not embodied in the texts of the treaty and the annexed letters. In view of the wish expressed by His Excellency Fuad Bey that this question should be dealt with in an unofficial manner, I am in communication with him on the subject with a view to elucidating the questions to be submitted to my Government.

With highest respects,
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 6 in No. 17.

*Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.*Your Royal Highness,
(After Compliments.)*Jedda, January 28, 1932.*

WITH reference to my note of the 21st January, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, after careful consideration of the case of the man Bakhit, who fled to this Legation from the house of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, find themselves unable to accept the contention of the Hejazi Government that the man in question should not have been given asylum at the Legation and manumitted in the usual way.

My Government, who attach the greatest importance to this case, have instructed me to take the necessary steps to embark the man in question in His Majesty's sloop "Penzance," now lying in Jedda Harbour. I am taking the necessary measures to carry out these express instructions without delay and would ask that the local authorities of Jedda may be informed accordingly.

The decision which my Government have intimated to me is categorical regarding the case of Bakhit. I am still in communication with them regarding the wider issues raised in the personal letter which his Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed to me on the 11th Ramadhan (the 19th January) and my discussion with Fuad Bey on the 21st January.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 7 in No. 17.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.

(Telegraphic.)

Mecca, January 28, 1932.

WITH reference to your note dated 28th January, I must express my deep regret at its contents concerning decision given (and) that I should be compelled, in accordance with the right and agreement made between us, to refuse it and to consider it contradictory to the mutual understanding to which my Government strictly adhere. Therefore the Government cannot agree to allow the local authorities at Jedda to give permission for the departure of the slave in question. With regard to the other points of your note, I will reply at a later opportunity.

Enclosure 8 in No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 29, 1932.

I HAVE received the telegram sent by your Royal Highness on 28th January.

The respect of my Government for what is right and what they have agreed to is known throughout the world. I cannot act contrary to their decision. I am sending Bakhit to the sloop to-day. If local authorities raise any difficulty all responsibility will lie with your Government.

[E 795/314/25]

No. 18.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 62.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 1, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 15 of the 29th January relative to the disposal of the ex-slave Bakhit, I have the honour to forward the following three documents which complete up to date the correspondence enclosed in my despatch No. 58 sent earlier that day:—

Translation of a telegram received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 1.15 P.M. on the 29th January;

Copy of paper presented to the port authorities at the moment of Bakhit's embarkation at 4.15 P.M. that day.

Copy of telegram sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening of the same day.

2. In view of the possible repercussions of this affair it may be well to record what actually happened. When I sent my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of the 28th January my intention was to make no attempt to embark Bakhit until the 30th January, so that the authorities in Mecca should have had time to communicate by wireless with Ibn Saud. As they replied the same evening, I decided early on the 30th January to advance the plan already made, which was to send Bakhit to the usual embarkation place in charge of Mr. Hope Gill and any other necessary members of the staff and to embark him in the Legation launch for conveyance to His Majesty's sloop "Penzance," unless the police, &c., offered such opposition as to amount to forcible resistance. If such resistance were offered Mr. Hope Gill was to do everything possible to prevent the man's falling into the hands of the local authorities and to bring him back to the Legation pending consideration of the next move. I saw nothing in the enclosed telegram from Mecca to necessitate any alteration in the arrangements. I enclose a memorandum by Mr. Hope Gill showing how they were finally carried out.

3. I thank you, sir, on Mr. Hope Gill's behalf and my own for your telegram No. 10 of the 30th January congratulating us on the successful embarkation of the ex-slave. I may say that it was necessary to consider every possible contingency and that certain risks had to be taken. Mr. Hope Gill and the other members of my staff concerned deserve great credit for their handling of the situation at the port, which was such that the fullest advantage was taken of the amazing ineptitude of the Hejazi authorities both high and low. I understand from a trustworthy source that the Governor of Jedda refused to have anything to do with the matter as being one within the province of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It would appear that Fuad Bey Hamza then gave direct instructions to the police. They were that if I myself took Bakhit down they were to remonstrate but not to resist; whereas if he were accompanied by Captain Seager, who normally deals with slaves, they were to prevent the embarkation by every means. Mr. Hope Gill's report shows that they were taken by surprise, perhaps owing to the effect of the Ramadhan fast, and that Bakhit was on board before they collected themselves enough to confront a situation not foreseen by Fuad Bey, namely, the presence not of myself but of several members of my staff headed by Mr. Hope Gill, who is known to act as His Majesty's representative for long periods. The head of the police party was thrown into prison in due course. I have even been sounded as to whether I might not get him out.

4. As I pointed out in my telegram No. 15 of the 29th January, the matter is not ended by the embarkation of the individual concerned. Ibn Saud has been dealt with, for very good reasons, like any little Trucial Sheikh. Fuad Bey, who feels that the maintenance of the right of manumission is the one breach in the independence consecrated by the Treaty of Jedda, will encourage the King to believe that I am primarily responsible for the affront. Your action has followed so logically on the line which I myself had taken in discussing the Bakhit case that people of their mental outlook will assume that I inspired your decision. My position with both the King and Fuad Bey may become more than difficult, especially as Ibn Saud has been none too pleased with me since August 1930.

5. It is also probable that the question of manumission generally will come to a head. The Hejazi authorities have been more and more obstructive over

ordinary slaves. I have reason to believe that they have now issued most stringent instructions with a view to preventing slaves from gaining access to the Legation. An opportunity of testing the Hejazi attitude will present itself in the immediate future. I have at present in the Legation two ordinary slaves. I obtained the consent of the local authorities to the embarkation of one of them on the 23rd January, after they had made all sorts of difficulties. The man got on board the Khedivial steamer just before it sailed for Port Sudan, but had to be refused a passage as he was found by the ship's doctor to have an infectious disease diagnosed on board as small-pox, on shore as chicken-pox. In the other case the usual period of notice to the local authorities has not yet expired and I do not wish to give the authorities any excuse for criticism. I have therefore arranged to keep those two cases separate from that of Bakhit and to endeavour to embark the men in the ordinary way on the 6th February, when the one will have recovered and time will have been allowed for the completion of the formalities in the second case. Mr. Hope Gill will keep you informed of developments during my absence from Jedda.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.)

Mecca, January 29, 1932.

IN reply to your telegram of to-day's date, my Government do not agree, and never will agree, to the departure of the slave Bakhit, which is contrary to the agreement which exists between our two Governments. They, therefore, cannot oppose the action of the local authorities in preventing the embarkation of a person in a manner contrary to the laws which are observed and are in force. They cannot accept your statement that the responsibility for the opposition lies on them. On the contrary, we assure you (*sic*, ? they assure you) that their insistence on their rights and the right of their authorities in their territories will not result in any responsibility (falling) on them. The responsibility, rather, falls on those who wish to violate the great right. And they, while insisting on this right of theirs and on their refusal to accept responsibility, notify you that they consider your Excellency responsible personally for precipitating and causing an incident which results in a violation of their authority, and they consider you responsible for the future results of this hasty action.

But if you wish to bring the "Penzance" into the matter, their regret for this second aggression will be much greater than for the first, and they hope that you will not make the situation more critical by bringing the "Penzance" into it.

However, they reserve to themselves their full rights in protesting and requesting suitable reparation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

Certificate.

BAKHIT-BIN-MUHAMMED has been manumitted by the British Legation, and notice of his intended repatriation was given to the local authorities in Jedda on the 21st December. He is being sent on board His Britannic Majesty's ship "Penzance" to-day in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Government. A communication in this sense was addressed to the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Minister on the 28th January, and was confirmed by a telegram to His Royal Highness the Minister this morning.

In these circumstances, I have instructed Mr. Hope Gill to take the necessary steps for the embarkation of Bakhit in the launch of the Legation, to be conveyed to H.M.S. "Penzance."

(Legation Seal.)

ANDREW RYAN.

*British Legation, Jedda,
January 29, 1932.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 29, 1932.

I HAVE received your Royal Highness's telegram of to-day. Greatly as I regret any cause of dissension, I was compelled to submit case of Bakhit to my Government after failure of my efforts to settle it amicably. They do not admit that this particular case is covered by any existing agreement. I carried out their decision this afternoon, and am responsible to them for my action.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

Memorandum by Mr. Hope Gill.

Minister,

YOUR order of yesterday, that the Royal slave, Bakhit, was to be taken off to H.M.S. "Penzance" openly, without subterfuge and after due warning to the Hejazi Government, was duly carried out by the Legation staff at 4.15 p.m.

A preliminary reconnaissance of the port by the head cavass did not reveal any extraordinary police precautions, although it was found afterwards that a new Nejd police officer and half a dozen Nejd soldiers had been posted at the quay. The slave was driven in the Legation car to the main entrance to the quay, and followed me through the port hangar down to the quayside. Captain Seager meanwhile engaged the attention of the passport control officials and presented your embarkation paper. Mr. Wikeley brought up the rear in case an attempt were made to take the man from behind.

Two armed police under the police officer were posted as usual at the quayside. They made no attempt whatever to interfere. I ordered the slave into the Legation launch and followed him; after a short conversation with Mr. Wikeley, I gave the word to start. When the launch was already about 10 yards away and gathering speed, two soldiers appeared, and with the police made a futile rush to the end of the quay, shouting to the launch to stop. I slackened speed, and asked them somewhat angrily if they did not know who I was. This silenced them, and while they were scratching their heads the launch proceeded without any further attempt being made to interfere, and the slave was put on board H.M.S. "Penzance."

Mr. Wikeley remained on the quay, and explained that it was indeed the slave, Bakhit, who had been taken off. Captain Seager had some difficulty in persuading anyone to accept your embarkation certificate. The passport officer eventually took it, but handed it at once to the police officer, who hurried off to report by telephone to the Governor. Mr. Wikeley and Captain Seager returned to report to you.

On my return to the quay I brought back the head cavass and the launch boy to the Legation, but no attempt has been made to interfere with them. The staff did their work well, and without hurry, fuss or opposition.

C. G. H. G.

January 30, 1932.

[E 798/314/25]

No. 19.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 3, 1932.

WITH reference to Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 62 of the 1st February, in which he reported the circumstances surrounding the embarkation of the slave Bakhit in His Majesty's sloop "Penzance," I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum which explains in detail the procedure of manumission as at present observed.

[7797]

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2. This memorandum shows the extent to which the local authorities can go if disposed to prevent the embarkation of a slave manumitted by the Legation. No person may leave Jedda by sea without permission from the Governor. The ordinary traveller must obtain an exit visa. In the case of a slave or a destitute who is being repatriated the Governor's signature is required before the port officials will allow him to embark. It was owing to the refusal of the Hejazi Government to allow the Governor to authorise Bakhit's departure that the certificate enclosed in the despatch under reference was handed to the passport control at the quay.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 19

Memorandum respecting the Manumission of Slaves who take Refuge in the Legation.

Procedure.

A SLAVE arrives at the Legation, usually in the very early morning and by stealth, having succeeded in entering the town by the guarded Mecca gate disguised as one of the West African day labourers who live outside the walls. Occasionally a slave arrives in broad daylight and actively pursued, having run away from a local household. Pursuit generally stops at the Legation gate, however, although Bedouin have been known to carry it into the Legation itself, and have had to be turned out. Now and again a slave is sent to the Legation by another mission, for none of these themselves manumit slaves.

2. The slave's arrival is reported by the door-keeper to the pro-consul, who interrogates him (or her) and has him thoroughly searched for anything in the way of money or valuables or arms. If of such kind or quantity as a slave would not normally possess, but might be suspected to have stolen, they are taken from him and kept pending enquiry.

3. The slave is then examined by the Legation interpreter in the presence of a cavass and his full story is extracted, pieced together and written down. He is then passed for cross-examination, with his history, and in charge of the same cavass, to the Indian vice-consul, who has long experience of the country and slavery conditions.

4. The slave is then returned, with the report of his examination and cross-examination, to the pro-consul, who, if he satisfies himself that the case is *bona-fide*, gives the slave a room on the ground floor and places him in charge of the door-keeper, allotting the equivalent of 1s. a day from the Legation charity fund for his food, which is purchased for him by the door-keeper. He is not required to do any work of any kind.

5. The slave's history sheet is meanwhile passed to the Chancery for filing and submission to the Head of Chancery, whose duty it is to assure himself that the case is a straightforward one requiring manumission. If satisfied, he passes the file to the pro-consul with instructions (a) to inform the local authorities unofficially that the slave has taken refuge, giving them such details as may enable them to trace his master and satisfy themselves that he is not a fugitive from justice; and (b) to draw up a manumission *questionnaire* (specimen attached⁽¹⁾). This form is submitted to the Minister for approval and eventual signature (see 11).

6. Any case which presents unusual features is reserved for the Minister's decision before further steps are taken *vis-à-vis* the local authorities.

7. A slave's master seldom makes any attempt to retrieve him. In a few cases, however, more especially in regard to female slaves, the master sends a friend to the Legation, very occasionally coming himself, to try to persuade the slave to return. He has, however, to speak to him (or her) in the presence of the pro-consul. It is sometimes then found possible to arrange for voluntary manumission by the master, which takes the form of a declaration of grant of freedom, made before the Sharia Court of Jedda, sealed by the court and presented by the master to the Legation for safe keeping. The ex-slave thereupon leaves with his (or her) former master.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

8. In the majority of cases, however, the master makes no move and the slave remains in the Legation. Once in a way a slave walks away and does not return, but if, as in the normal run of cases, he is ready to accept manumission by the Legation and repatriation to Africa, seven days are allowed to pass before the local authorities are officially approached by the Legation. They are then asked for the necessary permission, without which no one, bond or free, foreigner or native, is allowed to leave the country. This period has by usage become a minimum time, in which the local authorities are expected to be able to satisfy themselves that the slave is not a thief or otherwise criminally charged by his master. It is normally exceeded only by the time necessary to await the arrival of a suitable ship on which to embark the slave.

9. Shortly before the date of sailing, and provided the authorities have had seven days' notice of the slave's arrival at the Legation, a written request is addressed to the Governor "to grant the usual facilities in respect of so-and-so, who is being sent by the Legation to" If higher authority in Mecca has intervened, or if a claim lies against the slave, the "facilities" are refused until the matter is settled with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In such cases, which have not hitherto been many, the slave is kept until the next sailing. Ordinarily, however, the Governor endorses the request with his signature, an act which has two functions: it authorises the slave's departure, and is thus equivalent to the permissive exit visa which all departing travellers must obtain; and it grants exemption from the usual fees, from which destitutes and slaves, who are being repatriated by the Legation, have hitherto by custom been exempted.

10. Thus endorsed, the request passes to the Finance Department, who retain it and issue two written orders, one to the Passport Office, the other to the Quarantine Department, instructing them to allow so-and-so to pass freely and without payment of the outgoing dues. Armed with these orders, a cavass accompanies the slave to the quay, embarks him in the Legation launch, and places him on board ship.

11. The Legation's act of manumission itself is comprised in the signing by the Minister of the manumission *questionnaire*. This has hitherto and by usage (specimen A⁽¹⁾) merely implied manumission. It now (specimen B⁽¹⁾) specifically declares it. This form is sent under cover of a despatch to the authority who is to receive the ex-slave on arrival, and goes by the same ship. A copy is retained in the Legation file of manumissions. Statistics of the slaves manumitted in 1930 and 1931 are attached (C⁽¹⁾).

12. The majority of slaves are sent to Suakin, where the Sudan Government maintain a special "slave's cubicle" for their reception. After the necessary period of quarantine, the Commissioner at Port Sudan, who receives and files the Legation manumission form, interests himself in finding suitable employment for the liberated man. Very few manumitted slaves are known to return to Arabia.

Jedda, February 3, 1932.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 729/463/25]

No. 20.

Sir John Simon to Ahmet Ferit Bey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 19, 1932.

WHEN I had the pleasure of seeing you on the 28th January your Excellency was so good as to inform me that your Government had received a request from the Hejaz-Nejd Government for assistance in the training of their air service and army, and to explain that the Turkish Government, having regard to the friendly relations existing between them and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, desired to ascertain their views before replying to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's enquiry.

2. I desire again to express to your Excellency the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the friendly spirit which prompted the Turkish

Government to consult them regarding this matter, and I have the honour to inform you that, after full consideration, they see no reason why the Turkish Government should not accede to the request of the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 1010/640/25]

No. 21.

Memorandum by Sir A. Ryan on the Situation in Hejaz-Nejd as it affects His Majesty's Government.

(A.)—*Position as regards various Questions of Interest to His Majesty's Government.*

1. *Transjordan Frontier Question.*—This has temporarily been reduced to the proportions of a nuisance, but one which causes infinite trouble all round. It tends to envenom all our relations with Ibn Saud, and might again produce a dangerous situation if he decided to countenance raiding on an important scale from Hejaz-Nejd, or went further and decided to have a fling at Transjordan as a definite means of escape from his troubles. We must suffer the nuisance, unless we are prepared for drastic remedies, like driving the Amir Abdullah and Ibn Saud into direct relations and letting them settle their tribal differences between them; and/or attempting a readjustment of frontiers so as to give the Wadi Sirhan to Transjordan (or perhaps neutralise it) and clear up once for all the question of Akaba and Maan. The difficulties in the way of any remedies so radical are notorious.

2. *Persian Gulf Questions.*—Our main objective is to induce Ibn Saud to remove the embargo on trade between Nejd and Koweit. I do not know whether Colonel Biscoe made any headway with this during his recent interviews with Ibn Saud. The proposal to exercise pressure by increasing transit dues at Bahrein appears to be in abeyance.

3. *Arabian Air Route.*—We have reduced our demands on Ibn Saud to a minimum, viz., facilities for the landing of service aircraft at suitable emergency landing grounds. The question of similar facilities for civil aircraft remains in the background. Fuad Hamza's reaction to my latest representations in January was very sticky, but Colonel Biscoe seems to have obtained more satisfactory results from his conversations with Ibn Saud and Yussuf Yasin. I have no details as to what he asked for or as to how far he got any firm undertaking.

4. *Shell Benzine.*—No redress has been given for the outrageous raiding of stocks last autumn. The Hejazi Government have defaulted on the contract made with the Director-General of Finance in order to patch up the affair. My representations in January have produced no effect, the proposals made to Gellatley, Hankey and Co. having been of an entirely unsatisfactory nature.

5. *Other Money Matters.*—All efforts to get the settlement of the Government of India claim on to a satisfactory basis have failed. It is presumably not of primary importance to obtain payment. As for the Eastern Telegraph Company cable account, the sums involved are not large, but the habitual failure of the Hejazi Government to make proper monthly settlements is a constant source of trouble. They have of late been keeping the arrears down to some extent by paying doles on account. The situation would become really serious only if Imperial Communications lost patience to the extent of refusing to work the cable. Minor money matters, like the failure of the Hejazi Government to pay British and British-protected chauffeurs, are tiresome, but hardly of major importance.

6. *Pilgrimage.*—The maladministration of the pilgrimage gives rise to many complaints on the part of Indian and other Moslems. They are often apt to be exaggerated, but the fact remains that, apart from his one great achievement of making the pilgrim routes secure, Ibn Saud has done little to effect any permanent improvement in pilgrimage conditions, and tends more and more to exploit or tolerate the exploitation of pilgrims. If a good opportunity offered, it might be worth while to attempt an agreement under certain main headings to secure the temporal interests of pilgrims.

7. *Slavery.*—It is impossible to verify the claim made by Fuad Hamza on behalf of Ibn Saud that he has taken serious steps to prevent slave traffic in accordance with the obligation accepted by him in the Treaty of Jedda, an obligation which he has firmly refused to repeat in his treaties with France and Italy. He is wholly recalcitrant regarding the maintenance of slavery in his dominions. He resents the continued exercise by the British Legation of the right of manumission preserved by way of *modus vivendi* in the letters annexed to the Treaty of Jedda. Frequent efforts are made to obstruct the repatriation of slaves manumitted by the Legation. The question has been brought to a head by the case of the slave Bakhit, whom Ibn Saud claimed as his property, though not as a member of his household or army, and to whose manumission he objected on the strength of an alleged oral agreement with Sir G. Clayton qualifying the letters attached to the Treaty of Jedda.

8. *Deportation of British Subjects and Protected Persons.*—Although His Majesty's Government do not question the right of the Hejazi Government to deport British subjects, &c., without stating reasons, the arbitrary conduct of the Hejazi Government in the matter is a cause of not infrequent hardship.

9. *Akaba and Maan.*—The question of the juridical status of this area is in abeyance. There is no urgent reason for reopening it on our side, unless it is found essential to thrash out the subject of the *de facto* boundary south of the Jebel Tubeik, or unless serious inconvenience results from claims by Ibn Saud to regard tribesmen from the disputed area as his subjects. The question should not, however, be disregarded in any estimate of our general position *vis-à-vis* of Ibn Saud.

10. *Hejaz Railway.*—This question is also in abeyance, and the reasons for leaving it so are even more cogent than in the case of Akaba Maan, owing to the sensitiveness of Moslem opinion, inflamed by the illusory idea that the railway is a Wakf. Otherwise it would probably be in the interest of all concerned if the former proposal to recondition the railway as a whole, without reference to claims to Moslem ownership of it, could be made practical politics.

11. *Naval Visits.*—Greater freedom in the matter of visits to Hejazi and Asiri ports, other than Jedda, is desirable, but not, in my opinion, essential for any practical purpose.

12. *Treatment of Foreign Representatives in Jedda.*—No complaints are made regarding any lack of personal courtesy towards foreign representatives. Their official position is, however, impaired in three distinct ways, viz., by the continued failure of the Hejazi Government to produce a Ministry for Foreign Affairs worthy of the name, by the denial of access to any place except Jedda and the jealousy with which the Hejazi Government regard intervention on behalf of foreign subjects, especially Moslems. The last of these points is a matter of considerable practical importance, as is shown, *inter alia*, by the line taken by the Hejazi Government over the matter of the Shell benzine.

The foregoing list is a general summary of the more important specific matters requiring consideration in any general estimate of the position of His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* of Ibn Saud. It reveals a generally unsatisfactory position, but not (apart from the repercussion of the Bakhit affair) an acute one, except in so far as the settlement of the questions at 1 to 4 inclusive, and perhaps the Eastern Telegraph Company question at 5, may be regarded as urgent. I have prepared the summary while travelling and largely from memory. I do not think I have omitted anything of first-class importance, but the list would need revision, if required for more than the present purpose of a general review. It might be expanded in various directions, *e.g.*, it does not deal with matters like the state of the port at Jedda and the vexatious character of certain customs regulations.

(B.)—*Position of Ibn Saud.*

Ibn Saud is almost certainly on the down grade. He has perhaps not reached the limit of ambition and may, therefore, be tempted into dangerous enterprises, but he has reached the limit of what he can achieve without embroiling himself with His Majesty's Government or else trying conclusions with the Imam of the Yemen. People used to ask whether his system could survive his disappearance from the scene. It is now a question whether he can maintain it during his own lifetime. He is still physically robust and there is no reason why he should not last another twenty years or so, though it may be true that he tends towards

impotence and finds it disconcerting; and it is now certain that he suffers from dyspeptic troubles. The reasons for the deterioration in his political position are manifold, but may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) He has made a complete mess of the Administration of the Hejaz, his tenure of which goes back only six or seven years. The population has no guts, but discontent with his régime is widespread.
- (b) He indisposes extreme Wahabi opinion by his modernising tendencies, although there are no certain signs that his position in Nejd and its Dependencies, based on personal ascendancy and reinforced by his suppression of the 1929 revolt, is seriously impaired.
- (c) He isolates himself in the Arab world by his individualism, his hostility to the Hashimites and his dislike of any manifestations of Arab nationalism (*e.g.*, the Arab alliance project) not tending towards his own domination.
- (d) He antagonises large sections of Moslem opinion by his religious intolerance, fundamentally that of a Wahabi, though with a difference, as manifested, *e.g.*, in the desecration of shrines.
- (e) He unfits himself for a real place in the family of nations by his intractability, his excessive jealousy of his independence and his dislike of any form of foreign penetration. His attitude regarding slavery affords a test of his remoteness from a world in which all civilised Moslem Powers and most enlightened Moslem opinion agree that slavery is an outworn institution. I say only "a test," because no one, except Great Britain to some extent and potentially the League of Nations, if Ibn Saud sought membership, minds very much about slavery as it exists in Arabia.
- (f) He has no advisers fit to help him in organising a modern State. He clings to Abdullah Suleiman, a glorified office boy, but the only Nejd in high position in his Central Government; deplorable as a Finance Minister from any European point of view, but excellent as a grand extortioner and evader of liabilities. Fuad Hamza is clever and modern-minded, but not experienced or strong enough to create order out of chaos and himself too mad on the idea of independence to take large views. The other Syrian, Yussuf Yasin, is a useful secretary but fundamentally a fanatic. Hafiz Wahba, a sensible but easy-going man, is out of the picture and hates the Syrians. These and perhaps a few other non-Nejdis are genuinely devoted to Ibn Saud's cause; most of the minor Syrians and other alien odds and ends are in his service for what they can make out of it. He has scrapped the one man, also a Syrian, personally ambitious but useful, who seemed likely to make a moderate success of the embryo regular army on European lines.
- (g) At the back of all, just now, is financial stringency operating on a small scale, but fatally, because Ibn Saud and Abdullah Suleiman between them have destroyed what little credit the country might have had; because the Hejaz has no serious resources other than the diminishing pilgrimage; and because the Hejaz has to carry a great part of the burden of Nejd. The Government as such is unquestionably bankrupt. There is no means of verifying or disproving the belief held in some quarters that Ibn Saud has collected a substantial reserve for his own purpose at Riadh.

(C.)—*Position of His Majesty's Government.*

It is a common superstition in the East that Ibn Saud subsists by the favour of His Majesty's Government. As a present-day proposition this is absurd, but it is true that Great Britain is the only Power that really counts in Arabia. Ibn Saud's greatest achievements in the international sphere have been the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah on equal terms and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. It is a question of major policy whether we should follow one or three broad courses, viz.:—

- (a) To give positive support to Ibn Saud, on the ground that he is, in spite of everything, an element of stability, about the best example of his type and reasonably well disposed, so long as he is not crossed.

- (b) To let the present situation evolve on its own lines, maintaining a generally friendly attitude towards Ibn Saud without really helping him, and recognising that we can hope for no real satisfaction in regard to matters like those enumerated in part (A) of this memorandum;
- (c) To stiffen our attitude all along the line, at the risk of definitely antagonising Ibn Saud, and, perhaps, promoting his downfall or perhaps driving him into mad adventures.

Alternative (a) is ruled out by the fact that we cannot help Ibn Saud in the only way that would be really useful to him, *i.e.*, by financing him in one way or another; and because we cannot back him against other Arab rulers.

There is much to be said for alternative (b); because the problem of Ibn Saud, though important, is but a small factor in the present world situation; and, unless he seeks further aggrandisement at our expense or at the expense of our special interests in Arabia, it matters very little whether he survives or collapses; but in this alternative we must be prepared to tolerate the Transjordan nuisance and to go easy with everything else, including the questions of Koweit and the Arabian air route, unless Colonel Biscoe has already got them on to a definitely better basis.

There is something but perhaps not so much to be said for alternative (c). If Ibn Saud's bluff is to be called, now is as good a time as any other to call it. He is weak and our grievances against him are solid. We could make out a case for rigidity good enough to appeal even to many Moslems, though many others would rally to his support on the general principle of defending any Moslem cause against any European Power.

ANDREW RYAN.

Foreign Office, February 23, 1932.

[E 957/957/25]

No. 12.

Sir John Simon to Mr. Morgan (Angora).

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 1, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 65 of the 22nd February, forwarding a copy of my note of the 19th February to the Turkish Ambassador, in regard to the request made to his Government by the Hejaz-Nejd Government for assistance in the training of their air service and army, I have to inform you that the Turkish Ambassador called here again on the 23rd February.

2. He alluded to my above-mentioned note, and stated that his Government would be glad, in view of the close relations existing between our two countries, to exchange any information of common interest about the Hejaz-Nejd which might reach either Government.

3. In reply, his Excellency was informed that His Majesty's Government fully appreciated this offer and, should any information be received of a nature to interest the Turkish Government, opportunity would be taken to pass it on to them on a footing of reciprocity.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 1119/266/25]

No. 23.

Consul-General Biscoe to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, March 3.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, February 5, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief report on my recent visit to His Majesty King Ibn Saud at Hasa.

2. I left here by slow mail for Bahrein on the 19th January and arrived there the following day. I had asked the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq if arrangements could be made to bring Colonel Dickson down by air to Bahrein, and he very kindly placed a flying-boat at his disposal, and Colonel Dickson

arrived on the 22nd. Meanwhile telegraphic communication had been established informally between Bahrein and Hasa, and I received a message from Ibn Saud asking me to come as soon as possible as he was anxious to return to Riyadh, and informing me that arrangements had been made for my reception at Ojair. As I thought it probable that questions concerning Bahrein might arise during the discussions, I asked permission from His Majesty to bring Captain Prior with me, and this was readily accorded.

3. Accordingly, on the 23rd we proceeded from Zilag, on the south side of Bahrein Island, in a launch belonging to the Qusaibis, to Ojair. Fortunately the weather was fine and we accomplished the journey in about five and a half hours. At Ojair I was received by Yussuf Yasin, His Majesty's private secretary, and left at about 3.30 for Hasa.

4. The road for about the first 35 miles runs over a series of sand-dunes, which I think would certainly be described as quite impracticable for motor transport, except immediately after rain. However, there seems to be no limitation to the capabilities of Mr. Ford's products, and the car in which I was driving surmounted these piles of sand without check, and we reached Hasa at 5.30. The other cars which were possibly not in such good condition and were also more heavily laden were not so fortunate, and our luggage and servants did not arrive till 1 p.m. the following day, having taken about twenty-two hours to accomplish the 49 miles' journey.

5. Colonel Dickson, Captain Prior and I were lodged in the same house as that occupied by His Majesty, and arrangements were made to provide us with European food. Owing to the fact that it was the month of Ramazan, it would in any case have been awkward for us to have attended dinner, of which His Majesty partook at about 5.30, directly after sunset. Soon after my arrival His Majesty came and saw me and we had about an hour's conversation on ordinary subjects.

6. We stayed in Hasa four days, during which our programme was as follows: About 10 a.m. Yussuf Yasin would visit us, and after half an hour's talk we went to visit the King, with whom discussions took place lasting generally two hours. After lunch Yussuf Yasin occasionally came and had a short discussion, and in the afternoon cars were placed at our disposal and we were allowed to visit the numerous hot springs with which the Hasa Oasis abounds, and to walk through the date groves. We were informed that it was undesirable that we should proceed on foot through the town, a pose, I think, on Ibn Saud's part, since the population nowadays is not in the least fanatical, whatever it may have been once. On our return on two days we had further interviews with the King, each lasting about one and a half hours, and after-dinner discussions with Yussuf Yasin, lasting generally till midnight.

7. The following matters were discussed either with the King or with Yussuf Yasin, and will form the subjects of separate despatches:—

- (i) The Koweit blockade.
- (ii) Emergency landing grounds on the Hasa coast.
- (iii) Telegraphic and postal communication between Hasa and the outer world via Bahrein.
- (iv) Passport facilities for Nejd subjects proceeding to India or Iraq.
- (v) The possibility of some consular status being afforded to Nejd representatives in Bahrein and Koweit.
- (vi) Incursions by Nejd officials and troops into Koweit territory.
- (vii) The possibility of having a very simple extradition treaty between Bahrein and Nejd.

8. As stated above, the details of these discussions will be dealt with separately and I will content myself here with saying that throughout all our talks His Majesty's attitude was one of extreme cordiality, and naturally his secretary took his cue from him. Even so controversial a matter as the Koweit blockade, after a little preliminary fulminating on the usual lines, was discussed by the King in a most friendly spirit, and when he lays himself out to please there are few men who can be more charming than Ibn Saud. His Majesty was looking extremely well; he informed me that when he left the Hejaz he had been leading a very sedentary life and had done a great deal of work and had been feeling very tired. Latterly, however, he had been going out hunting in the desert, which had done him a great deal of good, and he hoped

after the 'Id to spend another month or so in the desert with his family before proceeding to the Hejaz for the Haj. He mentioned that he was 53 years of age now, and as the Arabic year is eleven days shorter than the solar year this would make him about 51 according to our reckoning. He certainly does not look more. He made no attempt to disguise his financial difficulties, to which he referred repeatedly. He stated that the expenditure of the Hejaz was a million pounds, and its revenue about £800,000, and of all the revenues of Hasa one-fourth went to Qusaibis (presumably against advances received from them), one-fourth went to Ibn Jiluwi for the administration, and one-fourth was remitted to the Hejaz. He was in such straits that he had written to his leading sheikhs informing them that in future he could only receive them on certain stated occasions, and that they were not to visit him at other times. He mentioned that he himself had no private estates, and that the Beit-al-Mal, which formerly went to the privy purse, was now paid into the general revenues and that literally he hardly knew how to support himself and his family.

9. On the other hand, his expenditure on motor cars must be enormous. I was told that he had between five and six hundred, and there is no doubt that they are run on the most wasteful lines. The wear and tear on a car across desert tracks is of course very high, and I have no doubt that he is robbed right and left by his chauffeurs. Apart from this, if he is to stop his tribes raiding he must give them allowances, and this must be a very heavy drain, and there is no doubt that his position financially is a parlous one. On the other hand, in Nejd at any rate whatever may be the position in the Hejaz, although I think he has somewhat lost his position as a spiritual leader his writ still runs unquestioned throughout the length and breadth of the land.

10. An interesting sidelight on Ibn Saud's methods of administration was furnished on the day of my departure. Two members of the Murra tribe had stolen some camels, and after four days' pursuit were captured by Ibn Jiluwi's men. The latter was for having them killed, but Ibn Saud commuted the sentence and decreed that they should each have one leg and one arm cut off. This was done on the morning of my departure, and the dismembered limbs were exposed publicly in the bazaar. It will probably be a long time before any other member of this tribe steals a camel. An enlightened member of the Bahrein commercial community, with whom I returned, spoke most approvingly of this method of punishment, and said that the British system of locking a man up was no deterrent at all—a view which in the case of Bedouin tribes is probably correct.

11. In the course of conversation Ibn Saud said to me that though the British Government had troops, aeroplanes and ships they could not control the bird upon the twig, neither could they control the Bedouin, but he (Ibn Saud) could, and certainly, so far, his authority in Nejd is unquestioned.

12. His Majesty spoke most warmly about the late Sir Gilbert Clayton, and said that he gave a definite "yes" or a definite "no," and was a man, and he knew where he was with him.

13. He further mentioned that Mr. Philby had just left Hasa to cross the Rub-al-Khali, and, in order possibly to outdo the exploits of Mr. Thomas, he was going to cross it twice, proceeding by one route to the Hadramaut and then back by another route. He spoke cordially of Mr. Philby, and said that although hot-headed he was a loyal friend.

14. We left Hasa on the 28th January after a most pleasant stay of four days, and as our luggage on this occasion got through with greater rapidity we were enabled to leave Ojair in the Qusaibi launch at 4 p.m., and, again favoured by good weather, had a smooth crossing and arrived in Bahrein about midnight. There I was delayed for four days awaiting the departure of the mail steamer, but we finally left on the 1st February, getting back to Bushire on the 2nd.

15. At my last interview, when I went to say good-bye to him just before I left, Ibn Saud asked me to transmit a message from him to His Majesty's Government, and after he had delivered it verbally I suggested that Yussuf Yasin should write it down: His Majesty therefore dictated it to him, and freely translated it runs as follows:—

"I wish you to give my greetings to the British Government and say to them that I speak to them with the word of a Moslem Arab.

"Firstly, that I do not desire or seek greater friendship from anyone else in all the world, either from among the European or the Moslem Powers, than that which I have with the British Government, and it is quite

impossible that I should oppose them in any matter. Secondly, I desire peace and friendship with the whole world, but specially with those of my neighbours and others who are in relations with the British Government, and whoever says to the contrary is in error, or a liar, or has misunderstood. And I ask of them that if anyone says such a thing of me, that they should refer the matter to me and let me know what mistake I am supposed to have committed; but on the condition that the reference should be made through an intelligent man who can grasp the actual facts and will not misconstrue them."

The Arabic is in one or two places a little ambiguous, doubtless due to the fact that the King took no trouble to choose his words but dictated it straight away. I therefore enclose a copy of the message in Arabic as well.⁽¹⁾

16. My visit was, I think, unquestionably a successful one chiefly owing to the fact that it was informal, and that I came with no instructions from His Majesty's Government, but simply to establish friendly relations and talk over questions of interest to us both in a friendly spirit. Ibn Saud was friendly, cordial and reasonable, and at times, when recalling his battles and intrigues of former times with the Turks, interesting and amusing. His attitude towards the two questions that I was chiefly interested in, namely, the Koweit blockade and the emergency landing grounds on the Hasa coast, was helpful, and as regards the latter I was given clearly to understand that there would be no difficulties about facilities on islands, though he was still opposed to landings on the mainland.

17. On my departure Ibn Saud expressed the hope that we might meet again, and I hope an opportunity will recur next year. Ibn Saud presented me with a stallion and a mare, and also gave a horse each to Colonel Dickson and Captain Prior together with the customary abbas and shawls. The horses are of no value at all, and I am endeavouring to induce some Arab sheikh to take them. Colonel Dickson assured me that this would not be viewed amiss since such presents are regarded as of a purely ceremonial nature. Moreover, among the presents given to my staff was a gold watch which had on the back of it the Royal British Arms and had presumably been presented at some time by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud.

18. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 1145/266/25]

No. 24.

Consul-General Biscoe to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, March 5.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, February 5, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to state that, during my recent visit to His Majesty King Ibn Saud, I discussed with him the question of the Koweit blockade. I began by informing His Majesty that my visit was entirely private and informal and that I had no mission of any kind, neither had I received any instructions from His Majesty's Government, and emphasised that His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah was, of course, the channel for official communications. At the same time, it might be desirable to discuss any questions connected with the Persian Gulf informally, and I asked Ibn Saud if he had any matters which he wished to raise affecting the Gulf.

2. Ibn Saud replied that sometimes quite small matters loomed large in places in which they arose, because the places themselves are so small, and that he had nothing of importance that he wished to discuss. I then said that there

was one matter regarding which I would like to take the opportunity of ascertaining His Majesty's views, and that was the embargo on trade between Koweit and Nejd. I pointed out that at present Koweit was being ruined by the cessation of its commerce with the interior; that the customs receipts had fallen from about 8 lakhs to under 2 and that, though some of this loss might be due to the prevailing commercial depression, there was no doubt that much of it was owing to the blockade which His Majesty had imposed. I asked His Majesty whether, in view of his close former relations with Koweit, some means could not be found to alleviate the situation. Ibn Saud said that Koweit interests were his, and that he and Sheikh Ahmad were brothers, but what he feared was the loss to his own country. He had to consider that first of all. He was in dire straits for money; though he made small allowances to his sons, he took nothing for his privy purse. He had no private domains, and the Beit-al-Mal, which formerly went to the Ruler, was now paid into the general revenues. He added: "I swear by God as a Moslem that I have no money for my children, for my family, and I know not if they will have money for food and clothing. Money is a question of life and death, and no country can do without it." If he allowed his tribes to go to Koweit he would lose the revenue now derived from Hasa and Ojair.

3. I mentioned that in the days of the former Nejd Government the tribes traded with Koweit and the then Government presumably took its dues; why should they not do so now? His Majesty replied that then they were all Badu; there was no Government, the tribes did as they pleased. What would suit him best was for his people not to trade with Koweit under any circumstances. I mentioned that they were apparently permitted to trade with Iraq through Zubair, to which His Majesty replied that he proposed to stop this, too, and compel them to get all supplies in their own country through their own ports.

4. The conversation continued for some time on these lines, and ultimately His Majesty said that there were three ways in which the matter could be settled:—

- (1) He should be allowed to establish a post at some place on the outskirts of Koweit territory, *e.g.*, Subaihiyah, where he would take his customs, Koweit to guarantee that all goods should pass through this place, and that nothing should leave its borders by any other route.
- (2) A Nejd customs post in the hands of Nejd official, with, however, no official position in Koweit, should be established at the gate of Koweit town and he would collect the Nejd dues as caravans passed out.
- (3) Koweit should make a fixed annual payment representing the Nejd share of the Koweit customs.

5. I suggested that, since caravans must follow certain well-defined routes in order to obtain water, a chain of border posts could easily control them, though, obviously, a few odd camels could slip through from time to time. His Majesty retorted that smuggling would certainly take place, and that even now they could not prevent luxuries which paid higher duty from being smuggled. I pointed out that it was virtually impossible on a long frontier line to stop a certain amount of smuggling in any country and that we had been unable effectively to stop gun-running, despite the expenditure of very large sums of money, but what was possible was to exercise control over caravans conveying smuggled goods into the interior, provided the caravans passed through one's own territory. The Persian Government had, to a very large extent, reduced smuggling into Persia, not by patrols along the coast, but by making it exceedingly difficult to transport goods into the interior.

6. His Majesty then went on to say that if he allowed trade with Koweit Ojair would be killed and Hasa would lose one-fourth of its trade. So for the time being I left the matter at that.

7. Subsequently, I discussed the matter with Yussuf Yasin, and he informed me that His Majesty had realised that proposals (1) and (2) put forward by him were impracticable. Koweit could not possibly guarantee that all goods would pass through the tunnel of Subaihiyah, or wherever it might be established, and he realised that the suggestion of establishing a customs post at the gate of Koweit town would never be accepted by the sheikh, and in any case would prove unworkable. For instance, many of the Koweit Araibdar and tribesmen from Iraq come in to purchase goods in Koweit. It would not be possible for the

Nejd officials to distinguish between them. The only solution he could suggest was that there should be an annual payment by Koweit to Nejd. The sheikh, however, had informed Colonel Dickson previously that he would never agree to anything of this sort as it would be regarded as a tribute in Arabia.

8. Yussuf Yasin mentioned that some customs arrangement of this kind was in force between Palestine and Syria and in other places. I said I knew nothing about this, but he must bear in mind that an arrangement which would be perfectly feasible between two Powers of equal standing might bear a different appearance when entered into between a big man and a small man. I also pointed out that the blockade really amounted to an act of war, and that if the Government of India took similar action, say, in the case of Goa, in order to divert trade to their own port, Bombay, it would unquestionably evoke very serious protests on the part of the Portuguese Government. Colonel Dickson and I, however, did not entirely dismiss the possibility of some solution on the lines of a payment by Koweit to Nejd and thought that circumstances might force the sheikh to agree.

9. However, the following day I again returned to the charge with Ibn Saud and made a personal appeal to His Majesty, pointing out all he owed to Koweit and the fact that he had been brought up there. I said that, presumably, he did not want to see it ruined and sink to the level of Debai, as it certainly would do if the present policy were persisted in. The King said that he must consider his own interests and that it was for him to milk his own people and not to supply pasture cows for Koweit. Ultimately, however, he said that the only solution he could see was for arbitrators from either side, consisting of well-known merchants, with possibly one official, to meet and try and work out a compromise that would be agreeable to both parties, but the arbitrators must be carefully selected for their patience and ability. I welcomed the suggestion and promised to put it before Sheikh Ahmad.

10. The discussion on the whole was conducted in a most friendly spirit. Ibn Saud was not uncompromising and his description of his financial straits was, of course, correct, and at present, at any rate, he cannot afford to lose a penny of his revenues. On the other hand, if any system can be devised by which he will not lose revenue or have to incur heavy expenditure on the establishment of posts on the frontier, then, I think, he will be prepared to meet us half way. I asked Yussuf Yasin if the real reason of the blockade was not that His Majesty was afraid that the tribes might establish too close relations with Koweit. He said: "No, not nowadays. We have got them too much in hand."

11. If I may say so, I think perhaps it would have been helpful if His Majesty's Government had seen fit to inform the Nejd Government of the large and exceedingly well-substantiated claims put forward by Koweit against them. It would have given me, to some extent, a lever. All that we could do under the circumstances was for Colonel Dickson to mention the matter to Yussuf Yasin. While normally I doubt if much can be accomplished by the appointment of commissioners, especially in such cases as frontier affairs, boundaries, &c., the present case is rather different. I have no doubt one of Ibn Saud's commissioners will be a member of the Quasaibi clan. Koweit also has one or two merchants of considerable standing. The latter will be fighting for their own existence and welfare, and will certainly spare no effort to arrive at some arrangement, and once the question is reduced to a commercial basis there is some prospect, at any rate, of a settlement being arrived at. For instance, it seems possible that they might agree to increase the Koweit customs duties, which are at present merely 4 per cent., and then for so many annas in the rupee to be paid to Nejd, or something of that sort. If an arrangement of this sort was arrived at between the commissioners, the mercantile community of Koweit would certainly bring a good deal of pressure to bear on the sheikh to accept it. I would, therefore, suggest that if the sheikh agrees to the appointment of arbitrators Ibn Saud should then be asked, through His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, to inform us what type of representatives he proposes to nominate, e.g., whether merchants or officials, so that Koweit can appoint the same kind of persons. I would suggest two merchants and one official, preferably a customs official. When these details have been settled, I would suggest that, if Sir Andrew Ryan sees no objection, he should be authorised to inform Fuad Hamza personally of the Koweit claims, and, if he considers it desirable, let him have a copy. He can say at the same time that His Majesty's Government

had not presented these claims as they were hopeful that a friendly settlement of the Koweit blockade would be arrived at. If so, the sheikh would be willing to let the claims go, but that they thought it desirable to let the Nejd Government know informally that these claims had been submitted. I am asking Colonel Dickson to ascertain Sheikh Ahmad's views regarding the appointment of commissioners and will report further in due course.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 1191/1191/25]

No. 25

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 80.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a report on the heads of foreign missions at this post for the year 1931.

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Confidential Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Jedda.

(Passages marked with an asterisk (*) are reproduced from last year's report.)

Egypt.

HASSAN ACHMOUNI BEY was superseded in March 1931 by Hafez Amer Bey, a gentleman with no previous diplomatic or consular experience, but said to be a protégé of Emin Yehia Pasha, brother of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was originally an advocate at Tintah, his home town, and later held various minor judicial posts in Egypt. He speaks English imperfectly and French very sketchily. He is by way of being very friendly with the British Legation and pays extravagant compliments, especially to my wife. He affects an air of frankness, which is for the most part illusory, but which gives him an excuse for his own great inquisitiveness. On the whole, he is an agreeable colleague, but excessively soapy in his manner. He is an ardent and somewhat apostolic Moslem, rigid in abstention from alcohol and other observances. Before he had been long here, he conceived a very poor opinion of the Wahhâbi régime. Little is known of his diplomatic activities except that he pursues in an unfavourable atmosphere the long-outstanding conversations with a view to a better understanding between Egypt and Hejaz-Nejd. It is too soon to judge of his capacity.

Hafez Amer Bey has a family, but they live in Egypt.

France.

*M. Roger Maigret, who occupies the peculiar position of being Chargé d'Affaires at the head of what is still a consulate, is a man of perhaps 60. He has had a long career in the French Near East service, and was employed for some twenty years in Morocco, including Tangier, where, I believe, he was employed up to 1921. He was subsequently employed in Iraq, whence he came to his post here. I have heard it vaguely suggested that he was not well regarded in Morocco, but cannot vouch for this. He is intelligent and witty, and has a

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considerable knowledge of Arab countries. In his lighter moments he claims also to know a great deal of the Parisian underworld, having cultivated *apaches* in his conscript days. As we have both been in Morocco, though at different periods, I have many interests and acquaintances in common with him. I find him, however, rather too "smarmy" on the personal side and rather too reticent about the affairs which now interest us both officially. He has little social value of a general kind, for, though he has a passion for Arabian travel, he sticks very tight in his house when in Jedda. I have not heard him speak English, but he appears to have considerable book knowledge of this language, and has already completed a French translation of Mr. Philby's recent work on "Arabia."

*He is married, but appears to be permanently separated from his Spanish or half-Spanish wife. She has never come to Jedda. A venerable mother has recently come to live with M. Maigret instead.

Since the above was written M. Maigret has become even more of a recluse. He is seldom seen away from his house. His emoluments are said to be quite considerable, but he does practically no entertaining, except for a small weekly card party.

Germany.

M. Heinrich de Haas arrived in Jedda in the autumn of 1930 to spy out the land for trade. Having settled down to do business in partnership with a Moslem Tripolitan exile, and as a result of the ratification of the treaty between Germany and the Hejaz-Nejd, he was appointed consul for the Hejaz, obtained an exequatur, and entered upon his functions in March 1931. He continues, nevertheless, to trade.

He is about 38 years of age and the son of the late Dr. Walter de Haas, who spent most of his life in Australia, where both were interned during the war, and who was subsequently employed in the German Foreign Office as head of the so-called "Anglo-Saxon" Department. Shortly before the death of his father last November, M. de Haas left Jedda, and he may not return. His post is meanwhile unofficially occupied by a resident German merchant.

A pleasant colleague with an excellent knowledge of English and good French. He is unmarried.

Italy.

*The Italian representative, M. Sollazzo, calls himself consul, although Italy has not yet established normal relations with Ibn Saud. He is a youngish man of about 35, but not aggressively Fascist. He speaks French reasonably well. He is a man of good average intelligence and definite views. He finds himself, I think, rather overshadowed by the Italian administrators in Eritrea. He does not seem to care much for society; but I find him an agreeable and useful colleague, very ready to exchange information on matters of interest.

*M. Sollazzo married not long ago an attractive and pleasant but not very interesting Italian wife. She shares all his vicissitudes, but they both dislike Jedda.

The foregoing paragraph is less than just to Mme. Sollazzo, who has come out a great deal and now shows herself lively and intelligent.

Netherlands.

M. van der Meulen was succeeded in July 1931 by M. C. Adriaanse, who, in accordance with standing Dutch arrangements, came here earlier in the year to prepare to take over the post of Chargé d'Affaires. He is large, loose-limbed and a good fellow. He does not speak English as well as his predecessor, but has quite an adequate command of it. He has made a serious study of classical Arabic at the feet of Professor Snouck Hurgronje, and acted as general secretary to the Orientalists' Conference at Leiden last summer. He can get on in the spoken language. As an official, he gives the impression of being steady rather than specially able. He maintains the traditional good relations with this Legation and is genuinely friendly with all of us.

M. Adriaanse has a wife and family in Holland.

Persia.

*M. Habibulla (or Habibulla Khan) Hoveida bore in the days of Persian titles that of Ain-ul-Mulk. He was "diplomatic representative" when I arrived and is now Chargé d'Affaires. He is a Persian Moslem, but his special habitat appears to be in Syria. He is an elderly man. He was recommended to my favourable attention by Sir R. Clive, but I fear that I find him unattractive, in spite of his great desire to please and his ability to speak English passably. I have heard him accused of making so much per head out of his pilgrims, but I have no reason to believe a charge so easy to invent in connexion with the representative of a country like Persia in a country like this. He left Jedda some six months ago. Shortly afterwards, the junior whom he left in charge went away also, telling us that his wife was ill and asking us to forward correspondence to his chief at Beirut. Little seems to have been heard of either since then, and the Persian Legation is not effectively occupied. I much doubt whether M. Hoveida will return. His health suffered here, and I rather think that he covets the post of Persian representative at Cairo.

M. Hoveida did return in April 1931, but stayed only until June, and did not come back again until the end of December. On this occasion, however, he left a subordinate, who is also his sister's husband, in charge. During his stay he gave one spectacular diplomatic dinner, after which he photographed the company by incandescent lamplight. The result, though odd, was more successful than might have been expected. I was, perhaps, too hard on him last year. At any rate, his friendship towards us appears to be genuine.

Soviet Russia.

*M. Nezir (sometimes called Nezir Bey) Touracoulov, the only Minister besides myself, presented letters before me, and is therefore doyen of the Diplomatic Body. He comes from Turkestan, and is a round-headed young man with distinctly Tartar features. He seems fairly intelligent, and has learnt enough French and Arabic since he came here a couple of years ago to carry on conversation in those languages. He usually talks Turkish, which he knows better, on the comparatively rare occasions when we meet. He has a sound, simple sense of humour and is an agreeable companion, but he goes little into European society. I have never attempted to talk politics to him. On the one occasion on which I had occasion to seek information from him on a non-political matter connected with public health he was very helpful. He presents no appearance of wishing to make a splash. He strikes me as a nice, straightforward person, rather more interested in commercial and economic subjects than in others, and as being a genuine Moslem. If I am wrong and he is deep, then he must be very deep indeed. M. Touracoulov is married to a Russian lady from Samara. She is a professional doctor or nurse, and left Jedda before I arrived in May to take charge of some sort of institution in Moscow. She has not returned.

I continue to like M. Touracoulov, but doubt whether he is as simple or as good a Moslem as I supposed. He had a burst of diplomatic activity in the summer, when he went into the business of selling benzine to the Hejazi Government, and perhaps attempted even greater things, with a view to bringing his country into closer relations with the Hejaz. He went on long leave in October. It is doubtful whether he will return.

Turkey.

Seni Bey left in July to take up an important post in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Ankara. He was succeeded in July by Ahmed Lutfullah Bey. The latter had a small post at the Sublime Porte in the old days in Turkey and is a favourable specimen of the type of official produced there. Before his appointment in Jedda he had been employed at Ankara and in London, and appears to have been favourably regarded by British colleagues. He speaks French well and has some knowledge of English. He has varied interests. He claims to be an authority on protocol (he has published a work in two volumes on the subject), and he dabbles in the arts. He is amiable and talkative. In our short acquaintance I have been unable to form any opinion of his capacity, but

should imagine that he is keener on his side-lines than on playing an active diplomatic rôle. He is personally intimate with the non-Moslem Russian who acts as Soviet representative in the Minister's absence.

Lutfullah Bey is unmarried.

January 1932.

[E 1197/1197/25]

No. 26.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 88. Confidential.)

Jedda, February 16, 1932.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for last November and December. I am indebted to Mr. Furlonge for the passages on finance and economics and Parts IV and VI to IX.

2. Copies are being sent to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Bushire, Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 26

Jedda Report for November and December 1931.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

THE occasion is taken of repeating the information that the spelling "Jedda" is consecrated by Foreign Office usage. It is, moreover, convenient that a place where His Majesty's Government maintain a Legation should be known in official English by a fixed name. Some other posts still seem to find it difficult to reconcile the spelling "Jedda" with their philological principles. If these can finally be overcome, it will be much appreciated at Jedda.

(Confidential.)

I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ibn Saud.

THE King continued in Riyadh throughout November and December, but he was no longer able to brood on his personal troubles; there came home to roost in Nejd the troublesome offspring of union with the Hejaz. The last two reports have described the process of further disintegration which the already rotten state of the Hejaz passed through after Ibn Saud's withdrawal into Nejd in June. In the first days of November he had before him at Riyadh a memorandum on the situation drawn up by his son Feisal, the Viceroy, and Fuad Bey Hamza, his Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. These had at length revolted against the virtual dictatorship of his henchman and Director-General of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who had to go to Riyadh to give his own account of his stewardship. The memorandum revealed dissension in the Government of the Hejaz amounting to deadlock and a critical state of financial chaos. It prescribed two remedies which His Majesty had never yet been able to stomach, a budget and a "Cabinet." He now, however, accepted both, with what difficulty is not known, and sent his chief political adviser, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, to Jedda with a proclamation and to concert financial measures with Fuad Hamza. Abdullah Suleiman he retained in Nejd until the trouble should blow over.

Reforms.

2. On the 3rd November the Hejaz was shocked by the news that, by direct order of the King, the Treasury and all its branches were to be closed and the tills locked, and that no payments, however small, were to be made pending further instructions. This was the first sign of Ibn Saud's reaction to the situation. Its inconveniences were manifold, for all daily-paid public and municipal work at once ceased, and the Quarantine Department, for instance, had to borrow fuel for its launch in order to function at all.

3. Late on the 12th November, Yusuf Yasin arrived post-haste in Jedda, where the Amir Feisal and Fuad Hamza were awaiting him to learn the King's decisions. On the following morning His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was invited to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to receive the welcome news of financial and constitutional reform. The latter, he was given to understand, was not yet elaborated, but the King had conceded the principle of a Council of Ministers on whom would rest joint responsibility for government in addition to individual responsibility for their departments. The resulting decree, which was not published until January, falls to be considered in the next report. As to financial reform, Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Hamza were in a position to announce the establishment of a budget.

4. They told Mr. Hope Gill in confidence that the revenue would be in future apportioned under four headings:—

35 per cent., official salaries, intended to cover all normal costs of administration;

25 per cent., indebtedness, to cover all arrears of salaries as well as the Government's internal and external debt;

15 per cent., reserve (a novelty with all the attraction of a pot of honey); and

25 per cent., extraordinary expenses, intended to ensure the comfort and health of pilgrims and to develop the country's hidden resources.

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Even approximate figures of estimated revenue were not yet available, but it had been calculated that current indebtedness could be met in about two years. There Sheikh Yusuf's information stopped, and he left to say his prayers. Nevertheless, it was gratifying to learn of even the birth of a budget.

5. On the same day the "Umm-al-Qura" published a long proclamation by the King to his people announcing the information contained in the preceding paragraph, but omitting the percentages, establishing the principle that all creditors must stand on an equal footing, and forecasting with pious hope the beneficial results that would flow from the policy of retrenchment and development which had now been adopted. Further communiqués published in subsequent issues announced the King's commands to reduce expenditure, to select a Reorganisation Committee, to create a Treasury Department, and to appoint a Treasurer, and, meanwhile, to employ the Director-General of Finance and the Vice-President of the Hejaz Legislative Assembly in an inspectional tour of the other side of Nejd (whence they had not returned by the end of December). The King's personal expenditure was also to be reduced, for which the "Umm-al-Qura" gave him loyal praise.

6. Although the budget, or what passes in this country as a budget, was not published until the 15th January, it may conveniently be dealt with here. It took the form of a badly worded decree in six articles and a list of items of expenditure which do not add up correctly; a translation is attached as an appendix to this report. The budget thus resolves itself into an estimate of expenditure under various heads, which do not seem to correspond with the percentage allotments previously communicated. The decree states that the revenue equals this expenditure, but no detail is given and no mention is made of the reserve fund. Nor is it stated whether the budget applies to the Hejaz only or to the whole of Ibn Saud's dominions. As soon as budgetary reform was announced, it was generally held to have come too late. Now that the details have been published, pessimism is confirmed. Fuad Bey himself seems to have no illusions as to the uncertainty of the revenue prospects.

7. One other point emerging from the budget discussions has been that the financial capital will in future be Jedda instead of Mecca. The idea of supplementing the reform by the employment of a European financial adviser is still canvassed, and the post is said to have been offered to the local manager of the Dutch Bank, M. Jacobs, and also to another Dutchman, M. van Leeuwe. Nothing definite has transpired, however.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

8. The Amir Feisal, Viceroy and Minister, moved his Government and Department back to Mecca on the 6th November from Taif, whither he had removed them on the 6th July for the summer. On the 7th November his Under-Secretary informed the foreign representatives that the Jedda office of the Ministry had been transferred (from the flat which it occupied in the offices of an Italian shipping agent and for which, incidentally, it has failed to pay the agreed rent) to a separate building of its own. This has meant nothing more than a welcome change of environment, which will make it no longer necessary for the Under-Secretary to speed his parting visitors through *al fresco* macaroni parties on the stairways. The new office, however, is just as vacant as the old. Personal contact with the foreign representatives at Jedda, which it had been hoped a year ago (December 1930 report, paragraph 1), would become more frequent, is as rare as ever, and heads of foreign missions are becoming restive and increasingly critical of their isolationist treatment.

9. Fuad Bey came to Jedda on the 29th October and left on the 3rd November. On the 1st he gave His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires a three-hour interview. He returned on the 7th to await the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who came on the 9th, signed a treaty with France on the 10th, and left on the 13th. They were joined on the 12th by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, hot-foot with the reforms from Riyadh, and Mr. Hope Gill had a further interview with Fuad Bey, which was attended by the Sheikh. They both left Jedda on the 14th November. Yusuf Yasin returned to Riyadh on the 2nd December, and Fuad Hamza, after a flying visit to Jedda on the 4th-6th December, followed him there on the 15th, the day on which His Majesty's Minister arrived. He was not seen again until January.

Financial Situation.

10. The general financial position at the close of the year was as gloomy as the economic (see paragraph 17). The reform scheme, if it had not come too late, had no one capable of running it rationally. The Treasurer, for example, is a bankrupt of 35. Nor were the prospects of revenue brighter. A pilgrimage from overseas of 20,000, or half the number of the meagre 1931 pilgrimage, was all that could now be expected; and each year's pilgrims were bringing less money. The customs revenues showed a continued decline, due to decreased pilgrimage and general depression. For the lunar year ended in June 1929 they were believed to have ranged round the million mark; for that ending next May they seem unlikely to exceed half a million sterling. With this decreased security, with increasing uncertainty as to the stability of the Saudian régime, and following on the breakdown of the negotiations with the Dutch Bank (July-August report, paragraph 9), the prospects of a development loan being obtained on commercial lines from any European country have receded out of sight. Relations with Soviet Russia, which alone might engage in trade, or even finance, on uneconomic lines, remained obscure. A consignment of 42,000 cases of Russian kerosene arrived at Yanbu' and Jedda on the 26th November in fulfilment of the July contract (July-August report, paragraph 10), and Russian matches were also on sale; but big business between the two Governments seemed out of the question. The "prohibition" of Soviet merchandise was maintained.

11. The sterling crisis of September had at first no direct effect on the currency of the Hejaz, which is based on the gold sovereign actually in circulation and not on sterling as such. By November, however, one noticeable effect became evident in the lessened volume of gold in circulation, probably owing to hoarding and to heavy purchases of gold made by the local Dutch bank. English and Egyptian notes came into increasing use, the former possibly on account of the Soviet Legation, which has no local banking account and meets its liabilities with English bank-notes imported by bag.

12. The silver riyal had been depreciating steadily since February and in the first fortnight of November sank to a rate which fluctuated between 18 and 20 to the gold £. Attempts made by the King to bolster it up by popularising its use in Nejd, by the setting up of a net-work of retail stalls, stocked with "borrowed" Hejazi goods, in which riyals alone were accepted, were frustrated by the attitude of the Nejd merchants, who complained that the riyal was useless to them for transactions in Koweit and Bahrein, and refused to deal in them. The gold value of the riyal in Nejd is said to have been as low as 30. In the Hejaz the Government themselves had long since ceased to attach any value to the so-called "official" rate of 10 riyals=£1 gold, except in so far as they secured their acceptance at this rate when making payments wherever they could. Early in October they had made their first definite admission that the riyal had depreciated by insisting that customs dues, which are fixed in piastres Miri at the rate of 110 piastres Miri=10 riyals=£1 gold, should be paid either in gold or by an equivalent number of riyals at the market, as opposed to the official, rate. This rule was now extended to other classes of payments. In the uncertainty which followed the departure of Abdullah Soleiman to Riyadh (September-October report, paragraph 10), the riyal seemed likely to fall to the value of its silver content, about 24 to the gold £. By the end of December, however, under the influence of the events described in the preceding paragraphs, it had recovered to about 17½ and 12½ to the gold and paper £ respectively.

13. No Government indebtedness was reduced during November and December, with the notable exception that the Eastern Telegraph Company received three remittances, totalling some £1,450, in respect of their long-outstanding account. Despite this, the debit Hejazi account amounted to some £2,000 at the end of December. Official salaries were for the most part six months in arrear on the 12th December, from which date the budget is to operate. It is, however, the declared intention of the Government to lump these arrears with the general floating debt, which it is hoped to pay off in the next two years. In face of the penury of all classes of officials, this arrangement has not made any wide appeal.

14. Throughout the autumn the Legation received a stream of complaints from British and British-protected motor-car drivers, mostly Somalis, who had been attracted to the country during the 1931 pilgrimage season by the high wages

offered by certain Government-controlled motor companies, but who, on being discharged after the season, had been quite unable to obtain the balances due to them. The claims, where they appeared genuine, were forwarded to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but, although the Government's liability was not contested, no claim was settled up till the end of the year, and in only two cases were the men able to make even sacrificial arrangements with the companies. In most cases the drivers were reduced to beggary and had to be repatriated by the Legation.

15. The Government of India debt is dealt with in paragraph 44, and that due to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. in paragraph 45.

16. In November His Majesty's Government were approached by the Ottoman Debt Council with the proposal that they, in conjunction with the other Government signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, should make joint representations to the Hejaz-Nejd Government in the matter of the shares of the Ottoman Public Debt due by the latter. It appeared that the Hejaz-Nejd Government, invited by the council to settle their quota of the debt, had replied on the 29th September refusing point-blank to recognise any responsibility or to take any action in the matter. This can hardly be regarded as surprising. His Majesty's Government had earlier in the year been approached by the French Government with a similar proposal of the council in respect of the European Governments, who were similarly debtors, and had replied that, while they agreed in principle to the proposal, they considered the moment inopportune for the purpose. No further action was accordingly taken in this instance, a formal acknowledgment only being sent to the Council.

Economic Situation.

17. It was generally felt, at the end of the year, that the economic situation could hardly have been worse. The merchants of Jedda and Mecca had, for the past two years, been increasingly hard hit, not only by trade depression, but by the ever-growing volume of forced loans, without material prospect of repayment, extorted from them by the Government in the guise of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman. To this was now added the uncertainty produced by monetary crises elsewhere. Prices of imported goods had risen considerably; and as most of the necessities of life are imported, living was appreciably dearer. Amongst the tribes, particularly in the Northern Hejaz, the utmost misery was reported. Their live-stock, especially camels, have been seriously depleted by Government requisitions for military purposes, and they have been compelled by necessity to sell off much of what remained at heavy losses. Tales of famine were rife, although stories of Bedouin dying of starvation by the hundred were doubtless exaggerated. It became impossible, however, to discount the continuous reports of hunger and increased mortality received from all sources and all directions.

Economic Development.

18. Mr. Twitchell has shown great activity. He first installed his American prospector, Mr. Moseley, near Taif, where he remained during November and December prospecting for gold, with results so far unknown. Mr. Twitchell then resumed work on the Waziria Wells near Jedda (September-October report, paragraph 16). The American windmill pump was erected, and by mid-December was producing a regular flow of water, which at one time found its way through the old Turkish conduit to Jedda. His success stopped there, for the conduit developed serious leaks, and the authorities shrank from the expenditure necessary to recondition it. By the end of December the hoped-for flow of water into the town had still not been attained. On the 15th December Mr. Twitchell departed on an extended tour through Nejd under the King's auspices, to investigate potential supplies of minerals and water. His wife remained at Jedda in charge of the windmill and certain water-seeking operations which had been started in the neighbourhood with the aid of a hand-drill.

Customs Duties.

19. An official communiqué of the 10th November announced the levying as from that date of additional customs duties on benzine, kerosene, sugar, tobacco and cigarette paper, and matches.

Wireless Installation.

20. No further instalments of payment were made by the Hejazi Government (September-October report, paragraph 18), and at the end of December payment was five months in arrear. Some progress in installation was made. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 20th November reported that the station at Hail was now in communication with Taif, Mecca and Medina. This, however, would appear to be an original Turkish plant, since, according to Marconi's engineer, no work at all had as yet been done at Hail. On the 4th December it was announced that the Tabuk station was working as from the 28th November, thus confirming a previous report. M. Boucicault, who had completed it, was at the end of December still detained through lack of stores and benzine at Tabuk, where famine was reported to be increasing. The main Riadh station had not been begun by the end of December, partly owing to the opposition of the Nejd ulema, who objected to wireless as an invention of the devil, and had to be silenced by a Royal harangue reinforced by a squad of soldiery. The old Turkish installation at Jauif has been removed to Skaka, the new headquarters of the district Amir. M. Boucicault had intended to erect a new Marconi station at Jauif, but it is learned that Ibn Saud now wants him to proceed to the Hasa first. There is a difference of opinion, however, as to who should pay his travelling expenses.

Legislation.

21. His Majesty's Minister had in July drawn the attention of His Majesty's Government to a Hejazi regulation published the previous February, under the terms of which writs issued by foreign courts for use in the Hejaz had apparently to be legalised first by the British Legation at Jedda, and then by the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had suggested that the seals and signatures of all courts or officials in British territory, which might be accepted for the purpose, should be communicated to him. The Government of India was requested by the India Office on the 4th November to act in this sense, and the Governments of certain Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories were similarly addressed by the Colonial Office on the 20th November.

Communications.

22. Early in November His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires questioned the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs as to the reported proposal to start a motor-service on the old pilgrim route from Najaf to Medina (September-October report, paragraph 21). Fuad Bey confirmed that the Iraq Government had enquired as to the route from Najaf through Jauif and Taima to Medina, and had been told that it was impracticable for cars between Jauif and Taima on account of the soft sands of the Nafud desert. He added that the Hejaz-Nejd Government were now studying the possibilities of the old direct route, the "Darb Zubeyda," from Najaf through Hail to Medina; but that there was no truth in the report that the King would shortly travel to Hail to inaugurate it.

23. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 11th November published a long article entitled "Moslem Routes." Eight routes, it stated, were formerly used by pilgrims on their way to the Holy Cities, namely, the routes of Syria (from Damascus), of Egypt, of Aden, of San'a, of Oman, of Al Ahsa, of Basra, and of Bagdad (the Darb Zubeyda); but most of these had been abandoned of recent years in favour of the sea-routes to Jedda. The Government were now examining a project to open a motor-route from Iraq via Najaf, Al Ruwun, and Jauif, an Iraqi company running motor-services as far as Jauif, and a Hejazi company running a corresponding service on from Jauif to Mecca and Medina. A route from Jauif to Hail and Medina was also being considered. Subsequent articles intimated that the Government had received many applications for permission to open a road from Syria to Jauif, which they were studying, and that over 2,000 pilgrims were expected this year to travel overland from Iraq, though it was not yet settled which route would be used.

24. The October number of the "Oriente Moderno" also mentioned the project of a motor-route from Syria and Iraq via Najaf, stating that Syrian, Persian and Iraqi pilgrims would be able to use it and thus escape the vexatious

Syrian and Egyptian quarantine regulations. An Iraqi company would probably obtain the concession to run motor-services on the route, in preference to the British company which was said to be applying.

The Hejaz Railway.

25. The Moslem Congress held at Jerusalem on the 6th to the 16th December formed a committee to study and report on the vexed question of the Hejaz Railway. The committee's report was neither accurate nor profound. The discussion of it was too inflamed to be serious. The following resolution was finally adopted:—

"After hearing the report of the committee on the Hejaz Railway and perusing the documents relating thereto, the congress declares its resentment of the usurpation of Moslem property, which is essentially a Wakf. The congress should approach Islamic and other Governments in this regard, and should empower the Executive Committee to discuss other means for the recovery of this line."

26. It remains to be seen what action, if any, Ibn Saud will take.

Moslem Congress at Jerusalem.

27. On the 14th November the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, under urgent instructions from Ibn Saud, requested His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to ascertain His Majesty's Government's attitude towards the proposed Moslem Congress. The Grand Mufti of Palestine, Fuad Bey said, had invited the Hejazi Government to send a representative and leading persons, like himself and Sheikh Yûsuf Yâsin, to attend. He stressed the probable anti-British and patently anti-Saudi complexion of the conference, and said that the King did not know whether to stand aloof and suffer the consequences, or to send a representative to look after his interests. He did not like the agenda and was confused by the fact of receiving an invitation from a Palestinian Government official. So he relied on a lead from His Majesty's Government.

28. Fuad Bey was told on the 21st November, in reply, that His Majesty's Government regretted that they could not take the responsibility of advising Ibn Saud as to whether he should send delegates or not. He might, however, be glad to know that His Majesty's Government were in no way associated with the proposal to hold the congress, and that it had neither their encouragement nor support. Their attitude was one of detachment, excepting in so far as regarded any possible reaction on public security in Palestine. As for the Grand Mufti, he was no doubt acting as a religious dignitary and not as a Palestinian official.

29. A week later Fuad Bey was orally informed that, as a result of recent conversations between the High Commissioner for Palestine and the Grand Mufti, His Majesty's Government did not anticipate that political issues would be raised, or that the proceedings of the congress would cause embarrassment to Ibn Saud's Government. Moreover, the Grand Mufti had given a specific assurance that the Caliphate question would not be raised. Fuad Bey expressed gratitude for this information.

30. In the event Ibn Saud sent no delegate, his "Umm-al-Qura" snubbed the congress (although Fuad Hamza sent a message of support), and the only questions raised at Jerusalem which appear to affect Ibn Saud were that of the Hejaz Railway, dealt with in paragraph 25 above; the proposal that a committee be appointed in each Moslem country to raise funds for the projected university at Jerusalem; and the circulation of a propaganda leaflet, entitled "The Voice of Mecca," denouncing the Saudi régime. It may also be noted that the delegates visited the tomb of the late ex-King Hussein, and lunched with his son Abdullah. Wahhabi tendencies were displayed at the congress by Rashid Ridha, an Egyptian, but met with opposition from the rest.

Security.

31. The only known case affecting internal security continued to be that of the Danish Moslem, Knud Holmboe (September-October report, paragraph 24). Although informed that the man had definitely not returned to Transjordan, and repeatedly pressed, unofficially, for more and accurate information, Fuad Bey only replied that nothing was known of the affair.

II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

Raiding.

Transjordan.

32. The Hejazi Government have lately complained of the five following raids, said to have been made from Transjordan into Nejd in December:—

- On the 1st December at Kalakh, twenty-five camels taken;
- On the 2nd December at Rajm-an-Naam, sixteen camels taken;
- On the 8th December near Shinam, sixty camels taken;
- On the 8th December at Ar Rajaa, twenty-five camels taken;
- On the 14th December at Mudhaibia, a caravan taken and two men killed.

No raid was complained of on the Transjordan side of the frontier during November and December.

33. Repercussions from the raid of the 28th September at Haj (not Hazim, nor Hazm) engaged attention. On the 2nd December the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs stated categorically that the victims, the Atun section of the Huweytat, were subjects of Ibn Saud. The Transjordan authorities, however, claimed them as Transjordan subjects, and during the rest of the month past correspondence was examined in an attempt to settle the question, but without final result.

Glubb-Ibn Zeid Meetings.

34. No meeting was held, but preparations were made to hold one early in January.

MacDonnell Investigation.

35. On the 23rd November the Hejazi Government replied in these words to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires' request of the 6th October for the payment of the Hejazi share of the costs of the investigation:—

"The agreement, in accordance with the terms of which the arbitration took place, contained the proviso that each party should bear the expenses of the arbitration in proportion to the judgment given against it, but there was no ruling to meet the case of no judgment being given against either party. . . . My Government are surprised that they should be requested to pay half the expenses of the arbitration, when they have experienced heavy loss as a result of the reduction of the claims of their subjects."

This Semitic calculation on an arbitral award, which held that the claims of both sides cancelled each other out, was transmitted to His Majesty's Government on the 1st December, and when Mr. Hope Gill had occasion, during a telephone conversation with Fuad Bey later in the month, to refer to it in appropriate terms, he received the soft answer that, if the Hejazi Government were pressed to pay, they would probably do so. He advised Fuad Bey that the Hejazi Government would no doubt find it more pleasant to make up their mind and pay without waiting for His Majesty's Government's views on their refusal. They did nothing, however, by the end of December.

Aerial Trespass.

36. On the 1st December, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied to a Hejazi protest, made in October, to the effect that three British aircraft had violated the Transjordan-Nejd frontier. He explained that one machine had been compelled by engine trouble to land, but that the atmosphere was hazy, and the leader of the formation was therefore doubtful of his exact position; he thought that the landing was made in Transjordan territory. In fact it was made in Nejd territory. Mr. Hope Gill drew attention to the fact that the landing was due to circumstances beyond the pilot's control and expressed His Majesty's Government's regret. In reply of the 12th December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he found it necessary to draw His Majesty's Government's attention to the fact that, although the Hejazi Government were always ready to afford all possible

assistance, they could not avoid taking such measures as would leave no room for any infringement of their regulations or violation of their honour.

37. In transmitting this reply to His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Minister observed that its language reflected the churlish spirit in which the Hejazi Government habitually dealt with questions of this kind. It might almost be construed as a menace, but in view of His Majesty's Government's desire to avoid fruitless correspondence over the matter, Sir A. Ryan did not propose to pursue it in writing, but would draw Fuad Bey's attention to the unfriendly tone of the reply on his return from Riyadh. He did so in January. Fuad Hamza explained, somewhat lamely and obscurely, what he apparently tried to convey was that the note meant that, even if the Hejaz-Nejd Government had to condone a violation of territory, it did not impair their rights. In view, however, of the friendly nature of contemporary correspondence about the missing Iraqi pilot, Squadron-Leader Warburton, Sir Andrew did not press the matter further.

Iraq.

38. There is nothing of interest to report, except the death at Riyadh in October or early November of the Mutair chieftain Feisal-ad-Dawish, once a prominent figure on the Iraq frontier and leader of the 1929 rebellion against Ibn Saud. He is said to have died of an internal disorder in the nature of dysentery.

39. The project of a pilgrim route for cars from Iraq to the Hejaz has been noted in paragraph 22.

Koweit and Bahrein.

40. There is nothing definite to report, beyond a certain increased activity on the Koweit border on the part of Ibn Muhairib, Ibn Saud's frontier official.

Asir and the Yemen.

41. The meeting of Saudi and Yemeni delegates referred to in paragraph 46 of the last report was held early in November at An Nadhir, near Mount Arwa, the place in dispute. Neither side would give way, however, and the matter was referred to their respective Governments. Telegraphic messages were thereupon exchanged between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya, as a result of which the latter asked the former to arbitrate. "Wherefore His Majesty," as the Hejazi proclamation puts it, "wishing the dispute to be settled by peaceful means and bloodshed to be avoided, desirous also of seeing co-operation prevail amongst the Arabs, could not but telegraph to His Highness the Imam giving judgment against himself, namely, the surrender of Mount Arwa to the Yemen Friendly relations have thus been established between His Majesty the King and His Highness the Imam on firm foundations, please God Almighty." Ibn Saud must have felt that circumstances were indeed against him, to induce him to yield ground to the Yemen.

42. The local pact nevertheless bore fruit. On the 15th December a treaty of friendship, neighbourliness and extradition was signed at Abu Arish between the Hejaz-Nejd and the Yemen. It came as a surprise and is not much believed in.

III.—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA.

British Empire.

43. Relations were normal. They centred round the Transjordan frontier, the Hejaz air force and Ibn Saud's debts. The first-named has been dealt with in paragraphs 32 to 37. Air matters are reported in paragraphs 55 to 60 below. It is convenient to mention the debts here.

44. At the end of his conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 13th November (see paragraph 4 above), the Hejazi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs preferred a request that His Majesty's Government would allow the 1929 debt of £30,000, owing to the Government of India, to be included in the virtual moratorium and placed on a basis of equality with the whole of Hejazi-Nejd indebtedness. Mr. Hope Gill replied that he would communicate the

request to His Majesty's Government, but that facts and figures would certainly be required. Fuad Bey was in no position, however, to say what the other indebtedness was, either by category or in total, but he thought that it would be possible to liquidate it all in two years. This meagre information was telegraphed to London.

45. Mr. Hope Gill then reminded Fuad Bey of the benzine debt of £13,000 to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., which he insisted could not be deferred, but must be paid according to the agreement of September. Fuad Bey took note of this, but promised nothing. As regards the current debt to the Eastern Telegraph Company, which was always £2,000 or more, he assured Mr. Hope Gill that all postal and telegraphic receipts would henceforth be reserved for its liquidation and would not be pooled with the Government's other resources. Mr. Hope Gill made a passing reference to the Hejazi half-share of the costs of the MacDonnell investigation, a matter of only £1,700, and was promised an early reply (see paragraph 35). He made no reference to the Marconi debt, which, though mounting up and £5,000 high at the turn of the year, is a matter on which neither the company nor Mr. Philby, their agent, has yet approached the Legation. He mentioned, however, the several hundred pounds owing to a number of British and British-protected chauffeurs in Government employ (see paragraph 14), but without drawing more than a sardonic reference to the similar plight of all Government employees in the country.

International.

46. On the 23rd November the Hejaz-Nejd telegraphed to Geneva its adherence to the proposed armaments truce. No decision to accept the invitation to attend the Disarmament Conference was notified before the end of the year.

France.

47. The treaty with France was at last signed on the 10th November, together with an agreement covering relations with Syria. The former is the result of nearly two years' negotiation; it is understood to follow the lines of the Treaty of Jedda, but to exclude all mention of the suppression of the slave trade, that civilised aim to which His Majesty's Government had succeeded in binding Ibn Saud—on paper.

The Netherlands.

48. M. Adriaanse returned to Jedda on the 5th November and presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires. He had spent a part of his leave acting as secretary to the Orientalists' Conference at Leiden, but he finds the local Arabic well-nigh unintelligible.

Germany.

49. M. de Haas went on leave in November, leaving a local German merchant in charge of his consulate.

Soviet Russia.

50. A second consignment of Soviet oil was delivered at Jedda in November (see paragraph 10).

Turkey.

51. Lutfullah Bey was in November at length able to present his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires. His Legation has since been charged with Afghan interests.

Persia.

52. Ain-ul-Mulk Habibullah Khan Hoveida once more returned to Jedda, after six months' leave of absence, on the 26th December.

United States of America.

53. The prospecting activities of Mr. Crane's engineer are described in paragraph 18.

Denmark.

54. There being no Danish representative here, His Majesty's Government were asked to have enquiries made by the Legation as to the fate of an adventurous Dane, with results that are told in paragraph 31.

Hejaz Air Force Machines.

IV.—AIR MATTERS.

55. Following on the crash of one machine (September–October report, paragraph 6), and the departure of the last British pilot (*ibidem*, paragraph 62), the four Wapitis remained in their hangar throughout November and December. No one was in particular charge of them. The British engineer who looks after the local sea-water condensers was occasionally asked to look at them; he reported that the engines were apparently sufficiently well greased, but that the fabric and stays were suffering from moth and rust respectively. The roof of the hangar then fell in; the machines were moved to an adjacent spot where they were kept under lock and key and a cover of cotton sheets.

Hejaz Air Force Personnel.

56. On the 7th November the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs gave a private hint to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that if His Majesty's Government were to propose that a British aviation mission should be sent to the Hejaz, he would be prepared to urge Ibn Saud to accept it. The position, he explained, had changed since the King had refused an offer of even partial assistance in 1927, and Fuad Hamza was now so anxious to avoid the impression of Anglo-Hejazi estrangement which would be given by their engagement of a personnel other than British that he was ready to act as indicated. He was not in a strong enough position to do more.

57. To this suggestion, and to the King's definite proposals reported in paragraph 67 of the September–October report, His Majesty's Government replied on the 14th November. They pointed out, firstly, that their willingness to select new personnel for the Hejaz Air Force was based on the Hejazi Government's proposals of the 17th June (May–June report, paragraph 56), which were superseded by the King's proposals referred to above. These had been sympathetically considered, but could not be accepted. The King's request that the personnel should be "under his orders for every purpose" could not be complied with, for reasons already stated (September–October report, paragraph 66, first sentence), while the alternative proposal to engage British personnel for instruction and maintenance and non-British personnel for operations could not be accepted, as it would be unworkable in practice owing to divided responsibility. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was also informed that even the June proposals, if revived, would have to be subject to major conditions, (a) that the personnel should not be employed for warlike operations or against rebels, the Government of India having revived their previous objections on this point, and (b) that no foreign personnel should be engaged for flying the aircraft for which British personnel would be responsible. Moreover, the lack of instructional machines, the language difficulty, &c., were, in any case, serious obstacles to the success of the scheme; while complications over the payment and treatment of the personnel would have been inevitable, in view of the state of the Hejazi finances. The scheme would thus, in any case, have had to be abandoned. The suggestion of an air mission had already been tentatively considered; but it would not meet Ibn Saud's apparent desire to use the pilots against possible enemies or rebels, while its cost, no part of which His Majesty's Government could bear in the existing crisis, would be greater than that of an unofficial personnel.

58. The decisions regarding Ibn Saud's later proposals and the air mission suggestion were duly communicated to him through Fuad Hamza. On the 22nd November the latter forwarded a message from the King regretting His Majesty's Government's decision, reaffirming that he did not wish to use the personnel for warlike operations against anyone but must have them under his orders whenever necessary for defence, and stating that, while he understood His Majesty's Government's attitude, he was obliged to look for personnel elsewhere. This was not the first little rift in the lute, but it began to affect the tune.

59. There the matter rested at the end of December. Nothing transpired as to the King's attempts to engage foreign personnel, except an unconfirmed report that a Polish engineer from Mecca had been sent to recruit personnel in Poland.

Arabian Air Route.

60. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had on the 10th October suggested to His Majesty's Government that, if they could help Ibn Saud to obtain the air personnel he required, his agreement to the facilities they sought from him in regard to landing grounds on the Hasa Coast (July–August report, paragraph 72) might be requested as a *quid pro quo*. He suggested an annual rental for these grounds of £1,000 gold as the lowest which Ibn Saud would be likely to consider. On the 26th November the Air Ministry informed the Foreign Office that, while it now seemed improbable that the request for facilities could be made as a *quid pro quo*, they would like it to be broached to Ibn Saud at the first suitable opportunity. They considered, however, that the suggested rent was excessive, as they did not require the grounds for exclusive Royal Air Force use, but only asked that they should be marked out and available for pilots flying on the Persian Gulf route to land on in case of distress; the other desiderata relating to the treatment of the crews of distressed aircraft were, they suggested, no more than His Majesty's Government had a right to expect on grounds of humanity and international courtesy. An annual rental of £50 for each of the three grounds would, in their opinion, be adequate to meet the cost of maintenance and renewal of the markings. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was accordingly instructed on the 2nd December to take up the matter with the Hejaz-Nejd Government at a suitable opportunity; one did not, however, arise before the end of the month.

V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

Northern Hejaz.

61. During November and December the only addition reported to have been made to the Saudi forces in the northern amirates was that of a draft of 150 men to Tabuk. The Amir of Jauf, Turki-as-Sudairi, moved his headquarters and wireless to Skaka, a village 22 miles north-east of Jauf, in November. In December he posted 100 camelmen and five cars under Ibn Hamdan forward in the Wadi Sirhan, at Isawiya.

62. Everywhere in the north the condition of the garrisons continued to deteriorate. Still no pay was issued, and at Kaf and Tabuk the troops were said to be on the verge of starvation. Circumstantial reports were, at the same time, received from Mecca and Medina that a Nafir al 'Amm, or general call to arms for Jihad, was in progress in Nejd and the Northern Hejaz. It was commonly thought that Ibn Saud was on the point of risking his arm in a throw against Transjordan as the only means left to him of pacifying the general discontent and offering his starving tribes the chance of helping themselves. Reflection, of course, suggested that Ibn Saud could not be so foolish as to engage openly in an enterprise which would bring him into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government, but the possibility could not be dismissed in the case of a man such as he, strong-willed and ambitious, who was already in hard straits and might be desperate in a few months. There was, of course, the alternative possibility of the same object being pursued less openly by the promotion of authorised raids, but no untoward development in either direction took place before the end of the year.

East (Nejd).

63. The death of Feisal-ad-Dawish in prison at Riyadh (see paragraph 38) is said to have caused widespread consternation and gloom amongst the Mutair and increased bitterness against Ibn Saud. The common belief was that he had been murdered.

64. Apart from this, there were rumours of much dissatisfaction in Nejd and some specific allegations of discontent owing to oppressive taxation, non-payment of wages and bounties, levies in kind on merchants, attempts to impose the use of the unpopular Hejazi dollar, and the reforms instituted in the Hasa by the mission of Muhammad-at-Tawil, whose life was said to have been

more than once in danger; but there was no active outbreak or military movement of note. Information was, however, received from Bahrein that an unusual withdrawal of horsemen from the Hasa Coast into Nejd had been noticed in November, and from Mecca to the effect that some 24,000 rifles had been collected and repaired there and sent to Riyadh. The inference drawn was that, while Ibn Saud was certainly consolidating his position there, it was probably more as a precautionary measure than with a view to expansion or conquest. That is as much as can be said of a situation that was unsettled and obscure.

South (Asir).

65. Clashes were reported between Khalid-bin-Luwey and dissidents of the Beni Najran, who are said to have been subdued. On the whole, however, the southern frontier was quiet, thanks to the conversations reported in paragraphs 41 and 42, which resulted in the pact of Mount Arwa and a treaty with the Yemen.

VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

66. No naval visits by British or foreign warships took place during November or December.

67. On the 5th November His Majesty's Government communicated to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires their decision regarding the advisability of the more frequent visits by His Majesty's ships to ports in the Hejaz and Asir desired by the Admiralty (July-August report, paragraph 78). It was decided to maintain for four months the present practice, by which His Majesty's ships visit none of these ports except Jedda, and to review the situation at the end of this period.

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

Forged Rupee Notes.

68. More reports were received regarding the presence in the Hejaz of forged Indian currency notes. In one case pilgrims from districts on either side of the North-West Frontier of India were said to be in possession of forged notes believed to have been distributed there by Soviet agents; in another, German agents were said to be distributing forged notes among pilgrims in the Hejaz. No confirmation of either story could be obtained, however. In December another letter was received from the alleged broker of forged notes in Syria by the member of the Legation staff who had tried to entrap him in the previous winter (January-February report, paragraph 51). The matter was referred to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut on the 27th December for his views.

Nigerian Pilgrim Destitutes.

69. On the 10th November the Sudan Government replied to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires' despatch of the 6th October (September-October report, paragraph 75) regarding the 500 odd Nigerian destitutes whom the Legation was obliged to repatriate to Africa at the cost of the Nigerian Government. They pointed out that the majority of these destitutes had probably arrived in the Hejaz via Eritrea in sanbuqs, for had they come via Suakin they would have had return tickets and passports, and recent correspondence had clearly shown up the failure of the Eritrean authorities to implement the articles of the 1926 Sanitary Convention, which bound them to prevent embarkation by sanbuq from Massawa. In the state of unemployment existing in the Sudan and of economic depression reported in French West Africa, they did not feel justified in accepting the responsibility on behalf of the Government of Nigeria for the repatriation of these destitutes, which would have the effect of encouraging pilgrims to evade quarantine measures and use the Massawa route. They suggested that the Eritrean authorities should be held responsible for their repatriation. A despatch from his Excellency the Governor-General, dated the 14th November, amplified these points, but envisaged the possibility of some of the destitutes being absorbed in the Sudan labour market in February 1932, should conditions still warrant it.

70. It was therefore arranged to examine and classify at the Legation all Nigerian destitutes then in Jedda and seeking repatriation. This examination

was carried out during the second week of November by the pro-consul, in the presence of a member of the Italian consulate, who assisted in the interrogation of the pilgrims and agreed the conclusions arrived at. It involved five days' exhaustive work; but the results were striking. During the month which had elapsed since the opening of the question, many more destitutes had flocked to Jedda under the stress of economic depression throughout the country, and a total of over 900 was finally examined. Some 100 had come to the Hejaz via Suakin, and 800 via Massawa. Of the former, thirty-two held return tickets, all of which were time-expired; the remaining two-thirds had come to the Hejaz between pilgrim seasons on single tickets. Ninety-four held pilgrim-passes or other Sudan papers; the rest had lost theirs.

71. On the 29th November, 108 pilgrims who had come via Suakin were repatriated at destitute rates by Khedivial Mail steamer to Suakin, with the concurrence of the Government of Nigeria and of the Sudan Government, who, while reserving their rights in the matter, undertook to waive the incoming quarantine dues. The Hejazi Government also waived outgoing dues. In the meantime, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had approached the Italian consul with a view to inducing the Eritrean authorities to accept at Massawa, without payment of quarantine dues, 500 out of such destitutes as might be proved to have come to the Hejaz via Massawa, to be sent in batches of 100 by the fortnightly Italian steamer. The consul proved helpful. He sent his interpreter, as already stated, to be present at the interrogation of the destitutes; and, on receiving the resulting proof of the Massawa sanbuq traffic, succeeded in securing the acceptance of the proposed arrangement by the Eritrean authorities. The latter also intervened with the subventioned Italian shipping company to induce them to quote a low destitute rate. The Nigerian Government agreed to the arrangement, and on the 20th December the first batch was embarked for Massawa, the Hejazi Government again waiving outgoing dues.

Nigerian Pilgrimage Control.

72. The examination of Nigerian pilgrim destitutes described in paragraph 70 above incidentally showed up three undesirable aspects of the present system by which these pilgrims reach the Hejaz. The first was that far too high a proportion of those embarking at Suakin do not come during the pilgrimage season, when they are compelled to purchase return tickets, but slip over between seasons on single tickets. Another was that the six-month period of validity of return tickets is too short to suit the leisurely habits of the African pilgrim, who, on reaching the Hejaz, usually works there for over a year to earn money before recrossing the Red Sea. His Majesty's Minister, who had the previous May suggested to the Sudan Government that return tickets should be made compulsory for pilgrims all the year round and should be valid for at least a year, on the 21st December again emphasised these points in a despatch to Khartoum.

73. The third and most important fact of which irresistible evidence was now afforded was the existence of a regular pilgrim-traffic by sanbuq from Massawa to ports on the Arabian littoral. The Foreign Office, in a despatch of the 9th October, had forwarded corroborative evidence of this, collected independently by the Sudan Government, and requested His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to submit any evidence collected at Jedda which might assist His Majesty's Government to represent the more forcibly to the Italian Government the failure of the Eritrean authorities to implement the relevant articles of the 1926 Sanitary Convention. The information contained in paragraph 70 above was accordingly forwarded to His Majesty's Government on the 28th November.

74. On the 10th September the Nigerian Government gave their general approval to the proposals for improved control of the West African pilgrimage drawn up between the Legation and the Sudan Government (March-April report, paragraph 63).

1932 Pilgrimage.

75. Despite active propaganda on behalf of the pilgrimage carried out in India, Malaya, and Java by the Hejaz Government, including an assurance that Pilgrimage Day in 1932 would fall on a Friday, prospects at the end of December were very poor. All the direct sailings from Singapore during November and

December were cancelled for lack of bookings. Only about 2,500 Javanese arrived during these months, and the Dutch Legation thought these to be about half the eventual number, which would thus be 5,000 as against the 16,000 of 1931. The Indian pilgrimage promised slightly better; but it seemed unlikely by the end of December that the total number of overseas arrivals for 1932 would much exceed 20,000, as against the meagre 40,000 of last year.

Manumissions.

VIII.—SLAVERY.

76. One Nigerian male slave who took refuge in the Legation in December was manumitted and repatriated to Suakin on the 26th December.

Intelligence Service.

77. As a result of a meeting of the Standing Aden Committee held in London in July, His Majesty's Government decided not to establish a slavery intelligence service on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea.

Abyssinian Slaves.

78. The successful repatriation by the Legation of two Abyssinian slave-boys by way of Jibuti (July-August report, paragraph 84) led His Majesty's Government to enquire of His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa whether the Ethiopian Government would be likely to consent to all Abyssinian slaves manumitted in future by the British Legation at Jedda being sent by this route at the cost of their Government, as a permanent rule. Sir S. Barton in his reply of the 2nd November stated that he would prefer to take up specific cases as they arose, rather than press the Ethiopian Government to agree to any permanent system.

Visitors.

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

79. Mr. Twitchell left Jedda on the 15th December for a prospecting tour in Nejd. His activities have been reported in paragraph 18 above.

M. Fazl-ul-Haq, former Minister in Bengal and member of the Round Table Conference, arrived in Jedda on the 26th December and left six days later after visiting Medina.

Colonel Nawab Osman Jar-ud-Daula, Commander-in-chief of the Hyderabad State Army, arrived at Jedda on the 29th November and left on the 4th December after visiting Mecca and Medina.

Princess Saniya Insherah visited the Hejaz early in November and left for India on the 26th November *en route* for Hyderabad.

Prince Mehmed Djemaledine (son of Prince Mehmed Shevket), with his wife and two other persons, arrived in the Hejaz in November, and, after being refused visas for India, left for Massawa on the 6th December *en route* for either San'a or Addis Ababa. Their object was apparently to raise the wind, but local generosity rose to no more than the cost of their passages out of the country.

Deportations.

80. Throughout October and November a certain Mubarik Ali, an Indian graduate of Punjab University and a religious fanatic, who had "done hijra," i.e., fled like the Prophet, from the infidel land of India, had been bombarding the Legation, the local banks, and the Dutch Legation with abusive and threatening letters from Mecca. His grievance at first concerned certain losses on exchange which he said he had suffered through the depreciation of sterling; but its scope was extended in subsequent letters to include the failure of the Legation, in a third-person note, to call him "Sir"; the duties of British representatives; the barbarism of half-naked European women; and the coming of the Mahdi and his triumph over Christians in battle. Explicit reference was made in the last case to massacre of unbelievers, and the Legation was constrained on the 21st November to ask the Hejaz Government to deport him.

Staff.

81. Sir Andrew Ryan returned to Jedda from leave of absence, and resumed charge of the Legation on the 15th December.

Mr. Wikeley arrived back in Jedda from leave of absence on the 18th November.

Meteorological.

82. Office readings for the year were as follows:—

1931.	Humidity. Average Percentage of Saturation.		Temperature.			
			Highest Maximum Reading.	Average.		Lowest Minimum Reading.
				Maximum by Day.	Minimum at Night.	
	Percentage.	Rain.	F.	F.	F.	F.
January	72.5	..	83	80	72	68
February	63	..	81	78.5	71	65
March	60	$\frac{1}{2}$ inch	89	79	74	66
April	65.5	..	90	85	74	70
May	68	..	99	84	79	72
June	63	..	92	92	79	74
July	59	..	97	93	85	81
August	66.5	..	97	93	88.5	85
September	73	..	96	91.5	85.5	80
October	70	..	93	89	81	79
November	67	2 inches	92	84	77	72
December	64	$\frac{1}{2}$ inch	84	78.5	72	65

Wind was about 90 per cent. constant but variable in force; the prevailing quarter was north-west (Red Sea).

Annex to Enclosure.

(Translation.)

Budget Regulation for the Financial Year beginning Shaban 1, 1350 (December 12, 1931), and ending Rajab 30, 1351 (November 30, 1932).

A HIGH decree has been issued sanctioning the Government budget regulation for the financial year which commences the 1st Shaban, 1350 (the 12th December, 1931), as follows:—

1. The funds specified for Government Departments for the financial year beginning the 1st Shaban, 1350 (the 12th December, 1931), and ending the 30th Rajab, 1351 (the 30th November, 1932), as mentioned in the attached lists, amount to 106,442,544 piastres miri (about £967,659 gold).

2. The revenues of the Government for the present year, mentioned in article 1 and in the attached lists, also amount to 106,442,544 piastres miri (about £967,659 gold).

3. There must be strict compliance with all the orders, Acts and financial regulations in force regarding the 10 per cent. and 15 per cent. reduction of salaries and the 50 per cent. reduction of some of the annual allowances.

4. There must be strict compliance with all orders, Acts and financial regulations regarding the method followed in the past of paying out, receiving, entering, recording, affixing of stamps and keeping and checking of accounts.

5. There must be strict compliance with the decision of the Council of Ministers, No. 3, dated the 21st Rajab, 1350 (the 2nd December, 1931), regarding the enforcement of the budget regulation for the present financial year.

6. The Ministry of Finance, the Director-General of the Treasury, and the heads of the competent Departments are authorised to put into effect the provisions of this regulation, each in what concerns him. The Minister of Finance must prepare the final accounts, and submit them at the end of the financial year in their final form.

List of Allowances decided for the Financial Year 1350-1351.

	Piastres miri.	Roughly equals £ gold.
Royal allowances	6,000,000	60,000
Debt instalments	16,500,000	150,000
Allotment to amirs, Royal diwan, palaces, and the officials of the Treasury Department	12,650,000	115,000
Forces of the frontiers	3,850,000	35,000
Share of the Hejaz in Defence Depart- ments	22,000,000	200,000
Communications and Transports	11,000,000	100,000
Headquarters of Justice and Sharia Courts	1,127,692	10,252
Viceroy's office and sections	3,146,530	28,605
Legislative Council and Administrative Councils	577,310	5,248
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and sections	1,490,789	13,553
Public Health and quarantines	2,734,240	24,857
Water condensers and sections	1,353,225	12,302
Public Department of Education	1,717,047	15,609
Customs Department and sections	1,240,832	11,280
Finance Departments	2,253,028	20,482
Public Security	10,441,196	94,920
Government press	161,820	1,471
Committees of Virtue	165,070	1,501
Miscellaneous allotments	688,720 ⁽¹⁾	6,261
Posts, Telegraphs, Wireless and Tele- phones	4,210,450	38,277
The two Sanctuaries and Wakfs	2,048,137	18,619
Grand total	106,442,544 ⁽²⁾	967,659 ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ The Arabic text not clear; it may be 988,720.

⁽²⁾ Bad addition; really = 105,956,086 or about £963,237 gold.

⁽³⁾ Calculated at "official" rate of piastres miri 110 = gold £1, but market rate on the 31st December was piastres miri 192½ = gold £1. The "official" rate has been used for the purpose of this approximate calculation, although the Hejazi Government have admitted in confidence that the market rate will rule in many of the above allotments, according to their convenience.

[E 1198/704/25]

No. 27.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 90.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 13th February, enclosing an official notification and an extract from the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 14th February respecting relations between Italy and Hejaz-Nejd.

Jedda, February 17, 1932.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca, to Mr. Hope Gill.

Mecca, Shawwal 6, 1350 (February 13, 1932).

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to communicate herewith, with respects, the official notice circulated by the Press Department concerning the signature of the two treaties of friendship and commerce between the Governments of His Majesty the King and of Italy.

(Seal)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Official Notification No. 16.

ON the date mentioned hereunder, a plenipotentiary on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King and a plenipotentiary on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy signed treaties of friendship and commerce between the Kingdom of Hejaz-Nejd and its Dependencies and the Kingdom of Italy, at Jedda, on Wednesday, the 3rd Shawwal, 1350 (the 10th February, 1932). The texts of the two treaties will be published later.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca,
Shawwal 3, 1350 (February 10, 1932).

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

Extract from "Umm-al-Qura" of February 14, 1932.

TEXT OF OFFICIAL RECOGNITION BY ITALY.

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highness,

ON signing a treaty of friendship and a commercial agreement between the two Kingdoms of Italy and the Hejaz-Nejd and its Dependencies in my capacity as plenipotentiary of His Majesty my Lord the King, I have the honour to declare that the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy recognise His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

In according this recognition the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy express their intention of strengthening the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and of strengthening the commercial connexions between Italy and the Colony of Eritrea on the one side and the Hejaz-Nejd and its Dependencies on the other.

His Royal Highness then made a suitable reply. (Not published.)

[E 1310/4/91]

No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)

Sir,

India Office, March 11, 1932.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject of the Muscat Succession.

I am, &c.

S. F. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India.

Sir,

Bushire, February 23, 1932.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 104, dated the 12th February, 1932, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter dated the 15th February, 1932, from the Political Agent, Muscat, and a translation of its enclosure, regarding the accession of His Highness Sayyid Said-bin-Taimur to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. To complete the record I also enclose a copy of my letter of the 9th February referred to in His Highness's letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, Lieutenant-Colonel.

[7797]

E 4

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

Political Agent, Muscat, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Sir,

Muscat, February 15, 1932.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 40 of the 13th February, 1932, I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter in Arabic, with English translation, addressed to you by His Highness.

2. His Highness's accession took place on the 10th instant without incident. There was a certain amount of discussion between his uncles when they were informed of the late Sultan's abdication, but the latter's letter to His Highness nominating him as his successor and your letter conveying the fact that the accession had the approval of His Majesty's Government disposed of any serious opposition that might have been offered. As a matter of fact, considering that His Highness had already acted virtually as Sultan in his capacity of President of the Council, that he was the eldest son of Sir Taimur-bin-Feisal, and that he was generally looked on as the heir apparent, no other member of the Royal Family had any claims to the throne.

3. The only one of His Highness's many uncles who was at all recalcitrant was the eldest of them, Sayyid Nadir, and his attitude was actuated not in any way by personal ambition but by fears for himself. On the morning of the 9th I was informed by Captain Alban, on behalf of His Highness, that all the uncles, who had been informed on the 7th instant of the approaching accession, had agreed to support it with the exception of Sayyid Nadir, who still held out, and who announced his intention of interviewing the Political Agent. He, His Highness, had no objection. I had no wish, of course, to interfere in the family differences of the Royal Family, but as this was an important matter I sent a message to Sayyid Nadir saying that I would be pleased to see him.

4. Sayyid Nadir talked to me for a long time, his refrain being: If His Highness "did anything against him" would I—as Political Agent—help him? I informed him, politely but firmly, that His Highness was Sultan and that I had no intention of interfering in such obviously internal affairs as the relation between the Sultan and his uncles. I purposely kept the conversation, as far as I was concerned, on a light note, and refused to take Sayyid Nadir's apprehensions seriously. I introduced a little judicious flattery, by saying that instead of harbouring these fantastic fears he should be thinking of how he could best help His Highness with his advice and assistance, which, doubtless, would be most useful. Sayyid Nadir finally took his leave looking rather lugubrious, but apparently my advice had a beneficial effect as—having got nothing out of me—I heard afterwards that he hastened to His Highness and effusively offered him his full support. I informed the Sultan later of my conversation with his uncle. His Highness said that he was grateful for the good advice I had given Sayyid Nadir, and added, with a smile, that he imagined that the latter's apprehensions were concerned with a possible cut in his allowance.

5. On the 11th instant, as arranged with His Highness, I made my official call on him, with Captain Mackay, to offer my congratulations on the 'Id and on his accession. There were present members of the Royal Family and notables. I made a short speech to which His Highness replied.

6. As far as can be judged the abdication of Sir Taimur-bin-Feisal and the accession of His Highness have caused little stir or excitement in Muscat. The late Sultan, owing to his prolonged absence from his dominions, had faded out of the picture, and his son was looked on as the inevitable heir. Moreover, the population of Muscat are commercially, not politically, minded, and such matters as the export price of dates and fish, and the import price of piece-goods, together with the rise and fall of the dollar, are probably of more real interest to them, especially in these hard times, than the accession of a new Sultan. Such interest as has been displayed in the town is all in favour of His Highness. The tribes along the coast, and in the interior, will doubtless display more concern. When indications of their attitude are received I will submit a further report.

I have, &c.

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 28.

*The Sultan of Muscat to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.**February 10, 1932.*

(After compliments.)

I ACKNOWLEDGE with pleasure the receipt of your honoured letter dated the 9th January, 1932, in which you informed me that my father has abdicated from the Throne of his State and has appointed me as his successor. You state that you have informed His Majesty's Government of this and that the High Government have been pleased to recognise me as Sultan of Muscat and Oman. I would request you to convey my thanks to the High Government. I am writing to inform you that I have, in conformity with the orders issued by my father, ascended the Throne of the Sultanate to-day and have intimated to the members of my family the decision of my father to abdicate from the throne and that he has nominated me to succeed him. They have approved of that and have accepted me as Ruler of the State. I would request you to inform the High Government that it is not hidden from me that I shall endure in my rule by the continuance of their help and assistance to me and my Government in the same manner as my ancestors were helped by them. And it is hoped that you will assure the aforesaid Government that I have accepted all the obligations to the High Government descending to me from my father and that I am determined to follow his policy in all my relations with Government and that I rely on the help of the Government and declare that in accordance with the wishes of my father I will be guided by its views in important matters, as I am assured that the Government will not be pleased except in what profits my State and desires the maintenance of the independence of our Government and Sultanate. And since, nowadays, there are no other representatives of those Powers in Muscat with whom we are in treaty relations, we would request His Majesty's Government to inform the Governments of the United States, France and Holland of our accession.

In conclusion, I thank your Honour for your sincere wishes and hope that our friendship and union may continue.

Your sincere friend,

SAYYID-BIN-TAIMUR.

Enclosure 4 in No. 28.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

Your Highness,

H.M.S. "Fowey," January 9, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Highness that your father, Sayyid Taimur-bin-Feisal, at the conclusion of an interview which I had with him at Karachi, addressed to me a letter in which he announced his unwillingness to return to Muscat for reasons of health and his determination to abdicate from the throne and informed me that he had nominated your Highness to succeed him and to exercise all powers as Ruler of the State.

I have communicated the text of this letter to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, who, in accordance with the wishes expressed in your father's letter, have authorised me to inform you that they recognise your Highness officially as Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

In conclusion, permit me of your Highness's kindness to express my very sincere wishes that your Highness may have a long and prosperous reign, and to renew our friendly relations.

Yours, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 24.)
(No. 113.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him translation of an extract from the "Umm-al-Qura" publishing the text of the treaty between the Hejaz-Nejd and the Yemen.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Rome and to Aden.

Jedda, February 29, 1932.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Extract from "Umm-al-Qura" of February 26, 1932 (Shawwal 19, 1350).

(Translation.)

TREATY WITH THE YEMEN.

WE publish in this issue the text of the treaty concluded between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies on the one side and the Yemen on the other, which the representatives of both parties signed at Abu 'Arish on the 5th day of Shaban, 1350 (the 15th December, 1931), and the ratification of which has been mentioned in the previous issue.

Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, and of Nejd and its Dependencies and the Yemen.

IN compliance with the commands of His Highness the Imam-al-Aadham (the greatest Imam), Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamiduddin, and His Majesty the great King Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud, we have assembled on behalf of the two Kings with a view to the conclusion of an agreement between the two Governments under the articles mentioned hereinafter.

ARTICLE 1.

Both countries shall maintain friendship and good neighbourliness, strengthen the bonds of amity, and not permit in their territory any activity prejudicial to the other (side).

ARTICLE 2.

Each Government shall hand over (to the other) at the request of his Government any criminal, whether political or non-political, who shall commit a crime after (the conclusion of) this agreement.

ARTICLE 3.

Each country shall treat the subjects of the other residing in their territories in accordance with the Sharia laws in all respects.

ARTICLE 4.

Each country shall guarantee and give full Sharia rights to the subjects of the other. Any difficulty which the Amirs and officials are unable to settle shall be referred to the King and the Imam.

ARTICLE 5.

Each country shall refuse admittance (into its territories) to any fugitive, great or small, employed [? by his Government] or not employed, who is seeking to escape from obedience to his country. Such a person shall be returned to his own country at once.

In the event of a subject of either Government causing an incident in the other country, he shall be tried by the courts within whose jurisdiction the incident arose.

ARTICLE 7.

Amirs and officials [? of either country] shall not interfere with the subjects (of the other country) in such a manner as to cause disturbance and to bring about a misunderstanding between the two countries.

ARTICLE 8.

In the event of a subject of one of the Governments residing in the territories of the other being required by his own Government, after (the conclusion of) this agreement, he shall immediately be sent to his Government.

This is what has been agreed upon between the representatives of His Highness the Imam and His Majesty the King Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud. The execution of these eight articles is subject to agreement and ratification by the two great Kings. The above has been written in duplicate, one copy having been given to each party, on this 5th day of Shaban, 1350 (the 15th December, 1931).

(Signatures and Seals.)

ABDULLAH-BIN-MUHAMMAD-BIN-MUAMMAR.

QADHI ABDULLAH-BIN-AHMAD-AL-ARSHI.

FAHD-BIN-ZUEIR.

SAKHAR ABDULLAH-BIN-ALI MANAA.

ABDUL WAHHAB-BIN-MUHAMMAD ABU MELHA.

ABU TALIB-BIN-MUHAMMAD MUHJAB.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-DALIM ABU ZAATA HAMAD-AL-ABDALL.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-ALI-AL-HAZMI.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 119.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 5, 1932.

IN his despatch No. 36 of the 21st January, Sir A. Ryan transmitted to you the text of the "budget" upon which the finances of this country are supposed now to be based. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that the "budget" contained no detail of estimated revenue; the Hejazi Government simply assuming that sufficient revenue would accrue to meet the estimated expenditure, of which alone certain details were given.

2. To facilitate study of these details, I have prepared a list, (1) which I attach, grouping them under six main heads:—

- (1) Royal allowances.
- (2) Royal Princes, palaces, diwan, and Treasury.
- (3) Frontier forces and Defence Departments.
- (4) Communications and transport.
- (5) Debt instalments.
- (6) Administrative Departments.

(1) Not printed.

3. It will be noticed that items (1) to (3) are estimated to cost round-figure sums which are multiples of 110. This leads one to suppose that they are calculated on the gold basis of 110 piastres miri equals £1. At this rate they would be equivalent to a total of £660,000.

4. The fifteen subdivisions (a) to (o) of item (6), however, are estimated to the uttermost piastre. In view of the fact that they represent chiefly the salaries and wages of departmental staffs and employees, and in view also of Fuad Hamza's admission reported in paragraph 4 of Sir A. Ryan's despatch that much of the expenditure would, in fact, be incurred in silver, it is, I think, safe to assume that the whole of item (6) is calculated in silver piastres. The current rate of these is about 190 to the £ gold. At this rate item (6) would represent some £175,000. The total estimated expenditure would thus amount to £835,000 in the current financial year which ends the 30th November next.

5. You will observe that none of these items of expenditure bears any relation at all to the percentage allotments which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Bey Hamza informed me officially and confidentially last November would form the basis of the budgetary reform. Thirty-five per cent. of the revenue was to be devoted to the administration of the country, 25 per cent. to the liquidation of its debt, 25 per cent. to economic development and pilgrimage needs, and 15 per cent. was to be put aside as a reserve fund. This basis has evidently gone by the board. When reporting its adoption, I remarked that it was not clear how the King would live. It is now quite clear, however, that about half the revenue, or the £410,000 accounted for by expenditure items (1) to (3), will pass to Ibn Saud, or to his comptroller Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman. I should not be in the least surprised if item (4) communications and transport, £100,000, also went that way. Items (5) and (6), repayment of debt and payment of administrative costs and salaries, are likely to be the first to suffer from any diminution of revenue below its "assumed" total. As I have already reported elsewhere, only 70 per cent. of the first financial month's salaries and none of the second month's have so far been paid. The third month is now drawing to a close and the officials are pessimistic. As for the debts, it is the declared intention of the Government to make no repayment until the end of the financial year. I make so bold as to prophesy that they will then declare their inability to make any repayment.

6. What I have written is no more than a series of assumptions. It is unfortunately impossible to submit to you anything more valid at the present time. It is possible that when the Dutch financial adviser arrives—and I learn that he may shortly be expected—something more concrete may materialise. In the meantime this Legation has done its best to collect such local information as may be had, and I have the honour to transmit herewith an interesting memorandum by Mr. Furlonge on the results of the Indian vice-consul's conversations with a leading and intelligent notable, Sheikh Suleiman Gabil, an erstwhile Mayor of Jedda.⁽¹⁾ It discloses, with what accuracy I cannot say, a little of the inner history of the "budget," and makes an attempt to estimate revenue, which seems to fall short of the estimated expenditure by about 25 per cent. of the latter. I am very much inclined to agree with the ex-mayor's dictum that "the whole budget is so much eye-wash."

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of copies of Sir A. Ryan's despatch under reference.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 1558/121/91]

No. 31.

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 389.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 30, 1932.

MR. ATHERTON saw me this morning with reference to the transfer to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company of the oil concession which the Eastern and General Syndicate are seeking to obtain from the Sheikh of Kuwait. General Dawes had mentioned this matter to me last December, and I had referred what he had said to the Colonial Office. Mr. Atherton indicated that the State Department were

concerned at the lapse of time which had taken place without a reply from the British Government, especially as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a rival concern, has been in the meantime conducting geological investigations in the area, and has been following these up by an expedition equipped with drilling machinery and plant.

Mr. Atherton left with me a note which he had been instructed to deliver, and observed that inasmuch as a satisfactory arrangement had been made in reference to Bahrain, his Government considered that there ought to be no objection in the case of Kuwait. I explained to him that my own absence at Geneva had to some extent delayed the reaching of a conclusion on the matter, but that I had, since my return, been studying it afresh. Several Departments were interested in the question and I hoped to have the opportunity of bringing the matter before the Cabinet at its next meeting in a week's time, after which I would communicate with him again.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Mr. Atherton to Sir John Simon.

United States Embassy,

London, March 29, 1932.

Sir,

ACTING under instructions, I have the honour to inform you that my Government recalls the enquiry which it made through this Embassy in 1929 as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in the matter of the holding and operation of petroleum concessions by American nationals in British-protected Arab territories such as Bahrain. His Majesty's Government is aware of the solution subsequently arrived at in the specific case of the Eastern and General Syndicate which, on behalf of the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, was at that time seeking a modification of the so-called "nationality clause," the inclusion of which in any oil concessions granted by the Sheikh of Bahrain was being insisted upon by the Colonial Office. The arrangement then agreed upon had appeared to my Government only just in view of the extremely liberal treatment accorded in the United States and in its possessions in reference to the operation of petroleum concessions by British companies. My Government had therefore supposed that the policy of His Majesty's Government would be no less liberal in the matter of according open-door rights to American nationals in Kuwait than it had shown itself to be in the almost identical case of Bahrain. The American Government sincerely trusts that it has been correct in this assumption and would appreciate an early indication that such is the case.

My Government understands that it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to require the companies seeking concessions in Arab States, such as Kuwait, that such companies obtain the prior consent of the rulers of such States to the entry and operations of such companies in the territories in question. The American Government is informed that contrary to the impression that seems to have prevailed in the Colonial Office, the Sheikh of Kuwait is understood to be quite agreeable to the specific entry of the Persian Gulf Oil Company and to the granting on behalf of that company of an oil concession without the inclusion of the "nationality clause." The American Government trusts that, in view of the apparent willingness of the Sheikh in this matter, His Majesty's Government will see its way clear to taking up, in the case of the Kuwait concession, no less liberal an attitude than was assumed in the case of the Bahrain concession.

The American Government understands that, despite the fact that the Colonial Office as early as 1925 gave its full and unqualified consent to the negotiation by the Eastern and General Syndicate of an oil concession with the Sheikh of Kuwait, that office later qualified its consent by insisting upon the inclusion of the nationality clause in any agreement arrived at with the Sheikh for the apparently specific purpose of preventing the entry into that territory of the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, which had meanwhile arrived at an understanding with the syndicate as to the transfer of any concessions that it might obtain from the Sheikh. The continued insistence of the Colonial Office on this point and its apparent unwillingness to accord to that syndicate the same

treatment as was accorded in the case of Bahrein has seriously handicapped the syndicate in bringing to a conclusion with the sheikh the negotiations which that concern was authorised by the Colonial Office to undertake.

The above situation is further complicated by the fact that at the very moment while His Majesty's Government had under consideration the petition of the syndicate for the elimination or modification of the "nationality clause," permission was granted the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a rival concern, to send a small party of geologists to Koweit for the purpose of studying the surface geology of the ground.

It will be recalled that this Embassy on repeated occasions requested of the Foreign Office that the company in question should not be permitted to proceed with its operations, pending a decision by His Majesty's Government on the question then before it regarding open-door rights for American nationals in Koweit. Now my Government has been informed that this study of the surface geology has been followed by a second expedition equipped with drilling machinery and plant. The Government of the United States greatly regrets that no effect has been given to this Embassy's request in this matter, but would appreciate being assured by His Majesty's Government that this fact will not be allowed to militate against the position of the syndicate and its affiliate, the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, in the eventual granting of an oil concession in Koweit.

I have, &c.
RAY ATHERTON,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

[E 1787/704/25]

No. 32.

Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies.—(Communicated by Italian Ambassador, April 4, 1932.)

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the King of Italy, on the one hand, and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies on the other; animated by the desire to establish and consolidate the bonds of friendship between the respective countries, have decided to conclude a treaty of friendship;

For this purpose His Majesty the King of Italy has appointed Commendatore Guido Sollazzo and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies has appointed His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal as their respective plenipotentiaries;

Who, having examined their credentials and having found them to be in good and due order, have concluded the following:—

ARTICLE 1.

In consequence of the recognition by His Majesty the King of Italy of His Majesty Abdulaziz-bin-Abderrahman-el-Feisal-al-Saud as King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, close ties of sincere and enduring friendship exist between His Majesty the King of Italy and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and perpetual peace shall prevail between them and their respective kingdoms and subjects.

ARTICLE 2.

Carrying the preceding article into effect, the contracting parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations between themselves. To this end the diplomatic and consular representatives of each of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other the treatment established by the principles of international law and they shall likewise enjoy, subject to reciprocity, the treatment accorded to the most-favoured-nation.

ARTICLE 3.

The contracting parties undertake to use their endeavours to maintain good relations between themselves and to take steps to prevent their territories being used by any party as a base for illegal acts against the territory of the other party.

ARTICLE 4.

The nationals of each of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other party, subject to reciprocity, most-favoured-nation treatment in regard to their persons and their property.

The same treatment shall be accorded to companies of each of the contracting parties in the territory of the other party.

ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty the King of Italy recognises the national status (Hejaz and Nejd) of all subjects of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies who may be within the territories of His Majesty the King of Italy.

Similarly, His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies recognises the national status (Italian) of all the subjects of His Majesty the King of Italy and of all the persons who enjoy the protection of His Majesty the King of Italy, who may be within the territories of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies; it is understood that the principles of international law in force between independent Governments shall be respected.

ARTICLE 6.

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies undertakes to grant facilities and protection, to the like extent as to other pilgrims, to Italian subjects of the Moslem faith who proceed on pilgrimage to the Hejaz for the practice of their worship.

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, moreover, undertakes that the property of Italian pilgrims who die in the Hejaz shall, after the formalities of the competent tribunals have been completed and the taxes prescribed by the laws of the Hejaz and Nejd have been collected, be delivered, failing a legal administrator in the Hejaz, to the Italian representative in Jedda, who engages to transmit such property to the legal heirs. In the event of a legal administrator being in the Hejaz, the estates of deceased pilgrims shall be handed over to such administrator.

ARTICLE 7.

The present treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Italian and Arabic languages.

Both texts shall have equal validity.

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time and shall enter into operation upon the exchange of the relative instruments of ratification.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO.
FEISAL.

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

Exchange of Notes.

(1.)

Commendatore Sollazzo to the Emir Feisal.

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

WITH reference to article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship, the text of which is as follows:—

(Quotation.)

I desire to assure your Royal Highness that the said article cannot in any case refer to the favourable treatment which, for reasons which are generally known, has been granted to the representatives of a third Power in the matter of slavery, this question having been settled between us by means of an exchange of notes.

I have, &c.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO.

(2.)

The Emir Feisal to Commendatore Sollazzo.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have received your note of to-day's date relating to most-favoured-nation treatment for the diplomatic and consular representatives of the two parties, and, in taking note of its contents, I thank you for the clear terms thereof.

I have, &c.

FEISAL.

(3.)

Commendatore Sollazzo to the Emir Feisal.

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to assure your Royal Highness that the second paragraph of article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship between Italy and the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies is intended solely for the purpose of determining the procedure to be followed in the handing over of the property of Italian pilgrims deceased in the Hejaz.

This will take effect without prejudice to the procedure relating to the estates of deceased persons who were not pilgrims, which will be accorded the reciprocal treatment that is the basis of the usual practice between independent States.

I have, &c.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO.

(4.)

The Emir Feisal to Commendatore Sollazzo.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

IN reply to your note of to-day's date regarding the estates of our subjects who die in your territories and those of your subjects who die in our territories, I desire to assure you that the procedure in regard to them will, as you have stated, be on the basis of reciprocity in conformity with international usage. His Majesty's Government will therefore arrange to take charge of the estates of your subjects who die in our territories and, after the legal procedure has been completed and the relative taxes collected, to hand them over, in the absence of a legal administrator of the deceased in our country, to the Italian representative at Jedda.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy will reciprocally undertake to take charge of the estates of our subjects deceased in Italian territory and, after the completion of the legal procedure and the collection of the relative taxes, to hand them over, in the absence of a legal administrator of the deceased in your country, to the competent representative of the Hejaz for that territory or, failing such a representative, to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

FEISAL.

(5.)

Commendatore Sollazzo to the Emir Feisal.

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

IN the course of the negotiations which have happily concluded in the Treaty of Friendship between His Majesty the King of Italy and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, I had the honour to explain the point of view of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy in regard to the traffic in, and the manumission of, slaves, which is as follows:—

1. The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy, in virtue of the high principles which inspire their action in the struggle against slavery, consider it necessary that the Government of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies should assume the obligation of co-operating with them, employing all the means at their disposal, in suppressing the slave trade. Such co-operation is destined to strengthen that spirit of mutual assistance and collaboration between the two Governments which animates and guides the joint and determined action of all civilised nations against slavery.

2. Similarly, the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy desire that their representatives at Jedda may be assigned the power to manumit and repatriate any slave who spontaneously applies to them. I desire to assure your Royal Highness that the exercise of such a power by our representatives should not be at all considered as an interference in the affairs of your country, but as a means whereby the co-operation of the two Governments in regard to the problem of slavery can be more actively and closely carried out.

I trust that His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies will appreciate this attitude on the part of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy and the reasons which induce them to maintain their point of view in this matter.

I have, &c.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO.

(6.)

The Emir Feisal to Commendatore Sollazzo.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

I HAVE considered your note of this day's date regarding slavery. The Government of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and Dependencies, while appreciating the humane sentiments which have induced the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy to make the request contained in the note under reference, desire to make the following explanatory statement on this subject:—

1. The suppression of the illicit trade in slaves constitutes one of the most important questions to which our Government have directed their attention. His Majesty my Sovereign, from the day on which he ascended the Throne of the Hejaz, has displayed particular interest to the end that the entry of slaves into his territory should be prevented; it may, in fact, be said that for several years no person has been able to import slaves into this country. The Government will spontaneously persevere in this line of action.

2. As regards the paragraph numbered (2) in your note, His Majesty's Government are using on their own initiative their endeavours within the

country to reach the end which is enjoined by our Islamic law with its principles of supreme justice and its pure sentiment of humanity. The reason for which our Government abstain from granting the power requested in the paragraph numbered (2) of your note is that such action in our territories is a sole and exclusive right of our Government.

I have, &c.
FEISAL.

[E 1804/704/25]

No. 33.

Commercial Treaty between Hejaz-Nejd and Italy.—(Communicated by Italian Ambassador, April 4, 1932.)

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the King of Italy, on the one hand, and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, on the other hand, being inspired by the desire to consolidate the commercial relations between the respective countries, have decided to conclude a commercial treaty.

For this purpose His Majesty the King of Italy has appointed Commendatore Sollazzo and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies has appointed His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal as their respective plenipotentiaries;

Who, having examined their credentials and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

The contracting parties undertake to facilitate commercial exchanges between the respective countries.

ARTICLE 2.

Each of the contracting parties shall grant to the subjects, vessels and merchandise of the other, on condition of reciprocity, most-favoured-nation treatment, particularly as regards the fixing of customs duties, transportation and the security and liberty of commerce.

Similarly, the products of the soil and industry of each of the contracting parties, which are imported into the territory of the other for the purpose of consumption, transit and exportation, shall be treated there, on condition of absolute reciprocity, as the like products of the soil and industry of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 3.

The contracting parties express the desire to conclude at the appropriate time a postal and telegraphic convention.

ARTICLE 4.

The relations of economic exchange between the Colony of Eritrea and the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and fishing along the Red Sea coasts of the Colony of Eritrea and of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, shall be regulated in accordance with the treatment which is granted to the most-favoured nation and on the basis of absolute reciprocity until such time as the said matters constitute the object of a special convention.

ARTICLE 5.

The present treaty is drawn up in duplicate, in the Italian and Arabic languages.

Both of the texts shall have equal validity.

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible space of time and shall enter into operation upon the exchange of the relative instruments of ratification.

ARTICLE 6.

The present treaty shall have the duration of ten years from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, and one year prior to its expiration the two parties shall come to an understanding in case they intend to replace or prolong it.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO.

FEISAL.

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

[E 1708/165/25]

No. 34.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 140.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 20, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 119 of the 5th March on the subject of the budget, I have the honour to report that I learn from a confidential and fairly trustworthy source that the Jedda Customs receipts for the first quarter of the current financial year amounted to some £27,500 gold. The customs houses at Yanbu and other ports may have taken half as much again, bringing the total to about £40,000, but I have no figures to go on. Revenue from customs would thus fall well below the rough estimate of £100,000 as average customs revenue per quarter, which I submitted in my previous despatch. The detailed figures of the quarter's receipts are attached.

2. I also learn, from the quarantine authorities, that the number of pilgrims who arrived during the quarter was about 9,000. These will have yielded, at the generally computed figure of £7 per head for Koshan, a total of £63,000 gold, plus £9,000 in quarantine dues.

3. Out of this minimum total revenue of about £110,000 for the quarter, the only known outgoings have been some £29,000 in respect of the first and third months' salaries, which have now been paid. The pay of all Government servants is thus only one month in arrear on the completion of the first quarter of the new budgetary year.

4. It is, I think, probable that most of the remaining £80,000 of revenue has gone to Riyadh.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of my despatch under reference.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL

Enclosure in No. 34.

Jedda Customs Receipts.

First Quarter of Current Financial Year.

Month.	Piastres miri.	Paras.
Rajab	1,490,388	35
Shaban	2,151,049	10
Ramadhan	1,284,120	25
Total	4,925,558	30

It has been ascertained that these are *not* piastres gold. They, therefore, equal about £27,400 gold at the current market rate.

[E 1733/121/91]

No. 35.

Sir John Simon to Mr. Atherton.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 9, 1932.

WITH reference to your note No. 1696 of the 29th March regarding the application of the Eastern and General Syndicate for an oil concession in Koweit, which they propose, if granted, to transfer to United States interests, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the representations made by General Dawes and yourself on this subject, and I am now in a position to return you a reply.

2. Your Government will appreciate in the first place that the Sheikh of Koweit, though an independent ruler, is in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government and enjoys their protection. These special relations lead him to seek their advice on important matters of policy, and place His Majesty's Government under an obligation to watch over his interests. Many years ago the predecessor of the present sheikh gave an undertaking that he would not grant an oil concession in his territories without their consent.

3. In paragraph 2 of your note of the 29th March you mention that your Government are informed that the sheikh is agreeable to the "entry of the Eastern Gulf Oil Company and to the granting on behalf of that company of an oil concession without the inclusion of the 'nationality clause.'" As was explained to you in a semi-official letter of the 22nd December last from my Department, His Majesty's Government, on learning this, felt some doubt as to the correctness of this interpretation of the sheikh's attitude, since the sheikh had consistently expressed himself emphatically to the local British authority as desirous of confining any oil concession to entirely British interests. In your letter of the 30th December you were good enough to transmit for my information a copy and translation of a letter from the sheikh to Major Holmes, the representative of the Eastern and General Syndicate, on which the American interests apparently based the information on this point given to your Government. His Majesty's Government have caused enquiry to be made of the sheikh, who replied that he was still averse from receiving in his principality a company other than an entirely British one and that he did not consider himself as in any way committed by his letter to Major Holmes to grant the Eastern and General Syndicate the concession which they seek. It will be observed from a reference to the sheikh's letter that its final sentence only expresses a readiness to discuss the matter further with Major Holmes after agreement has been reached between the syndicate and His Majesty's Government.

4. When examining the necessity for the continued insistence on the inclusion in any oil concession in respect of Koweit of a clause confining it to British interests, His Majesty's Government have been concerned not only with their own interests in the matter, but also with their duty to secure the best terms possible for the Sheikh of Koweit, and, in particular, have had regard to the possibility that it would be less difficult for the local British authorities to control the activities of a purely British concern and to reconcile them with the sheikh's interests. On a balance of all the conflicting considerations, His Majesty's Government are, however, now prepared, for their part, not to insist in this case that any concession must contain a clause confining it to British interests, if the sheikh for his part is willing to grant a concession without such a clause.

5. I wish, however, to make it clear that this decision does not imply agreement in the immediate grant of the proposed concession to the Eastern and General Syndicate, to which the sheikh, as stated above, considers himself in no way committed. His Majesty's Government indeed do not consider that they could properly advise the sheikh to give prior or preferential treatment to the Eastern and General Syndicate, but hold it to be necessary that any application for a concession which may be forthcoming from any quarter be examined with a view to decide which, if any, will best serve the interests of the sheikh and his principality. I should add that the draft concession submitted to the Colonial Office by the syndicate would in any case need revision, both in respect of the provisos designed to safeguard the interests of His Majesty's Government (clause 8) and on many points affecting the interests of the sheikh.

6. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of your note of the 29th March you have referred to the operations now being carried out by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in

Koweit and reminded me of the requests made to my Department that this company should not be permitted to proceed with its operations pending a decision by His Majesty's Government as to the exclusion of all but British interests. I would explain that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company manifested an interest in Koweit oil, and, indeed, made a formal application for a concession before the Eastern and General Syndicate had even appeared on the scene, though the negotiations were at that time not brought to a conclusion, chiefly because the terms suggested were not satisfactory. Several months before any representations were made by General Dawes or yourself in the matter, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made a request for permission to carry out a geological survey in Koweit with a view to decide whether to submit an application for an oil concession. In order to ensure that any oil concession which the sheikh may grant shall embody the best available terms, it is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, desirable and proper that any interested companies be given every opportunity in advance of satisfying themselves, whether or not they wish to submit an offer. His Majesty's Government therefore raised no objection to the grant by the sheikh of the application of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I understand that their present activities in Koweit are confined to such a geological survey.

7. The position therefore is that His Majesty's Government, for their part, are prepared to agree to the omission from any oil concession, which the sheikh may be prepared to grant, of a clause confining it to British interests. If, therefore, the Eastern and General Syndicate desire to renew their application to the sheikh for a concession, which they would subsequently transfer to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to the application being taken into consideration together with any other applications for oil concessions which may be forthcoming from other quarters.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 1963/4/91]

No. 36.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

Sir,

India Office, April 20, 1932.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a despatch from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, dated the 7th April, on the subject of the abolition of the Council of Ministers, Muscat State, and consequent changes.

I am, &c.

S. F. STEWART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Consul-General Biscoe to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, April 7, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for the information of the Government of India a copy of a letter addressed to the Political Agent by His Highness the Sultan of Muscat, announcing the abolition of the Council of Ministers and the division of the work of the State into three offices.

2. In forwarding this communication the Political Agent has reported that Sayyid Hamad-bin-Faisal, an uncle of His Highness the Sultan, has been placed in charge of internal affairs, while Sheikh Zubair-bin-Ali has been placed in charge of the administration of justice. As the Government of India are aware, Captain R. G. Alban fills the appointment of financial adviser in addition to that of Commandant of the Levies.

3. These arrangements are, I think, satisfactory. Sayyid Hamad is a capable and fairly well-educated man, he was formerly Vali of Sohar, where he was left for a considerable period with little or no supervision on the part of the

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F 3

State, and his conduct was not altogether satisfactory. His Highness, however, informs me that he works satisfactorily as long as he is supervised, which he will be in his present post. He is probably the most capable member of the ruling family, and in Muscat it is exceedingly difficult to get anyone with the requisite energy or ability to hold administrative posts. Sheikh Zubair is a quiet, steady-going individual, who was formerly on the council for many years past, and will, I hope, supervise the administration of justice adequately. His Highness does not desire that these persons should receive the title of "Ministers," and, I think, proposes to take a very active part in the Administration himself.

4. In this connexion I would venture to put before the Government of India certain considerations which, I think, should guide us in our future dealings with the Muscat State, and which are the outcome of numerous conversations which I have had on different occasions with His Highness the Sultan. We have now to deal with a very different personality to that of the ex-Sultan, Sayyid Taimur. We have ourselves given to Sayyid Said a better education and wider outlook than was possessed by any of his predecessors. He has been educated partly at Bagdad and was for four years at the Mayo College, Ajmere. It is inevitable, under these circumstances, that he should have become imbued with, I will not say a nationalistic outlook, for this would be too strong an expression, but with some of that desire for independence that is moving so many Oriental nations nowadays. He is young, full of energy and zeal, and most eager to see the State flourishing and well administered. On the other hand, he is sensible and does realise how dependent he is upon the support of the Government of India, and he is most genuinely grateful for the help they have given him lately. When one gets to know him well he is a very attractive personality, and I do not think he will be difficult to deal with provided he is not, if I may use an expression so much in vogue on this side of the Gulf, "pin-pricked" over minor matters, and is given at least that measure of autonomy which is enjoyed by the States in India.

5. To illustrate my meaning, I would mention that in a discussion which I had with His Highness at Sur regarding the finances of the State, the question of the increase of tariff came up and His Highness asked me about the difficulties that had arisen in connexion with obtaining the consent of the American Government. I mentioned that, as he was aware, the American Government in return for their consent were asking for most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of personal status for their citizens. In my express letter No. 75-S of the 12th February, 1932, I expressed the view that the State were unwilling to give this most-favoured-nation treatment to American citizens largely for reasons of *amour-propre*. In their telegram No. 669 of the 1st March, 1932, to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India expressed the view that I had perhaps exaggerated somewhat this sentiment. I can assure the Government of India that this is not so. His Highness spoke very strongly on the subject of these treaties, and asked whether the State was to be bound for ever by treaties entered into a century ago with his ignorant forefathers, and whether the State could not denounce them. "Surely," he said, "there must be some way of ending a treaty." He went on to ask why he should give the same treatment to American citizens as he accorded to British subjects; his relations with the British were totally different to those with any other State. He owed much to the British, but nothing to other countries. I could not help feeling much sympathy with His Highness's point of view.

6. Again, some Muscat subjects in Charbar are encountering certain difficulties about passports with the Persians, and have appealed to the Muscat State for assistance. His Highness has addressed a letter to the Political Agent saying that if his subjects in Charbar are ill-treated he will retaliate on Persian subjects resident in Muscat. I am investigating the matter, but merely mention these incidents now as examples of the feelings and character of the Sultan with whom we are called on to deal.

7. I have always been anxious to encourage Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf to administer their own States with as little interference by us in internal affairs as possible. We are adopting this policy elsewhere, and it is in accordance with present-day views and sentiment; moreover, I believe it to be the most advantageous policy for ourselves, as was strongly emphasised by the Government of India in respect of Bahrein, in their telegram No. 3458-S of the 27th November, 1929, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India. As regards

the particular case of Bahrein, owing to the total ineffectiveness and incompetence of the present ruler, I see little alternative but virtually to carry on the administration of the State ourselves through the financial adviser, but I venture to express my entire concurrence with the general policy outlined in the telegram referred to above. I think there is no doubt that not only Bahrein, but also Muscat, has been a cause of "signs of Arab uneasiness on the Trucial Coast," which has added considerably to our difficulties there, and that "after all it is not only *vis-à-vis* the Arabs that it is politic for us to work through a genuinely Arab Administration. It actually increases our power *vis-à-vis* foreign intruders; thus, an obviously autonomous Arab State can close its doors in a way in which an obviously British-run State cannot."

8. To sum up: we have now in Muscat a young Sultan who, if tactfully handled, should, I think, turn out a good ruler. He should, I think, be given every chance to administer his State on Arab lines, and every effort should be made to free him from those relics of the past which are galling to him, while we should try, at the same time, to build up a façade of independence in the eyes of the world. I do not think there is any risk of his failing to abide by his undertaking to be guided by us in important matters; he is certainly desirous of retaining Captain Alban's services as long as possible, and told me that he felt that he would for many years to come need the services of a European to manage the finances of his State, since there was no local official who was in any way competent to do so.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Sultan of Muscat to Political Agent, Muscat.

(After Compliments.)

Shawal 9, 1350 (February 17, 1932).

I TAKE the opportunity of writing you this letter to inform you that on account of my accession to the Throne of the Sultanate, the Council of Ministers is automatically abolished. I have therefore established three offices to carry out the work, and they are—

- (1) Office of the financial adviser, which will deal with finance and what concerns it.
- (2) An office to look after internal affairs.
- (3) An office to hear cases that is the Court of Justice besides the Shara Court, which concerns the Shara Law, but all important matters will be referred to me direct by all offices. Whenever I am absent from Muscat I shall appoint a deputy, and will let you know in due course. I desired to inform you of the above.

In conclusion please accept, &c.

Your sincere friend,
SAID-BIN-TAIMUR.

[E 2055/946/25]

No. 37.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. Warner.—(Received April 26.)

(Confidential.)

My dear Warner,

Jedda, April 8, 1932.

PHILBY reached Mecca from the Rub'-al-Khali on the 5th April, and came to Jedda on the 6th. I saw him then, and again yesterday, when he described his trip with the aid of "Southern Arabia" (Thomas), published last September by the Royal Geographical Society. If the details interest, pull out the map and I will recount them as briefly as I can.

[7797]

F 4

Philby left Hufuf on the 6th January, with thirty-two of the finest Omaniya camels in Arabia, provided by Ibn Saud, eighteen barbarian Bedouin, all sectional sheikhs of the Ajman and Murra tribes, chosen by Ibn Jiluwi of Hasa and engaged by him for the adventure at 30 riyals (£2) a head, with the promise of a gratuity at the end. They took with them only dates and rice, also tents. Philby carried a sporting gun, sextant, compass, chronometers, &c., as well as four different kinds of Kodaks and a Zeiss "Ikon" cinema camera, with which he took several hundred photographs and reeled 200 feet of film. He and three of his companions kept Ramadhan (the 9th January-7th February) religiously, and felt all the better for it. Two salukis accompanied them throughout and caught hares for them during the first part of the trip.

They first made south-east across the Jafura, which, like the Dahana to its west, is a prolongation northward of the Rub'-al-Khali. Arrived at Salwa, which lies at the southern end of the bay separating Qatar from Hasa, they turned south-westward to the Jabrin oasis (about 23° 15' N. 49° 15' E.). Philby found that Cheeseman's plotting of Jabrin is about 25 miles too far to the west, as are the other mapped points of that area.

From Jabrin they went south to a magnificent well called Maqnamama, dug 170 feet deep in limestone and containing the purest water; it lies at about 22° 10' N. 49° 10' E.

Travelling thence due east, they came to Bir Fadhil (about 22° 15' N. 50° 40' E.), a fine 130-foot well, and there they turned south-eastward towards Farajja, which Thomas visited (about 21° 35' N. 51° 10' E.). On the way they passed not only a regular group of shallow wells, but also large surface deposits of fresh-water shells and quantities of dressed flint implements. Philby is of the tentative opinion that this area is still directly connected with the Wadi Maqran, now shown on the map as finishing some 300 miles away, a little south of west, but which he thinks must have flowed in ancient times into the Persian Gulf. An unnamed one of these wells he has called Bir Maqran.

I should here explain that Philby's immediate objective was the traditional city of Ubar, with its fabled Qusur—castles or palaces—which used to house 2,000 beauties and other delights. Fifteen years ago he was told that the site was easily recognisable and marked by an iron statue of a camel, or a piece of iron as big as a camel, he does not exactly remember which. One of his guides now affirmed that he knew it, and led the party to a spot 10 miles west of Farajja. There they found a lump of what looked like iron, but which Philby pronounces to be a piece of meteorite, 27 cm. long by 15 by 15, and lying on the surface of the sand near two craters. One of these is 150 yards across, the other somewhat smaller. They crown a gently rising tract of desert of some 2 miles radius, and their lava-like walls protrude from the surrounding sand. On the inner side they stand about 30 feet high round about shallow crater-bottoms covered with slag-heaps. Philby is sure that this is Ubar, although Thomas thought that it might lie at about 18° 50' N. by 52° 25' E. Philby's companions are convinced that the crater-walls are the ruins of the famous palaces, but Philby knows them to be either the lips of extinct volcanoes or else the edges of the points of impact of meteorites, he is not sure which. They are vitreous and clearly the product of great heat. The desert for miles around is dotted with small, quite round, lava-like pebbles, which Philby's Bedouin declared to be the black pearls of those ancient beauties and collected greedily. Philby has brought many such specimens from the site, including the piece of meteorite. Thomas, by the way, is said to have found a similar smaller piece a hundred or more miles to the S.S.E. of Farajja.

After "Ubar" Philby went southward along a string of wells to Naifa (about 19° 50' N. 51° 25' E.), a well lying some 20 miles due west of Thomas's Bainha, and containing water with all the properties of Epsom salts. This well lies in a horseshoe of high-piled sand, and here Philby, dancing on the crest in the right kind of wind, made the sands sing. Then tobogganing down with the falling sand, he drew deep trombone-notes with his hands from the moving surface. He was intensely pleased, collected samples of the sand, and speaks of vacuum as a possible cause of the sound. Here, too, he tracked down the Bedouin myth of the walking stones, stones which lie quiet when a man approaches, but which leave a tell-tale trail behind them. These Philby found only on sufficiently sloping ground.

Around Naifa lay another marked grouping of shallow wells, more deposits of fresh-water shells, and frequent traces of flint weapons. This area Philby

tentatively connects with the distant Wadi Dawasir in the west, but unfortunately his final westward tracks lay well to the north of the supposed ancient line of this river, which he was consequently unable to check *en route*. From Naifa, where he had to abandon one camel, Philby went south again to Thomas's Shanna (about 19° N. 51° 30' E.), and here he prepared for his main objective, the crossing of Rub'-al-Khali along the longest completely waterless line. This, he reckoned, lay over the 350 odd miles from Shanna to Sulaiyil in the west (about 20° 25' N. 45° 30' E.). On about the 21st February they set out. Each morning the baggage camels went ahead at 2 A.M.; the rest followed at 4. On the fifth day out, and just short of the south of Shuwaikila, about a third of the way across (say, 19° 25' N. 49° 25' E.), Philby found the baggage train halted at midday, the camels sheltered from the sun in tents, the men frightened and refusing to move further. The camels had broken down with sunstroke, and all that could be done was to make back at once to water. They just succeeded in five more days in reaching Naifa again, helped by two camelious miscarriages, which they ate, and running out of water twelve hours before reaching the well on the 1st March. There they rested, feasting on the two weakest camels, which they killed, and reorganised.

Philby thereupon decided to make the second attempt light, and sent back to Riyadh the fourteen weakest camels, all the tents and rice, and the eight worst men. There was apparently some competition among them to proceed instead of returning, which Philby attributes to the gratuity at the other end. He was by then completely disgusted with the company of his companions, whom he rates as quite the most animal men can be; he nevertheless valued their stamina and desert-craft very highly.

Philby set out on the second attempt on about the 5th March, with fifteen camels, ten men, sundried camel-flesh, two skins of dates, and six skins of Epsom-salty water, with another 10 gallons in petrol tins as an iron-ration. He also took his instruments and cameras, of course, but sent back his records of the trip to date, in case he failed to reach Sulaiyil. For ten days they moved steadily across the emptiest part of the Empty Quarter, guided by directional instinct checked by the compass, finding practically no sign of life of any kind, and on one day spending eighteen hours in the saddle. The camels were given no water, with the exception of four of the weakest, who received an occasional teapot-full poured into the nostrils or squirted in by men's mouths, "to cool their brains," they said. They picked up very little grazing by the way, and for three days there was not a twig nor a blade. Most of the way lay over undulating, rolling, or corrugated sand desert, but they crossed one 50-mile wide stretch of fine dead-flat gravel, which lay in the midst of their course, and which Philby reckons to be 150 miles long and to afford the finest speed track in the world.

At the end of 111 hours' riding from Naifa, and after fifty-five days since seeing another human being, the party reached Sulaiyil with their iron-rations intact. There they rested and feasted, and thence they made their way by easy stages through the comparatively civilised surrounding of Bisha, Turaba, and Taif, to Mecca, which they reached on the 5th April, in nice time for the pilgrimage. Philby's Omaniya celebrated her arrival with a foal. She must have done nearly 1,800 miles in the ninety days' outing.

Philby himself kept very fit and betrays remarkably little sign of the strain. His determination to ride into Mecca broke down, however, a few miles out at Sail, where he saw a motor-car, and incontinently deserted his camel.

As for climatic conditions, at Salwa the morning sand had been too cold to walk upon (Philby is tender-footed). In the Rub'-al-Khali it scorched him. The sun temperature there was about 140, with about 100 in the shade. The nights were cold, and he appreciated two quilted coverings throughout his trip. No rain was supposed to have fallen in the Rub'-al-Khali for twenty years. On the same day that Mecca was flooded, however, and people were drowned (the 6th March), there was heavy rain near Naifa, and rainstorms seemed to have flanked much of the passage of the Emptiest Eighth, but they left the party dry.

Philby says that he has enough material to work on for a year. I think it likely that he will visit England in a month or two and take his specimens with him.

Yours ever,

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 2112/266/25]

No. 38.

Consul-General Biscoe to Colonial Office.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 27.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, March 31, 1932.

IN paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 2 of the 5th February, 1932, regarding my visit to King Ibn Saud, I mentioned that among the subjects discussed was the possibility of some consular status being afforded to Nejd representatives in Bahrein and Koweit.

2. I now have the honour to amplify somewhat the brief reference to this subject therein made. The question was raised by Yusuf Yasin in the course of one of our lengthy nightly discussions, and he began by asking me whether it would not be possible to accord some consular status to a Nejd representative at Bahrein. I replied by saying that he knew how delicate was the position at Bahrein *vis-à-vis* the Persians, who had not yet abandoned their claim; that there was a very large Persian colony at Bahrein, and that if we allowed the Hejaz-Nejd Government to have a consular representative the Persians would inevitably put forward a similar demand: in fact they had already made a request to this effect, to which His Majesty's Government had not acceded. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin admitted the force in this contention and did not press the matter any further in respect of Bahrein, but went on to ask whether it would not be possible to give some sort of official status to Nafisi, Ibn Saud's trade agent at Koweit, since, as far as he was aware, there were no difficulties with the Persians at that place. I replied that this was not altogether correct: the Persians did not claim Koweit, but did not recognise it and impounded Koweiti passports if brought to Persia, &c. It would, in my opinion, be extremely undesirable to allow the Persians to have a consular representative at Koweit for reasons which he would doubtless appreciate; but if any consular status was accorded to Nafisi we could hardly refuse a similar concession to the Persians, who had a large number of subjects in Koweit. He saw the force of this argument and did not press the matter further.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 2031/122/91]

No. 39.

Sir John Simon to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1932.

WITH reference to the note which you were so good as to address to me on the 25th January last, in regard to the Red Sea Lights Convention, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the matter has now received the further consideration of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

2. His Majesty's Government learnt with regret that the French Government were unable to accede to the proposal in my note of the 26th November, 1931, that they should co-operate in accelerating the entry into force of the convention on the understanding that His Majesty's Government would be ready as soon as the convention should have come into force to open negotiations with the Lighthouse Company, with a view to meeting, in as sympathetic a spirit as possible, their reasonable demands. His Majesty's Government had further offered to use their good offices, in co-operation with the French Government, in order to obtain the necessary agreement of the other signatory Powers, either by means of a supplementary protocol or by exchanges of notes, to any settlement which might be reached with the company in regard to the point which had been raised. In their desire to meet the views of your Excellency's Government, His

Majesty's Government have caused the entire question to be examined afresh, but I regret that they are unable to recede from this position.

3. It is unnecessary for me to recapitulate the difficulties and delays which preceded the signature of the Red Sea Lights Convention. The history of these negotiations has, however, convinced His Majesty's Government that to reopen them with a view to the modification of even the most trivial point, could only postpone indefinitely the entry into force of the convention, and cause renewed difficulties and complications which His Majesty's Government are not prepared to face. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate any negotiations with the company with a view to the revision of the contract annexed to article 4 of the convention until after the convention has definitely been brought into force by the ratification of at least four Powers. The convention has now been ratified by Italy and by the Netherlands, and the British ratification can now be completed at very short notice. The French Government are therefore in a position to bring the convention effectively into force in the immediate future by completing their own ratification without further delay. Should they, as His Majesty's Government much hope will be the case, now be ready to do so, the British ratification will follow, and His Majesty's Government will, as you have previously been informed, be ready, upon the entry into force of the convention, to consider in as sympathetic a spirit as possible the company's reasonable demands. I think it well, however, in order to remove the possibility of future misunderstanding, to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government feel considerable doubt as to the soundness of the company's claim, as stated in your note of the 20th November, 1931. In particular, it is clear from the statement, which I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herein,⁽¹⁾ that the annual remuneration provided for under the temporary agreement with the company would have been amply sufficient to meet the actual annual expenditure incurred on the maintenance and repair of the three lighthouses during the quinquennium 1926-31, and at the same time to provide a considerable margin of profit.

4. The maintenance and repair of these lights have, as your Excellency is aware, been for many years a charge on His Majesty's Exchequer alone. In any circumstances the continuance for an indefinite period of this charge for services rendered, not to British shipping alone, but to the shipping of all nations, would have been unreasonable. In the present financial stringency His Majesty's Government have no alternative but to reduce the amount of the financial burden which they are called upon to bear. Unless, therefore, the Red Sea Lights Convention can be effectively brought into force in the near future, they have decided, as an initial measure of economy, to close down the Centre Peak Light. A draft notice to mariners, providing for the closing of this light as from the 1st September next, has accordingly been prepared. A copy of this draft notice is enclosed herein.⁽²⁾ It is proposed, should it prove necessary, to issue it to all concerned on the 1st June.

5. His Majesty's Government are confident that your Excellency's Government will appreciate that they have only reached the decision to close the Centre Peak Light if the convention does not enter into force after mature consideration and with extreme reluctance. It is still their earnest hope that the French Government will see their way to ratify the convention, and to use their influence with the company with a view to induce them to accept the reasonable offer which remains open to them. Should they do so before the 31st May the provisional arrangements which have been made for the issue of the notice to mariners will be immediately cancelled, and the lights will be handed over to the company in accordance with the terms of the convention. In the contrary event, His Majesty's Government will regretfully be obliged to forward copies of the notice to mariners to the other Powers signatory to the convention, with the necessary explanation of the circumstances which have obliged them to decide, as from the 1st September next, to close down the Centre Peak Light.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

⁽²⁾ Not printed

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 187.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 27, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for March, as well as for January and February. I apologise for its bulk, and for the failure to render the report bi-monthly as usual, which has been due to the pressure of current work last month.

2. I am sending copies to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Bushire, Koweit, Simla, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 40.

(Confidential.)

Jedda Report for January, February and March, 1932.

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Chapter I.—Internal Affairs.

Ibn Saud.

THE King left Riyadh on the 2nd January for Hufuf, the capital of the Hasa. News of this visit was telegraphed by His Majesty's Minister to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and advantage was taken of it to arrange a meeting between Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe and Ibn Saud, with results which are mentioned in paragraphs 41 to 43. Colonel Biscoe arrived at Hufuf on the 23rd January and stayed until the 28th. On the 7th February Ibn Saud left the Hasa to return to Riyadh for the Id-al-Fitr, the breaking of the fast of Ramadan. He remained there for the rest of February and March.

Accession Day.

2. His Majesty the King telegraphed a message of good wishes to Ibn Saud on the occasion of the anniversary of the latter's accession day, the 8th January.

3. As a result of the opposition of the Wahhabi Ulama of Nejd, reported in paragraph 21 of the Jedda report for last May-June, this year's celebration of accession day was modest by comparison with that of last year. Mecca, being a religious centre under puritan protection, was entirely spared the defilement which joy occasions; but at Jedda, where morals are looser, school-children sang about the streets, the Governor held a morning reception of the foreign representatives, happily not a very gay affair, and the afternoon was devoted to a tea-party at the Green Palace—which, incidentally, has not yet been paid for—the palace, that is, not the tea-party. This was organised by the local Celebration Committee, and attended by the Viceroy, who came from Mecca expressly for the function. The annual celebration was thus deliberately repeated, in spite of the King's promises to his divines to be good; but there was neither review nor dinner-party, nor the poetry-cum-picnic-luncheon at Wadi Fatima, features which so polluted the occasion last year.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

4. Although His Majesty's Minister had returned to Jedda on the 15th December, no effective contact with the Hejazi Foreign Ministry, otherwise than by letter or telephone, was possible until the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs returned from Nejd, whither he had gone on the 15th December. He left Riyadh on the 2nd January, arrived at Mecca on the 5th, and came to Jedda on the 7th, followed the next day by his princeling-Minister. The latter made no attempt to live up to his title of Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was, nevertheless, entertained to dinner at the Legation on the 11th January, and seemed languidly pleased. All business was transacted with Fuad Bey Hamza, in a series of interviews held on the 11th, 13th, 16th, 18th, 19th, 21st and 24th January. The Amir Feisal returned to Mecca on the 18th, his Under-Secretary on the 26th.

5. They returned to Jedda together on the 10th February for the signing of the Italian treaty, remained to meet the first Iraqi diplomatic representative on the 14th, and left again on the 17th. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires discussed current matters with the Under-Secretary on the 11th and 16th. The next visit to Jedda was paid on the 18th March, when Fuad Bey came alone to discuss pilgrimage matters with Mr. Hope Gill. He did so on the 19th, and left a day or two later. He was in Jedda again during the last days of March fixing up his trip to Europe, but was not heard or seen by the Legation. Perhaps he felt that ten conversations a quarter were enough to hold with any foreign mission. Be that as it may, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, for his part, was disposed to agree that one can easily have too much of a bad thing.

Constitutional Reform.

5A. In paragraph 3 of the last Jedda report it was remarked that Ibn Saud had at length conceded the principle of a Cabinet charged with joint responsibility for Government and individual responsibility for departmental affairs. On the 15th January the "Umm-al-Qura" published in the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, a "Regulation concerning the Council of Ministers." In form it calls for more compassion than a busy man is inclined to feel, such a rigmarole is it, such a mesh-work of cunning knots and slip-knots. In effect,

however, it is just the sort of measure in which a subtle Syrian Under-Secretary of State can entangle an autocratic Nejd Director-General of Finance, who has been keeping him and his friends short of funds. That, of course, is its *raison d'être*, to arm the intrusive Syrian clique against the possessive Nejd gang. Fuad Bey Hamza had long been preparing it. What is probably its most effective article reads: Ministers may make enquiry of each other and ask for a written explanation of each other's actions. The decree's least convincing feature is in its title, "Council of Ministers." There is only one individual Minister in the country, namely, the Amir Feisal, and he is quadriform, being Viceroy and President of the Council as well as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and now Minister for the Interior, a new function and Ministry brought surreptitiously to birth by implication out of article 3. "Ministers" who attend the Council are the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Director-General of Finance, the Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly, and a Nejd make-weight, added in March, the Director of Finance Departments, who happens to be a brother of the Director-General. "The Council is to meet nightly," says article 12. There seems to be more of the Thousand Nights and a Night in it all than of modern statecraft. The text of this important constitutional advance forms Annex "A" to this report.

Financial Reform.

6. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of the last Jedda report gave warning of the new "budget," and a copy of that instrument was annexed to the report. It is now possible to show more of its inner workings. These are exposed in a tentative schedule drawn up by the Legation, which forms Annex "B" to this report. Items 1 to 5, comprising royal and military expenditure and liquidation of debt, are officially estimated in round-figure sums, multiples of 110. It is therefore fairly safe to assume that they are based on the official gold rate of 110 piastres Miri=£1. Thus the King is paid in gold. The fifteen sub-divisions of item 6, however, are estimated to the uttermost piastre. They represent the costs of administration, such as salaries, wages, &c., and in view of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs' admission of the 19th January to His Majesty's Minister, that much of the expenditure lumped together in the "budget" as piastres Miri, would in fact be incurred in silver, it is also fairly safe to assume that all payments under item 6 are calculated to be made in silver piastres.

7. This curiously mixed statement of estimated expenditure, called "the budget," seems to bear no relation at all to the percentage allotments confidentially stated last year to form the basis of the budgetary reform (November-December report, paragraph 4). This basis seems to have gone by the board already. It was, indeed, not clear how the King could live on it, since it left him entirely out of account. It is now clear, however, that he or his comptroller, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, will receive about half the total Hejazi revenue, namely, items 1 to 3, or £410,000 to be devoted to royal and military needs. The Hejaz-Nejd memorandum, circulated at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, leads one to suppose that he will also take care of item 4, £100,000 for Communications and Transport, and thereby have the spending of half-a-million pounds.

8. If revenue does not come up to expectations—and these have been left conveniently vague—item 5, liquidation of Government indebtedness, will undoubtedly be the first to suffer the pinch, followed by item 6, the salaries and wages of Government servants. The first four months of the Hejazi financial year have now passed, but only three months' salaries and wages have been paid; this failure is additional to the four to eight months' previous arrears of pay which have been consolidated for eventual liquidation under item 5.

9. The Hejaz of Ibn Saud, in fact, is not unlike the England of King Charles II, with the pleasing difference that the King does not have to ask Parliament for money. His Nejd's control revenue at the source and send most of it in specie to His Majesty. At the end of Ramadan, for instance, no salaries were paid, but £12,000 in sovereigns and 100,000 silver riyals (nominally £10,000) were reported to have been sent from Mecca to the King at Riyadh. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud has been recently heard to say that he literally hardly knows how to support himself and his family, and that one quarter of the revenues of Hasa had to be remitted to Mecca to help finance the Hejaz.

10. To sum up the financial reform in the dictum of an ex-mayor of Jedda, "the whole budget is so much eye-wash."

11. News of the engagement of a Dutch financial adviser, M. van Leeuwen, was published in March. He is expected to complete his labour in a year. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 1st April published a vigorous denial of the rumoured loan of £500,000 by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud, "in return for his renunciation of certain matters which affect his independence, such as the appointment of an English adviser to supervise the organisation of his finances. . . ." Forgetting the hints and requests and negotiations of last year for financial aid from London and Amsterdam, the editor concluded: "The Government of His Majesty have not contracted a loan with anybody, thank God, and they cannot tolerate interference in any matter which concerns their complete and full independence." M. van Leeuwen is due to arrive in April.

12. The market value of the Saudi riyal fluctuated during the quarter between 17 and 15 to the gold sovereign, and 13 and 11½ to the £ sterling, with a strengthening tendency due to the approaching pilgrimage.

Economic Situation.

13. Ramadan is normally an expensive and busy month, when the merchants and shop-keepers expect to do well. This year there was absolute stagnation in Mecca, and conditions were little better in Jedda. The populations of the towns were too crippled with debt to move. Such information as was received about the tribes indicated that their condition was still no better than that of utmost misery described in paragraph 17 of the November-December report.

Economic Development.

14. Mr. Twitchell returned to the Hejaz on the 18th January from his prospecting tour in Nejd and the Hasa, the main results of which are still hidden. It is known, however, that he advocates the sinking of wells along the Jedda-Riyadh-Hufuf road, and the construction of a harbour at Ras Tanura on the Hasa coast. In the latter half of February he examined some ancient workings near Medina called "Mahd Dhahab" or "Cot of Gold," which are supposed to date from Harun-ar-Rasid's days. He considers it worth while to employ up to 100 men in sampling the site. His confederate, Mr. Moseley, working alone on quartzes near Taif, does not seem to have found anything worth reporting. He left early in March for the United States of America, and Mr. and Mrs. Twitchell sailed for the Yemen on the 7th March, leaving voluminous reports and recommendations in the hands of Ibn Saud and his Council. The former apparently resented being given advice for which he had not asked. The latter passed the reports round amongst their more commercially-connected friends, no doubt with suitable safeguards against the time when concessions should be granted and the work of development begun. If mere cupidity were enough, this would be the wealthiest country in the world. But where energy and ability is needed, there is no power and no might save in God alone.

Customs.

15. The Jedda customs receipts for the first three Moslem months of the financial year, which began on the 11th December last, were, according to unofficial information supplied to the Legation, 4,925,558-30 piastres Miri, equivalent at the rate of exchange then ruling to £27,400 gold. Other Red Sea ports of the kingdom, e.g., Yanbu, took perhaps half as much again, which would bring the total to about £40,000 gold. The Persian Gulf Customs were farmed out in January last for 11 lakhs of rupees to Muhammad-at-Tawil, once Prime Minister of the Hejaz, during the reign of King Ali. He was sent to the Hasa by Ibn Saud in the autumn of 1930 to reform the Customs Administration (Jedda report for September to November 1930, paragraph 4). In February, however, Muhammad-at-Tawil apparently had to ask that the figure of 11 lakhs should be reduced, as he was unable to raise the amount. He visited Jedda in March, after a year and a half's absence in Nejd, whither he has now returned unwillingly at the King's orders. In his present frame of mind it is quite possible that he may try to escape the country, once back on the Persian Gulf coast, and seek freedom by way of Bahrein.

Wireless System.

16. None of the monthly instalments of £1,000 have been paid to the Marconi Company since last August. It is understood that they have now been relegated to item 5 of the "budget," entitled indebtedness, payable if and when funds admit. Meanwhile, the work of installation proceeded slowly. Mr. Boucicault is believed to have completed the $\frac{1}{2}$ -kilowatt station at Qaf or Qaryat-al-Milh, the "salt-villages" in the Wadi Sirhan. Kurdy Bey has started work on the main 6-kilowatt station at Mecca.

Communications.

17. The projected motor-route to connect Medina with Iraq has made no material progress. It is still in the stage of a preliminary exchange of views as to terms, dues payable, passport and quarantine controls, &c., between the Hejazi and Iraqi Governments. The former's proposals are greedy, and not very practical, and have not been well received.

Legislation.

18. A voluminous commercial code at length completed piecemeal publication in the "Umm-al-Qura" in February. All that is now lacking in this respect is a competent court and bar; the existing Majlis-at-Tujjar or Tribunal of Merchants is most incompetent.

19. Instructions governing the boarding of ships lying in Jedda harbour were issued in January. They were brought officially to the notice of the foreign missions in February. These were asked to supply lists of the names of their staffs, so that embarkation permits might be issued to them. This appeared to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to infringe diplomatic immunity, and therefore meet to be resisted, in that momentary forgetfulness to carry the permit might seriously interfere with the performance of a duty to visit an incoming or departing vessel. He therefore expressed regret to the Hejazi Government that he could not instruct the Legation staff to carry this type of permit, but he communicated the required lists, containing thirty-three names, and asked that they might be made known to the control officials posted on the quay. There the matter has been allowed to rest, and no cases of interference have been experienced since a few unsuccessful attempts were made in January to hold up the Indian vice-consul when visiting pilgrim ships.

20. No other legislation of importance was enacted during the period under review.

Wakfs.

21. At the beginning of the year a zealous body was formed in Mecca, which called itself the "Awqaf-al-Haramayn Claims Association," having the object of "claiming through legitimate channels that which is due to the people of the two Holy Sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina, in the way of donations and Awqaf in various countries." A committee of ten has been formed under the presidency of Sheikh Abdullah-ash-Sheybi, son of Sheikh Abdul Qadir-ash-Sheybi, hereditary Keeper of the Keys of the Kaba, whose family has battened more fatly on the faithful than have most Meccawis, and is now peerless.

The Rub-al-Khali.

22. The Empty Quarter has again been crossed by an Englishman, this time under the auspices of Ibn Saud, who, according to the "Umm-al-Qura," appears to regard that desert also as a part of his dominions. Mr. Philby set out from Hufuf on the 6th January, and reached Mecca on the 5th April. Ibn Saud's Amir of Hasa provided him with thirty-two of the best Omaniya camels and eighteen Bedouin, sectional sheikhs of the Ajman and Murra tribes, as companions and guides. Their route was as follows: Hufuf, Salwa, on the coast between Qatar and Hasa, the Jabrin oasis, Maqainama Well ($22^{\circ} 15' N.$, $49^{\circ} 10' E.$), Bir Fadhil ($22^{\circ} 15' N.$, $50^{\circ} 20' E.$), Farajja ($21^{\circ} 35' N.$, $50^{\circ} 45' E.$), 10 miles to the west of which Mr. Philby thinks he found the Bedouin traditional site of the ancient city of Ubar (which really was in the Yemeni highlands), Naifa ($19^{\circ} 50' N.$, $51^{\circ} E.$), and Shanna ($19^{\circ} N.$, $51^{\circ} 05' E.$).

23. From Shanna they made an attempt to cross the Emptiest Eighth, the 350-mile wide, completely waterless, tract between Shanna and Sulaiyil ($20^{\circ} 25' N.$, $45^{\circ} 30' E.$). On the fifth day out, however, and about a third of the way across the camels failed, and they had to make back to the nearest water, Naifa, which they reached in another five days, on the 1st March, their water giving out twelve hours before they came to the well.

24. At Naifa they rested and re-formed. Mr. Philby sent back to Riyadh the fourteen weakest camels, three having died, with eight men and all tents and other baggage. He made the second attempt westward light, with fifteen camels and 10 men. On the tenth day, after 111 hours' marching across completely waterless sand and gravel, during which the camels received no water and picked up practically no vegetation, the party reached Sulaiyil with two petrol-tins of water in reserve. Thence they made their way leisurely by Bisha, Turaba and Taif, to Mecca. Mr. Philby visited Jedda on the 6th April. He must have covered some 1,500 miles in the ninety days' outing, but showed remarkably little sign of the strain. He has enough specimens and material to work on for a year, but has first to answer the shower of well-deserved congratulatory telegrams and offers, which has met him in Jedda from all parts of the world, including one from Mr. Bertram Thomas.

Chapter II.—Frontier Questions.

Transjordan.

Raiding.

25. No raids were reported to have been made during the quarter from either side of the frontier, yet all was not quiet on the northern front.

Frontier Meetings.

26. It will be recalled that, after much diplomatic preparation in Jedda, a series of meetings between the frontier representatives for the liquidation of past raids and the settlement of future differences was arranged last April. The preliminary meeting took place on the 3rd June, 1931, when contact was established between Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Zeyd. The first phase of the main meeting was not held until the 15th August; the Nejd was then quite unprepared, but agreed to return a little loot, while Captain Glubb feared open rupture if they were to meet again and went on leave. At the end of October, however, he invited the Sheikh to meet him again for the second phase. He received a reply two months later and they met near Haditha on the 7th January. This meeting proved fruitless. The atmosphere was very friendly and the two representatives quite old friends, but the Nejd had no authority to negotiate or compromise. Captain Glubb on his part declined to discuss the 1930-31 claims until the raid of the 28th September last was disposed of. They failed to agree on this or any matter, except provisionally to meet again after Ramadhan, mid-February. The Legation is unaware that this or any other meeting has been held.

His Majesty's Minister's visit to Jerusalem.

27. In pursuance of a plan provisionally made in London while on leave last autumn, but advanced somewhat by certain circumstances in Transjordan, His Majesty's Minister left Jedda on the 2nd February to visit His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan. He spent the 12th and 13th at Amman, where the following matters were discussed with the British Resident, who was assisted by Mr. Kirkbride, Peake Pasha, and Captain Glubb:—

- (1) The Atun section of the Huweytat, with special reference to—
 - (a) Their national status.
 - (b) Araif camels.
 - (c) The effects of the raid of the 28th September, 1931.
 - (d) Hejazi handling of the loot taken.
- (2) The Beni Atiya—
 - (a) Their national status.
 - (b) The proposed refusal to them of access to Transjordan.

- (3) (a) General question of determination of tribal nationality.
(b) Possibility of agreement with Hejaz-Nejd as to allocation of tribes.
- (4) The military and quasi-military situation on the frontier, with special reference to—
(a) Competitive establishment of posts.
(b) Ibn Saud's alleged military preparations.
- (5) The general situation on the frontier, with special reference to—
(a) Actual or possible recrudescence of raiding.
(b) Glubb-Ibn Zeyd position and future co-operation.
(c) Complaints against Captain Glubb, retaliatory confiscation, withholding returnable loot.
(d) Handing over of "raiding criminals."
- (6) (a) Diplomatic discussion at Jedda of Fuad Bey Hamza's "principles."
(b) Establishment of direct and normal Transjordan relations with Hejaz-Nejd.
- (7) Minor points outstanding at the end of 1931—
(a) Commission on loot.
(b) Allegation of asylum given to criminals.
(c) Allegations of enticement.
(d) Taxation of sojourners.
(e) Press attacks.
- (8) Closer and more direct collaboration between Jerusalem and Jedda—
(a) Greater conciseness in Transjordan reports and greater expedition in forwarding.
(b) Sifting of Transjordan reports by Jerusalem in the light of major policy.
(c) Importance of recording all raids, and as soon as possible.
(d) Clear indication as to distribution of copies of despatches and reports.
(e) Codes.
(f) Exchange of intelligence.
- (9) Miscellaneous—
(a) Nature of Transjordan forces.
(b) Bedonin Control Board and the Amir Shakir.
(c) Druze refugees in Nejd.
(d) Frontier at Jebel Tubaik.
(e) Commercial relations with Hejaz-Nejd.
(f) Wireless communications.

28. These discussions at Amman, though not conclusive on various questions, were most useful and enabled His Majesty's Minister to clear up many points in a frank and friendly manner. Sir A. Ryan has recorded his appreciation of the courtesy shown him by Colonel Cox and his colleagues, and their readiness to recognise that such divergencies of view as arise from time to time are not due to unwillingness on the part of the Legation at Jedda to support Transjordan in dealing with a most troublesome situation, but to the frequent difficulty of accommodating action as regards Transjordan questions, with the broad policy of keeping Ibn Saud sweet and giving him moral support for reasons of Imperial interest.

29. On the 13th February His Majesty's Minister was received by the Amir Abdullah, who was most affable. He spoke temperately throughout of the "King of Nejd." While not excluding the possibility of full recognition of Ibn Saud, if His Majesty's Government considered that the right course, he put his finger unerringly on the weak spot, from his point of view, in any argument in favour of his adopting it just now. As the most likely aspirant, perhaps, to the reversion of the Hejazi throne, should the Saudian régime collapse, he is doubtless very unwilling to compromise his hopes by recognising the kingship of Ibn Saud at a time when the latter's position is menaced by so many difficulties.

30. On the 15th February His Majesty's Minister reviewed with His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan the most important, from a Jerusalem point of view, of the matters discussed on the previous days at Amman. Sir A. Ryan left Jerusalem on the 16th for London, whither he had been unexpectedly summoned for consultation by His Majesty's Government.

Export of Cereals.

31. The Hejaz-Nejd Government drew the Legation's attention in January to reports they had received of some sort of an embargo on trade from Transjordan into Nejd. After enquiry had been made of Jerusalem, they were informed that an embargo had been placed on the export from Transjordan of cereals, irrespective of their destination, and that the order had been necessitated by internal prices in Transjordan, but might be removed in the future. The Hejazi Government replied in March that they appreciated these motives, but hoped that it might now be possible to remove the prohibition against their own subjects.

Ibn Hamdan.

32. At the instance of the High Commissioner for Transjordan, the Hejaz-Nejd Government's serious attention was drawn in February to an unfriendly incident of the 28th December, staged on the frontier by Nejd troops under the command of one Ibn Hamdan. They had apparently approached four Transjordan Arab Legionaries who were encamped in Transjordan territory, executed a war dance before them, and fired at an improvised target; they had then drawn closer and scrutinised the Legion camp through field-glasses. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires protested against this unwarranted and unfriendly action on the part of armed forces under the control of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, asked for a full enquiry, and suggested that in the interests of friendly relations they should inform him of the action taken to punish those responsible.

33. In conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in March, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs seemed disposed to argue that the Transjordan Legionaries had been camped in Nejd territory, but he promised a full investigation and an early reply. No reply has yet been received.

MacDonnell Investigation.

34. His Majesty's Minister followed up the earlier representations recorded in paragraph 35 of the last Jedda report by speaking emphatically to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 11th January about the refusal of the Hejaz-Nejd Government to bear their share of the costs of the MacDonnell Investigation. He strongly advised them to reconsider their attitude without awaiting the reaction of His Majesty's Government to their note of the 28th November, hinting that otherwise the reaction might be very disagreeable. On the 17th January Fuad Hamza wrote semi-officially to say that His Majesty the King had given his gracious command to the effect that no objection should be raised to the payment of the sum and that he sanctioned its payment to the British Government, with thanks. The sum has not, of course, been paid, and is unlikely to be paid until item 5 of the "budget" is financed (see paragraph 8 above). The sum in question is £1,726 7s. 8d.

The Beni Atiya.

35. The movement of Beni Atiya into Transjordan foreseen by Captain Glubb last summer (see paragraph 37 of the Jedda report for September-October) actually took place in February, when some 250 tents moved northward over the frontier. Their motive, however, was apparently rather to find grazing than to escape punishment, although they seem to have deserved it—unless, indeed, it be true, as suggested by Captain Glubb last year, that they had received *carte blanche* from Ibn Saud to raid, in order to dissuade disaffected Hejazi tribes further south from making northward for Transjordan through the Beni Atiya dira. No rain at all is said to have fallen this year in the Northern Hejaz between its northern frontier and a point some 50 miles south of Taima, so that the Beni Atiya, together with the Huweytat-at-Tihama and the Billi, moved both north and south from their normal diras in search of grazing.

36. While some were moving northward, the Amir of the district sallied forth from Tabuk with 130 camelmen and a machine gun. He set out immediately after the fast of Ramadhan and held to the eastward of the Beni Atiya tents, marching quickly up the Hejaz Railway until near the Transjordan frontier. A little short of Hajj he turned westward, thus interposing his force between the moving tribe and Transjordan. On the 14th and 15th February he fell upon the nearest tents and progressed steadily southward through the rest of them back to Tabuk, which he reached on the 20th after mopping up everything in his way and driving off 350 camels, the Arabs say, beside many more sheep. On the same day the leading tents of the Beni Atiya began to cross into Transjordan. The southward-bound portion of the tribe had meanwhile passed to the south of Taima.

37. Information available to the Royal Air Force in Transjordan indicates that the Beni Atiya who entered Transjordan were refugees from justice, but Captain Glubb, who was in close touch with them, was convinced that their migration was of a routine nature, but began before the normal time because of the lack of rain further south. By the middle of March, according to Royal Air Force reports, 300 tents had crossed the frontier with 2,000 camels. They were collected well away from the frontier and sent north of Ma'an under police supervision.

38. On the 29th February the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London requested that these tribesmen should be returned by the Transjordan authorities to the Hejaz. It was suggested to him at the Foreign Office that such frontier questions could best be raised through the frontier authorities, or, if that was impracticable, through the Legation at Jedda. He promised to suggest the former channel to his Government, but the latter on the 9th March addressed themselves to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, invoking the inconclusive correspondence of 1930-31 about denial of refuge in Transjordan to certain Beni Atiya groups (see 1931, January-February report, paragraph 11), and expressing the hope that the British Government would agree to refusing present refuge to the Beni Atiya in Transjordan. An exchange of views and reports on the facts of the matter proceeded between London and Jerusalem, but no decision as to a reply had been reached by the end of the month.

Iraq.

39. Material for reply to Fuad Bey Hamza's *démarche* of last September (September-October report, paragraph 39) regarding certain remnant chiefs in Iraq of the 1929 Nejd rebellion was received in January, but was not used, as Fuad Bey had not again mentioned the matter, and the Iraqi representative was expected shortly to arrive. The gist of the reply, if made, would have been that these chiefs were not near the frontier, and that, so far as was known, they were keeping quiet and had received no special favours.

40. The Iraqi representative's arrival is reported in paragraph 68. It is to be hoped that he will shortly be in a position to relieve the Legation completely of questions concerning Iraq.

Koweit and Bahrein.

Biscoe-Ibn Saud Meeting.

41. As soon as it was known definitely in Jedda that Ibn Saud had left Riyadh on the 2nd January for the Hasa, steps were taken to bring about the courtesy visit to him of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf which had been spoken of at His Majesty's Minister's audience of the King on the 2nd March, 1931 (March-April report, paragraph 29), and recorded at the inter-departmental conference held at the Foreign Office on the 12th August (September-October report, paragraph 42), as a necessary preliminary to the negotiation of the Persian Gulf questions. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs having arrived at Jedda and His Majesty at Hufuf, Sir A. Ryan was able to communicate through the former by wireless with the latter and prepare him for the visit. On the 17th January Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe telegraphed a personal message from Bushire via Bahrein to Ibn Saud and received a reply asking him to come as soon as possible. Accompanied by the Political Agents at

Koweit and Bahrein, he reached Hasa via Uqair on the 23rd January, stayed four days in Hufuf with the King, and left for Bahrein on the 28th.

42. The following matters were discussed either with Ibn Saud personally or with his chief political adviser, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin:—

- (i) The Koweit blockade.
- (ii) Emergency landing-grounds on the Hasa coast.
- (iii) Telegraphic and postal communication between Hasa and the outer world via Bahrein.
- (iv) Passport facilities for Nejd subjects proceeding to India or Iraq.
- (v) Possible consular status of Nejd representatives in Bahrein and Koweit.
- (vi) Incursions by Nejd officials and troops into Koweit territory.
- (vii) Possible simple extradition treaty between Bahrein and Nejd.

43. Ibn Saud's attitude throughout was one of extreme cordiality. The visit was successful, chiefly owing to the fact that it was informal and that Colonel Biscoe went with no instructions from His Majesty's Government, but merely to establish friendly relations and talk over questions of mutual interest. Results will be recorded as they occur.

44. On the 28th January Ibn Saud gave Colonel Biscoe the following message for His Majesty's Government:—

"I wish you to give my greetings to the British Government and to tell them that I speak to them with the word of a Moslem Arab.

"First, I neither desire nor seek greater friendship from anyone else in the whole world, whether European or Moslem Government, than the friendship of the British Government, and it is impossible that I should seek to differ from them in any matter.

"Secondly, I desire peace and friendship with the whole world, especially with those of my neighbours and others who are in relations with the British Government. Who speaks to the contrary about me is wrong or a liar and has not understood. If such a thing is said of me, I ask the British Government to refer the matter to me and explain to me the exact mistake attributed to me, but on condition that the request be made through the agency of an intelligent man who will understand from me the truth and will not misunderstand."

This message should be read, however, in conjunction with the slavery chapter of this report.

Koweit.

45. On his return to Koweit Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson discussed with the Ruler Ibn Saud's proposals regarding the raising of the commercial blockade of Koweit. His Excellency was very sceptical of any useful result accruing from the suggested appointment of arbitrators to meet and work out a compromise agreeable to both parties. He finally agreed to it, however, subject to certain conditions, and Colonel Dickson was instructed in March to obtain his consent in writing.

The Ruler visited Ibn Saud at Riyadh from the 16th to the 31st March, travelling both ways by car.

46. An unhappy band of pilgrims left Koweit on the 19th February overland for Mecca under the leadership of the Ruler's cousin, Sheikh Subah-an-Nasir-al-Subah. Ibn Saud suspected them of wishing to smuggle contraband into Nejd. "May God save you," he wrote to the Ruler, "but we have come to know that with the pilgrims are people of Nejd and others who are carrying much merchandise, costly goods, which constitute the principal source of our income. That we should inspect the pilgrims and search them to the bottom, especially as there are females among them, is neither appropriate nor in keeping with the dignity of us two." He asked, therefore, that the leader of the band should carry with him and produce an inventory of all dutiable goods. The pilgrims had already left, however, before the letter arrived. The Ruler, in reply, said that he could do nothing: "Their question now concerns God and your Majesty." The outcome is not yet known.

47. On the 11th January, having at length received full particulars from Koweit, His Majesty's Minister addressed the Hejaz-Nejd Government on the subject of a series of armed incursions made into Koweit territory in August and October 1931 by officials of Ibn Saud. He stated that these intrusions were of the most serious concern to His Majesty's Government, in view of their special position in regard to Koweit. In protesting against them, he requested that the guilty parties be punished and that instructions be given to all frontier officers that neither they nor their men should enter Koweit territory without proper sanction. The Hejazi Government replied, on the 23rd January, that the truth of the allegation was being investigated and that the frontier Amirs had been ordered to see that no one entered Koweit without a permit. On the 29th January a telegram was received from Colonel Biscoe to the effect that the King had shown him at Hufuf a telegram from the Foreign Ministry at Mecca purporting to give the substance of Sir A. Ryan's note of the 11th January and the Ministry's reply. The note, as reported to the King, demanded that no Nejdīs should in future enter Koweit; the King had therefore replied that no Koweitīs should in future enter Nejd.

48. Fortunately for good relations, Colonel Biscoe was able to convince Ibn Saud on the spot that there must have been a mistake, since only the incursion of armed forces had been objected to; the latter at once cancelled his former instructions. Sir A. Ryan also rubbed into Fuad Bey Hamza, who was no doubt responsible for misrepresenting to the King the contents of his note, the exact meaning of the clear language he had used. That phrase of Ibn Saud's recurs to the mind: "On condition that the request be made through the agency of an intelligent man." Fuad Bey is more subtle than intelligent.

Bahrein.

49. In 1920, at Ibn Saud's personal request, the 5 per cent. *ad valorem* dues levied on all goods passing in transit through Bahrein to the mainland was reduced to 2 per cent., and a further concession was made in respect of goods transhipped from steamers direct into lighters bound for the mainland, on which no duty was to be charged. This concession was always unpopular in Bahrein, and in 1931 the second part of it was prejudiced by an agreement made between the Bahrein State and the British India shipping company, to the effect that the company would refuse to accept any cargo for overside delivery in Bahrein Harbour, in consideration for an extension of free demurrage from the ruling three days to ten days on all cargo landed at Bahrein from their ships. Ibn Saud has not yet protested, but, in view of the probability that he will, and also on grounds of principle, the question was receiving consideration in March from the Government of India.

Asir and the Yemen.

50. On the 13th March the Hejaz-Nejd Government communicated to the foreign representatives a copy of the treaty of the 15th December signed with the Yemen. The text had previously been published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 26th February, copies of which were seen in Sana. It has been noticeable, however, to regular Hejazi readers of the Yemeni Imam's newspaper, "Imam," that it has completely ignored the treaty. Moreover, when the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, in the course of a visit to Sana, from which he has recently returned, congratulated the Imam on being now linked in friendship with Ibn Saud, the Imam laughed heartily at the idea of his having signed any treaty with Ibn Saud, and said that the only instrument negotiated had been a working agreement between the Amirs of Jizan and Medi, by which a *modus vivendi* had been established on the frontier.

51. The situation in Asir and on the Yemeni frontier has been obscure. It is believed that some Asiri tribes revolted in the beginning of February against the Nejdī occupation, but that the revolt was crushed by Ibn Saud's Amir Khalid-bin-Luway, after more tribal fighting in the Najran district. The Bedouin Nejdī troops, however, were said to have but little stomach left for meeting the Asiri highlanders. Looting had become too dangerous.

Chapter III.—Foreign Relations.

British Empire.

Complaint against His Majesty's Minister.

52. In immediate reaction to the manumission by the Legation of a slave claimed by Ibn Saud (see chapter VIII), the Hejaz-Nejd Government, on the 8th February, complained of Sir A. Ryan's behaviour, and stated, in effect, that his retention in the post of His Majesty's Minister at Jedda was not conducive to good relations. Sir A. Ryan had left Jedda on the 2nd February on a visit to Jerusalem (see paragraph 27); on the conclusion of the visit he proceeded to London. His Majesty's Government answered the Hejazi complaint in full on the 21st March, and stated that, if it were not withdrawn, neither would Sir A. Ryan resume his duties as His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, nor would any other Minister of His Majesty's service replace him. The Hejazi Government climbed down on the 5th April. His Majesty's Minister remained in London to meet the Hejazi mission, with the intention of returning to Jedda by the end of May.

Hejaz-Nejd Mission to London.

53. Ibn Saud chose this moment to announce a mission to the capitals of friendly countries, which may already have been in contemplation but had been kept remarkably dark. His Majesty's Government were asked on the 24th March by the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London whether they would receive the Amir Feisal, accompanied by Fuad Bey Hamza, in May. They replied that their answer must depend on the Hejazi Government's action regarding their note of complaint against Sir A. Ryan. On the 8th April they were informed that His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive their mission. It sailed from Jedda on the 12th April to visit Rome, Geneva, Paris, London, The Hague, Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow, Angora, Tehran and Bagdad. Before they left, Fuad Bey Hamza showed Mr. Hope Gill their programme of dates. They were due in Paris on the 31st April. On being told that might not be a good day, Fuad Bey changed it to the 1st May, but when he heard of May Day and Communists and unemployed and what-all, not to mention the French elections, he recoiled into April. Fuad is 33, Feisal 27. These neophytes are escorted by an A.D.C. done up in a uniform to taste, and a negro attendant who looks like a slave. It is understood that they have enough money with them.

Other Matters.

54. Relations during the last three months were overshadowed in January by the slave incident and clouded for the remainder by the complaints against Sir A. Ryan. They were enlivened somewhat locally in March by pilgrimage difficulties, which are recounted in chapter VII. In his series of interviews held in January with the Hejazi Under-Secretary, His Majesty's Minister covered a good deal of other ground, notably in connexion with debts, the coming pilgrimage, Transjordan, Persian Gulf questions and Colonel Biscoe's visit, and emergency landing-grounds on the Hasa Coast. None of the debts owing to His Majesty's Government, the Government of India and other British creditors were, of course, paid. Transjordan affairs have been dealt with in paragraphs 25-38, Persian Gulf questions in paragraphs 41-49, and the landing grounds in chapter IV.

International.

International Sanitary System.

55. After mature consideration of the advice given them last July (July-August report, paragraph 50), the Hejazi Government acceded in March to the Rome Convention of 1907.

Paris Pact.

56. They also adhered, in February, to the Kellogg Pact, notifying the American Government through the United States Ambassador in London.

Disarmament Conference.

57. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London was delegated in January to represent his Government at Geneva. A lengthy memorandum giving information on the armaments of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies was circulated to the conference on the 8th February, followed on the 24th by a memorandum by the Hejazi delegation notifying his views as to the need and manner of disarming the world.

Congresses.

58. His Majesty's Government's invitation to attend the Fifth International Congress of Local Authorities (July-August report, paragraph 54) was accepted by the Hejaz-Nejd Government in January, their Minister in London being deputed to represent them. An invitation to attend the London International Congress on commercial education was apologetically declined.

Italy.

59. A treaty of friendship with Italy and a commercial agreement were at length signed on the 10th February, after negotiations lasting two years. The Italian draft anti-slave trade clause has been dropped (*cf.* November-December report, paragraph 47).

Germany.

60. M. de Haas reassumed charge of his consulate on the 23rd March.

The Netherlands.

61. M. Adriaanse left Jedda on the 7th March on a brief visit to the Yemen to present Queen Wilhelmina's reply to a letter of greeting, sent to her last year by the Imam Yahya on the occasion of M. van der Meulen's visit to Sana (May-June report, paragraph 46). No other political significance is attached to this visit.

62. A M. van Leeuwen, erstwhile of the Netherlands Trading Society, was engaged in March by the Hejaz-Nejd Government as financial adviser for a year at £2,000 (see paragraph 11 above).

Soviet Russia.

63. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has presented the Amir Feisal with 5 rifles of a pattern known as "Turki" and apparently much prized by Bedouin. He was also discovered recently holding a small arms exhibition in his Legation. No arms are known to have been ordered.

64. The last consignment of Soviet benzine, 30,000 cases, was landed at Jedda in February in completion of the contract of last summer (July-August report, paragraph 63). Payment is understood to have been relegated to item 5 of the "budget."

Turkey.

65. On the 28th January the Turkish Ambassador called on His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to tell him that the Turkish Government had been asked by the Hejazi Government to lend pilots and mechanics for the development of their air service and to send a military mission to give similar help to the Hejazi army. Ferit Bey said that, before replying to this request, the Turkish Government, having regard to their very friendly relations with His Majesty's Government, desired to inform them of the request and to consult them about it. He was thanked for his communication and subsequently told that His Majesty's Government saw no reason why the Turkish Government should not accede to the Hejazi Government's request. This request follows upon Ibn Saud's failure to obtain British personnel (see November-December report, paragraph 59). There is no sign as yet of the arrival of any Turkish personnel or mission.

Egypt.

66. At the end of 1931 the Egyptian Prime Minister informed His Majesty's representative at Cairo that Egypt now had a consular representative of some ability at Jedda, and that, according to this official's reports, the difficulties which stood in the way of establishing friendly and regular relations were not insoluble. Sidky Pasha added that he was occupying himself with the matter, with the purpose and in the hope of solving the difficulties, which were of a religious as well as of a political order. Hafiz Amer Bey, however, who went on leave of absence last September, has not yet returned to Jedda, and nothing is known locally either of any progress in Egypto-Hejazi relations or of the Egyptian consul's movements.

Iraq.

67. Dr. Naji-al-Asil, King Feisal's first diplomatic representative at the Court of King Ibn Saud, arrived in Jedda on the 14th February with a wife (not visible) and family, and a secretary and clerk. He was greeted as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general by the Viceroy, but his letters of credence were not accepted; they named him specifically to Mecca instead of to Jedda. His luggage and his note-paper bore the same address (see paragraph 40 of the report for September-October). There has apparently been either a misunderstanding on the part of Nuri Pasha, who seems convinced that Ibn Saud agreed with him last March that Mecca should be the seat of the new Legation, for reasons of special consideration for his brother Feisal, or else Ibn Saud did indeed agree to the proposal; but his Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was ill and absent at the time, must have managed on his return to make him go back on his decision and omitted to mention it to the Iraqis. Whatever the cause, the effect was distinctly disagreeable to Dr. Naji, who has taken his anomalous position very philosophically, however, has failed as yet to secure an honourable compromise, and has settled down in Jedda to await results. He learned at the end of March that King Feisal would send a personal message by special courier to Ibn Saud, appealing to him to honour his bond. The incident is an ill-omen for independent Iraq-Nejd relations. Dr. Naji has shown himself very friendly disposed to the Legation, which he often visits for advice and to exchange information.

Afghanistan.

68. Ahmad Shah Khan, Minister of Court and cousin of King Nadir Shah, arrived on pilgrimage on the 17th March, and with the further objects of negotiating a treaty with Ibn Saud and of building an Afghan pilgrim hostel at Mecca which should redound to the credit of the Afghan King. Having brought very little money, he is having difficulty with this objective. Nothing definite is yet known of the course of the negotiations, but there are indications of a deplorable atmosphere of suspicion.

United States of America.

69. Mr. Crane's American engineer left for the Yemen on the 7th March, after making an extensive prospecting tour in the Hejaz and Nejd, and detailed recommendations to Ibn Saud for the development of his wealth by the purchase of American machinery and the engagement of American mining experts (see paragraph 14 above). He may return shortly to press his suit, which is not thought to please the King, however.

Poland.

70. In February a Polish professor of Chinese culture, who claimed to speak forty languages and to live in Cairo with a tubercular wife, visited Jedda from Egypt. From the language which he held on various occasions, it was understood that his object was primarily to obtain payment from the Hejazi Government of something over 2 million zloté in respect of the Polish arms delivered in 1930 (August 1930 report, paragraph 15). A secondary object seemed to be to discover what medical and sanitary arrangements the Hejazis were making for the pilgrimage, with discretion, if these were reassuring, to use the prospect of persuading a few score Polish Moslems to perform pilgrimage as an inducement to the Hejazi Government to pay him the desired £50,000 gold.

It seems that the visit was inspired by the Polish Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo. The professor left disappointed about equally with Hejazi science and Hejazi finance.

Chapter IV.—Air Matters.

Hejaz Air Force.

71. This invisible body figures in the Hejaz-Nejd communication to the Disarmament Conference, dated the 24th January, as comprising 11 officers and 150 men. The Hejazi Government's approach to the Turkish Government for the loan of pilots and mechanics has been reported in paragraph 65.

72. The same memorandum gives the number of Hejazi aeroplanes as nine. Only two of these are capable of flying to-day. Two more might fly after an overhaul and some rebuilding; the other five will never fly again.

Arab Aeronautical Society.

73. A report on the first year's working published in March does not make encouraging reading. £2,000 was subscribed, but not paid. Happily, the society holds promissory notes from all subscribers, and expenditure was nil. In spite of difficulties the society registered its determination to carry on. A new appeal for support is to be issued, rich pilgrims are to be asked to contribute, and propaganda is to be set on foot. Fuad Bey Hamza is vice-president.

Emergency Landing Grounds.

74. On the 24th January His Majesty's Minister took up with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs the question of the provision of emergency landing-grounds on the Hasa coast for aircraft in distress on the Persian Gulf route, in accordance with His Majesty's Government's instructions of the 2nd December (November-December report, paragraph 60). He went very fully and tactfully into the matter but found Fuad Bey very sticky. It was evident that he personally disliked the whole idea and would like to see Ibn Saud drive a hard bargain, should he agree to His Majesty's Government's request. Sir A. Ryan, in reporting the interview on the 25th January, opined that it was a matter in which Ibn Saud might be more amenable to a direct appeal, but unfortunately there was no prospect of his visiting Jedda before April at soonest.

75. On almost the same day the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf mentioned the same matter to Ibn Saud himself at Hufuf. The King said that he was prepared to consider it sympathetically. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin shortly afterwards informed Colonel Biscoe that Ibn Saud was now ready to afford any facilities asked for on islands, but not on the mainland, for fear of incidents with Bedouin. Certain islands were discussed and Colonel Biscoe suggested to His Majesty's Government that the matter should now be taken up officially. A Rangoon flying-boat which took refuge at Jinna Island in mid-January reported that a landing-ground was already marked out and fit for use and staffed with clerks complete with customs forms in Arabic and English for the use of visiting pilots. Only formal permission to use the ground now seemed required, but with the King's disappearance again into Nejd and in face of Fuad Hamza's malign influence at the seat of Government, no favourable occasion occurred of pursuing the matter.

Aerial Trespass.

76. Squadron-Leader Warburton was lost in the desert west of Rutba Wells in early January, and in order to forestall complaints of aerial trespass over his territory, Ibn Saud was formally asked for aerial hospitality for the search patrol. This was readily accorded and every assistance promised. Meanwhile, the missing machine was found in Iraq. Ibn Saud was thanked.

77. In mid-January a Rangoon flying-boat forced-landed at Jinna Island in the Persian Gulf. The Hejaz-Nejd Government were informed and the hope was expressed that there was no objection to the necessary relief measures. They replied that, as a humane duty, they had no objection. Meanwhile, a new engine was fitted and all at Jinna were very courteous; the Hejazi Government were thanked.

78. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London informed His Majesty's Government late in February that a British machine had flown over Qaryat al Milh without permission on the 27th or 28th January, but he did not press the point, nor was the Legation troubled.

79. In March, however, the Hejazi Government weighed in with a formal protest against three cases of alleged aerial trespass by British aircraft in the same district on the 22nd and 23rd February and the 3rd March. The matter was referred for enquiry.

Chapter V.—Military Matters.

General.

80. Ibn Saud is his own Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief. It is true that the "Council of Ministers" decree, annexed, goes out of its way to state that the President of the Council controls the Military Departments, but this constitutional change has been denied by a responsible member of the Government. Either he or the decree is wrong, probably the latter. The Military Departments comprise a Directorate of Military Affairs (regulars) under an ex-Turkish corporal, Hamdi Bey; a camel-corps (irregulars) under a Qaid al Hijan; and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who is also Director-General of Finance and King's Comptroller, as Quartermaster-General and Master of Ordnance.

Armed Forces.

81. The Hejaz-Nejd memorandum of the 24th January communicated to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva contained a lengthy dissertation on the Arabian Peninsula. It may be summed up in the opening words of section 8: "The natural and social conditions of this country are so extraordinary that they may be regarded as peculiar to it. This also applies to the military organisation." The following tables were annexed:—

Table I.—Total Armed Forces.

Number of men	43,437
Number of officers	734

Explanatory Notes.

- (1) The armed forces consist of:—
 - (a) Police, 33 officers and 896 men.
 - (b) Regular troops, 53 officers and 1,780 men.
 - (c) Camel corps, 250 officers and 12,500 men.
 - (d) Coastguards, 14 officers and 211 men.
 - (e) Garrison troops, 350 officers and 26,500 men.
 - (f) Frontier guards, 23 officers and 1,400 men.
 - (g) Air force, 11 officers and 150 men.
- (2) Military service is not compulsory, and men are engaged by voluntary enlistment. In war-time, all males between 14 and 65 are liable for active service.
- (3) In certain units the period of service is not specified, the men serving for as long as they wish or for as long as they give satisfaction.
- (4) The police, coastguards and regular troops serve under contract for a definite period, which may not exceed five years.

Table II.—Air Force.

Number of aeroplanes	9
Total horse-power	3,780

Table III.—Annual Expenditure.

		£ gold.
Police	...	39,211
Coastguards	...	11,340
Frontier guards	...	35,000
Air force	...	12,000
Other categories	...	633,950
Material and ammunition	...	98,450
Transport and communications	...	100,000
Total	...	930,151

Military Expenditure.

82. Table III as communicated to the Disarmament Conference compares thus with the current "budget" as annexed to this report:—

Table III.		"Budget."	
Item—	£ gold.	Item—	£ gold.
Police and coastguards ...	50,551	Public security ...	54,952
Frontier guards ...	35,000	Frontier forces ...	35,000
Air force ...	12,000	Hejazi share in Defence	
Other categories ...	633,950	Departments ...	200,000
Material and ammunition	98,450	Communications and trans-	
Transport and communica-		port ...	100,000
tions ...	100,000		
Total ...	930,151	Total ...	389,952

Difference roughly = £540,000

Apart from possible clerical and mathematical errors (such as 633,950 for 63,395), which are hardly ever lacking from important Hejaz-Nejd calculations and enactments, the difference of over half-a-million pounds may probably be explained by the fact that the "budget" is solely Hejazi, although this is not expressly stated. If confronted with these figures, Ibn Saud would no doubt readily aver that Nejd pays the difference as senior military partner in the dual kingdom. This might be true, but again it might not. There is no means of telling. This at least can be said, that the bulky figure of "£633,950—Other categories" deserves to be regarded with grave suspicion.

Northern Hejaz and Frontier.

83. The northern Amirates continued in a bad way, lacking pay and food for the men and petrol and spare parts for the cars. The Amir of Tabuk, however, was able to raid and loot the Beni Atiya in February, as described in paragraph 36, an operation which relieved his garrison's distress.

84. According to Transjordan information, Hejazi military and police forces in March were distributed as follows:—

Location.	Military.		Police.		Camel Corps.	Guns.		Military Cars.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Field Guns.	Machine Guns.	
Mecca	3	60	8	145	300	6	6	12
Taif	1	19	1	35	85	1	1	5
Jedda	4	50	9	119	75	8	9	7
Medina	1	34	7	114	125	4	3	10
Yanbu'	1	10	2	18	25	1	1	1
Wejh	1	10	1	15	42	1	1	2
Tabuk	2	24	1	15	40	1	..	6
Skaka	1	14	100	10
Qaf (under Ibn Zeyd, Tribal Control Officer)	50	50	6
Totals	13	207	30	525	842	22	21	59

Notes.

- (i) "Camel Corps" includes the Governor's bodyguard.
- (ii) "Cars" are frequently changing locations and the majority are now unserviceable awaiting spares. Some have machine guns.
- (iii) Local Governors can raise irregular forces at short notice.
- (iv) This list will be amended and added to when reliable reports are received.

East (Nejd).

85. There is nothing definite to report.

South (Asir).

86. Reference to tribal unrest has been made in paragraph 51, but the frontier appears to have been quiet. The Nejd reinforcements sent to Jizan last September (September-October report, paragraph 45) returned in March by sea, in dhows.

Chapter VI.—Naval Matters.

87. Lieut-Commander A. R. Farquhar, D.S.C., R.N., visited Jedda in H.M.S. "Penzance" on the 28th January. The visit happened to coincide with the manumission by the Legation of a slave claimed by Ibn Saud and proved most timely for his embarkation, under somewhat unusual circumstances, and repatriation to Africa (see chapter VIII). His Majesty's Minister left Jedda on the 2nd February in H.M.S. "Penzance" for Port Sudan, on his way to Jerusalem.

88. The French despatch-vessel "Dunkerque" visited Jedda from the 24th to the 28th March, after paying short visits to Wejh and Yanbu.

89. The Italian minelayer "Azio" visited Jedda from the 9th to the 11th February, for the occasion of the signing of the Italo-Hejazi treaty.

Chapter VII.—Pilgrimage.

General.

90. By the end of March some 20,000 pilgrims had landed at Jedda, of whom 8,000 were Indians. Pilgrimage Day was due to fall on Friday, the 15th April, and another 5,000 oversea pilgrims were expected to arrive for it. Last year's figures were 40,000 in all from oversea.

Indian.

91. Hejasis live on Indians, amongst others. They felt the pinch of a lean season last year and their appetite has recently been sharp. The Hejazi Government have equally suffered the pinch and their practice has become all the sharper. They are an unpleasant species at the best of times; but when, as during the past three months, they begin to make their annual meal in lairs which they call the Holy Sanctuaries, they offend the senses and exercise the mind of interested observers.

92. Last summer they published an official tariff of dues for the 1932 pilgrimage which advertised a reduction of mutawwifs' fees. It was scaled in piastres and rupees. They broadcast it through India and beyond in a propaganda pamphlet, entitled "Friday Pilgrimage," promising the fall of Hajj Day on Friday, the 15th April, with consequential sevenfold blessing that day upon God's Guests. (It may be noted in parenthesis that it was not the Prophet but the shop and lodging-house keepers of Mecca who invented this windfall, 200 years later.) Indian pilgrims were thus led to believe that the 1932 pilgrimage would cost less than that of 1931 and be seven times as valuable. This was good business.

93. On the basis of the official tariff and other necessary expenditure in the Hejaz, the Legation estimated the total cost of pilgrimage in 1932 to be not less than 800 rupees, and the Government of India were so informed. When the sterling and rupee left gold in the autumn, however, the Hejazi Government made no sign. They maintained a fictitious "official" parity with gold, but in practice the Saudi riyal, which contains 11 Miri piastres, had long ago parted from gold, and stood at the end of 1931 at 17½ to the £ gold, parity being 10. There were thus grounds for belief that pilgrims would be able to buy piastres at the market rate and that fees scaled in rupees would be accepted in rupees. But as soon as the first Indian pilgrims landed at Jedda on the 30th December they found that they were charged all dues and fees, including those in rupees, on a gold basis, and were also charged for items which did not figure in the official tariffs at all. They found, in effect, that expenses in the Hejaz were some 40 per cent. higher this year than last. The majority held quite insufficient funds.

94. There followed a series of representations by the Legation and of dilatory, evasive and contradictory statements by the Hejazi Government.

Pilgrims were first told to apply to the local Government at Jedda, who had been instructed to investigate and report. The obvious conclusion was that neither gold basis nor overcharges had been authorised by the Hejazi Government. On the 17th January, however, the latter answered His Majesty's Minister's note of the 2nd January with a notification that the tariff was fixed on a gold basis and charges must be collected accordingly. The Legation at once informed the Government of India, who issued a press communiqué on the 23rd January warning pilgrims of the change and advising them to estimate the total cost of pilgrimage at 1,100 rupees.

95. The Hejazi Government and others commercially interested in pilgrims made every endeavour in India, through the press and otherwise, to discredit the Government of India's advice. They succeeded in inducing the majority of pilgrims yet to come that 750, or even 500, rupees would suffice. As a result, several thousand more Indians arrived in Jedda with insufficient means. On discovering their position, they clamoured for redress and help from the Legation, but were told that they were themselves largely to blame for trusting the Hejazi Government and agencies rather than their own Government, and were shown the Government of India communiqué, together with a telegram of the 10th March sent in clear English, in which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires described their position to the Government of India, stressed the responsibility of the Hejazi Government for their distress, and asked that the facts be brought to the notice of all intending pilgrims still to come, so that they might come with their eyes open, expecting neither financial assistance from the Legation nor any remission of dues from those who have to live on pilgrims. The Government of India therefore issued a second communiqué on the 16th March based on this telegram. There was a noticeable falling off in the numbers of pilgrims embarked thereafter, the last two or three ships arriving almost empty at Jedda.

96. It is unnecessary to recount the slipshod prevarications of the Hejazi Government throughout March. They turned chiefly on the official maximum transport charges, which had long been promised, were not made known until the 3rd March, and were then invariably exceeded, but were officially raised by the Government to cover the excesses as often as these were brought to notice by the Legation. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires obtained an oral promise from the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 19th March that the maxima would not again be raised, and endeavoured to obtain from the Hejazi Government an agreed copy of the charges as finally fixed. This was withheld and the promise went for nothing. Transport conditions and charges have remained chaotic. The experience of the last three months makes it imperative to devise means before the next pilgrimage of curbing the appetite of this shamelessly hungry Government.

Nigerian.

97. The desiderata referred to in paragraph 72 of the last report were obtained, thanks to the Sudan Government's negotiations with the Khedivial Mail Line Company, concluded in January. The company agreed to issue only return tickets and all the year round, to pilgrims leaving Suakin, with two unobjectionable provisos, and they further agreed unofficially to consider such tickets valid up to a maximum of two years—a most satisfactory result.

98. The repatriation of 912 destitute Nigerian pilgrims was completed on the 29th March (see November–December report, paragraphs 69 to 71). 581 were sent to Massawa and 331 to Suakin. The pro-consul at Jedda felt much relieved at the conclusion of this arduous task.

Somali.

99. Recommendations were made by the Legation in March to Sheikh and Aden with a view to improving the control of the Somali pilgrimage.

Chapter VIII.—*Slavery.*

Bakhit Incident.

100. Two male slaves, Nigerian and French Sudani by origin, had escaped towards the end of December from Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's house at Mecca and taken refuge in the Legation. It was intended to manumit them in the

normal way and send them to Port Sudan on the 26th December. The local authorities, however, under instructions from Mecca, refused to grant the necessary papers to leave the country, on the ground that they were Royal slaves. His Majesty's Minister made strong representations to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by telephone on the 24th December, and the opposition to the Nigerian's departure was withdrawn. He claimed with apparent truth to have come on pilgrimage in 1930 or 1931, and to have been sold by his master, or companion, into slavery. His case seemed thus to fall under article 7 of the Treaty of Jedda regarding the suppression of slave trade. He was consequently repatriated as intended, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a note of the 26th December admitting that he was a free person wrongfully enslaved.

101. The Hejazi Government asked, however, that Bakhit, the other slave, should be handed over to the local authorities as being a Royal slave. They stated that the fact of his having been with Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman was immaterial, as the latter bought all the King's slaves. Bakhit was therefore retained in the Legation and personally questioned by His Majesty's Minister. He gave a straightforward and convincing story of having been brought from Africa as a child, at pilgrimage time, captured by Bedouin outside Jedda, sold in the Yemen, sent many years later to Medina, taken when the city fell to Ibn Saud's son, sent by him to Ibn Saud's cousin Ibn Musa'id, and by him to Abdullah Suleiman eighteen months ago. He had had nothing to do with the King. Copies of His Majesty's Minister's *questionnaire* and the man's replies were sent to the Hejazi Government on the 31st December.

102. The case developed during January on acute lines which it is unnecessary to describe in detail. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London made representations to the Foreign Office. His Majesty's Minister had a series of patient interviews with the Hejazi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in a sustained effort to find a compromise. Fuad Hamza, however, was uncompromising, became heated, and eventually lost his head. There seems little reason to doubt that, once armed with Ibn Saud's claim to have the slave returned, he made no further reference, or inadequate reference, of the course of the affair to the King, who was at Hufuf, with the result that a deadlock was reached.

103. His Majesty's Government, who were kept fully informed by His Majesty's Minister by telegraph, stated on the 27th January that the matter was one of very great importance on which they could not yield. They instructed Sir A. Ryan so to inform the Hejazi Government and promptly to arrange with the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, to embark Bakhit in H.M.S. "Penzance." They added that the matter was so important that, had "Penzance" not happened to be at Jedda, they would have asked the Admiralty to send a ship for the purpose. They realised that the embarkation might present practical difficulties, but they gave Sir A. Ryan fullest discretion. His Majesty's Minister accordingly informed the Hejazi Government on the 28th January of His Majesty's Government's views and their express instructions, which, he added, he was taking the necessary steps to carry out without delay. He asked that the local authorities be informed.

104. After consultation with Commander Farquhar, it was decided to leave the process of embarkation to be carried out on the following afternoon by the Legation staff, openly from the quay in the Legation launch. If and when this attempt failed owing to physical or armed opposition, it would be necessary to consider the need for naval co-operation. The next day was decided upon in order to give the Hejazi Government time to communicate by wireless with the King. But they telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister the same evening, immediately on receipt of his note, that they would never agree to the departure of the slave. Sir A. Ryan telegraphed back the following morning that he was sending Bakhit to the sloop that day.

105. The man was duly embarked in the afternoon without difficulty, the doubled Nejd guard on the quay making no attempt to intervene until too late, when the launch was already under weigh; then they made a futile rush to the water's edge and stood there shouting and gesticulating. It was later learned that Fuad Hamza, who is no ordinary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had himself issued standing orders to the police to shoot Bakhit on sight outside the Legation, and particular instructions, in the attempt to embark him, to oppose Sir A. Ryan if he accompanied the slave in person, without, however, using physical force in the last resort; but if it were Captain Seager (who usually deals

with slaves), to resist him by every means at their command. Happily it was Ramadhan and the guard failed to adjust their wits in time to the arrival of Mr. Hope Gill, followed by the slave, flanked by Captain Seager who engaged the passport officials, and with Mr. Wikeley as rearguard in case an attempt was made to take the man from behind. The Nejd commanding the guard was summoned to Mecca and imprisoned.

106. The incident delighted Jedda, whose population were only sorry that a landing party had not been used to do the thing in style, but it had a deplorable effect on Ibn Saud's temper which could certainly have been avoided had Fuad Bey Hamza kept his head. The general opinion was that, had the King been kept fully informed, he would undoubtedly have made a large gesture at the last moment, *faute de mieux*, and given the slave to Sir A. Ryan, thereby saving some prestige. If he was kept fully informed, his message of the previous day, the 28th January, to His Majesty's Government through Colonel Biscoe was meaningless (see paragraph 44 above); if he was not, his desire for an intelligent channel of communication would be easily gratified by his replacement of Fuad Hamza by someone intelligent.

Other Slaves.

107. Two other male slaves took refuge in the Legation in January and were manumitted and repatriated to Africa early in February, without difficulty. A woman who had been a slave and feared re-enslavement, and a fourth male slave, who took refuge in the Legation in February and was manumitted, were also repatriated. Three slaves who escaped from the Amir Feisal's retinue when he visited Jedda in February, were expected to attempt to reach the Legation, and the local authorities took elaborate precautions to prevent and find them. They apparently made good their escape by other means and were not found.

Chapter IX.—Miscellaneous.

Visitors.

108. Lady Dorothy Mills, known to some as "Uneaten and Unbeaten," explored Jedda from the 12th to the 15th January, and was accommodated in the Legation. Prominent pilgrims will be noted in the next report.

Deportations.

109. Mubarik Ali was deported on the 25th January by the Hejazi Government in response to the Legation's request (see November-December report, paragraph 80). A misguided disciple named Mirza Suleiman Ahmed was made to accompany him.

Staff.

110. His Majesty's Minister left Jedda on the 2nd February in H.M.S. "Penzance" for Port Sudan on an official visit to Jerusalem, to discuss Transjordan matters with His Majesty's High Commissioner. Mr. Hope Gill became Chargé d'Affaires.

The Indian vice-consul, Munshi Ihsanullah, received the well-merited title of Khan Bahadur on the 1st January.

The Malay pilgrimage officer returned to Jedda for the season on the 28th February.

Annex "A" to Enclosure.

(Translation.)

Extract from "Umm-al-Qura" of January 15, 1932.

REGULATION CONCERNING THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

(After Compliments.)

A high decree has been issued sanctioning the following regulation:—

Article 1. The Council of Ministers (Majlis-al-Wukalaa) is composed of the President of the Council (Rais-al-Majlis), the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Wakil-al-Kharijiya), the head of the Finance Department (Wakil-al-Maliya), and the Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly (Wakil-ash-Shuri).

Art. 2. The President of the Council of Ministers, in the absence of His Majesty the King, becomes *ex officio* Viceroy of His Majesty (Naib-al-Amm), but when His Majesty is present he will be President of the Council of Ministers only.

Art. 3. The Presidency of the Council at the present time directs the Viceroy's Office (Niyabat-al-Amma) and the Ministries of Interior (Wazarat-ad-Dakhiliya) and Foreign Affairs (Wazarat-al-Kharijiya) and the War Departments (al Askariya).

Art. 4. The Council of Ministers shall have a general office (diwan), which will be under the charge of a chief responsible for the administration of its affairs. This office shall issue instructions to the Ministries (Wakalat) and Departments (Idarat), whether emanating from the Council of Ministers or from the President thereof, either in his capacity as President or in his capacity as Viceroy of His Majesty during the latter's absence.

Art. 5. The Council of Ministers derives its authority from His Majesty the King; the Ministers (Wukalaa) are jointly responsible to His Majesty the King for the general policy of the country, and each of them is responsible also for the affairs of his Ministry (Wazara).

Art. 6. The decisions of the Council of Ministers will be taken in accordance with the opinion of the majority. No decision may be executed unless it bears the signature of the majority and includes the signature of the Minister (Wakil) whom the decision primarily concerns.

Art. 7. In the event of a difference of opinion arising between the Ministers (Wukalaa) on any matter, or when opposition is raised to any decision made by the majority, the President of the Council, when he is Viceroy, if the matter is an important one, can order the execution of the decision on his own responsibility. If the matter is one which can be postponed for submission to His Majesty the King, the President should defer its execution until he has referred it to His Majesty for his gracious command.

Art. 8. The Ministers (Wukalaa) may make enquiries from each other and may ask for the production of a written explanation concerning the action of their colleagues in regard to decisions taken, the execution of which has been entrusted to those colleagues or to one of them. The colleague responsible must produce such an explanation, and when difficulty is experienced in bringing about agreement between the party asking for it and the party responsible, the matter should be referred to His Majesty the King so that the party asking for the explanation may be freed from responsibility.

Art. 9. The President of the Council is the channel through which Royal Orders are issued to the Government Departments (Dawair) and Ministries (Wakalat), and he is the authority to whom these Departments (Dawair) should address themselves in their official dealings.

Art. 10. Should any Minister (Wakil) or other head of a Department or any subordinate happen to think of a new matter, which may be beneficial or which may serve to avoid an abuse, when such matter is not provided for in the regulations of the Government nor laid down in the relevant arrangements, he should submit it in writing to the President of the Council for the latter to consider it, add his observations thereto and refer it, together with the observations, to His Majesty the King for his gracious command as to what should be done in the matter.

Art. 11. If the President of the Council should direct one of the Ministers (Wukalaa) to execute an order which is not provided for in the regulations laid

down, nor issued as a decision of the Council, or issued as a decision of the Council but has been disputed or opposed by the Minister (Wakil) responsible for its execution, then the opposing Minister (Wakil) must execute the order immediately, provided that it is communicated in writing and supported by a Royal Command, the number and date of which must be mentioned. If the Royal Command supporting it is not mentioned, the matter should be referred to His Majesty the King.

Art. 12. The Council is to meet nightly when the majority of the members are present at one place. It must in any case meet once a week during the daytime or at night for dealing with all questions submitted to it, which questions are to be prepared and classified by the Diwan.

Art. 13. In the event of one of the Ministers (Wukalaa) being absent when any matter arises requiring his presence in that it concerns his Department (Daira), the matter should not be postponed; the necessary decisions should be taken in respect of it and communicated to the Ministers (Wukalaa), including the absent one, according to the usual practice. If the absent Minister has anything to say against a decision taken in his absence, he should immediately submit his views to the President and to his colleagues so that they may defer execution of the decision pending consultation and meeting. If the absent Minister has nothing against the decision, it must be carried out; if he has not opposed the decision within twenty-four hours after learning of it, his silence will be interpreted as approval unless he has some legal [*sic* ? legitimate] excuse for delaying his opposition. Otherwise the decision will come into force.

Art. 14. The decisions of the Council shall be communicated to all the Ministers (Wukalaa) concerned with its execution, as is provided for by the decision of the Council No. 7 shown in the record under No. 6 of the meeting which took place on the night of Thursday the 18th-19th Rajab 1350 (the 29th-30th November, 1931).

Art. 15. A special record should be kept in writing of every meeting of the Council of Ministers, and every decision is to be entered separately therein; the signed text of the record of the proceedings is to be kept in the Diwan, and the necessary copies are to be distributed. In addition to this, a record of the proceedings should be copied under a serial number into a big register kept for the purpose.

Art. 16. The following administrations (jihāt) correspond direct with the President of the Council :—

1. The Royal Diwan.
2. Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Kharijiya).
3. Finance Department (Maliya).
4. War Departments (Askariya).
5. Legislative Assembly (Shuri).
6. Ministry of the Interior (Dakhiliya).
7. The Grand Qadhi's Office.
8. The Amirs of the Dependencies.

Departments (Dawair) other than the above correspond each with the (higher) Department (Daira) to which it is attached, and the principal Department (Daira) corresponds direct with the Presidency of the Council.

Art. 17. The Ministry of the Interior (Wazarat-ad-Dakhiliya) supervises the following Departments (Dawair) :—

1. Health.
2. Education.
3. Posts and Telegraphs.
4. Quarantine.
5. Central Police.
6. Shar'aa Courts (in the cases when these do not depend from the office of the Grand Qadhi).
7. The Municipalities.

Art. 18. It is not the intention of the previous article that the Departments (Dawair) should never correspond with His Highness the Amir. It is understood that communications received at the Diwan addressed to the Minister (Wazir) of the Interior will be sent to that Ministry (Dakhiliya) without any action being taken concerning them by the Diwan.

Art. 19. The Viceroy's Office, as it exists in its present form, will be divided into two parts: One section relates to the Ministry (Wazarat) of the Interior and will remain in the present office, carrying out the same duties as at present; the other section relates to the Presidency of the Council and will be incorporated in it. The Departments (Dawair) are to be informed when this division has taken place so that communications concerning the Ministry (Wazarat) of the Interior will be addressed to that Ministry, while those from Departments (Dawair) attached to the Presidency of the Council will be sent direct to the Presidency.

Art. 20. The name of the present Viceroy's Office will be changed to Ministry of the Interior (Wazarat-ad-Dakhiliya), while the name of the Diwan will become "Diwan of the Viceroy and of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers" (Diwan Naib-al-Amm-wa-Riasat Majlis-al-Wukalaa).

Art. 21. Transactions requiring the signature of His Royal Highness the Amir will be classified as follows :—

1. Documents issued when His Highness is charged with the office of Viceroy of His Majesty the King in the latter's absence, which will be signed "Viceroy of His Majesty the King" (Naib-al-Amm li Jalalat-al-Malik).
2. Documents issued when His Majesty the King is present and His Royal Highness is only President of the Council, which will be signed "President of the Council of Ministers" (Rais Majlis-al-Wukalaa).
3. Documents emanating from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Wazarat-al-Kharajiya), which will be signed "Minister for Foreign Affairs" (Wazir-al-Kharijiya).
4. Documents emanating from the Ministry of the Interior, which will be signed "Minister of the Interior" (Wazir-ad-Dakhiliya).

Art. 22. Departments (Dawair) will be notified of this arrangement, so that they may put into practice in their transactions and in communications addressed by them to His Royal Highness the Amir.

Art. 23. The Diwan will be (properly) arranged and its activities organised so that the transactions concerning any one Department (Daira) or any one subject will be filed in such a way as to facilitate reference to them. The records and registers and copies of correspondence must be properly kept.

Art. 24. The Diwan can best be arranged in the following way :—

- Head of the Diwan.
- His assistant.
- Officer in charge of Telegrams.
- Officer in charge of Registers and Archives.
- Work concerning the Council of Ministers and the Royal Diwan.
- Work of (other) Departments (Dawair).
- Typists and copyists section.

Art. 25. The head of the Diwan is the channel of communication between the Departments (Dawair) and the Amir. He attends the meetings of the Council of Ministers and shares in its work, and he has complete control over the work of the Diwan.

Art. 26. The assistant of the head of the Diwan is directly responsible for the work of the Diwan. He controls the staff and supervises the work of filing and registering documents and answering communications, &c. The other officials have each their own work, and, if necessary, an assistant to help them with it; each one does the work that concerns him, looks after it and distributes.

Art. 27. The reorganisation of the Ministry of Interior (Dakhiliya) will be carried out in such a manner as to meet the requirements of the work. Superfluous clerks and employees will be transferred to the Diwan of the Presidency of the Council.

Annex "B" to Enclosure.

(Tentative Schedule.)

Financial Year 1350-51 A.H. (December 12, 1931, to November 30, 1932)

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE.

Item.	Piastres. ⁽¹⁾	£ Gold.
1. Royal allowances	6,600,000	60,000
2. Royal Princes, palaces, Diwan; Treasury	12,650,000	115,000
3. Frontier forces and Defence Departments	25,850,000	235,000
Royal and military total		410,000
4. Communications and transport... ..	11,000,000	100,000
5. Debt instalment	16,500,000	150,000
Total		660,000
6. Administration—		
(a) Justice	1,127,692	
(b) Viceroy's office	3,146,530	
(c) Legislative Assembly	577,310	
(d) Ministry for Foreign Affairs	1,490,789	
(e) Health and quarantines	2,734,240	
(f) Water condensers	1,353,225	
(g) Public education	1,717,047	
(h) Customs Department	1,240,832	
(i) Finance Departments	2,253,028	
(j) Public security	10,441,196	
(k) Government press	161,820	
(l) Committees of virtue	165,070	
(m) Posts, telegraphs, telephones, wireless	4,210,450	
(n) Wakfs and sanctuaries	2,048,137	
(o) Miscellaneous	988,720	
Total	35,656,086 at 192=	175,000
Grand total		835,000

⁽¹⁾ 110 piastres = £1 gold.

[E 2324/1494/25]

No. 41.

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE HEJAZ-NEJD MISSION.

First Meeting.

THE first meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd Mission was held in the Foreign Office at 12.15 P.M. on the 9th May.

Present:

Sir L. Oliphant (<i>in the Chair</i>).	The Emir Feisal.
Mr. G. W. Rendel.	The Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd.
Mr. C. F. A. Warner.	Fuad Bey Hamza.
	M. Zada (Secretary of the Legation).

The business was of a formal nature.

Sir L. Oliphant, after a complimentary reference to the presence of the mission in this country, and to the good relations existing between the two Governments, said that he was at the disposal of the mission for the discussion of any questions which they might wish to raise, and suggested that it might be convenient that a meeting should be held in the afternoon for this purpose.

The Emir Feisal, after expressing pleasure at the friendship which bound the two countries, agreed to Sir L. Oliphant's proposal, and it was arranged that Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Fuad Bey Hamza should come to the Foreign Office for a further meeting at 4 o'clock.

Sir L. Oliphant said that the Emir would have learnt already from His Majesty the King, and from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it was their desire that the most cordial relations should be maintained.

The Emir Feisal expressed the pleasure with which he had heard these sentiments from His Majesty and Sir John Simon, and said that his father set great store by the maintenance of such good relations.

Sir L. Oliphant enquired whether there was any question which the Emir Feisal wished to discuss. The Emir replied that he had already alluded to the one question of fundamental importance. It was their desire that there should be between the two countries a true friendship, not merely an official one. He was much gratified by the assurances he had received on this point. He did not himself wish to raise any other questions, and would leave the discussion of any other points to Fuad Bey Hamza.

Foreign Office, May 9, 1932.

[E 2403/1494/25]

No. 42.

Record of Second Meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd Delegation held at the Foreign Office at 4 P.M. on May 9, 1932.

Present:

Foreign Office.

Hejaz and Nejd Delegation.

Sir L. Oliphant.
Mr. G. W. Rendel.
Mr. C. F. A. Warner.

The Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd.
Fuad Bey Hamza.

SIR L. OLIPHANT asked Fuad Bey Hamza to mention any questions which the delegation wished to discuss.

Fuad Bey Hamza replied that King Abdul Aziz had instructed them to raise the following points:—

I.

The main purpose of the mission was to ascertain whether His Majesty's Government still felt for the Hejaz-Nejd Government the same goodwill as in the past, and still desired the maintenance of close relations of friendship. King Abdul Aziz had been anxious for some time past as to whether His Majesty's Government's attitude towards him had not undergone some modification. He had mentioned the matter to Sir Andrew Ryan in June last, and Sir Andrew had no doubt reported it. His Majesty hoped to receive from His Majesty's Government, not only formal support, but also moral and material support, such as he had received from His Majesty's Government in earlier days. The mission were, therefore, to ask for an assurance on this point and to enquire to what extent His Majesty's Government are prepared to support and advise the Hejaz-Nejd in time of need. King Abdul Aziz also wanted to know how he should guide his policy in order to meet the views of His Majesty's Government. This was the principal purpose of their mission.

II.—Economic Questions.

Fuad Bey Hamza emphasised the present economic difficulties of the Hejaz-Nejd. King Abdul Aziz ardently desired the help of His Majesty's Government. The needs of the Hejaz-Nejd Government are numerous. They require, above all, financial help. The mission was therefore charged to enquire whether His Majesty's Government could make a loan to the Hejaz-Nejd Government and help them in other ways in their economic difficulties.

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III.—*Haramain Wakfs.*

There were in countries under British control various pious foundations, the proceeds of which, according to the wishes of the founders, should be devoted to the Holy Places of Islam. These proceeds are not now received in Mecca, and the Hejaz-Nejd Government desired the help of His Majesty's Government in putting this right.

IV.—*Transjordan.*

Fuad Bey remarked that it was useless to disguise that there had been considerable difficulties between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan. The mission was charged by King Abdul Aziz to declare his readiness to make with Transjordan similar arrangements to those recently made with Iraq.

V.—*Soviet Activities and Propaganda.*

They were also to enquire, as King Abdul Aziz had enquired in the past, what policy His Majesty's Government would advise him to follow in regard to Soviet activities.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that these were the points which the mission were instructed to take up with His Majesty's Government. The one of fundamental importance was the first. If the reply on that point was encouraging, the others could be dealt with in turn.

Sir L. Oliphant then replied on each of these five points in turn.

As to I, the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Hejaz-Nejd, he said he had always been puzzled when, from time to time, it was reported that King Abdul Aziz felt doubts as to the continuance of the friendly attitude of His Majesty's Government. He assured Fuad Bey Hamza emphatically that in fundamentals that attitude was as cordial as ever. He stressed the phrase "in fundamentals." With the extension of the dominions of King Abdul Aziz, the points of contact with His Majesty's Government had increased in number. Since the war, His Majesty's Government had certain connexions with territories which were adjacent to those dominions and which formerly had been part of the Turkish Empire. *Sir Lancelot* emphasised that these were not colonies, but mandated territories, and that this distinction connoted a real difference of relationship, and a real difference in the degree of control exercised by His Majesty's Government. With the more numerous points of contact, occasions of differences between His Majesty's Government and the Hejaz-Nejd Government had naturally arisen. King Abdul Aziz, before now, had explained that, when he spoke frankly, it was because it was appropriate to do so between friends. His Majesty's Government agreed with this sentiment, and when causes of difficulty arose, they, too, believed in speaking frankly, as the best means of clearing up differences between friends. His Majesty must, therefore, not misunderstand them when they did so, or think that this showed a change of fundamental attitude. As he said before, he could give an absolute assurance that, fundamentally, His Majesty's Government's attitude remained one of sincere friendship.

Sir Lancelot added that, if Fuad Bey, when he returned to his country, would explain this to His Majesty, and remove any misapprehensions which he might have on this subject, the mission's visit to this country would have been well worth while.

Fuad Bey Hamza expressed his pleasure at *Sir L. Oliphant's* statement, and he said he would do his best on his return to the Hejaz to eradicate from King Abdul Aziz's mind any mistaken ideas that might remain on this subject.

Passing to II, the mission's request for a loan, *Sir L. Oliphant* explained the difficulties in this time of most stringent economy. He would not mislead Fuad Bey into thinking it was at all likely that the mission's request could be acceded to. He would, however, put the point to the Treasury and would give an answer soon, so that the mission might, if they wished, approach financial houses, although he feared that from that quarter, too, the chances of getting a loan were remote.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that, if His Majesty's Government could not themselves make a loan to his Government, they could, perhaps, arrange one with some financial houses. His Government only required a loan of £500,000. In answer to a question, he explained that he meant £500,000 gold, or its equivalent, and that he had data as to what could be offered as security.

Sir L. Oliphant said that, while he could not encourage any hope in Fuad Bey, he would consult the competent department.

In regard to III, *Haramain Wakfs*, *Sir L. Oliphant* recalled that King Abdul Aziz had made a similar request some years ago, and His Majesty's Government had given a written reply. The Government of India could not interfere in religious and quasi-religious matters, and there were no religious courts in India; but His Majesty's Government had explained that, if the Hejaz-Nejd Government wished, they could have recourse to the civil courts, and had expressed readiness to consider sympathetically any request for assistance or advice.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that there were Wakfs administered by Government departments in British-controlled territory, *e.g.*—

- (i) There were Wakfs in Palestine, administered by the Supreme Moslem Council.
- (ii) Certain moneys, sent by the Nizam of Hyderabad, were distributed in the Hejaz. Fuad Bey seemed to think that these might be the proceeds of Wakfs.
- (iii) A certain Ali Surraty (? Surati), probably an Indian, died in Java, leaving properties in Rangoon, the proceeds of one-third of which were to be devoted to the poor in Medina and Mecca. The Hejaz-Nejd Government had applied to the authorities in Java, who replied that they could do nothing in respect of the properties in Burma, and that application should be made to the Administrator-General of Trusts there. Nothing had been received by the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

Fuad Bey also said that his Government might wish to send a delegation to India to make enquiries.

Sir L. Oliphant said that he would cause enquiries to be made regarding these specific cases which Fuad Bey had mentioned, and that no doubt such assistance as might be possible would be readily given by the India Office, *e.g.*, they would probably be ready to advise the Hejaz-Nejd Government as to the choice of legal representatives if required.

In regard to point IV, *Transjordan*, *Sir L. Oliphant* said that there was no use disguising the fact that relations on the frontier had given rise to considerable friction, and that in 1930 they were very bad indeed. He did not wish to go into details at the moment. It was, however, in his opinion, a very good sign that King Abdul Aziz should now have declared his readiness to make with *Transjordan* similar agreements to those made with Iraq. The matter was not, however, quite plain sailing; as he had already mentioned, *Transjordan* was not a colony, but a mandated territory, and there were quarters in which difficulties in this matter might arise. He would have the question examined.

As regards V, the question of relations with the Soviet, *Sir L. Oliphant* said that he would refer the matter to the Secretary of State.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that the relations of the Hejaz-Nejd Government with the Soviet were unique; they had diplomatic relations, but the Hejaz-Nejd Government maintained an embargo on Soviet imports. Reminded of the contract for the supply of certain consignments of Soviet benzine to the Hejaz-Nejd, Fuad Bey Hamza said that that was a Government contract, and an exception to the general rule.

In reply to *Sir L. Oliphant's* enquiry whether there was any other question which he wished to raise, Fuad Bey Hamza said that, as he had already mentioned, the Hejaz-Nejd Government looked to His Majesty's Government for material as well as for moral support. An American engineer (Fuad Bey Hamza no doubt referred to Mr. Twitchell) had recently been exploring the mineral

resources of the Hejaz and Hasa, and had presented reports which he (Fuad Bey) had with him. King Abdul Aziz always preferred to deal with the British, and would welcome the assistance of British firms in exploiting the mineral resources of his country.

Sir L. Oliphant intimated that British firms might hesitate to accept the report not drawn up by a British expert, and that there might be doubt as to the readiness of British firms to sink capital in a little-known country at the present time.

[E 2404/1494/25]

No. 43.

Record of Third Meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd Delegation, held at the Foreign Office on May 13, 1932, at 11.30 A.M.

Foreign Office.	Present.	Hejaz and Nejd Delegation.
Sir L. Oliphant (<i>in the Chair</i>).		The Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd.
Mr. G. W. Rendel		Fuad Bey Hamza.
Mr. C. F. A. Warner.		

SIR L. OLIPHANT said that he was now in a position to reply, one by one, to the points raised by Fuad Bey Hamza at the previous meeting; he hoped that Fuad Bey would thereafter ask for any elucidation which he might desire.

I. He wished to confirm the assurance which he had given to the delegation at the last meeting, that His Majesty's Government desired, as in the past, the most cordial and friendly relations with the Hejazi Government.

II. As regards a loan by His Majesty's Government, it was quite out of the question for them to meet the wishes of the Hejazi Government in the matter. But arrangements had been made since the last meeting that Fuad Bey Hamza should be received at the Bank of England, where he would be given explanations as to the present financial situation in the city and could discuss the possibility of a public loan or one by some reputable financial house. But in saying this he did not desire to raise any false hopes. He had also spoken to the chairman of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the chief manager of the bank, Mr. Eldred, would be happy to see Fuad Bey and to explain to him the preliminaries necessary before the flotation of a loan. But as the present time was most unpropitious for any financial ventures, Mr. Eldred would discuss the possibility of the Imperial Bank of Persia acting as London correspondents of the Hejazi Government, should this be desired. Sir L. Oliphant had also consulted a high official of the Treasury, who had confirmed his conviction that there was little, if any, chance of a loan for the Hejazi Government being entertained in the City at the present time.

III. As regards the Hamein Wakfs, the India Office had telegraphed to the Government of India, with special reference to the bequest of Ali Surati, who had died in Java, the case to which Fuad Bey Hamza had specifically referred.

The Colonial Office had also consulted the Government of Palestine about the Palestine Wakfs, raised by Fuad Bey Hamza, but the reply which they had received was not clear. These two points would be actively pursued, and an answer made to the Hejazi Government as soon as possible.

IV. Dealing with Transjordan, Sir L. Oliphant said that, as he had already told Fuad Bey Hamza, he personally thought that if agreements could be made between the Hejaz and Nejd and Transjordan similar to those made between the Hejaz and Nejd and Iraq, it would make a vast difference in the relations between the two countries; and while there were considerable difficulties in the way, a further study of the matter would be pursued energetically.

V. As regards the question of relations between the Hejaz and Nejd and the Soviet Government, the opinion of His Majesty's Government was that the views and tenets of the Soviet Government were presumably very different from those of King Abdul Aziz. If, however, King Abdul Aziz thought fit, in spite of this, to change his present policy towards the Soviet Government, it would, of course, not be a matter upon which His Majesty's Government would be in a position to feel aggrieved.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that he wished, as regards point I, to express his thanks for the assurances given by His Majesty's Government; he would communicate them to King Abdul Aziz.

It was a great personal grief and disappointment to him that His Majesty's Government could not see their way to assist the Hejazi Government with a loan. His Government might now have no alternative, but to look elsewhere for help. He wished to be quite frank and not to leave His Majesty's Government under a false impression.

Sir L. Oliphant here interrupted him to assure him that it was a matter of great regret to His Majesty's Government also, and that it was of course natural that the Hejazi Government should try to raise a loan elsewhere; and that His Majesty's Government would not for a moment misunderstand such action.

Fuad Bey Hamza continued that in connexion with Transjordan, the Hejazi Government would wait to hear further from His Majesty's Government. The proposal for the conclusion of agreements had been made in the interests of the two countries and not from any personal motives.

As regards the Soviet, he thought it unlikely that there would be any important change in the attitude of his Government.

At Mr. Rendel's suggestion, Fuad Bey Hamza mentioned the proposal which he had raised before the meeting that His Majesty's Government should reconsider their decision as regards the despatch of a Royal Air Force training mission to the Hejaz and Nejd; but this was to be regarded as a personal suggestion of his own.

He was assured that the matter would be examined.

The meeting was then concluded.

[E 2469/27/25]

No. 44

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 19.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

THE Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonial Office, London, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a letter from the Political Agent, Koweit, No. 48, dated the 6th April, 1932 (with enclosure) respecting the Sheikh of Koweit's visit to Riath.

Bushire, April 22, 1932.

Enclosure 1 in No. 44.

Political Agent, Koweit, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(No. 48. Confidential.)

Sir,

Koweit, April 6, 1932.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 45 dated the 5th April, 1932.

2. I have the honour to send you some rough notes on his Excellency the Sheikh's recent visit to Riath, which you may find interesting, including the impressions left on the Sheikh's mind by the visit.

3. I enclose five copies in case you would like to distribute them.

4. I am sending one copy direct to Jedda as they may be found useful.

I have, &c.

H. R. P. DICKSON, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Political Agent, Koweit.

Notes on his Excellency Sheikh Ahmad's Trip to Riath.

HIS Excellency the Sheikh returned to Koweit on the 3rd April, 1932, having been delayed a day at Al Khafs by King Ibn Saud, who insisted on keeping him back an extra twenty-four hours there.

2. Ignorant of this change of plan the Political Agent and leading citizens of Koweit proceeded on the 2nd April to Khabrat-al-Duwish, 57 miles out, to meet the Sheikh and party. As he failed to arrive the Political Agent and the others again went out to a point 22 miles from Koweit on the 3rd April, 1932 (Chawaibidah). This meeting of their Ruler is an old custom and highly valued by both Ruler and people of Koweit.

3. The following are the main points of interest connected with the Sheikh's entry into the city:—

- (a) The Sheikh and party arrived there at 3.30 P.M. in fifteen cars. Ten being those his party took to Riath and the remaining five being new ones presented by Ibn Saud.
- (b) The Sheikh halted half an hour for coffee and to get tidied up preparatory to making his official entry into the city.
- (c) This entry was made at 5 P.M., a total of some forty cars taking part in the procession.
- (d) The Sheikh led the procession in a large "Cadillac" 8-cylinder saloon car, presented to Ibn Saud by Mr. Crane, the American, and which formed the principal present of the King to the Sheikh.
- (e) The Sheikh insisted on the Political Agent sitting on his right hand during the entry.
- (f) Wonderful scenes of rejoicing were met with, and route from Jahara Gate to the town palace was lined with thousands of cheering crowds. In particular, large numbers of women were in evidence, both in the streets and lining house-tops, and their ululations and singing were a feature. At intervals swordsmen danced before the cars to the accompaniment of drum-beating, &c.
- (g) The Ruler made his way to his Great Mijlis hall on the sea front, and there halted and held a reception at which the whole city seemed to be present. This lasted till nightfall, when the Sheikh was able to get away and see his own family at "Dasman" Palace.
- (h) Koweit has apparently rarely seen such wonderful scenes of rejoicing, and the welcome the people gave their Ruler was significant as well as touching.

4. On the 4th April, 1932, the Sheikh came and saw the Political Agent and recounted his experiences, which were as follows:—

- (a) The outward journey, of exactly 462 miles by mileometer, and made in twenty-three hours of actual driving, was via Manaqish, Khabrat-al-Duwish, Khabari Waatha, Jarriya Ilya, Thalaat Turaibi to Kanhara (immediately east of the Dhana on Sadlier's 1819 route). From there cars turned sharp west and proceeded to Ruma and Rumhiyeh. From there again cars followed the route Shaib Hamayim, to Hamama, Thamama, through Bawabiyat, direct to Riath, leaving Banban about 7 miles to west.

(Return journey was the same except that the party were taken to Al Khafs by the King, who spent two days in camp there with them. From Al Khafs the cars went up Shaib-al-Tauki till they reached Rumhiyeh.)

The whole road was hard and gravelly-going, except when Dhana was crossed. This strip was sandy and very trying on cars. Tyres had not to be deflated, however, but the Sheikh remarked that any cars travelling by this route in future should have five passengers, excluding driver, as frequently cars stuck and only five persons could get cars out of sand.

From Rumahiyeh to Riath road was terribly stony, with many boulders everywhere.

At Bawabiyat was, perhaps, the worst portion of the whole road, as here the track wound down a steep spur with precipices on one side, and a single mistake would have meant that a car would go over the edge and be dashed to bits in the gorge below.

The return detour via Khafs though a trifle longer, was easier.

- (b) The Sheikh said that he surprised the King at Riath as he was going out to pitch camp for him. The meeting was most cordial and affectionate, and was followed by eight days of Royal entertainment in the capital with two days in the camp at Al Khafs.
- (c) The Sheikh saw all members of the Al Saud family, including Amir Saud (son), Mahomed (brother), Abdullah (brother), Ibn Musaad, Governor of Hail (cousin), and the leading members of the Ibn Rashid family of Hail, including Mahomed-bin-Tallal, the ex-Amir of Jebel Shammar.
- (d) Apparently the Sheikh's speech on arrival was to effect that he was not like other Arabs, who usually come to beg for money or a gift. His sole object was to see his old friend and brother, and to remove wrong impressions that the newspapers and other interested parties were trying to convey, namely, that he, Sheikh Ahmad, was trying to form a confederacy of Arab Rulers of the Gulf, more or less in opposition to him the King. He added that Ibn Saud was his elder brother, and as such it was his (Ahmad's) duty to come and see him from time to time. He wished Ibn Saud clearly to understand from the beginning that he desired no form of favour or present from him nor would he accept any, but that if he would like to give his servants the customary largesse, that, of course, was not his concern.
- (e) According to the Sheikh, Ibn Saud, who literally wept copious tears on their arrival, in reply to this preliminary speech, swore that Koweit was the loveliest spot in the whole universe, its Ruler his dearest friend, and its women the most fair. That his love for the house of Subah was eternal, and that just as the Al Saud and Al Subah Standards had flown side by side in every victory or defeat, during the last 300 years, so he prayed and believed it would continue to so fly in future. This and very much more in the same strain was said according to the Sheikh, and Ibn Saud surpassed all expectations in the way he went out of his way to make his guests feel comfortable and happy.

5. The following were the principal subjects of conversation that took place between himself and Ibn Saud (according to the Sheikh):—

- (a) Ibn Saud, in general talk on world politics, expressed great fear of the Turks and Persians. He said he could manage Europeans easily, but he believed a European war was again coming, in which case the Turks would find a way of returning to Iraq, and Persia would endeavour to seize Bahrein and Hasa. The Turks and Persians were far away the worst Moslems in the world, and also far more cunning in their methods than any European Power. Hence he feared them.
- (b) He thought a great deal of King Feisal, whom he liked for his honourable and straight dealings. Abdullah of Transjordan, on the other hand, he thought was a poisonous intriguer who was responsible for all the propaganda that was going on against him in Hejaz, Nejd, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. It was a pity he could not rest and let the past be. He feared Abdullah would not be happy till he raised another rebellion against him (by this he meant, said the Sheikh, that Abdullah was responsible for the Akhwan rebellion of 1929-30).
- (c) Ibn Saud told him that he intended shortly sending Emir Feisal, his second son, on a tour of the European capitals in the same way as the Emperor of Abyssinia had done. Fuad Hamza would go with him, and his secretary, Yusuf Yasin, would in their absence be in charge of his Foreign Office.
- (d) Mr. Philby would return to Mecca on or about the 5th April from his Ruba-al-Khali tour. He had already sent back certain stones and objects of interest to Riath to be forwarded to him in Mecca.

- (e) The King did not press the Sheikh to go to the Haj this year, but promised that next spring (1933) he would come up to Koweit for a few weeks and then would take Sheikh Ahmad to the Haj, making first a tour of Riath, Qasim and Hail. From the latter place he would go to Medina and then lastly to Mecca. This plan he had worked out and would follow to the letter.
- (f) The Sheikh asked if he, Ibn Saud, had really borrowed £500,000 from the English. But his host did not give him a "yea" or "nay," but contented himself by saying that he was trying to get a loan, and that Egyptian and Iraqi newspapers would stupidly attach ridiculous conditions and terms to any efforts of his to raise such loan.
- (g) The Sheikh warned him again and again to go slow in the matter of expenditure, and said that in the way he was going he would most assuredly "crash." The Sheikh said that he particularly talked "straight" in the matter of the obvious waste that he saw all round him where *motor cars* were concerned. He urged Ibn Saud reduce his number of cars by three-quarters and standardise by concentrating on Fords and Chevrolets. For himself as King a few good luxury cars were perhaps necessary, but he must stop the ridiculous expenditure on every form and variety of expensive cars which he saw round him. In this connexion the Sheikh said that it made his "stomach pain and his heart sore" to see the number of cars obviously new and expensive that, after doing only 5,000 kilom., were discarded as scrap-iron. Ignorant Bedouin drivers were, of course, responsible and lack of proper supervision. The Amir Saud, for instance, had eighty cars to himself, and God knew how many Ibn Masaad and the Amir Feisal possessed. According to the Sheikh, he strongly advised the King to appoint a good Englishman in place of the rascally Indian "Sadiq" to be in the sole charge of all his mechanical transport, together with half a dozen honest British mechanics (ex-soldiers) who would be under him. The Englishman, of course, to have extensive powers for fines, dismissals, &c. The King did not seem to relish the suggestions.
- (h) The Sheikh asked if he had had the country round Riath and Al Khafs examined by geologists as they looked very likely places for oil. The King said "yes," but that he was not anxious in the least to grant concessions to foreigners.
- (i) Whilst in Riath, a convoy arrived bearing machinery and gear for a 4,000-mile radius new wireless set. This was to be set up in Riath.
- (j) The Sheikh said he asked Ibn Saud what would be his policy when the English withdrew from Iraq altogether. Ibn Saud replied, obviously in joke, said the Sheikh, that he would not be slow to take advantage of such situation, as Iraq was a good country.
- (k) On the subject of the Koweit blockade, Ibn Saud kept complete silence, and Sheikh Ahmad said it would have been undignified for him to open the question or make any mention of a matter which might convey the impression that he came as a suppliant. Ibn Saud did, however, mention that he knew his frontier officers were mostly bad and were nearly always responsible for misunderstandings that took place. His frontier patrols also looted and stole helpless people's goods, not for himself, Ibn Saud, but for themselves. He lamented the fact that he was surrounded by many of the biggest rascals on earth, but what could he do running the "show" alone as he was doing? As regards his official, Ibn Khraimis, on the Koweit frontier, he urged Sheikh to treat him as his own official and order his every going and coming (a typical Saudian move).
- (l) The King asked after the Honourable the Political Resident in Bushire, and Colonel Dickson and family, and expressed great pleasure at having met them in Hasa recently.

6. The following are some of the impressions left on the Sheikh's mind as a result of his visit:—

- (a) Ibn Saud's position was unassailable so long as he remained alive. The whole laboriously built system would, however, most assuredly topple

and collapse as soon as the King died. Ibn Saud still inspired wholesome fear wherever he went, and this was especially evident at Riath, the heart of his Government. He was still a very great man and leader, but, in his opinion (the Sheikh's), the whole of the King's system was more than ever a one man show.

- (b) Ibn Saud was, on the other hand, a definitely sick and unfit man. Gone were the days when he was the hardest man in his kingdom and led every raid and foray.

Sheikh Ahmad opined that this was because he never took any exercise these days at all and ate far too much. On one occasion he, Ibn Saud, took the Sheikh to his old capital of Dhara'iyeh and both got out to walk. After 100 yards or so the King began to pant and blow and said he could not go on. This gave the Sheikh the opportunity of giving him a lecture, and he urged on him the vital necessity of taking at least half an hour's walk each day, and begged him to stop taking drugs, which apparently the King now cannot do without.

- (c) The King, said the Sheikh, ate far too much to be good for him, and at one sitting could put away a whole lamb himself.
- (d) The Amir Saud was a fine upstanding young man, as tall as his father and with lots of character, but at the "break up" which would assuredly follow the King's death, the Sheikh much doubted if Saud would be able to "make good." There were the ambitious Mahomed and Abdullah and a host of others, who all even now hated and were jealous of one another, to be reckoned with. All would be at each other's throats when the strong hand left them.

The Sheikh was particularly taken with the Amir Saud's charms of manner, and was overwhelmed altogether when the latter called and, after paying his respects, said: "I want you to treat me *firstly* as your best friend, and *secondly* as your son, and *thirdly* as your servant, not only during your visit here, but throughout the rest of our respective lives." Perhaps the Amir Saud saw the day not far distant when he would want an ally on the coast.

- (e) The Amir Ibn Musaad had aged very greatly. He was only 40 years old, but the Sheikh, who knew him in less peaceful times when they both used to go on raids together, said he was shocked to see what a great change had come over him. He was obviously being killed by worry and the cares of his high office.
- (f) The town of Riath was indescribably filthy, and, except for the group of rather fine houses inhabited by the King and his family, which all communicated by means of upstairs passages, was like a rabbit warren. Flies were dreadful, and smells and refuse in painful evidence. The Sheikh said he again and again urged the King to build outside the city for health reasons and encourage the members of his family to do likewise.
- (g) Splendid rains fell during his sojourn in Riath, and the whole country south and west of the Dahana was green and dotted with wild flowers. A contrast to the state of affairs north of the Dahana and round Koweit.

H. R. P. DICKSON, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

[E 2609/76/25]

No. 45.

Telegrams Communicated by Colonial Office.—(Received May 28.)

(1.)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(No 38. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 26, 1932.

I HAVE received information to-day from a reliable source that from 200 to 400 tribesmen of Billi and other frontier tribes have passed recently through Akaba from Sinai on riding camels, not accompanied by their families, and are

travelling southwards into the Hejaz. Local reports (especially from Akaba) say that the object of this expedition is to raise the Hejazi tribes to revolt against their King.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 23.)

(2.)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 26, 1932.

MY telegram of the 26th May, No. 38, Secret.

The order in my immediately following telegram is being issued by Emir Abdullah to-day, addressed to the Transjordan Government and to the Officer Commanding the Arab Legion.

(3.)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.)

May 26, 1932.

FOLLOWING is order referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"It has come to my ears from the British Resident that a large number of tribesmen, without their women and children, have passed through Southern Transjordan and assembled south of Akaba under leadership of Hamid-bin-Rasadah. It is said that these people expect help from me for some evil purpose in Hejaz. I order you to cause these people to return to their families in Sinai, Palestine or Transjordan and to prevent passage through Transjordan of any persons whose movements give cause for suspicion that their intentions are not wholly peaceful."

[E 2619/76/25]

No. 46.

Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 27, 1932.

JERUSALEM telegram No. 38 to Colonial Office.

Hejaz Government on 14th May sent long and somewhat strongly worded reply to my Beni Atiya note of 22nd April. Translation went by bag, due London 4th June, and Jerusalem via Residency, Egypt. Besides dealing with Beni Atiya and asking for agreement with Transjordan similar to that with Iraq, it asked for explanation of "arrangement made by Amir of Transjordan to provoke disturbance in Akaba-Maan area," alleging that Hamid-bin-Rifada-al-Awar was in Egypt under instructions from Amir Abdullah; that he was giving fugitives from the Hejazi Bedouin money to return, and instructions to await operations in the Hejaz; that Amir would help them with money and troops when necessary; and that there were special parties of Bedouin at Akaba who had been paid to prepare for operations to disturb the peace in the Hejaz. I replied on the 22nd May (copies by same bag) stating that these were serious charges which in present form did not admit of very serious investigation.

In belief that His Majesty's Government would wish them to be properly investigated, I had to request further necessary information, such as—here I asked a number of pertinent questions—since charges of this nature could only be investigated on basis of the fullest information from the Hejaz Government.

This was followed on 25th May and 26th May by interviews with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who laid himself out to convince me that Amir was hostile and not to be trusted. He promised more information, especially about Awar, who was a troublesome refugee of long standing.

I should not have telegraphed this but for serious nature of reported raid and its potential consequences and possible connexion with both Hejazi allegations.

I should like to know date of passage of raid through Akaba so that I may give Hejaz Government friendly warning if you agree and if Captain Glubb has not already given it to Ibn Zeyd.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 82.)

[E 2660/76/25]

No. 47.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 31.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, May 28, 1932.

REFERENCE the last paragraph of Jedda telegram to Foreign Office, No. 59; repeated to Transjordan, No. 82. I shall be glad if you will report date of passage through Akaba if known. Has Glubb warned Ibn Zeid? If he has not, or if he is unable to do so at once, His Majesty's Government are strongly in favour of His Majesty's representative at Jedda giving immediate friendly warning to Hejaz-Nejd Government, communicating substance of Amir's order quoted in your telegram No. 40 at the same time. His Majesty's representative at Jedda is being given authority to take any action which may be required in the light of your reply, which should be repeated to him.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 42.)

[E 2694/76/25]

No. 48.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 1, 1932.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 41 to Colonial Office.

Owing to increasing urgency of matter Hope Gill telephoned substance of Transjordan telegram No. 38 to Minister for Foreign Affairs early on 30th May. Later in the day Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a note purporting to be a reply to that addressed to him by Hope Gill on 22nd May (see Jedda telegram No. 59), although it did not deal specifically with points raised therein. My immediately following telegram gives gist of this communication.

Hejaz Government have pressed me for immediate reply to their latest note. I have confined myself to conveying to them my latest information as given in telegram under reference, deprecating the suggestion that His Majesty's Government could have acted in the short time available on the vague information in Hejaz note of 14th May, or that Ibn Rifada's performance implicated Transjordan Government, head of which, in fact, issued suitable instructions as soon as possible (see Transjordan telegram No. 23 to Jedda), and saying I must postpone further reply pending your instructions. I trust I may receive these as soon as possible, in view of obvious desire of Hejaz Government to exploit the incident and its possible repercussions on Hejaz side of the frontier.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 83.)

[E 2695/76/25]

No. 49.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 1, 1932.

FOLLOWING is condensed summary of Hejazi note of 30th May, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

I tried to convince you in conversation on 24th and 25th May [*sic*] of importance of matter and harmfulness of leniency. We are accustomed to give British Government warnings of impending risings, which they doubt

at first but afterwards find to be true. Our telephone conversation of 30th May shows that our information about Ibn Rifada was correct and that he had entered our territory with evil intent. Had British Government paid attention to our note of 14th May there would have been no need for your telephone message. We can cope with Ibn Rifada and have taken precautionary measures. We must, however, draw attention to danger of such incidents in view of untrustworthy attitude of Transjordan Government after incident, because Ibn Rifada could not himself equip even one person for such an enterprise and undoubtedly got help in Transjordan. We learn that he took arms from Akaba itself, and send you a copy of a telegram from Governor Dhaba supplementing previous information. We cannot keep silence regarding attitude of Transjordan Government consequently.

1. We protest against their indulgence, which has resulted in escape into our territory of Ibn Rifada fifteen days after we warned British Government.

2. We seek immediate information regarding action taken by British Government before and after the incident to prevent help being given to evil-doers.

3. We request undertaking from British Government on its own behalf and that of Transjordan to prevent entry of any of the criminals into Transjordan.

4. We request similar undertaking to surrender to us immediately any criminals who have participated in those evil actions and have fled to Transjordan.

This is what we ask in connexion with present incident. We also request that effect be given immediately to our suggestions for solution of difficulties between us and Transjordan before matters develop with evil consequences.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 84.)

[E 2691/76/25] No. 50.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 2.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 30, 1932.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 39 of the 28th May, on the night of the 20th-21st May some 400 to 450 tribesmen passed north of Akaba and established themselves in Hejaz territory at Sharieh, some 7 kilom. south of Akaba. According to latest reports they moved off further south on the 27th May. Glubb has not warned Ibn Zeid, and it is not possible to make arrangements for Glubb to see him immediately. I am of opinion, therefore, that a warning should be given by His Majesty's representative.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 26.)

[E 2734/76/25] No. 51.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 3, 1932.

MY telegram No. 61.

Situation in Northern Hejaz is evidently causing much perturbation in Government circles here. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is seeing me to-morrow morning to discuss matters dealt with in recent correspondence.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 85.)

[E 2735/76/25]

No. 52.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 3, 1932.

MY telegram No. 63.

I received this morning long Hejazi note, dated 1st June, and evidently written before receipt of my reply to note summarised in my telegram No. 62. My immediately following telegram gives main points.

Admission that forces, apparently consisting of Akhwan, are being moved towards frontier, indicates serious situation in north, which may possibly be ripe for widespread revolt. I postpone further comment until after conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 86.)

[E 2743/76/25]

No. 53.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 3, 1932.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following are main points in Hejazi note of 1st June:—

(a) Passage of tribesmen through Transjordan must have occurred before 20th and 21st May, which was about eight days before Hope Gill informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Such a force could not have passed without the knowledge of Transjordan Government, nor is it reasonable to suppose that British authorities were ignorant of these proceedings.

(b) In view of information conveyed in Hejazi note of 14th May and request therein for precautionary measures, the British authorities should have had information some six days before arrival of mischief-makers in Transjordan.

(c) Hejazi Government are confident, in view of strong and recently confirmed friendship between them and His Majesty's Government, that latter had no information concerning the matter and gave no instructions, but action of Transjordan Government in permitting formation of enemy force and allowing it to pass has been hostile and contrary to international law. They are responsible, even without regard to Hejazi Government's information that they have helped with money and arms.

(d) Hejazi Government are perplexed and desire a clear definition of His Majesty's Government's attitude towards action of Transjordan Government, so that they may know what attitude themselves to adopt towards that Government and their completely hostile action.

(e) The King has ordered forces from village settlements in north-west of Nejd to move towards the frontier districts, and has also ordered necessary preparations to meet all eventualities.

(f) Responsibility for consequences of these movements must rest on Transjordan Government. In addition to requests contained in their note of 14th May, Hejazi Government reserve the right to compensation for losses which may result from incident contrary to international law and to the letter and spirit of Hadda Agreement.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 87.)

[E 2743/76/25]

No. 54.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner, Transjordan.(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.)*Colonial Office, June 4, 1932.*

JEDDA telegrams Nos. 61, 62, 63, 65 and 66 to Foreign Office show that there is danger of serious situation developing in Northern Hejaz, which may involve stability of Ibn Saud's régime in that area. Friendly relations existing between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, and, indeed, ordinary international obligations, make it essential to ensure that possible rebellion obtains no support or assistance from Transjordan, that rebels are unable to use Transjordan as base of operations or place of refuge, and that good faith of His Majesty's Government in whole affair should not be open to doubt. Policy of His Majesty's Government towards situation which appears to be developing may have to be urgently considered early next week, and it is essential that I should be in full possession of your views at earliest possible moment, particularly on following points:—

- (a) Do you consider that there is any justification for allegations of complicity or connivance on part of Amir or leading Transjordan Arabs or for statement that Ibn Rifada purchased arms in Akaba and obtained money from Transjordan sources?
- (b) Can you supply any information regarding control measures in force, particularly in Akaba district, prior to Rifada incursion which could be effectively quoted to show that reasonable measures were in force to prevent Transjordan territory in this area being used in connexion with subversive activities against Ibn Saud?
- (c) Please report fully as to measures taken to prevent assistance being given to possible rebels by persons in Transjordan, since Amir's order of 26th May.
- (d) Do you consider that if serious rebellion should develop in Northern Hejaz and rebel Hejazi subjects attempt to escape from Ibn Saud's forces into or through Transjordan, it would be possible to close frontier against them?
- (e) If not, what measures can you suggest to ensure that any fugitive rebels who may enter Transjordan are so controlled as to prevent them from using Transjordan territory as a base for further hostile incursions into Hejaz or further subversive activities against Ibn Saud?
- (f) I had proposed to suggest that Hejaz-Nejd Government should be informed that no guarantee could be given that any rebels escaping into Transjordan would be surrendered to Hejazi authorities, and that each case would have to be examined as and when it arose. If, however, large scale rebellion should develop as result of, or in connexion with, Ibn Rifada's incursion, it may be necessary to consider adoption of policy corresponding to that adopted by His Majesty's Government at the time of rebellion in North-Eastern Nejd in 1929, when escaping rebel leaders were as far as possible surrendered. In that event, do you consider that any kind of guarantee could be given that fugitive rebel leaders would be surrendered provided their Hejazi allegiance could be established?
- (g) Can you suggest any measures to prevent further passage of possible rebels between Sinai and Northern Hejaz through Transjordan territory?

With regard to Hejaz-Nejd Government's final request in Jedda telegram No. 62, it is proposed to reply that, as was explained to mission in London, their suggestion for conclusion of treaty settlement between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd on lines of that concluded with Iraq is receiving consideration, but cannot be decided forthwith and must therefore be left to be dealt with independently of present issue.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 44.)

[E 2743/76/25]

No. 55.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, June 4, 1932.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 61-66 of 1st to 3rd June: Ibn Rifada's incursion into the Hejaz.

Hejaz-Nejd Minister made somewhat similar representations here on 1st June.

Now see Colonial Office-telegram No. 41 to Transjordan, repeated to you.

Pending High Commissioner's reply, when further instructions will be sent, you may let Hejaz-Nejd Government know that His Majesty's Government are in urgent communication with him as to facts and as to measures which can be taken.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 42.)

[E 2326/76/25]

No. 56.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 7.)

(Nos. 67 and 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 7, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 45.

I sent formal message in prescribed sense to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening. I had already had two long conversations with him, main points of which were as follows: He said that his Government had known of Ibn Rifada's activities for about ten months. They were connected with a plot having ramifications in Cairo, Bagdad and Amman. Egyptian consul here (now on leave) had tried to create secret committee to upset Hejaz Government, and had on his return to Egypt encouraged Ibn Rifada. Others implicated were Amir of Transjordan and Iraqi representative here, whose secretary was a creature of King Ali and whose efforts to promote success of plot had included insistence on being allowed to reside in Mecca, &c.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to secret source of information in Egypt, more particularly evidence of a refugee from Wejh, named Mahmoud Abu Togeysa, who had been associated with Ibn Rifada. This man had received £20 from Transjordan agent in Egypt and had gone to Amman, but finding out scheme was not properly organised had disclosed facts in letter to the Amir Dhaba, dated 30th May. The Amir Abdullah had given £1,000 to Ibn Rifada. Invading party was said to have included a person said to be an Egyptian or according to others a British officer. Bedouin were reported to be saying that the enterprise had British and Egyptian support. Suspect Egyptian launch had been detained at Wejh.

The King was satisfied that His Majesty's Government were not concerned. He had not anticipated danger from country like Transjordan, where British officers were stationed. He had now ordered forces from various village settlements to proceed to the frontier area and had sent cars from [? group omitted] as well as large loads of arms and supplies. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was notifying these preparations in accordance with Hadda Agreement. The King desired advice of His Majesty's Government in regard to particular incident and as to whether he should regard Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq as enemies or friends.

I deprecated hasty conclusion. His Majesty's Government desired stability in Arabia, and would certainly not wish Transjordan territory to be used for purposes hostile to Ibn Saud. All British officials in Transjordan were above suspicion, but they could not know every Bedouin movement at moment of its occurrence. I discounted evidence against the Amir and Transjordan Government, pointing out worthlessness of such a man like Abu Togeysa, and emphasised immediate action taken by the Amir. Transjordan Government could not be accused of breach of international law unless they had been accomplices or so negligent as to have thereby facilitated passage of Ibn Rifada. I described the whole sequence of events since Hejaz note of 14th May, and drew familiar moral that incident like this could only be averted by personal collaboration on frontiers.

[7797]

I asked for elucidation of King's request for advice as regards neighbouring Governments, whereupon Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was not accusing Governments but persons in the capital, *e.g.*, he drew distinction between King Feizal and King Ali. He asked me to await further conversations before telegraphing.

In second conversation Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed me for my personal view of position of Egyptian Government and probable attitude of His Majesty's Government if his Government used retaliatory measures to meet breach of international law involved in toleration of hostile activities. I expressed inability to answer latter question, but said as from myself everything I could think of to dissuade Hejaz Government from ascribing guilty knowledge to Egyptian Government or precipitating rupture over the present incident. He definitely asked whether, as there had been violation of Transjordan territory by forces organised in Egypt, His Majesty's Government would not take the matter up with Egyptian Government on behalf both of Transjordan and of Hejaz-Nejd. I promised to put the question, but was guarded as to your probable reaction.

He asked me to collaborate in communiqué designed to prevent distorted rumours. I refused on ground of delay which would be entailed by necessary reference to you. I advised Hejaz Government to prepare their own statement but to confine it to actual facts and not to envenom the situation by controversial attribution of responsibility.

He said the King intended to evacuate all tribesmen from area south of Hejaz-Transjordan frontier as a temporary measure of military necessity. I made no comment, but criticised as being contrary to Hadda Agreement a decision of which he had spoken earlier to require Atun and [? Ibn] Huweitat to settle definitely on one side or other of the frontier. I understood him to say this was superseded by plan to evacuate whole area provisionally.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs put forward on behalf of King request that (a) Transjordan force should repel any criminals attempting to cross the frontier, and should not allow them to approach frontier authorities. He wished to avoid difficulties when his forces approached frontier and danger of their overstepping it in ignorance. (b) His Majesty's Government should conclude, or cause Transjordan to conclude, agreement with Hejaz-Nejd similar to those between latter and Iraq.

I could get no information of magnitude of situation in affected area. According to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ibn Rifada is still near frontier and is not getting assistance for which he had hoped from Transjordan. My impression is that his adventures may possibly have misfired, but that in any case King is pursuing definite aim as follows: (a) to crush any movement, great or small, so mercilessly as to intimidate tribes completely; (b) to impress Amir of Transjordan and others of futility of efforts to upset his régime; (c) to use incident as means of pressure on His Majesty's Government to bring about new treaty settlement between him and Transjordan.

I agree that last-named question is separate from immediate issue, but in present circumstances any attempt to evade it or treat it as entirely independent will breed suspicion.

Diplomatic atmosphere is completely friendly so far.

Will you give necessary telegraphic information to Cairo and Bagdad? I will send them record of above conversation.

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 88 and 89.)

[E 2812/76/25]

No. 57.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 8.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 7, 1932.

YOUR No. 41 of the 4th June.

(a) It is believed that movement has been financed and engineered by Hizb-al-Hijazi, whose headquarters are in Cairo. The Emir was probably aware of it, but is not believed to have given financial assistance. His proclamation

(see my telegram No. 40 of the 26th May) can be quoted against allegation of his complicity. Leading Transjordan Arabs are not believed to be implicated, and concentration, which is in Hejaz territory, is composed almost entirely of Hejazi tribesmen. No money has been obtained from Transjordan sources, but some twenty-five rifles are reported to have been purchased in Akaba.

(b) Prior to Rifada concentration, as no abnormal situation was anticipated, there were no special measures in force.

There is a small police post at Akaba, but concentration of Ibn Rifada in Egypt and his passage through Palestine and Transjordan were unknown to the Governments of Transjordan and Palestine till after he had entered Hejaz territory. It has not been possible to stop infiltration in spite of orders to prevent further Hejazis passing.

(c) The Beni Atiya have been effectively prevented from joining movement, and guarantees have been taken from other Transjordan sheikhs in southern area.

(d) I am advised that it is impracticable to close the frontier, and suggest that Ibn Saud should be informed that onus of preventing escape of his rebels from Hejaz rests with him. All possible steps will, however, be taken to assist Hejaz authorities. Rebels could probably be stopped if they were to attempt to pass near Akaba, but if they move north and attempt to cross at night it would be difficult to stop them.

(e) Except for possible isolated individuals, the rebels have not come from Transjordan; they have passed through Transjordan and Palestine from Egypt, picking up Hejaz tribesmen *en route*. Fugitives returning or entering Transjordan will be disarmed and removed from the frontier.

(f) No guarantee should be given for surrender of escaping rebels, since under Palestine and Transjordan law, in absence of an extradition agreement, their surrender would be illegal. If, however, it is decided to adopt the policy described in your telegram, and this I strongly deprecate, I do not consider that any kind of guarantee could be given that fugitive rebel leaders would be surrendered, because in practice it might prove difficult, if not impossible, to honour any guarantee, however limited its terms.

(g) The strip of Transjordan territory over which these people pass is very narrow near the coast. Every possible police measure will be taken in Palestine and Transjordan, and should still more so be taken in Sinai.

Owing to lack of food in Hejaz this year, I consider that food scarcity may go far to check any rebellion.

I am now taking energetically all measures possible to prevent food supplies being sent to the rebels from Palestine or Transjordan, and I have no doubt that Egyptian Government will adopt similar measures.

It is suggested that, in any reply sent to Ibn Saud, it should be made quite clear that the presence of his forces in Transjordan will not be tolerated.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 29.)

[E 2813/76/25]

No. 58.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 8, 1932.

MY telegrams Nos. 67 and 68 of 6th June.

Urgent message received last evening from Minister for Foreign Affairs communicates report that brigands have been at Sharith, four hours south of Akaba, for ten days, and that Ibn Rifada himself has gone to Amir [*sic*] to procure certain requirements; also that brigands are buying rifles at Akaba for £5 or £6 each.

Hejaz Government draw attention of His Majesty's Government to this and request the arrest and surrender to them of Ibn Rifada.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 90.)

[7797]

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[E 2815/62/25]

No. 59.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 9.)(No. 205.)
Sir,

Jedda, May 11, 1932.

IN my immediately preceding despatch is transmitted a translation of a speech delivered by Ibn Saud in Mecca on the 12th April, as reported in the "Umm-al-Qura." I understand from some who were present that much more was said in the same vein of religious emotion, but that the newspaper has succeeded in adequately reproducing the main gist of the matter.

2. The occasion was the customary Royal banquet given to some 500 representative Moslems three days before they set out to observe the day of pilgrimage at Arafat. Neither the Indian vice-consul nor, I think, any of the Moslem foreign representatives were present, although they were invited. A number of prominent Indian pilgrims attended however.

3. The speech as heard and retailed has been badly received and is severely criticised, the remark: "By God, I fear the foreigner once, but I fear those who pretend to be Moslem three thousand times," being regarded as particularly offensive. My Turkish and Iraqi colleagues are highly incensed at the uncomplimentary reference to the Saudi régime's predecessors, to "the bloodshed then done, the sins committed, and the peace violated." I am credibly informed that when Ibn Saud came to Jedda after the pilgrimage he shocked a number of leading Jeddawis by greeting them with the words: "I could cut the throats of every one of you."

4. All observers are agreed that Ibn Saud is at his wits' end to obtain money, and many affirm that he is feeling insecure. He certainly seems to have lost much of the poise and balance which distinguished him in the early days of his Hejazi adventure. His present state of uncertainty, with its symptomatic lack of control of ideas and expression, but not yet of action, seems to me to be caused by a very real fear for his financial position, an increased feeling of futility amid the complexities of government, and a growing sense of the hostility which surrounds him in the Hejaz and the Moslem world outside. It was noticed that during the forty-eight hours which he recently spent at Jedda he remained outside the town, which he normally never fails to visit for some inspection or other; indeed he hardly put foot outside the palace building.

5. The effect of these obsessions is aggravated by ill-health. At my short formal audience of the 1st May Ibn Saud was listless, and looked a very different man from what he was a year and a half ago. His face had yellowed under the skin and was pouchy, puckered, and much more lined. Dr. Naji-al-Asil, who has had a number of private audiences in Mecca, confirms my impression that Ibn Saud is physically very unwell and mentally obsessed by problems which he cannot solve and which he now fears to face. It is probable that he will return to Riyadh as soon as he decently can, probably in less than a month's time.

6. I may here mention that on the 1st May Ibn Saud was polite, but distant. He smiled once or twice, but had nothing to say. I purposely allowed two long pauses to lengthen in order to draw, if possible, some reference to current topics, such as the Minister's absence. Ibn Saud at length broke the first silence with a comment on the weather, which had already received adequate comment. I broke the second one myself with a request for permission to leave.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 2835/76/25]

No. 60.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 9, 1932.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 43 to Colonial Office.

I appreciate High Commission's difficulty and am myself averse from undertakings, fulfilment of which cannot be guaranteed or scope of which may be subject of controversy. I must, however, draw attention to the following:—

(d) Formal intimation to Ibn Saud that onus of preventing escape rested with him would justify him in massing troops along the frontier. This would greatly increase the danger of his violating Transjordan territory, even if he should wish in good faith to avoid it.

(f) Argument that surrender of criminals is illegal in the absence of extradition agreement was not employed with Hejaz Government when discussing formula in Jedda report for May-June 1931, paragraphs 27 and 28, although promise of surrender was avoided in second formula and provision was made only for expulsion. If argument of illegality is now used openly it will not only suggest doubt of good intentions of His Majesty's Government, but will lend strong support to Ibn Saud's theory that new treaty settlement, including extradition agreement, is only cure for situation.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 94.)

[E 2860/76/91]

No. 61.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 9, 1932.

MY telegram No. 69.

Further urgent message received last night from Minister for Foreign Affairs conveys information in following paragraph, with request that greatest care may be taken in preventing supplies from reaching rebels, and that persons crossing into Transjordan may be arrested and handed over to Hejazi authorities only. Message is slightly obscure in parts.

Rebels are at Sharih. Ibn Rifada, with Mohammed Abdurrahim and Abu Bogeyga [sic], went to see Amir at Amman. Akaba merchant Abu Kabarti also went to Amman. Having got Amir's permission, he returned and took two car-loads of supplies, which he distributed gratis, and arms, which he sold to rebels. Ibn Rifada and his two companions returned from Amman with promise of abundance of further supplies and arms after ten days. Aeroplane subsequently came in pursuit and made search near Kuweyra, but found no one, because party were farther south.

It is not clear from message whether promise mentioned above is attributed to Amir or was given by Ibn Rifada, &c., to their followers.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 97.)

[E 2859/76/25]

No. 62.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 68 and 70 of 7th and 9th January: Ibn Rifada's incursion.

I approve your language.

You may now reply to Hejaz-Nejd Government on following lines:—

His Majesty's Government much regret that, owing to extreme narrowness of Palestine and Transjordan territory at Akaba, Ibn Rifada and his party were able in very few hours to pass from Sinai into Hejaz before Palestine or Transjordan authorities were aware of their entry.

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They also regret that it is not physically possible to clear the frontier. Prevention of escape of rebels from Hejaz must rest with Hejaz-Nejd Government. But entry of Hejazi forces into Transjordan territory could not be permitted. But all possible steps will be taken to assist Hejazi authorities, and any fugitive rebels entering Transjordan will as far as possible be disarmed and removed from frontier to place of safety. You should also inform Hejaz-Nejd Government of other measures of co-operation, such as stoppage of food supplies, &c., mentioned in Transjordan telegram No. 43 of 7th June to Colonial Office.

You may add in whatever way you consider most suitable that it is impossible to guarantee to surrender any rebel leaders who may escape into Transjordan territory. Every possible effort will, however, be made to prevent such persons from giving trouble to Hejaz-Nejd Government.

With regard to suggested general treaty settlement with Transjordan, you should reply in the sense of final paragraph of Colonial Office telegram No. 41 of 4th June to High Commissioner for Transjordan.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 44, and Cairo, No. 99.)

[E 2367/76/25]

No. 63.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 69 of 8th June: Ibn Rifada.

You may communicate to Hejaz-Nejd Government information contained in Transjordan telegram No. 31 to you of 9th June, making it clear, however, that latter part is not necessarily authoritative.

[E 2361/76/25]

No. 64.

Sir John Simon to Sir P. Loraine (Cairo).

(No. 100. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932.

YOU will shortly receive direct copies of reports suggesting that Amir Abdullah of Transjordan has been implicated in intrigue with King Fuad, Abbas Hilmi and ex-King Ali for restoration of Hashimite régime in Hejaz in return for Hashimite support for King Fuad's possible candidature for Caliphate and Abbas Hilmi's suspected ambitions in connexion with Syrian throne. These reports seem partly confirmed by Ibn Rifada's recent incursion into Hejaz, and by fact that similar information apparently reached Hejaz-Nejd Government from other sources some months ago. Situation is therefore most disquieting, particularly in view of friendly relations between His Majesty's Government and Hejaz-Nejd Government (which were recently reaffirmed during Hejaz-Nejd Mission's visit to London), and responsibilities of His Majesty's Government for Transjordan under Palestine mandate.

Please investigate reports as soon as possible, and if you consider that there is any foundation for allegations regarding King Fuad's implication in intrigue, discuss matter frankly with him, avoiding, however, any indication of source of secret reports, and explain grave embarrassment which anti-Saudi intrigue may cause His Majesty's Government, emphasising urgent necessity for preventing it from going any further.

Please report by telegram substance of any conversation you may have with His Majesty.

[E 2359/76/25]

No. 65.

Sir John Simon to Sir P. Loraine (Cairo).

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932.

JEDDA telegrams Nos. 67 and 68 of 7th June: Ibn Rifada's incursion into Hejaz.

Ibn Rifada, a Hejazi exile, who raised rebellion against Ibn Saud at Wejh in 1929, crossed from Sinai through Palestine and Transjordan territory into Hejaz with party of from 400-450 armed followers on night of 20th-21st May, presumably to raise rebellion in Northern Hejaz. Incursion was apparently organised in Egyptian territory, and High Commissioner for Transjordan reports that it is believed that movement has been engineered and financed by Hizb-al-Hejazi in Cairo. High Commissioner for Transjordan, in view of international obligations of His Majesty's Government, is taking all possible measures to prevent passage of further insurgents or supplies through Transjordan territory, and as far as possible to disarm and remove from frontier any Hejazi rebels escaping into Transjordan.

Please endeavour to arrange that corresponding instructions to take similar action are sent as soon as possible to authorities in Sinai Peninsula, with a view to preventing any further activity on part of rebels or their supporters in Egyptian territory, or their passage across Palestine-Egyptian frontier in either direction.

Please repeat the above to Sir A. Ryan and hereafter inform him by telegram of any measures taken, indicating whether he may communicate them to Hejazi Government and repeating such messages to Jerusalem.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 144.)

[E 2366/76/25]

No. 66.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 11.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, June 9, 1932.

JEDDA telegram No. 69 to Foreign Office, repeated to you.

Telegram not quite clear, but if, as it seems to suggest, Ibn Rifada has crossed into Transjordan, I presume that steps will be taken to ensure that he does not leave that territory.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 36.)

[E 2367/76/25]

No. 67.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 11.)

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 9, 1932.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 31:—

"Your telegram No. 90. Ibn Rifada is not in Transjordan. According to recent report rebels are still at Haikl, and says they will not move until the end of June. Total rifles about 200, and food supply sufficient about one month."

[E 2870/76/25]

No. 68.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 10, 1932.

FOLLOWING addressed to Transjordan, No. 96:—

"Your telegram No. 31.

"Can I inform Hejaz Government that Ibn Rifada is not known to have recrossed frontier since 21st May, and that he has held no communication with Amir?

"In view of numerous rumours current here, I shall be glad of all information possible regarding situation in Northern Hejaz.

"I propose, however, to communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs only such of it as relates to movements close to the frontier and location of rebels, omitting anything relative to their intentions or equipment. Do you agree?

"French Chargé d'Affaires confirms news that a launch from Suez was recently arrested at Wejh. According to representations made to him but not verified, it carried French flag. There is a local rumour here that the population of Wejh have taken to boats, fearing attack on the town."

[E 2873/76/25]

No. 69.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 11, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 48.

I am sending note this evening to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who returned to Jedda last night. I have closely followed prescribed lines, embodying in separate paragraphs general statement of measures already taken in Transjordan and mentioning High Commissioner's belief that no money was obtained from there, although means were found to purchase some twenty-five rifles. I have thought it best to include in my note paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference with slight verbal embroidery only.

Before receiving your instructions I had received another urgent communication, and had had conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs. His letter alleges departure from Maan on 31st May or the 1st June of official cars with supplies apparently identical with those already mentioned, and purchased by Abu Kabarti, of 100 rifles for rebels. Reference is made to visit by Glubb to Akaba; to departure for Amman with sheikhs; to belief amongst tribesmen that he is concerned in [? group omitted]; and to expectations of two raids towards Tebuk and along the coast. Remainder is not worth telegraphing.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that activities ascribed to Glubb were exactly such as might be expected of a frontier officer performing his duties, and that if accusations were being insinuated I should prefer them to be made frankly. He disclaimed any such intention, but suggested that tribesmen thought Glubb was pleased with turn of events. I said that High Commissioner was most anxious to collaborate with Hejaz authorities, but that latter seemed to [group omitted] everything from us. What were they themselves doing to guard frontier, and with whom was he to collaborate? This led to discussion of possible contact between authorities in Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd. I said I personally favoured method always [? recommended] by His Majesty's Government, namely, direct communication between frontier officers. I discouraged a personal idea of Yusuf Yasin that a Hejazi representative from Cairo or Damascus should be sent to High Commissioner.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 99.)

[E 2874/76/25]

No. 70.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, June 11, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 101.

I caused a suitable memorandum to be handed to Prime Minister this evening. He is making enquiries and will let me know what can be done.

British Governor of Sinai states that Bedouin in question left Egyptian territory in small parties and unarmed. If so, they presumably assembled and collected arms in British mandated territory.

None of above should be communicated to Ibn Saud until we have received reply of Egyptian Government, with which I will acquaint His Majesty's Minister at Jedda by telegraph.

(Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 2886/1494/25]

No. 71.

Sir E. Ovey to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 299.)

Sir,

Moscow, June 6, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Emir Feisal, accompanied by his suite, arrived in Moscow from Warsaw on the 29th May. He was met at the frontier by officials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and was greeted by brass bands which, according to the press, "played the Internationale and various Arabian airs." On his arrival in Moscow, where the station was decorated with bunting inscribed with Arabic expressions of welcome, the Emir was received by Comrade Krestinski among other officials, and by the Persian Ambassador.

2. The Emir's visit followed the usual programme provided for State guests considered to belong to the second category of importance. He was received by Kalinin, the president of the Central Executive Committee, on the day of his arrival and a dinner and reception in his honour were given by the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the evening. Members of the Diplomatic Corps were invited to the reception. Before leaving for Leningrad on the 2nd June, the Emir met Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev among other Soviet notables, while the visits paid by him included an inspection of the "October" military camp, and of an aeroplane factory in Moscow. The Emir and his suite returned to Moscow on the 5th June and left in the evening for Constantinople, whither he was accompanied by the head of the Protocol Department of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

3. The speeches which were made during the visit appear to have been confined to an exchange of the usual courtesies. No great prominence has been given to the visit in the press. On the day of his arrival, however, the "Izvestiya" published a leading article summarising the post-war history of Hejaz and Nejd, and in particular their relations with the U.S.S.R. This article was an unembroidered account of facts unaccompanied by socialistic ideology, and emphasised that the Soviet Union was the first Power to recognise the Government of Ibn Saud.

I have, &c.

ESMOND OVEY.

[E 2877/76/25]

No. 72.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 10, 1932.

HIS Majesty's Government have now given consideration to your telegram of 7th June, No. 43, and are grateful for the full and useful appreciation of the position which you have furnished and for action already taken.

You will realise that His Majesty's Government's international obligations make it essential that all possible steps should be taken with a view to preventing passage through Transjordan of further rebels or of infiltration of disaffected individuals seeking to join rebels in Hejaz. It is essential for the same reason to make every effort to obtain disarmament and removal from neighbourhood of frontier to places where they can be watched of any rebels escaping from Hejaz whose entry into Transjordan it may not be possible to prevent.

While, therefore, I recognise the impossibility of closing the frontier entirely, I feel confident that you will take all possible measures, especially at such danger points as Akaba bottle-neck, to prevent passage of rebels to and from Sinai, and I presume that you are satisfied that forces at your disposal are adequate for this purpose.

It would be useful if detailed particulars of measures taken could be supplied for communication to Hejazi Government as indication of good faith.

I agree that, in view of your recommendation, no undertaking to surrender rebels who may take refuge in Transjordan can be given. It is, however, essential that leaders of such rebels should be effectively detained in place of safety whence they cannot escape, while action is being considered as to their future disposal. Meanwhile, I am not clear why surrender of fugitive rebels would be illegal. I shall be glad if you will telegraph explanation.

It would be useful to define more closely to Hejazi Government nature of steps, referred to in paragraph (d) of your telegram, to assist Hejazi authorities. For instance, do you contemplate attempt to turn back rebels before they cross Transjordan frontier (*vide* Ibn Saud's request (a) in eighth paragraph of telegrams Nos. 67 and 68 from Jedda)? Do you think that it would be possible or desirable to try to establish any kind of liaison with Hejazi forces?

The Foreign Office are sending instructions by telegraph to the High Commissioner for Egypt to take up whole question with Egyptian Government, particularly with a view to intensifying supervision of Hejazi refugees in Sinai and control of Sinai frontier.

Foreign Office instructions to Jedda, concerning reply to be returned to Hejazi Government, will be repeated to you.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 49.)

[E 2877/76/25] No. 73.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 46. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 10, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 43, paragraph (a).

In view of volume of circumstantial evidence in possession of His Majesty's Government, possible complicity of Amir cannot at present be excluded.

This appears to make it doubtful how far complete confidence can be reposed in Arab authorities under Amir's control, and you will no doubt bear this aspect of question in mind in providing police measures on frontier districts and in safeguarding any disarmed rebels, &c.

Despatch follows.

[E 2881/76/25] No. 74.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 47. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 10, 1932.

MY secret telegram No. 46 of 10th June.

Among reports which have reached His Majesty's Government from secret sources is one stating that on 4th May Sheikhs of Billi tribe visited Amir, and that on 11th May Ibn Rifada visited him. Is it possible for you to ascertain whether or not such visits took place?

[E 2923/76/25]

No. 75.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office June 14.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.)

June 13, 1932.

YOUR No. 47 of 10th June.

It has been reported here that Ibn [?] Refada visited Amman on 11th May, but Amir has informed the British Resident that Ibn [?] Refada's last visit was during Ramadan.

It is impossible to affirm that he has had no communication with Amir, but Cox is convinced that Amir has not sent him money for [?] good reason he has none to spare.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 34.)

[E 2924/76/25]

No. 76.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 13, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 10th June.

The forces at my disposal are adequate, but I am reinforcing the Arab legion under Glubb in Southern Transjordan and by half a camel company of the Transjordan Frontier Force to frontier wells and by half a mechanised company to operate in Akaba bottle neck. In order to ensure that supplies of food-stuffs and arms are not sent to rebels through Transjordan control has been placed in Glubb's hands, and steps are also being taken to impose a complete embargo on exports of food-stuffs from Transjordan or Palestine to the Hejaz. You will, no doubt, consider whether similar measures can be taken in regard to Egypt. One officer and fifteen men of Arab legion have been detailed to Akaba to patrol Wady Araba and detain any suspicious characters.

2. All captured rebels, other than leaders, will be disarmed, removed from frontier and returned to country in which their families are located. Every effort will be made to capture the leaders, and if captured they will be detained in custody. I am now advised that the surrender of rebels would not be illegal, but I regard it as undesirable.

3. To turn rebels back before they cross the Transjordan frontier from Hejaz is not contemplated, because it would not be feasible in view of the nature of country and with forces at our disposal. It is hoped, however, with above-mentioned forces to arrest rebels as they arrive in Transjordan or Palestine.

4. It would be feasible to effect liaison with Hejaz forces should Ibn Saud so desire by allowing his commanders to communicate direct with Glubb by wireless or otherwise, but any liaison which might be followed by the entry of Hejaz forces into Transjordan is most undesirable.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 35.)

[L 3157/133/405]

No. 77.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 14.)

[Enclosures not printed.]

(No. 213.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 18, 1932.

WITH reference to Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 255 of the 3rd July last, regarding the proposed compendium of the constitutional laws of the world, I am at length in a position to furnish a reasonably comprehensive survey of the constitutional measures affecting the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies which have been promulgated since the establishment of the Saudian régime.

2. In his despatch No. 272 of the 20th October, 1929, Mr. Bond enclosed a translation of the Hejazi 1926 Constitution, or "Organic Instructions" or

"Fundamental Rules," as it is also sometimes styled. I have the honour to transmit herewith, marked "A," an amended translation which has now been made from an Arabic text of the Constitution communicated to this Legation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. The first important change in the Constitution occurred on the 29th January, 1927, when the Sultanate of Nejd and its Dependencies was made a kingdom and was formally united with the Hejaz under Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies. A translation of the text of the Royal decree as published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 8th April, 1927, is attached, marked "B."

4. In June 1927 a Committee of Inspection and Improvement was constituted by Royal command. A translation of the relevant extract from the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 1st July is attached, marked "C."

5. On the 9th July, 1927, and on the recommendation of this committee, articles 28 to 31 of Part IV of the Constitution regarding the Legislative Assembly were modified. A translation of the amending regulation published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 15th July is attached, marked "D."

6. In July 1928 this regulation was superseded by a similar regulation, which made no reference, however, to its predecessor, but only to Part IV of the Constitution. A translation of the text of the new regulation as published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 13th July, 1928, is attached, marked "E."

7. An undated regulation conceiving the Directorate-General of Finance and referring, by implication only, to articles 20 to 22 of the Constitution, was published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 21st September, 1928. A translation is attached, marked "F."

8. In October 1930 the Pilgrimage Committee, as defined by article 14 of the Constitution, was modified by Royal command. A translation of the text published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 5th October, 1930, is attached, marked "G."

9. In December 1930 a "Ministry" for Foreign Affairs was established by Royal command in place of the "Directorate," with relation to but without reference to articles 17 to 19 of the Constitution. A translation of the text published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 19th December, 1930, is attached, marked "H."

10. In January 1932 a Council of Ministers was constituted by an undated decree published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 16th January, a translation of which was transmitted to you under cover of my despatch No. 118 of the 5th March. This decree incidentally affected (1) article 8 of the Constitution, by modifying and defining the functions of the Viceroy's Office; (2) article 11, by mentioning a new Ministry, that of the Interior; and (3) article 27 of the Constitution, by vesting the control of military affairs in the Presidency of the Council instead of in the person of the King. A fifth member was added to the Council of Ministers by Royal command published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 11th March, a translation of which was transmitted to you in my printed letter No. 136 of the 19th March.

11. The text of the first national budget, presumed to apply only to the Hejaz, however, was published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 16th January. A translation was transmitted to you under cover of my despatch No. 36 of the 21st January.

12. There have certainly been many derogations in practice from the terms of the Constitution of 1926, and probably not a few modifications have been made constitutionally, and published in some form or another, but those enumerated above are all that can now be precisely traced, in the absence of any official gazette or other compendium, and with the assistance of the Hejazi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has stated in semi-official correspondence on the subject that Part IV of the Constitution has lapsed since the abolition of the post of Inspector-General, but he has been unable to indicate the date or exact nature of the modification. I would refer in conclusion to the comment made on the status of Asir in paragraph 5 (b) of Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 180 of the 15th May, 1931.

I have, &c

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 2926/165/25]

No. 78.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 13, 1932.

THIS morning I received through the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs a personal message from Ibn Saud in which the latter begged me to obtain reconsideration of the decision of His Majesty's Government regarding the question of a loan to the Hejaz Government. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that while his Government only required between £150,000 and £200,000, the Soviet Government were prepared to lend up to £1 million, which was more than was required, but unless His Majesty's Government were prepared to reconsider their refusal the Russian offer of assistance would have to be accepted. The Russians, he stated, had made the loan conditional on the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and commerce; their loan would take the form of goods and would consequently affect British trade. The Hejaz Government did not desire any such treaty with the Soviets and would in any case confine it within narrow limits. Nor did they desire that British trade should thus be adversely affected, and whatever happened they were determined not to renounce their policy of friendship with His Majesty's Government.

While promising to forward this message to you, I went over the course of events in London, and informed him that I could hold out no hope of a reconsideration by His Majesty's Government of their previous position in the matter. I explained what had passed between the Bank of England and Fuad Bey, adding, however, that I was not fully aware what he had done in other directions. I also emphasised the present unpromising financial outlook in the City. After we had exchanged the customary assurances and protestations the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs hinted that even if the present appeal could not be entertained he hoped that His Majesty's Government might prove more accommodating at a future date.

I should be grateful for instructions whether, in making the formal reply which the King's message calls for, I should confine myself to the inadequate material in my possession.

[E 2930/76/25]

No. 79.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office June 15.)

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MY telegram No. 48 of 13th June.

In connexion with control measures to be taken in region of Akaba, I consider that it would have a good effect if it could be arranged for one of His Majesty's sloops to visit Akaba in the course of the next few days.

[E 2986/76/25]

No. 80.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 67. Most Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 15, 1932.

PENDING receipt of reports mentioned in your telegram No. 100, Secret, I have given no hint whatsoever here that any suspicion of complicity rests on King Fuad.

However, Sidky, when talking to me yesterday about Hejaz loyalty, spontaneously told me the following story in strictest personal confidence, asking me to make no use of it:—

Early in May Egyptian consul in Bagdad telegraphed for permission to come at once to Cairo by air in order to make a very important and secret communication the nature of which was not indicated.

He was told that he could just as well send a cypher telegram.

He again urged that he must come in person, and said it was a message from the ex-King Ali to King Fuad. Permission was again refused, as neither King Fuad nor Egyptian Government wished to receive any secret communication from Ali. Consul was told that if there was any concrete message he could send it by post. Ali declined to make any written communication to consul, and latter reported by letter, giving gist of message to the effect that there was much discontent and effervescence in Hejaz; that moment was propitious for wresting its possession from Ibn Saud; and that the matter could be put through successfully if adequate funds were made available. Sidky said that neither the King nor the Egyptian Government had slightest intention of being drawn into any intrigue or adventure of this sort. No answer was sent to Ali and consul's report was merely filed.

Sidky surmised that, it being a matter of common knowledge that King Fuad was not well disposed towards Ibn Saud and that Egypt had not recognised Nejd-Hejaz Kingdom, Ali may be in agreement with other members of Hashimite family, was trading on this in the hope of securing King Fuad's assistance in this clandestine adventure. He added that then, as now, Egypt regarded herself as being under the ordinary international obligations of a neighbour to Hejaz, even though she had not recognised Ibn Saud, and that the King held exactly the same view.

I said to Sidky that I was glad he had told me this story; it was rather important. There was, as a matter of fact, suggestion in my correspondence incriminating King Fuad. Story might be useful for refuting the suggestion if I was authorised to use it later on. Sidky said he would speak to the King.

This morning Sidky has let me know that the King is willing that I should make discreet use of the story, and he encloses a copy of telegram of 9th June sent by Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the consul at Bagdad as follows:—

"Your confidential letter 31st May. It is undesirable that either Egypt or her Sovereign should be mixed up in the question which forms the subject of proposal. Make suitable use of these instructions, and in the future avoid receiving or acting as intermediary for any similar message."

This seems to take King Fuad out.

Since receipt of your various telegrams I have been in close touch with Egyptian Government, who are making a searching investigation. Report will be sent me, and I hope to be able shortly to telegraph its substance.

[E 2989/76/25]

No. 81.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 16, 1932.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 48 to Colonial Office.

I am having messages telephoned to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is now at Taif, embodying suitable portion of paragraph 1 of telegram under reference, but without giving number or other particulars of force mentioned. I am informing him in same message of sloop to Akaba.

I have made no use of remainder of telegram under reference or of High Commissioner's telegram No. 47.

Unless High Commissioner thinks it essential, I should prefer (a) not to pursue the question of liaison until I receive reply to my notes of 11th June, and (b) not to seek consent of Hejazi Government to any action concerned with the sloop unless it concerns them clearly and directly.

My cautious attitude is inspired by desire not to stimulate critical tendency of Hejaz Government, which was strongly, though politely, manifested in further conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 12th and 13th June. I am reporting these by despatch.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 104.)

[E 2924/76/25]

No. 82.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 13th June: Ibn Rifada's incursion.

On 14th June Hejazi Minister, in reply to representations on lines of those made to you by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, was informed in sense of my telegram No. 48 of 10th June.

He had no information of Ibn Rifada's activities since entry in Hejaz and only vaguest regarding movements of Ibn Saud's forces. He was asked to request his Government to keep you fully informed on these points for information of Transjordan authorities.

You may use suitable parts of paragraph 1 of Transjordan telegram No. 48 to Colonial Office in conversation and correspondence with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. As regards last paragraph, you may mention High Commissioner's suggestion regarding communication between commanders of Hejazi forces and Glubb.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 54.)

[E 2998/76/25]

No. 83.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 17.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 16, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 49 of the 15th June.

I am informing commander of sloop that everything is quiet at present, and no difficulties are expected to arise in the course of the next few days. My suggestion that a sloop should visit Akaba was made in view of the possibility that it might become necessary to disarm rebels retreating through Akaba and to detain their leaders (see my telegram No. 48 of the 13th June) when the mere presence of the sloop would have a restraining effect. I had in mind also the possibility that Ibn Saud's forces, if victorious, might press on to Akaba in pursuit, in which event the presence of the sloop would have a restraining effect, especially if pursuing forces consisted of Akhwan, who might get out of hand.

I had no intention of using the sloop for interference with shipping which might be carrying supplies to the rebels, and I suggest that, if His Majesty's Government wish any such action to be taken, instructions should be sent direct to sloop, which need not remain fixed at Akaba.

I have no information of the progress of Ibn Rifada's movements, and circumstances, in which I suggested that presence of sloop might be useful, have not arisen as yet, nor can I say yet whether they are likely to arise in the future.

(Repeated to Jedda and Cairo.)

[E 3001/76/25]

No. 84.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 17.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 16, 1932.

MY telegram No. 48 of 13th June.

Everything quiet in Southern Transjordan. I have no knowledge of any advance by rebels.

The police were reinforced yesterday by two half-companies of the Transjordan Frontier Force to prevent any further movement of rebels into Hejaz.

A complete embargo on exportation of food-stuffs is in force and will be validated by legislation.

[7797]

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Orders as follows have been issued by Air Officer Commanding with a view to stopping Hejazi forces if they cross the frontier :—

- (1) Every effort is to be made to [?] turn them back without firing.
- (2) Should they persist in crossing attempts will be made to disarm them. If they resist and continue to push forward into Transjordan, fire will be opened, in the first instance, on their camels and cars.
- (3) If second course is not effective, then, and only then, will rifle fire be opened on individuals.

With regard to arrest and interrogation of rebels or suspicious persons attempting to cross the frontier in either direction arms will be taken from them and the leading personalities detained and interned at Maan. A proportion of their camels may if necessary be impounded. Rifle fire may be opened to stop persons refusing to stop when challenged or attempting to escape.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 42, and to Cairo, No. 43.)

[E 2995/76/25]

No. 85.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 16, 1932.

MY telegram No. 77.

Just after drafting my telegram under reference I received a long Hejaz reply dated 15th June to my note of 11th June. It reaffirms the confident expectation of British assistance in resisting action of brigands, guilty of aggression against His Majesty's Government as well as Hejazi Government and divides the questions for consideration under two headings, viz. :—

- (a) Joint measures to be taken by both sides and by authorities under direction of His Majesty's Government in Transjordan, and
- (b) Investigation regarding responsibility and means of bringing it home to instigators.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sums up under four headings measures described in my note and expresses thanks for the care shown in dealing with action which he repeats has involved hostility to His Majesty's Government as well as to his Government and which violates article 2 of Treaty of Jedda, besides Hadda Agreement and principles of international law. He, nevertheless, considers the promised measures insufficient, as rebels are only a few hours' journey from Akaba, and will, if threatened with attack by Government force, find it easy to escape if frontier is not closed. They will have the guarantee of safety and escape penalty of rebellion against Hejazi Government. After developing these considerations further in order to show the need for severity, Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that difficulties to be overcome by mutual assistance can only be met by (a) preventing the rebels from crossing the frontier and expelling them by force if they enter Transjordan; (b) arresting them on entry and surrendering them; or (c) permitting limited pursuit into Transjordan, which is authorised by Hadda Agreement, subject to the consent of the other side. Adoption of these measures, or of some of them, will help in the solution of the difficulty; will end criminal activities; and will destroy the hopes of evil doers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs reverts to the question of alleged two car-loads of supplies and arms, and makes capital out of the admission that rebels were able to obtain twenty-five rifles at Akaba, notwithstanding the prohibition of arms traffic in Transjordan. He goes on to represent the importance of investigation and fixation of responsibility as a means of solving present and future difficulties and discouraging enemies of good relations. He suggests the improbability of a fugitive like Ibn Rifada having had means of his own to procure one month's supplies and 200 rifles mentioned by the High Commissioner. He asks His Majesty's Government to suggest a method of investigation so that it may be undertaken jointly and couples the request for early reply on this point with an offer to produce all evidence in the possession of his Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Transjordan is clear. They would defend it by force against attack. What would be their attitude and what steps would they take in converse case of aggression by Transjordan? He asks for a clear answer. In conclusion, he again emphasises the need for early negotiations for a settlement which will avert future difficulties and expresses the desire to start on them as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 105.)

[E 2996/76/25]

No. 86.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 16, 1932.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Note makes show of moderation in tone partly because Hejaz Government are endeavouring to distinguish between His Majesty's Government, whose friendship they invoke, and Transjordan Government, whom they persistently wish to incriminate; partly, perhaps, because I had answered every reasonable criticism in my conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 12th June and 13th June. In my opinion, they are largely animated by desire to exploit political incident which they have shown few signs of taking really seriously as a practical danger since first mobilisation of force sufficient to smash Ibn Rifada if necessary. I draw attention to their deliberate attempt to twist to their own purposes every piece of information supplied by the High Commissioner.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 106.)

[E 2997/76/25]

No. 87.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, June 17, 1932.

EGYPTIAN Government state that report of passage of Ibn Rifada and armed rebels in manner stated in your telegram No. 101 is baseless. While it is possible for small unarmed groups to cross frontier, passage of 400 armed men would not be possible in view of close surveillance exercised in that region. Nevertheless, strict orders have been given to competent authorities to exercise closest surveillance on frontier to prevent any movement or transport of provisions and arms destined for Hejaz or supply of Hejazi rebels in accordance with international rules.

(Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 3026/76/25]

No. 88.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 17.)

(Nos. 70 and 71.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 17, 1932.

(R.) MY immediately preceding telegram.

1. Egyptian Government's reply is an epitome of detailed information supplied by Jarvis Bey, who was summoned to Cairo. Examination of reports was conducted in close co-operation by Frontier Districts Administration and Residency, and I am satisfied that Egyptian Government's reply is justified.

2. It is, perhaps, not realised that it is forbidden to carry arms in Sinai. Any Bedouin seen carrying arms is at once arrested. Governor's control of the peninsula is even sufficiently close to make it impossible for more than three or four unarmed men at a time to slip across the frontier without permits.

3. Our information is as follows: Ibn Rifada has been living in Cairo and Benha. About eight months ago he paid a visit to Transjordan. He returned to

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Cairo about two months ago and recently proceeded unarmed to Akaba, having sent ahead some twenty to thirty unarmed Howeitat from Egypt proper. He gave them no money but only a few sacks of rice. He was short of money, and rumours regarding payments by him were spread with the idea of encouraging recruitment. From Sinai direct Jarvis estimates that possibly fifty crossed the frontier unarmed in the ordinary course of Bedouin migration to join in incursion, but there is a regular passage of unarmed Bedouin, even of whole tribes, across the frontier for harvest work and grazing, and it is impossible to distinguish between *bona fide* travellers and would-be raiders.

4. No evidence is available here of any contract between Hafez Amir and Ibn Rifada.

5. There is no official Transjordan agent in Egypt (see Jedda telegram No. 67), and I presume reference is to some private agent of Abdullah.

6. The Hizb-al-Hejazi is supposed to be a social club, the president of which is Abdel Hamid-al-Khatib, Hejaz agent in Cairo during Hussein's rule. It is not known that the society has any direct contact with Sinai, but its president is reported to be in contact with Emir Abdullah. It is not a serious institution and seems ill-qualified to organise any serious movement.

7. Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs states that main point is that Egypt had allowed Ibn Rifada to organise an expedition in her territory. As Sir A. Ryan, in reply, pointed out, no Government can prevent plots being hatched in its capital. Blame lies on organisers outside Egypt. There is as yet no evidence of responsibility of Egypt's complicity with plotters; armed bands could not be organised in Sinai and sent across the frontier without the knowledge of Jarvis.

8. With reference to your telegram No. 106, it is unlikely that any Bedouin will return armed (see paragraph 2 of above). Should any do so, they will at once be arrested and disarmed in accordance with permanent prohibition against carrying of arms in Sinai. All will be shepherded into their respective tribal areas more than 50 miles from the frontier. Steps have already been taken to prevent supply of food-stuff and arms to rebels. They cannot have received any from Egypt except in insignificant quantities. Our information is that such raiders as came from Egypt were supplied with arms just outside Akaba. (End of R.)

9. In view of the fact that foregoing information conflicts somewhat with statement made to Hejazi Government regarding passage of Ibn Rifada and party from Sinai to Hejaz (see first paragraph of communication contained in your telegram No. 48 to Jedda), I must leave it to you to decide what, if any, part of this telegram should be communicated to Hejazi Government.

(Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 2926/165/25]

No. 89.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 18, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 13th June: Ibn Saud's renewed request for a loan.

In informing Ibn Saud of the regret of His Majesty's Government that they cannot accede to his renewed request, you may explain that (a) apart from the exceptional cases which occurred during the world war, it is not the practice of His Majesty's Government themselves to make loans to foreign Governments; (b) in present financial conditions necessary parliamentary sanction for payment involved would in any case be unobtainable; and (c) as was explained to mission at Bank of England on 13th May, there is no possibility at present time of Hejaz-Nejd Government raising a loan in London.

You should add that His Majesty's Government warmly appreciate His Majesty's friendly assurances.

[E 3035/76/25]

No. 90.

*Sir A. Ryan (Nos. 108 and 109) to High Commissioner, Transjordan.—
(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received June 19.)*

(Nos. 81 and 82.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 19, 1932.

(R.) MINISTER for Foreign Affairs telephones that Ibn Rifada intends to send portion of his party along the coast of the Gulf of Akaba by sea. He asks that you should prevent this. (End of R.)

Information and request seem equally indefinite. What shall I reply?

[E 2996/76/24]

No. 91.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 21, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 78 of 16th June: Ibn Rifada's incursion into the Hejaz. Hejaz-Nejd Minister on 18th June made representations corresponding to those reported in paragraph 2, and was informed that His Majesty's Government could not reconsider their original reply (my telegram No. 48 of 10th June). He accepted this without demur.

It is undesirable to pursue further with Hejaz-Nejd Government question of responsibility.

Answer to question in last paragraph of your telegram No. 78 of 16th June is well-known to Hejaz-Nejd Government and proved by our successful action in recent prevention of raids from Transjordan.

In these circumstances I consider it preferable to make no reply to Hejaz note of 15th June.

Meanwhile, in view of suggestion in your telegram No. 79 of 16th June that Hejaz-Nejd Government may no longer be treating incursion as serious practical danger, you should, unless you see objection, press them for latest information regarding movements both of rebels and of Ibn Saud's own forces operating against them. This information is, in any case, required if measures which are being taken by Transjordan authorities are to be effective.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 57.)

[E 3146/76/25]

No. 92.

*Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Transjordan and Palestine, to Headquarters,
Royal Air Force, Middle East (Repeated to Air Ministry and Amman).—
(Received in Foreign Office June 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

June 23, 1932.

MAIN body of rebel party now located near Haraiba. A certain Alowie-al-Kabrait, of Suez, brother of Hamad-al-Kabrait, Mayor of Akaba, and Obeid-al-Kabrait, of Maan (*vide* paragraph 111 (a) of A.S.I. Summary), arrived Amman 15th June, Akaba 17th June, Amman 19th June, and now reported left for Suez.

Reliable information that Alowie distributed money to Rafajda's party before it left Egypt and Sinai, and that he now intends to organise supplies for rebels by sea from Suez. Reported that boats will be forwarded by Mohammad-al-Badawi, of Suez. One cargo will go direct to his brother Mahmoud-al-Badawi, at Dhaba, to appear as normal merchandise, and to be used if, and when, rebels capture village. Another will be landed on coast of gulf, wherever Rafada displays black flag.

Amman to repeat to British Resident.

(Copy to Palestine Government.)

[E 3035/76/25]

No. 93.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 19th June: Use of His Majesty's sloop "Penzance" at Akaba in connexion with situation in Northern Hejaz.

See my telegram No. 123 to Cairo of 23rd June, repeated to you.

If Sir P. Loraine concurs, you may inform Hejaz-Nejd Government, in reply to their request, that His Majesty's sloop "Penzance" is being instructed to take all possible steps in co-operation with authorities in Egypt to assist in prevention of supplies, arms or reinforcements reaching rebels by sea.

[E 3035/76/25]

No. 94.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir P. Loraine (Cairo).

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1932.

MY telegram No. 109 of 15th June: Use of His Majesty's sloop "Penzance" at Akaba in connexion with situation in Northern Hejaz.

Hejaz-Nejd Government have now requested that steps be taken to prevent Ibn Rifada from sending portion of his party along coast of Gulf of Akaba by sea.

There are serious difficulties in the way of authorising His Majesty's ships to engage in active operations against Hejazi rebels, but in view of fact that rebels entered Hejaz from territory under British control, notwithstanding previous warning from Hejaz-Nejd Government to His Majesty's Legation, and of indications which cannot be ignored that Amir Abdullah, for whose foreign policy His Majesty's Government are responsible, was cognisant of project, His Majesty's Government are anxious that sloop should give any possible assistance with a view to suppression of rebellion, for latest information regarding which see telegram No. P.A. 788 of 20th June from Headquarters R.A.F., Transjordan, to Air Ministry, repeated to Air Headquarters, Middle East.

His Majesty's Government therefore propose, subject to your concurrence or observations, to inform Ibn Saud that sloop will co-operate with authorities in Egypt in attempting to prevent supplies, arms or reinforcements sent in native craft from Egyptian territory from reaching Hejazi rebels across Gulf of Akaba or Red Sea, and to instruct sloop accordingly. You should accordingly, unless you see serious objection, endeavour to arrange informally that British authorities in Sinai, Suez, &c., should inform sloop immediately of any shipments from Egyptian territory which have evaded or are likely to evade their efforts to prevent and which sloop could intercept. Such informal arrangement may be matter of some delicacy, as it is important that no request should be addressed to Egyptian Government for *permission* to examine dhows flying Egyptian flag, or shipping in Egyptian territorial waters, as this might raise whole question of our customary rights of search in Red Sea, which we desire to avoid.

Please repeat to Sir A. Ryan this telegram and also your reply.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 58.)

[E 3160/76/25]

No. 95.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 23, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 62.

It is not clear whether you wish me to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of paragraphs 2 to 4 or to try to avoid discussion of points in his note of 17th June other than that covered by your paragraph 3.

I myself feel Hejaz note calls for some sort of reply to obviate misunderstanding of His Majesty's Government's attitude. Paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference does not seem to me to meet the points, as aggression now complained of is not ordinary tribal raid, but incursion which Hejaz Government allege to have taken place with connivance of Transjordan Government. I had conversation this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is here for a few days. He did not revert to above matter, and I was able to confine myself to other issues, most important of which were the questions of liaison on lines foreshadowed in High Commissioner's telegram No. 48 to Colonial Office and points raised in paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thought communication might usefully be established between Glubb and authorities at Dhaba Tebuk and Jauf subject to practical arrangements about call signs, &c., but he wished to consult King. He gave account of position as regards rebels and Government forces which, if accurate, suggests I may have been misled by slowness of movements on both sides into thinking situation more quiescent than it is. His account is as follows (see my immediately following telegram).

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 111.)

[E 3166/76/25]

No. 96.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 24, 1932.

BAGDAD telegram to the Colonial Office of 23rd June.

I thought it advisable to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs orally this morning of King Ali's visit to Amman rather than wait till news should reach him otherwise. He expressed utmost perturbation and begged that precautions should be taken to prevent ex-King from joining or lending support to rebels. He spoke of making written request for formal assurance from His Majesty's Government that Ali would not do so. I suggested that such a demand would be going further than was necessary or desirable, but I hope everything possible will be done to relieve anxiety of Hejaz Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 117, and Bagdad, No. 118.)

[E 3115/122/91]

No. 97.

Sir John Simon to Sir F. Lindley (Tokyo).

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1932.

MY despatch No. 356 of 11th May: Red Sea Lights Convention.

Lighthouse company are refusing to implement contract owing to depreciation of sterling, and French Government, in consequence, cannot see their way to ratify convention. His Majesty's Government are therefore making alternative arrangements and have decided to discontinue Centre Peak Light on 1st October. Notice to mariners is being issued accordingly. Estimated cost of maintenance under new arrangements will be about half that under convention.

Please inform Japanese Government accordingly, and express hope of His Majesty's Government that they will be ready to contribute 4 per cent., as under convention, of reduced cost of maintenance of two remaining lights

[E 3115/122/91]

No. 98.

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 626.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 24, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 468 of the 11th May enclosing a copy of a note to the French Ambassador regarding the Red Sea Lights Convention, I have to inform your Excellency that the French Government have not

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signified their readiness to accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government that both Government's should ratify the convention without further delay and that negotiations should immediately after its entry into force be opened between His Majesty's Government and the Lighthouse Company with a view to the settlement of the company's reasonable demands.

2. In these circumstances the Notice to Mariners providing for the discontinuance of the Centre Peak Light, a draft of which was enclosed in my note to M. de Fleuriau, is being issued to all concerned; but in view of the delay which has occurred the date of the discontinuance of the light has been postponed from the 1st September to the 1st October next.

3. I shall, therefore, be glad if you will at once inform the Government to which you are accredited, explaining to them the difficulties which have arisen with the Lighthouse Company and the reasons which led His Majesty's Government to refuse to negotiate with the company with a view to the revision of the contract annexed to article 4 of the convention until the convention had been brought into force. These reasons are fully set forth in my note of the 30th April to the French Ambassador.

4. You should at the same time inform the Italian Government that, in view of the failure of the French Government to ratify the convention, His Majesty's Government have been obliged to make alternative arrangements for the maintenance of the remaining two lights at Jebel Teir and Abu Ail, the cost of which it is estimated will, on the basis of the expenditure actually incurred during the last few years, amount to approximately £5,400 per annum, as against £11,000 per annum, which would have been payable to the Lighthouse Company under the convention during the preliminary period. It is clearly unreasonable that His Majesty's Government should continue to bear alone the cost of the maintenance of these lights, which are of benefit to the shipping of all nations. I shall, therefore, be glad if you will approach the Government to which you are accredited in the matter in whatever way you think best and make every effort to induce them to agree to contribute to the reduced cost of their maintenance in the proportion allotted to them under the convention, namely, 6 per cent. I enclose a copy of a table prepared by the Board of Trade on the basis of the expenditure incurred during the last few years, showing the approximate amounts involved.

5. Instructions in a similar sense are being addressed to His Majesty's representatives at Berlin and The Hague by despatch and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo by telegram.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 98.

Red Sea Lights.

CONTRIBUTIONS to be made by the Powers concerned (1) if the convention is brought into force, and (2) if Centre Peak is extinguished and the remaining two lights are maintained by the Board of Trade.

	Percentage.	Contributions.	
		Convention.	Board of Trade. Maintenance.
		£	£
Germany ...	9.5	1,045	513
France ...	7	770	378
United Kingdom ...	61	6,710	3,294
Italy ...	6	660	324
Japan ...	4	440	216
Netherlands ...	12.5	1,375	675
	100	11,000	5,400

[E 3167/76/25]

No. 99.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 25, 1932.

MY telegram No. 86.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has not reverted to question of responsibility or answer to note in our daily conversations since 22nd June. His line now seems to be to show confidence in genuine desire of His Majesty's Government and British authorities in Transjordan to afford practical assistance, and to keep alive the grievances against Abdulla and his associates. Communiqué, dated 18th June, and published on 21st June, pays fresh tribute to the zeal of His Majesty's Government.

In view of the above I may have exaggerated the importance of replying at any rate at present to Hejaz note.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 119.)

[E 3168/76/25]

No. 100.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 25, 1932.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Communiqué referred to represents rebels as stationary but inaccessible to troops sent from Mecca by car, so that the task of destroying them must await the arrival of forces well on the way from Nejd. It gives details of measures taken by His Majesty's Government. Leading article in yesterday's paper describes rebels as demoralised, owing to non-fulfilment of promises by persons who deluded them into the adventure and now seek to disavow them.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 120.)

[E 3174/76/25]

No. 101.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 26, 1932.

MY telegram No. 95.

Latest information of Hejaz Government is that rebels moved from original position first to Haikl and then to Alhumaidha, intending to proceed to Badu, and that they were likely to attack Muweila. They number about 800, and had hired camels from the Amran tribe, but only one for every four men.

The above news was brought by men who had gone from Dhaba and mixed with rebels, taking about six days each way.

King has ordered Ibn Oqaiyil, commander of levies from Nejd, which were expected to reach Alula about six days hence, to expedite march and advance until he meets the rebels.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 125, and Cairo, No. 126.)

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 29, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for April.

2. Copies are being sent to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Bushire, Koweit, Simla, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea sloops and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Chapter I.—Internal Affairs.

Ibn Saud.

111. The King left Riyadh at 9 A.M. on the 5th April by car for Mecca, preceded on the previous day by the baggage convoy and a mobile wireless set. He was met on the 7th by the Emir Feisal at Usheyra and by large numbers of Meccawis at as-Seyl, where he performed the major ablution and clad himself in two seamless wrappings, the "ihram" of the pilgrim. He entered Mecca (550 miles) at sunset on the 7th April, one week before pilgrimage day. At 7 next morning he was ceremoniously received by the Viceroy in the centre of the town, in a setting of awnings and troops and popular acclamation, the while a salute of 101 guns was fired and speeches and poems eulogised His Majesty. There, by Royal command, the celebrations ended, in the interests of national economy.

112. Ibn Saud was immediately surrounded by the multifarious cares of maladministration and the grievances of pilgrims. An unusually large number of prominent Indians was present for the Friday Hajj, and them he heard with some attention. On the 12th April he made a banquet for 500 guests and delivered his customary pilgrimage oration. It was a mediæval mixture of religion and politics, spoken from a full heart but a bewildered head; it caused much offence.

113. Starting with the aphorism (in such company) that one of the greatest blessings of God to man is the blessing of Islam, Ibn Saud ascribed the decline of Moslem temporal power to the decadence of Moslem religious faith and the resulting disunity between Moslem peoples. God had therefore empowered their enemies over them. But Moslems now were awakening from sleep and inadvertence. They should seize their weapons, which were of two kinds, the material, such as aeroplanes, the spiritual, piety. By these would they win glory in this world and pardon in the next. Here he inserted the remark that the Prophet of God had recommended the learning of foreign languages, as a means of power over the enemy. Ibn Saud then turned to his own position and that of the Hejaz. "If the relations between me and God are good," he said, "I do not care if the relations between me and all men are bad. A man can only do his best—in the general interest," he added. People had been talking too much about the Hejaz and its people and criticising them only because they believed in God Almighty. The Hejaz was once under the Turks and then under the Sherifs. His hearers were aware of the bloodshed then done, the sins committed, and the peace violated. But when God made Ibn Saud the ruler of the Hejaz, being a slave of God he followed no way but that of true religion, the Holy Book between his hands. Two things he would never allow, were all the world to fight against him, namely, the slightest deviation from the religion of God or any action affecting the independence or violating the honour of his country. People often asked, why did Ibn Saud not strive to defend the Moslems by propaganda against the English, the Russians, the Italians and the rest? He would tell them. He was not a wordy man, but a man of deeds. He did not instruct the editor of his newspaper to speak against such a one, but he commanded silence until the time of action came; when he acted, then he spoke. Hitherto he had kept still, not knowing the state of Moslem opinion, or rather the opinion of those who pretended to be Moslems. Here Ibn Saud began to betray his bewilderment. When Moslems speak against Christians, he said, they speak politely and with good manners, but when they speak against Moslems, they accuse them as though they were

their enemies. "There are some who have acted vindictively against us, looking with evil eye upon what God has granted us; thus the devil tempted them to many evil deeds. Not in one single case did I find one of the Moslems defending me. Moslems withheld the charities from the Holy Sanctuaries, and Moslems prevented people from performing pilgrimage. All this is against Ibn Saud. What has Ibn Saud done? Has Ibn Saud erected an idol to be worshipped in place of God? Has he allowed intoxicating drink? Has he permitted adultery and prostitution? Has Ibn Saud left the mischievous to commit evil upon earth? What has Ibn Saud done contrary to the Sharia law and Arab manliness? By God, he said, I fear the foreigner once, but I fear those who pretend to be Moslem three thousand times. I hope Moslems will forgive me for saying so, but, by God, I am true in what I say." What had Moslems agreed upon and striven for, Ibn Saud asked, and he had hesitated to join them? He had no use for words, but if Moslems went forth to action, it would be disgraceful for their honour, theirs, the Arabs', if they failed to do the same. But he did not go on to indicate any plan of action; instead, he turned aside to ventilate other grievances. He was censured for lack of rain in the Hejaz, he was said to be contracting a loan with the English, he was accused of wanting to do this and that. But he had taken nothing from the Hejaz; on the contrary he had given it peace and religious law. Almighty God withheld the rain, but upon Moslems lay the disgrace of withholding charity and preventing pilgrimage (regarded, of course, as ever in the Hejaz, primarily as commercial assets). By God, he continued, I have no money and my only possessions are the sword and the Koran. I declare openly that if any of the Moslem kings, princes, or merchants wishes to do a benevolent deed for the Moslems of this country, he is warmly welcome, provided that he does not violate the honour of our country nor interfere with our independence or our religious affairs. I swear by God, the only One God, that I have not contracted a loan with the English or others—but perhaps we may need to take from the Moslems, or others.

114. Here is a very fair indication of Ibn Saud's state of mind. He is at his wits' end to obtain money sufficient for his expensive needs. Moreover, he is feeling insecure and his words reflect his growing sense of the hostility which surrounds him in the Hejaz and which is spreading in the Moslem world outside. His reactions are alternately those of a man of action who would like to hit somebody, and a pious beggar for unconditional alms. But his enemies, though real to him, are impalpable, while benevolent Moslems are looking askance at his fanatical destruction of their shrines and his spendthrift maladministration of the Holy Hejaz.

115. After pilgrimage, Ibn Saud visited Jedda on the 30th April, but stayed only a day and left on the 2nd May. He startled the leading inhabitants, who assembled to pay homage to him at the Green Palace, by greeting them with the words: "I could cut the throat of every one of you." The foreign representatives were received in audience, one by one, on the 1st May. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires found Ibn Saud polite, but distant, and with very little to say. He looked a different man from what he had been eighteen months before, his face yellowed under the skin, pouchy, puckered, and far more livid; his ill-health was evident.

Viceroy of the Hejaz.

116. The Emir Feisal left on the 12th April on a mission to Europe (paragraphs 53 and 127) and was replaced by Ibn Saud's third son, Muhammad, aged 22, as President of the Council and Viceroy-to-be.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

117. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, at the same time, became Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Fuad Bey Hamza accompanied the Minister for Foreign Affairs on mission. Current affairs in April were dealt with by letter and telephone to Mecca. There were no interviews.

Finance.

118. The Hejazi Government made a further attempt in April to silence the persistent loan rumour (paragraph 11) which the Arabic and Indian vernacular press kept on repeating. They announced in the "Umm-al-Qura"

of the 15th April that the crisis in the Hejaz was only a part of the general world depression; they denied definitely that they had consulted the British or any other Government about a loan, the rumoured conditions of which (appointment of an Englishman to reorganise and control all finances, settlement of the Hejaz Railway question and use of Hejaz-Nejd territory by British aircraft) were such as the Government could never accept; they foretold a conference of local financial experts, and offered to assist anyone who might wish to be charitable to the Hejaz; they promised facilities to any Moslem, were he King, or prince, or merchant, who wanted to give them a loan, provided that their rights, religion and independence were not touched.

119. The financial position was unchanged. The Dutch adviser, M. van Leeuwen, arrived at Jedda on the 23rd April on contract for a year (paragraph 62).

Economic.

120. The pilgrimage, though very small, brought a little business and relief to the town populations of the Hejaz. The Bedouin, however, continued in miserable plight. As a result of the drought, the Northern Hejaz was said to be entirely empty of tribes, who had moved in search of grazing either northward into Transjordan or southward beyond Taima. Pilgrims to Medina were frequently mobbed by starving nomads.

Chapter II.—Frontier Questions.

Transjordan.

Raiding.

121. There were no complaints during April of raiding from either side of the frontier.

Frontier Meetings.

122. None are reported to have been held in April.

The Beni Atiya.

123. Under instructions from His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 22nd April replied to the Hejazi Government's note of the 9th March (paragraph 38) to the effect that the Transjordan Government regretted that they could not see their way to complying with the request for the return of the Beni Atiya to the Hejaz. It was pointed out that it had been in a spirit of co-operation, however, and in order to minimise the risk of trouble arising on the frontier, that the Transjordan authorities had taken measures to control these tribesmen as soon as they crossed the frontier and had sent them to the north of Maan.

Iraq.

124. Nil.

Koweit and Bahrein.

125. Nil.

Asir and the Yemen.

126. Ibn Saud sent a telegram of condolence to the Imam Yahya on the death of his second son, Saif-al-Islam Muhammad, on the 22nd April.

Chapter III.—Foreign Relations.

British Empire.

Hejaz-Nejd Mission to London.

127. Under circumstances which have already been recorded in paragraph 53, the Emir Feisal, accompanied by Fuad Bey Hamza, sailed from Jedda on the 12th April to visit London and other capitals. A touching scene was witnessed at the gangway, when the Emir's favourite was found on board and bundled off. It had been officially concluded that it would be incorrect if he were to accompany the mission, but the Emir had surreptitiously given him passage money at the last moment. Though full-grown, he howled like a child.

Another attachée, a well-known prostitute of Mecca, had left by a previous sailing for Port Said, where she intended to join the Emir. It has not yet been ascertained whether she fared better than her rival.

Italy.

128. The mission sailed in an Italian liner, specially diverted to Jedda for the purpose, and was accompanied by the Italian consul and Mme. Sollazzo, whose duty at Jedda had terminated with the signing of the Italo-Hejazi treaty (paragraph 59). The mission arrived at Naples on the 18th April as guests of the Italian Government. They were received there on the 19th by the Crown Prince of Italy and proceeded the same day to Rome. The Emir was received by King Victor Emmanuel on the 20th and stayed to luncheon. On the 21st he attended the celebration of the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, and was frequently photographed in company with Signor Mussolini. The mission left Rome on the 25th April, visited the Fiat motor and aviation works at Turin on the 26th and the trade fair at Milan on the 27th, and passed on to Switzerland. The Italian authorities appear to have made every effort to impress the mission with Italian efficiency in the industrial field. For their views on the slave trade, see paragraph 147.

The Netherlands.

129. The Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, M. Adriaanse, returned to Jedda on the 5th April from the Yemen, where he spent ten days as the guest of the Imam Yahya at Sana. He received yet another courtesy letter from Queen Wilhelmina.

130. The Dutch financial adviser, M. van Leeuwen, arrived at Jedda on the 23rd April (paragraph 62).

Iraq.

131. King Feisal's personal message to Ibn Saud regarding the seat of the new Iraqi Legation (paragraph 67) arrived by special courier in April. After several and friendly interviews with the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, Ibn Saud sent a reply, in which, it seems, he regretted that he could not infringe the rule which preserves the Holy Places of Islam intact from diplomacy, and invited King Feisal to furnish his representative with fresh credentials naming him to Jedda.

Chapter IV.—Air Matters.

Hejaz Air Force.

132. Nil.

Emergency Landing Grounds.

133. There was no opportunity in April of pursuing the matter.

Aerial Trespass.

134. None was reported.

Chapter V.—Military Matters.

Northern Hejaz.

135. The drought-stricken northern tribeslands were apparently deserted and at peace.

East (Nejd).

136. Nothing to report.

South (Asir).

137. News was received via Aden to the effect that, as a result of renewed trouble between the Saudi control at Jizan and certain Asiri tribes, the Emir-bin-Shuair had been recalled from Jizan and replaced by the Emir-bin-Zuair from Kunfida.

Chapter VI.—*Naval Matters.**Naval Visits.*

138. The customary naval visit during the pilgrimage was paid by Captain C. S. Sandford, O.B.E., R.N., Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, who visited Jedda for the first time on the 12th April in H.M.S. "Hastings." The visit lasted until the 18th April, pilgrimage day falling on the 15th. It was an unqualified success, which was largely due to the navy's own genial hospitality and their effective co-operation with the shore and the pilgrimage fleet in the running of the traditional Hajj regatta. The usual official visits were paid by Captain Sandford, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and the Governor of Jedda receiving salutes when they returned his visits.

139. There were no foreign naval visits.

Chapter VII.—*Pilgrimage.**Pilgrimage Day.*

140. The 9th Dhul Hijja did coincide with a Friday (the 15th April). The 50,000 or so Hajjis who assembled upon that day in the plain of Arafat were thus seven times blessed (for why, see paragraph 92). The shade temperature was then not more than 102° F., deaths were few and the general health all that could be desired. In announcing this happy circumstance, the Hejazi Government were moved to declare that the congregation that day numbered not less than 150,000. This may be ascribed as much to ignorance as to ecstasy. The desert so seldom teems that the Arab has but little knowledge of large numbers.

Arrivals.

141. The official Hejazi statistics of oversea pilgrims, which are not necessarily accurate, show some 29,000 this year as against 39,500 last year, made up as follows:—

Nationality.	Last year.	This year.
Indians ...	7,200	9,500
Javanese ...	17,000	4,500
Egyptians ...	5,000	2,300
Syrians ...	1,000	2,100
North Africans ...	250	1,800
Afghans ...	1,000	1,700
Palestinians ...	500	1,300
Bukharis ...	200	1,200
The rest ...	7,350	4,600
Totals ...	39,500	29,000

142. The financial and economic depression has thus decisively outweighed the attraction of the Friday Hajj. Total approximate figures of oversea pilgrims to Mecca in recent years have been:—

1927 ...	132,000
1928 ...	88,000
1929 ...	82,500
1930 ...	85,000
1931 ...	39,500
1932 ...	29,000

There was a larger attendance this year than has before been known of notable pilgrims from oversea, however. The names of some of these are given in paragraph 149.

143. No Hejazi statistics of local or overland pilgrims are kept. In fact, they are not called pilgrims at all, but the Arabic equivalent of tramp or hobo, since they bring no money into the country. Such are the Yemenis, of whom 5,000 are said to have come to Mecca this year. The estimated total of these and more local pilgrims is 20,000.

Departure.

144. There was an exceptional glut of pilgrims at Jedda during the last part of April. The slender funds of the majority were exhausted by high prices and extortion. The great idea was to get away by the first boat available. Large numbers, moreover, were unable to afford the visit to Medina, which is generally paid after the pilgrimage to Mecca. Consular and shipping staffs have consequently been working since the 20th April at considerably higher pressure than usual, in spite of the smaller pilgrimage.

Hajj Regatta.

145. Another successful meeting was added on the 17th April to the long list of Hajj regattas with which, since before living memory, the waiting pilgrim ships and the European community of Jedda have filled in the time while the Moslems are in Mecca. The oldest captain could remember a time when forty-two ships lay at anchor. This year there were only eight, seven British and one French. The usual regatta meeting was held at the British Legation, the usual luncheon on board the regatta flagship, steamship "Boulac," and a programme of nine pulling and sailing events was carried through harmoniously, with the valuable assistance of H.M.S. "Hastings." Ships were dressed overall on the 16th to the 19th April for the four days' pilgrimage festival, the Id-al-Azha. Salutes, however, are only fired by the shore battery, which fired them incessantly.

Chapter VIII.—*Slavery.**Manumissions.*

146. One male and two female slaves who took refuge in the Legation in April were manumitted on the 20th and repatriated to the Sudan, their country of origin.

Slave Trade.

147. The signature of the Italo-Hejazi Treaty (paragraph 59) was accompanied by an exchange of letters, in the first of which the Italian plenipotentiary opined that his Government considered it necessary that Ibn Saud's Government should assume the obligation of co-operating with them in suppressing the slave trade. Similarly, his Government desired that their representatives at Jedda should have powers of manumission and repatriation. They trusted that Ibn Saud would appreciate their attitude. The slave-owners' representative replied, however, that, while appreciating the Italian Government's humane sentiments, he had to explain that the suppression of the illicit trade in slaves constituted one of the most important questions to which Ibn Saud's Government had directed their attention, that His Majesty was personally interested in preventing the import of slaves into his country, and that his Government would persevere to this end. As to manumission, the Government were themselves of their own initiative endeavouring to reach the end enjoined by Islamic law, with its principles of supreme justice and its pure sentiment of humanity. They could not grant powers of manumission to the Italian representative because such action was their own sole and exclusive right. This Italian face-saving and Hejazi clap-trap will no doubt be published with the treaty as evidence of good faith on both sides. A further exchange of notes agreed that the most-favoured-nation treatment accorded to Italy by the Hejaz-Nejd did not include the "favourable treatment which, for reasons which are generally known, has been granted to a third Power in the matter of slavery"—the British right of manumission secured by the Treaty of Jedda.

148. Nevertheless, Aden has received a report that, on the 10th April, a slave boy of 14 was brought to Jizan—he is thought to have been landed on the Subeyhi coast east of Perim and to have been brought overland into Asir—and was kept in the house of a local sheikh for sale. Thereupon, it was said, certain merchants interested in the slave trade enquired of the Emir of Jizan—whether the old or the new is not stated—whether he would encourage and facilitate a revival of the import business. He is said to have promised to do so. Other reports received at Aden state that two slaves were landed at Mocha in March 1931 and one in October 1931, and that at the beginning of March 1932 four

slaves—a man, a woman and two boys—were landed at Dubab and taken overland to Zabid, where they were bought by one Muhammad Ibrahim Meccawi for 2,000 Maria Theresa dollars. The man and one boy were said to have been sent later to Sharif Ibrahim ar-Rifa'i at Midi for sale.

Chapter IX.—Miscellaneous.

Visitors.

149. The following Moslem notables, amongst others, came on pilgrimage :—

Sheikh Ismail-al-Azhari, Grand Mufti of the Sudan.

The widow of the late Colonel Nawab Sir Muhammad Nasrullah Khan of Bhopal.

The Honourable Sirdar Saheb Suleman Cassum Haji Mitha, C.I.E., J.P., member of the Indian Council of State.

Sultan Saleh-bin-Ghalib Qaiti, nephew of the Sultan of Mukalla.

Babu Fazal Elahi, secretary of the Karachi Haj Committee.

Nawab Sir Amiruddin Ahmad Khan Bahadur, K.C.I.E., ex-Nawab of Loharu and grandfather of the ruling Nawab, Pataudi, the cricketer.

Nawab Sir Nizam Jang Bahadur, Kt., C.I.E., O.B.E., of Hyderabad.

Nawab Fakhur Yar Jang Bahadur, of Hyderabad.

Nawab Muhammad Akram-ud-din Khan, of Hyderabad.

His Highness Ahmed Shah Khan, Minister of Court and cousin of the King of Afghanistan.

Nawab Sir Shams Shah, of Kalat.

Khan Bahadur Nawab Abdullah, M.L.C., of Aligarh.

Muhammad-ibn-Isa-al-Khalifa, Mubarak and Abdullah, sons of Hamed-ibn-Isa-al-Khalifa, of Bahrein.

M. Van de Poll, the Dutchman lately retired from profitable business in the Hejaz to build himself a palace in Algeria.

150. A number of prominent Indian Nationalists and agitators also came, among them Iqbal Shaidai, Ismail Guznawi, Ahmad Din, son of Nizam Din, Abdurrahman Malabari, the editor of "Al Amin," Hazrat Mohani, Moulvi Nazir Ahmad Khajandi.

151. The Croat violinist, Zlatko Balokovic, put into Jedda on the 3rd April, on a world cruise in the yacht "Northern Light," captained by a retired officer of the Royal Australian Navy, and accompanied by his American owner-wife and Baron Fleetwood of Sweden as pianist.

Staff.

152. Mr. F. V. Jones, Legation archivist for the past two years, left Jedda on the 29th April, but died on the 1st May, aged 27, on his way home for his first leave; he was buried at Tor. He had been weakened by the climate and recent attacks of influenza and malaria, and succumbed to a twenty-four-hour attack of double pneumonia. His loss has been keenly felt.

[E 3216/640/25]

No. 103.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 236.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 7, 1932.

I HAD the honour to report in my telegram No. 60 of the 30th May my arrival in Jedda on that day. In view of the circumstances of my recent absence it may be worth while to give a short account of certain matters connected with my return.

2. I reached Jedda in H.M.S. "Hastings" on the morning of the 30th May. I was met on board by Hamdi Bey, the Director-General of Military Organisation, who had been sent from Mecca to present the King's compliments, and who was accompanied by a junior officer. I was welcomed at the quay by the Governor of Jedda in person, attended by all the principal local officials holding subordinate posts.

3. As this was my first landing in Jedda from a warship since my first arrival, I cannot be certain that the sending of Hamdi Bey to meet me was in the nature of an extra courtesy, but I got the impression that the Hejazi Government were anxious to show the maximum of politeness on this particular occasion. In order to show my appreciation, I made the official announcement of my return more than formal. I enclose a copy of my note to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a translation of the Acting Minister's acknowledgment.⁽¹⁾

4. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin arrived in Jedda on the evening of the 2nd June. He visited me the next morning and expressed in the most cordial terms the King's satisfaction and his own at my return in good health. He went on to congratulate me on the anniversary of King George's birthday and delivered the message embodied in my telegram No. 64 of the 3rd June.

5. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin came again in the afternoon to the reception held by my wife and myself to celebrate His Majesty's birthday. The gathering of Europeans, local notables, Indians, &c., was a large one for Jedda, and both Sheikh Yusuf and the Governor were full of friendliness.

6. I am afraid that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's journey from Taif to Jedda was undertaken primarily with the object of pressing me in connexion with the Ibn Rifada incident, which so unfortunately came to a head just before my return. It is nevertheless gratifying to have evidence of so strong a desire on the part of Ibn Saud and his Government to treat the episode arising out of the Bakhit case as dead and buried, at any rate for the time being. I think that their general attitude has been a good deal affected for the better by the reception accorded to the Amir Feisal's mission in London and more especially by the telegram addressed by His Majesty the King to King Abdul Aziz on the occasion of its departure.

7. I am doubtful as to how far the present atmosphere of affability can be expected to survive future strains, but I need hardly say that on my own side I have contributed my full quota to the flow of courtesy. There has been no reference on either side to the Bakhit affair and its aftermath.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 3196/76/25]

No. 104.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office June 28.)

(No. 229.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 23, 1932.

KING ALI left this morning by air for Amman, where he proposes to stay with his brother until the end of August.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Amman and Jedda.)

[E 3213/76/25]

No. 105.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, June 28, 1932.

JEDDA telegram No. 90 (see my telegram No. 85).

Egyptian Government has issued to the press a denial that expedition was organised in Egyptian territory (see press summary enclosed in my despatch No. 576 of 23rd June).

(Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 3214/76/25] No. 106.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 30, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 75.

I had already communicated all the particulars in Transjordan telegram No. 57 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, beginning: "I regret."

I propose to postpone further action pending fresh news from Transjordan, unless reaction of Minister for Foreign Affairs, from whom I have not yet heard, makes it advisable to convey the information in High Commissioner's telegram No. 59 immediately, in which case I will express regret more formally as from His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 134.)

[E 3167/76/25] No. 107.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 30, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 86 of 23rd June: Situation in Northern Hejaz.

1. In reply to note of 15th June you may address Hejazi Government on following lines:—

2. You should first draw attention to numerous measures taken by British authorities in Transjordan and Palestine, and by authorities in Egypt at request of His Majesty's Government, to prevent supplies, arms, or reinforcements from reaching rebels. You may also mention assistance which British naval authorities in Red Sea are endeavouring to render in same direction. Necessary details are already in your possession.

3. As regards question of responsibility, you should say that His Majesty's Government cannot consider suggestion for joint investigation, but would be prepared, in due course, to consider question of themselves investigating any relevant evidence which the Hejaz-Nejd Government may care to produce, and you might suggest that in any case question of responsibility is of less urgency than other immediate issues.

4. I read Hejazi Government's final enquiry (see last paragraph of your telegram No. 78 of 16th June as applying not to past incursion through Akaba bottleneck, but to possible future organised aggression by Transjordan forces. If this interpretation is right, answer is that His Majesty's Government would act just as vigorously in preventing a Transjordan attack against Hejaz-Nejd as in preventing a Hejaz-Nejd attack against Transjordan.

5. Question of possible general settlement between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd is being actively pursued, but involves many complicated issues which it will inevitably take time to settle. This matter can, therefore, only be dealt with independently.

6. In view of final paragraph of your telegram No. 94 of 25th June, detailed reply on these lines may appear to you to be unnecessary, and I leave it to your discretion whether to communicate all or any part of above to Hejaz-Nejd Government.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 76. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 65.)

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 171/171/89]

No. 108.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 12, 1932.)

(No. 104. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 22, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 102 of the 17th December, regarding the political situation, I have the honour to report that the elections at Damascus have been adjourned in consequence of rioting of somewhat serious proportions provoked by the Government party's undue interference with the ballot.

2. It is perhaps necessary for a complete comprehension of events to point out that the police and municipal officials are not, as might be taken for granted, a permanent body of public servants at the orders of whatever Government may be in power. On the contrary, they are the personal henchmen of the Administrative Governor (Wasseq-el-Muayyad) and the chief of police (Behij-el-Khatib), appointed by them in place of others dismissed without explanation, and bound to them by the strongest ties of personal interest. The same is true of even the fire brigade, which Wasseq-el-Muayyad has converted into a gang of partisans.

3. Both Wasseq-el-Muayyad and Behij-el-Khatib are aware that their future fortunes depend entirely on the return to power of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, and that any other Government would dismiss them immediately. When it is added that in 1928 the former openly tampered with the ballot-boxes, it is easy to appreciate the deep suspicion of the Opposition and their insistence on guarantees of the freedom of the elections on the part of the High Commissioner.

4. M. Ponsot refused to intervene further than to remove Sheikh Taj-ed-Din and Jemil-el-Ulchi from office—precautions that were entirely ineffective as long as Wasseq-el-Muayyad and Behij-el-Khatib remained in power.

5. The Electoral Law requires that the empty ballot-boxes shall be exhibited and then sealed by a committee before polling begins at 8 A.M. At the polling station in the Keimariyeh quarter, where Sheikh Taj-ed-Din and Jemil-el-Ulchi are candidates, Nationalist representatives arrived at 7 A.M. in order to exercise their right of inspection and were informed that the operation had taken place at 6 A.M. In the polling station at Qanawat a Nationalist named Zeki-el-Khatib insisted on remaining during the poll and was thrown out by the police. He applied to the High Commissioner's delegate for authority to control the ballot but without success. He then returned and made an inflammatory speech to his constituents.

6. Excited crowds gravitated naturally to the Merje, a centrally situated square adjoining public offices, including the municipality. The firemen attempted to disperse the crowd, but the pumps were soon put out of action, and the crowd attacked firemen and police with stones. The latter emptied their revolvers into the crowd and retreated to the municipality, which was then itself attacked.

7. The French forces arrived and established calm, and the High Commissioner's delegate suspended the elections. Strategic points are still strongly occupied. The curfew has been imposed, and special measures taken for the defence of the Salhiyye quarter, where most of the French live.

8. It is hard to estimate casualties. Five were buried yesterday and others have since died. An immense crowd attended the funeral, but guarantees had been given that no demonstrations would occur if the police did not interfere. Speeches were made, one wild attack on the mandate by a Greek Orthodox priest who should have known better, but the Nationalist leader, Fakhri Baroudi, recommended the population to behave peaceably.

9. M. Solomiac has left this morning for Zahle to consult M. Ponsot and General Bigault de Grandrut. If it is decided to hold the elections again, it is only reasonable to hope that scrutineers from non-Government parties will be allowed to attend at the polling stations. Such a concession would have prevented the disturbances of the 20th.

10. Popular feeling has for the moment been allayed by the suspension of the elections. It is now concentrated on the six functionaries who form the backbone of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din's party. A leaflet issued yesterday holds them up to public execration—Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, Jemil-el-Ulchi, Wasseq-el-Muayyad, Behij-el-Khatib, Tawfiq Shamie and Abdul Kader-el-Khatib. The last is a creature of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, who holds the very lucrative post of Director of Waqfs. There has been, curiously enough, no manifestation of hostility against the French Administration, and during the actual rioting the crowd took care not to harm Frenchmen.

11. It has for some time been so patent that no free elections could possibly be held without change in the existing system, and that an attempt to enforce them could not but result in troubles that it is hard to understand how the French Administration failed to sum up the situation. It is natural that the High Commissioner should prefer to treat with a pro-French Government, and that he should countenance the exertion of influences that might contribute to their triumphant return; but it is surprising that he should believe that such barefaced trickery as was certain to be resorted to could possibly escape public notice. Apparently, he has allowed himself, for the second time, to be duped by Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, with whom the delegation is still in constant communication.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 173/171/89]

No. 109.

Consul Monck-Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 12, 1932.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, December 24, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to report that polling for the elections of the second degree for Deputies of Syria took place in Aleppo on Sunday, the 20th instant. There was considerable disturbance, but no bloodshed, and to that extent the elections may be said to have passed off "normally."

2. There is unfortunately no room for doubt that the system under which voting was carried out was anything but impartial, a number of urns having been "seeded" in the moderate interest before electors had a chance of recording their votes. The Nationalist party in Aleppo, who are, however, certainly much the strongest party, abstained in the circumstances from recording their votes.

3. The gerrymandering of the elections, attributed of course to the mandatory authorities, has roused the indignation even of those Christians who approve any action of the authorities, whether fair or foul, which would prevent the Nationalists becoming supreme in the district. It is indeed a significant commentary on the political principles of the Christian element of Aleppo that the action of the authorities in "faking" an election to the disadvantage of the Nationalists should seem to them admirable. A single instance of this "faking" will suffice, as typical of many others. In the "Wara-ed-Djami" quarter of 703 persons summoned to vote, only 62 appeared with their lists, which they deposited in the urn. When the latter was opened, no less than 803 lists were found in the box.

4. On the 22nd instant the local "Al Nahda" newspaper distributed gratis in the Mahometan quarters an election supplement, which contained among other news the statement that the Nationalists were acting as the tools of the British, by whom they were financed. The "Al Nahda" is a daily paper of very small circulation and no influence at all, and I attach no importance to these remarks. M. Lavastre, the Assistant Delegate, to whom I mentioned this article, agreed with me that there was no necessity to drag a friendly Power within the range of political animosities, and said he would prevent such press statements appearing in the future.

5. The "results" of the elections at Aleppo are of course farcical, and it may seem remarkable that there was so little public effervescence. The reasons

for this are: that the population of Aleppo is certainly more law-abiding and less warlike than that of Damascus; while the fact that 45 per cent. of the population of the city is Christian and therefore in favour of a Christian mandatory rather than of a Mahometan authority is not without its influence on the question. There is, however, no elation over the "victory" of the moderates, who are identified simply with the French.

6. Protests are still being made to the Assistant Delegate, and street demonstrations take place periodically. The shops in the covered markets are closed, and the atmosphere is one of tension. It is not, however, likely that there will be bloodshed, as a considerable display of armed force, in the form of cavalry and tanks, is being made.

7. I enclose in original two letters⁽¹⁾ written to me by Ibrahim Hanano, the local leader of the Nationalist party; they speak for themselves, and the facts are as stated, except that the events of Damascus seem to have been exaggerated.

Copies have been sent to Beirut (No. 56) and to Damascus (No. 43).

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 226/226/89]

No. 110.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 6, 1932.

WITH reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 433 of the 23rd December last, I have the honour to report that I took the opportunity of my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning to remind his Excellency of his fears that King Feisal was a candidate for the Throne of Syria, and to say that it looked at present as though the ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, was now more prominent in that respect.

2. Tefik Rüstü Bey replied that he agreed that King Feisal's candidature was dead, and said that, in principle, Turkey would prefer to see a republic in Syria; but if there was to be a King, the Turkish Government had no objections to Abbas Hilmi, whom they knew well and considered as a friend of Turkey. In fact, he had taken means to let King Fuad know this, thinking that His Majesty would like to see a member of the Khedivial house succeed to the throne, but it had been made clear to him that this was not at all King Fuad's view. The matter had consequently gone no further, though I have little doubt that Turkey's support of the candidature of Abbas Hilmi was a good deal warmer than the Minister for Foreign Affairs led me to suppose.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 229/229/89]

No. 111.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 17.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 8, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, who during his stay in Angora for his treaty negotiations has freely associated with the Gazi, the Turkish Ministers and other leading Turks, most of whom are old friends of his, has informed me that the Turkish Government are closely watching events in Syria. They are hoping that the evolution of Syrian affairs may give them an opportunity of obtaining the cession to them of Alexandretta. It is their belief that France, which formerly abandoned to them Cilicia, may be induced to make this further concession. With regard to the internal constitution of Syria, Turkish statesmen dislike its division into numerous States, and especially the existence of the State of the Grand Lebanon. Although Nuri Pasha did not say

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so, I assume that the Turkish Government view with disfavour the existence of the Lebanese State because it destroys any hope of complete French withdrawal from Syria, a consummation which, as suggested *passim* in Mr. Morgan's despatches Nos. 432 and 433 of the 23rd December, Turkey devoutly desires.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 262/15/89]

No. 112.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations, Geneva.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 16, 1932.

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to invite your attention to Foreign Office letter of the 11th November, 1931, communicating the text of a joint request by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government to the Council of the League of Nations, relating to the settlement of the frontier between Iraq and Syria.

2. With reference to the eleventh paragraph of that joint request, I am to enclose herein the text of a joint request by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and by the French Government submitting, for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, the agreement concluded by the two Governments on the 31st October last, regarding the settlement of the question of the frontier between Transjordan, on the one hand, and Syria and the Jebel Druse, on the other hand.

3. I am to request that you will be good enough to place this question on the agenda of the meeting of the Council which is to be held at Geneva on the 25th January.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

Joint Request by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government to the Council of the League of Nations, relating to the Settlement of the Frontier between Transjordan, on the one hand, and Syria and the Jebel Druse, on the other hand.

1. IN the month of November 1931 His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic addressed to the Council of the League of Nations a joint request relating to the settlement of the question of the frontier between Iraq and Transjordan, on the one hand, and Syria and the Jebel Druse, on the other.

2. In that communication the two Governments explained the difficulties which had prevented them from carrying out the delimitation of the frontier defined by the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, and requested the Council of the League to decide the question so far as the section of the frontier between Iraq and Syria was concerned. As regards the section between Transjordan, on the one hand, and Syria and the Jebel Druse, on the other, the two Governments explained that they had succeeded in arriving at a solution of the problems which had confronted them, and had agreed, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, upon a line which could be delimited upon the ground by a commission such as is contemplated by article 2 of the aforementioned Franco-British Convention.

3. This revised frontier line between Transjordan and Syria and the Jebel Druse has been embodied in a protocol signed by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon on the 31st October last. There is attached to the protocol an annex laying down the main lines of an agreement to be concluded subsequently for the regulation of frontier relations. These instruments were formally approved, on the date of their signature, by an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have the honour to submit, for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, the arrangements on which they have agreed.

5. Copies of the protocol of the 31st October, 1931, and of the annex thereto, are attached to the present joint request, together with a complete set, duly certified, of the five maps, (1) three English and two French, referred to in that protocol, and three extra copies of the three British maps.

Foreign Office, January 16, 1932.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

Protocol relative to the Settlement of the Frontier between Syria and the Jebel Druse, on the one side, and Transjordan, on the other side.

I.—Definition of the Frontier.

1. Yarmuk Sector.

(a) FROM the point where the railway crosses the Yarmuk above El Hamme as far as the point where the railway crosses the river above El M'Khebi, the frontier follows the thalweg of the Yarmuk, it being understood that the section of the railway situated between these two bridges, and lying to the east of the Yarmuk, shall be accorded, in favour of Syria, the same exterritorial régime as was provided for, in the case of the section of the railway already delimited as far as the station of Semakh, by the Delimitation Agreement of the 3rd February, 1922 (which fixes the last point delimited).

(b) From the above-mentioned point above El M'Khebi up to the point where the railway crosses the Wadi Meidan in the direction of Mezerib for the last time, the frontier runs on the Transjordan side of the railway at a distance fixed, where these rivers flow on the south side of the railway, by the thalweg of the Yarmuk and of its tributaries, the Wadi Zeizun and the Wadi Meidan, and where the railway runs on the Transjordan side to the south of these rivers, by the railway itself.

In the latter case, the frontier shall be established to the south of the railway and parallel to it in such a way as to leave to Syria, besides the railway itself, its structures and grounds, its borrow-pits, its stations, its yards and outbuildings, and the area necessary both for the technical protection of the railway and its works and for its operation. This definition of the railway also applies to the section of the railway mentioned in paragraph (a) above.

(c) Nothing in the preceding definition of the frontier shall have the effect of modifying the water régime relative to the Yarmuk and its tributaries, as provided for in article 8 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

2. Deraa-Remthe Sector.

From the point defined above, where the railway crosses the Wadi Meidan, as far as the point where the frontier meets the railway to the south of Nasib, the frontier is defined by the following marks and cairns:—

From the bridge on the Wadi Meidan, the frontier rejoins the line which separates the lands of the Transjordan villages of Amrawa, Shejera, Turrah and Remthe, on the one hand, from the lands of the Syrian villages of Tel Shehab, Mezerib, and Deraa, on the other.

This line passes through El Bueib on the road from Deraa to Remthe, and thence follows the western crest of the Jebel-az-Zumla as far as the cairn situated at the southern extremity of the line separating the lands of Deraa from those of Remthe.

From the latter cairn the frontier runs to the cairn situated approximately 1,500 metres to the south of the farm of Rahaya; thence it passes to the cairn of Kabr Hamdan, and continues towards the cairn situated at Kerkur Sud, and thence rejoins the railway at a point situated between the Syrian village of

(1) Not reproduced.

Nasib and the Transjordan village of Jabir, in such a way as to leave to each of these villages the lands which belong to them.

It is understood that when the frontier, in this second sector, follows a water-course or wadi, the thalweg is meant, and when the frontier follows a crest, the water parting is meant.

It shall be further understood that whatever the actual line of the frontier, the inhabitants of Turrah shall continue to have access as heretofore to the water points in the Wadi Meidan situated to the east of Jisr Meidan.

3. Sector to the east of Nasib and Jabir.

From the point above mentioned, between Nasib and Jabir, to the point where it meets with the frontier between Transjordan and Iraq, in the neighbourhood of Jebel Tenf, the frontier is defined as follows:—

(a) From the above-defined point on the railway, the frontier rejoins the point of intersection of the meridian of Semma with the line defined hereafter. Between the meridian of Semma and the meridian of Tell Rumah it passes to the north of a line running through the following points:—

Semma, Umm-es-Surab, Shajara (a place approximately 2 kilom. south-west of the solitary tree on the track from Umm-el-Jemal to Tissiye, Subhiya, Sabha, Umm-el-Kuttein, Deir-el-Kahf (or Deir-el-Kaht) and Tell Rumah, these points being situated in Transjordan.

The frontier shall be indicated by boundary marks placed 3,200 metres (say, 2 miles) to the north of and parallel to the lines which join the centres of the places or localities mentioned above.

It is understood that if the village of Khirbet Awad or any part of that village is found to lie to the south of the frontier line as marked out above, the frontier shall be deflected around and to a point situated 60 metres to the south of the last group of houses at present existing, rejoining the main line to the east and to the west of the village by lines forming an angle of approximately 90 degrees at the point above mentioned (60 metres to the south of the village), in such a manner as to include in the territory of the Jebel Druse all the inhabited part of this village as well as the land situated within this salient from the main line.

(b) From the point situated 3,200 metres north and on the meridian of the highest point of Tell Rumah to the frontier of Iraq in the neighbourhood of Jebel Tenf, the frontier shall run in a straight line in the direction of Abu Kemal on the Euphrates, the geographical position of this village being calculated, for the special purpose of establishing this line, by reckoning the central point of the locality.

II.—Agreement on Frontier Relations and "Bon-Voisinage."

An agreement on frontier relations and "bon-voisinage," of which the essential points are indicated hereafter, and which shall enter into force at the same time as the present agreement, shall lay down the reciprocal guarantees of security in the interests of the two States and shall assure the safeguarding of the rights of the inhabitants of the frontier zone.

III.—Maps.

The following maps, which have been utilised in the course of the negotiations, are annexed⁽¹⁾ to the present agreement for the purposes of explanation:—

On the French side—

1. Feuille de Bosra, édition 1930 au 1/200,000.
2. Feuille du Yarmuk au 1/100,000.

On the British side—

1. Yarmuk Valley, scale 1/50,000; contours at 50-metre intervals.
2. Marked bromide reproduction map of the area between J. Rumah à Abu Kemal, scale 1/1,000,000.
3. Syria-Jaffa-Damascus, scale 1/250,000 corrected.

⁽¹⁾ Not reproduced.

The frontier lines marked on these maps, having been drawn prior to the agreement, have a purely relative value for the purposes of general indication.

On the other hand, the indications shown in ink on the maps of the Yarmuk Valley are intended to support the agreed text, in particular in so far as concerns the course of the Wadi Zeizun and the Wadi Meidan.

H. PONSOT.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Paris, October 31, 1931.

Annex to Protocol.

General Lines of the Agreement on Frontier Relations and "Bon-Voisinage."

A separate agreement will be concluded as soon as possible, to regulate relations on the frontier between Syria and the Jebel Druse, on the one side, and Transjordan, on the other side, in such a way as to allow non-nomadic, semi-nomadic and nomadic inhabitants having properties or rights of pasture, watering or cultivation across the frontier, to continue to enjoy their rights.

Such inhabitants shall be able, within the limits of a frontier zone on either side of the frontier of a width to be defined hereafter, to convey from one side of the frontier to the other their beasts, the natural increase and produce of their flocks, agricultural implements intended for their work, their vehicles, their seeds, and the agricultural produce of their properties, without having to pay any dues in respect of customs, pasturage or watering, or any other tax leviable in respect of entry into the neighbouring territory.

The agreement contemplated will furthermore contain provisions designed to ensure the maintenance of complete order and security in the regions bordering on the frontier. In particular the measures to be taken against persons coming from one territory and committing acts of aggression in the other will be laid down, and provision will be made for the exclusion from a zone on each side of the frontier, of a width to be fixed by agreement between the two Governments, of any individuals whose conduct might be considered as prejudicial to peace and order in the territories under the administration of the other party.

H. PONSOT.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Paris, October 31, 1931.

[E 271/171/89]

No. 113.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 4, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 104 of the 22nd December, 1931, regarding the disturbances on the occasion of the election, I have the honour to report on the progress of events till to-day.

2. The city is still in charge of the army, though a state of siege has not been proclaimed. The control has been made somewhat less ostentatious than on the first few days after the troubles; the curfew has been abolished and barricades removed, but strategic points in the town are strongly occupied and tanks and armoured cars are held in readiness. Pickets and patrols are numerous.

3. A committee has been formed to collect subscriptions on behalf of casualties in the disturbances; the members represent every section of the population, and include many most reputable personages.

4. It seemed at one moment that M. Ponsot would arrive at complete agreement with the National party: Wasseq-el-Muayyad and Bahij-el-Khatib were both removed and the general atmosphere of the discussions was friendly. But at the council of delegates held at the Residency on the 30th December, the

proposal of M. Solomiac to postpone all elections was overruled and it was decided in accordance with M. Lavastre's advice to proceed with the elections to-morrow in all districts, except Damascus, Hama and Douma, where they will be held at a date not yet fixed.

5. Damascus will be closed to-morrow in protest, and the attitude of the Nationalists towards the elections will depend on the Aleppo results: if the chief Nationalist candidates are elected, they will contest the elections at Damascus; otherwise they will boycott them.

6. In an interview, published on the 31st December, Jamil Beg Mardam Beg outlined the Nationalist demands—fresh elections in Damascus, Hama and Douma and eleven (of twenty-nine) wards in Aleppo, where it is asserted that practically the entire electorate has protested. As yet, this last demand has been refused, though no official statement has been issued by the Residency.

7. The High Commission invited the National party to include in its list three candidates who were acceptable to the French authorities, Nassouhi Beg El Boukhari, Mohamed Ali Beg El Abid, and Rida Pasha Rikabi. The first was already conditionally on their list; they had coquetted with the second for some time on account of his great wealth, but the third is anathema. Their reason for refusal was, however, based on the principle that in a free election a party chooses its own candidates.

8. I am glad to record that Nationalist leaders have refrained from any attempt to excite public feeling in somewhat tempting circumstances and seem to be animated by a sincere desire to reach agreement with the French Administration.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 460/226/89]

No. 114.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 11. Confidential. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 20, 1932.

MY telegram No. 23, Saving, 21st December.

The Prime Minister has spoken to me again about the candidature of ex-Khedive to the Throne of Syria. I am reporting by despatch and enclosing copies of letters exchanged between Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject which Prime Minister left with me, but it may be of interest to record, meanwhile, main points which emerged in conversation:—

1. Egyptian Government have made it perfectly plain to the French Government that the presence of Abbas Hilmi on eventual Throne of Syria would not be agreeable to them.

2. French Minister in Cairo has continued to express attitude of his Government, as it has appeared in French communiqués, but hitherto orally only and not in writing. The French Ambassador has also explained to Sidki that the reception given to Abbas Hilmi by the French High Commissioner was one merely of courtesy due to his rank.

3. Egyptian Minister at Angora, having been invited to a reception by the Prime Minister in honour of ex-Khedive at which French Minister was also present, formed the conclusion that Turkish Government viewed Abbas Hilmi's candidature favourably. Soundings were thereupon taken which showed that this diagnosis was correct. Thereupon Turkish Chargé d'Affaires made a textual communication from his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Egyptian Government admitting that Turkish Government viewed Hilmi's candidature

with favour, and had had no grounds for supposing that Egypt would feel otherwise. Turkish Government considered Abbas Hilmi as a friend of Turkey, and they had supposed that he would be welcome to Egypt as a member of Egyptian Royal family. Turkish Government, nevertheless, in view of their friendly relations with Egypt, wished for a clear expression of views of Egyptian Government, especially as they had assumed Abbas Hilmi had been acting hitherto in consultation and in agreement with the King of Egypt and his Government.

4. Reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs shows that these assumptions are unfounded; that Abbas Hilmi has been working entirely on his own account, and, indeed, in contradiction with understanding with Egyptian Government that he should remain aloof from politics, and explains reasons why it would create a disagreeable position for Egypt if an ex-ruler of this country and an ex-pretender to its throne, to whom, moreover, the Egyptian Constitution denies access to Egyptian soil, were to become the monarch of neighbour State with which Egypt had closest ties of every description.

(Repeated to Beirut, Jerusalem and Istanbul.)

[E 439/226/89]

No. 115.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 24.)

Angora, January 15, 1932.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister for Iraq, has informed me that during his recent stay in Angora, in connexion with Turco-Iraq treaty negotiations, he learned beyond reasonable doubt that the Turkish Government, anxious, as he says, to prevent a union of Iraq and Syria, were wholeheartedly in favour of the candidature of the ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, to the Throne of Syria, and intended to support it in every way open to them. Nuri Pasha added that he did not know what attitude the French Government were adopting, but he had heard that Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Bey, on his way back to Turkey from Persia and Iraq, would stop in Syria to press the Turkish point of view on the authorities there.

2. Furthermore, his information was that Abbas Hilmi Pasha had promised large sums of money to Turkish journalists—including, of course, Yunus Nadi—to open a press campaign in favour of his candidature at a suitable moment, which, according to Nuri Pasha, would be on Tevfik Rüstü Bey's return from Tehran. Fethi Bey was also giving his full support to the ex-Khedive, but whether in return for a pecuniary consideration or not, Nuri Pasha could not say.

3. The local newspapers contrive to find space each day for some small paragraph about the ex-Khedive. They reported his return to Turkey from Amman with Hasan Pasha, Prime Minister of Transjordan, his reception by the Gazi, Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüstü Bey, his approaching departure for Cannes, and also his denial that the Throne of Syria has been offered to him. According to the "Milliyet" of the 11th January, the ex-Khedive regards as premature the rumour of the creation of a Kingdom of Syria, and thinks it probable that a republic will be established in that country. His view is that a definite solution should be given to the questions of the form of administration desired by the Syrians and of the mandate given to France by the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Genève, le 26 janvier 1932.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

Mandats: Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak.—(Received in Foreign Office, January 29.)

Note du Secrétaire général.

A LA demande du Gouvernement français, le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil une lettre de ce Gouvernement, en date du 23 janvier 1932, relative à la question du tracé de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak qui a fait l'objet de la résolution du Conseil du 9 décembre 1931.

Lettre du Gouvernement français.

Au Secrétaire général,

Paris, le 23 janvier 1932.

Par résolution en date du 9 décembre dernier, le Conseil de la Société des Nations a décidé d'accepter en principe la requête des Gouvernements britannique et français lui demandant d'examiner tous les aspects des difficultés soulevées par la délimitation de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak, d'établir ses conclusions en ce qui concerne les intentions que traduit l'article 1^{er} de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920⁽¹⁾ et, cela fait, d'indiquer une frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak définie sur la base de cette convention, mais modifiée pour tenir compte des considérations susvisées.

En vue de la décision que le Conseil de la Société des Nations doit prendre dans ces conditions, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le Gouvernement français estime être en droit de revendiquer pour la Syrie, par stricte application de la convention du 23 décembre 1920 précitée, la frontière décrite et brièvement commentée ci-après :

1. Secteur du Tigre.

A l'est, le Tigre depuis Djeziret-ibn-Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul.

La frontière turco-irakienne ayant été, par suite de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations, en date du 9 octobre 1925, et du Traité d'Ankara du 5 juin 1926, conclu entre l'Angleterre et l'Irak d'une part et la Turquie d'autre part, conformément à cette décision, reportée vers le sud jusqu'au confluent du Tigre et du Khabbour, ce confluent se trouve être le point de départ de la frontière syro-irakienne.

A partir de ce confluent, la frontière est marquée par le thalweg du fleuve jusqu'au point où le fleuve est coupé par la limite entre l'ancien vilayet de Diarbékir et de Mossoul, telle que cette limite est figurée sur la carte au millionième.

2. Secteur Tigre-Roumelan Keui.

Au sud et au sud-est, ladite limite des anciens vilayets vers le sud jusqu'à Roumelan Keui.

Au point d'intersection entre le thalweg du Tigre et la limite des vilayets, la frontière suit cette limite telle qu'elle figure sur la carte au millionième, limite qui s'infléchit vers le sud dans sa partie ouest et passe légèrement au sud de Roumelan Keui.

L'expression "jusqu'à Roumelan Keui" doit donc s'entendre "jusqu'à la hauteur de Roumelan Keui," c'est-à-dire jusqu'au point de la limite des vilayets le plus rapproché de Roumelan Keui.

L'emplacement de Roumelan Keui est déterminé par la coordonnée géographique que lui assigne cette carte.

⁽¹⁾ Note du Secrétaire-général.—Pour le texte de cette convention, voir "Recueil des Traités," publié par le Secrétariat, Vol. XXII, p. 354.

3. Secteur Roumelan Keui-Euphrate.

De là, une ligne laissant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Khabbour occidental et se dirigeant en ligne droite sur l'Euphrate, qu'elle franchit à Abou-Kemal.

Abou-Kemal ne se trouve pas sur l'Euphrate, mais à 400 mètres à l'ouest de la rive droite de ce fleuve. La frontière ne peut franchir l'Euphrate à Abou-Kemal même; elle la franchit au point de son cours le plus rapproché de Abou-Kemal.

L'origine et l'aboutissement de cette ligne étant ainsi déterminés, la ligne d'après la convention doit :

- (1) Laisser l'intégralité du bassin du Khabbour au mandat français;
- (2) Se diriger en ligne droite sur l'Euphrate, qu'elle franchit à hauteur d'Abou-Kemal.

Si l'on se reporte à la carte au millionième, la ligne droite joignant les deux points précités paraît répondre à ces deux conditions.

4. Secteur Euphrate-Imtan.

Puis une ligne droite aboutissant à Imtan au sud du Djebel Druze.

Cette définition n'appelle pas de commentaire.

La définition qui précède est faite d'après la carte anglaise internationale au millionième, éditée en 1916 et révisée en 1918, que les négociateurs de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920 ont eue sous les yeux.

Peuvent être également citées comme références :

La carte au millionième annexée au Traité de Sèvres;

La carte annexée au rapport de la commission chargée par la Société des Nations d'enquêter sur la question de la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak;

La carte au millionième annexée au Livre blanc britannique contenant le texte du traité conclu à Angora le 5 juin 1926 entre le Royaume-Uni, l'Irak et la Turquie ("Treaty Series, No. 18 (1927)").

Je crois devoir vous faire parvenir ci-joint, à titre d'indication, un exemplaire de la carte anglaise internationale au millionième, sur lequel la frontière syro-irakienne entre le Tigre et l'Euphrate a été tracée conformément à la définition donnée plus haut.⁽²⁾

Je vous serais obligé de bien vouloir porter les précisions contenues dans la présente lettre à la connaissance des membres du Conseil.

BERTHELOT.

⁽²⁾ La carte en question a été déposée aux archives du secrétariat.

Foreign Office to the Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1932.

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to invite a reference to the resolution adopted by the Council on the 9th December last, following upon a joint request from His Majesty's Government and the French Government, regarding the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria.

2. In view of that resolution, I am to transmit to you, for the information of the Council, the accompanying memorandum (together with eight copies of the map mentioned therein) on the interpretation of article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920. The Council will no doubt wish to refer this memorandum, for examination, to the commission contemplated in section 2 of its resolution of the 9th December, when that commission is set up.

3. A further memorandum, containing certain proposals for the revision of the frontier as defined in the convention of 1920, is being prepared, and will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

Enclosure in No. 117.

Memorandum on the Interpretation of Article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, relating to the Boundary between Iraq and Syria.

THE boundary between Iraq and Syria is defined in article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, the text of which is as follows:—

"On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

"On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French mandate the entire basin of the Western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse."

2. The convention makes no mention of a map, and, it is understood, no map was found annexed to the original document. The framers of the convention, who had no first-hand knowledge of the ground, must, however, have used a map. All external and internal evidence points to the 1:1,000,000 Asia map of 1916. It is understood that this is not questioned.

3. The convention must therefore be read in the light of the 1:1,000,000 Asia map of 1916. This map is admittedly little more than a sketch map and is far from accurate. The application to the ground of any line drawn on this map is likely to present many difficult problems, which must come up for solution at a later stage; they have, however, no connexion with the interpretation of the convention, which must take the form of drawing on the map used the line which the framers of the convention intended to describe.

4. The first sector as far as Roumelan Koeui offers no difficulty of interpretation. The boundary would follow the Tigris from the mouth of the Kabur, where the frontier between Iraq and Turkey begins, to a point opposite Faish Kabur and thence the administrative boundary marked on the map to Roumelan Koeui.

5. The succeeding passage, from the words "thence a line" to the words "crosses at Abu Kemal," is obscure. It is not contended that the wording of the convention absolutely rules out a straight line from Roumelan Koeui to Abu Kemal. There is, however, no reason to doubt that, for the reasons developed in paragraph 6 below, the line which is described in the convention and which the framers intended to describe is that shown in red on the accompanying copy from the map of 1916. This line may be more fully described in words as follows:—

From Roumelan Koeui a curved line running south of the Wadi-er-Radd in the general direction west-south-west and then south-south-west so as to leave in Syria all the drainage lines running to the Kabur; after passing between the lake of Khatuniya, which it leaves to Iraq, and the heads of the two drainage lines, which it leaves in Syria, the line continues in the same direction to a point on parallel of latitude 36° N. immediately to the east of the head of Shaib Abu Hamda, the most southerly of the drainage lines to the Kabur shown on the map from this point a straight line towards the Euphrates to the E in Werdi, whence it crosses the Euphrates at right-angles to Abu Kemal.

6. The following considerations are adduced in support of the line described above as opposed to the straight line:—

(a) It is highly improbable that the framers of the convention would have drawn a line bisecting so prominent a feature as the Jabal Sinjar.

(b) If a straight line from Roumelan Koeui to Abu Kemal had been intended, there would have been no need to mention the basin of the Kabur, since the map shows the whole of the basin well to the west of such a straight line.

(c) Furthermore, the use of the word "line" in the phrase referring to the basin of the Kabur and "straight line" in the phrase referring to the approach to the Euphrates supports the view that the framers were not describing a line straight throughout its length between Roumelan Koeui and Abu Kemal, though the clumsy wording of the sentence taken alone does not exclude such a meaning.

(d) The line described in paragraph 5 corresponds closely with the actual situation obtaining at the time of the conclusion of the convention.

7. The last sector, a straight line from Abu Kemal to Imtan, presents no difficulties of interpretation.

[E 522/226/89]

No. 118.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 4.)
Sir,

Beirut, January 6, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that the ex-Khedive of Egypt reached Beirut from Turkey on the 22nd December and left for Palestine the following day. He returned to Beirut on the evening of the 2nd January and left again the next morning for Turkey. On his arrival he was accompanied by several persons, among whom were a French girl, a Hungarian painter, a Turkish official said to be a friend of Mustafa Kemal, and the ex-tutor of King Feisal and his elder brothers. Some of these persons dined at the Residency on the 22nd December, where there was a dinner of sixteen covers. On his return Abbas Hilmi, as M. Ponsot was to leave for Damascus early the next morning, dined quite quietly with the latter and Mme. Ponsot. On his return to his hotel about 10 o'clock he, according to a press report, had a long conversation with Mohamed Ali Bey-el-Abed, who came specially from Damascus to see him.

2. So far as I know these visits aroused little interest or comment in Beirut. The Damascus elections have been of absorbing interest to the Moslems, while the Christians have had to distract them the death and funeral of the Maronite Patriarch and the inevitable speculations as to his successor.

3. It was suggested to me to-day at the High Commission by M. Chauvel in the course of conversation that Abbas Hilmi's original intention had been to go to Palestine at the time of the Moslem Congress organised by the Mufti, and that it was on that ground that he had obtained in Paris M. Ponsot's consent to his passage through Syria. Why he went after the congress was over, and whether his real intention was to visit Transjordan, as M. Chauvel seemed to think, I cannot of course say. I do not even know whether he visited the Emir Abdallah. My own personal opinion is that he did not come here in the capacity of a candidate for the Throne of Syria. So far as I can see the French are preserving an open mind on the question of monarchy versus republic, and are waiting until the situation in Syria becomes clearer either by the creation of a Parliament following on the conclusion of the elections or in some other way. As I understand it, the Nationalist leaders prefer a republic because it gives each one of them more chance of obtaining a share in the spoils of office. The French, too, might favour a republic, assuming that it would be easier for them, if necessary, to get rid of an obnoxious President than of an unsatisfactory Monarch. As for the mass of the people, it seems to be reasonable to believe that in an oriental country they would favour a King rather than a President. The former, as the father of his people, might possibly do something for them. The latter, with a brief term of office ahead of him, might reasonably be expected to do as much as possible for himself. One thing about Abbas Hilmi which would make him a desirable candidate from a popular point of view is that he is reputed to be extremely rich, so that he would not have to extract money from his

subjects and might even expend some on them. Ex-King Ali, on the other hand, is believed to be quite poor, so that he would have to make his own living and could do little for his people.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[E 514/226/89]

No. 119.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 74. Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, January 20, 1932.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 11, Saving, to transmit to you herewith copies of the letters exchanged between the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. The willing acquiescence of the Turkish Government in the eventual occupation of the Syrian throne by the ex-Khedive is an interesting factor in the situation. During my last audience with King Fuad, His Majesty expressed his belief that the Turkish Government would welcome this contingency, and that view is now confirmed by the language held to me yesterday by Sidky Pasha. King Fuad had hinted to me that the ground for the attitude which he attributed to the Turkish Government might be that the latter foresaw the possibility of arranging with Abbas Hilmi, as King of Syria, a rectification of the Turco-Syrian frontier to their own advantage. Sidky did not allude to any such Turkish ambition. He thought, and I rather share his view, that the tone of the Turkish communication made by Shevki Bey was frank and open, and that the misapprehension of the Turkish Government in regard to Egypt's attitude towards Abbas Hilmi's candidature had been a genuine one. It will be interesting to see whether the Turkish Government alter that attitude in view of the exposition which they are now receiving of the attitude of the Egyptian Government.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINÉ,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 119.

Copie d'une Lettre adressée par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Angora à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de Turquie au Caire et dont lecture intégrale a été donnée par ce dernier à Abdel Fattah Yehia Pacha, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

LA visite de l'Ex-Khedive à Angora a été de son propre gré. La réception par le Président de la République est due au fait qu'il appartient à la Famille régnante et amie de la Turquie et aux relations intimes qu'il a toujours eues avec le Gouvernement de la République.

Nous avons pris un soin spécial à ce que toute question pouvant intéresser de près Sa Majesté le Roi se passât sous les yeux de son Excellence le Ministre d'Egypte à l'occasion de la présentation de l'Ambassadeur de France à l'Ex-Khedive, puisqu'il s'agissait de son voyage en Syrie. Tout soupçon peut s'écarter dans de pareils cas lorsqu'on nous demande des explications auxquelles nous sommes prêts à répondre de plein gré et en toute franchise.

Imbu de ces sentiments sincères, je vous donne les renseignements suivants selon la requête faite par son Excellence le Président en présence du Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

La nouvelle de la candidature de l'Ex-Khedive a été aussi répandue en Turquie. On peut même dire que cette nouvelle fut télégraphiée du Caire et nous avons déduit que Sa Majesté le Roi voyait avec plaisir cette candidature.

Je dois vous dire pourtant que l'Ex-Khedive ne nous a pas fait part de ce désir. Seulement nous lui avons expliqué, lorsque l'occasion s'est présentée, ainsi

qu'à nos amis les Français, qu'il n'était pas de notre habitude de nous immiscer dans les affaires intérieures d'un autre pays. Si le régime d'un pays est républicain, il est évident qu'on ne peut s'attendre à aucune hostilité de notre part. Par contre, si une royauté se proclamait en Syrie, il est évident que nous préférierions avoir un Roi qui fût ami de la Turquie et nous n'avons pas caché que la candidature de l'Ex-Khedive nous serait agréable.

Comme nous ne connaissions pas le point de vue égyptien jusqu'à la réception de votre dépêche, nous étions sous l'impression et avions la conviction, ci-haut citée, que pareilles relations entre la Syrie et l'Egypte seraient très agréables à Sa Majesté le Roi.

Je dois pourtant vous dire que nous ne croyons pas à un changement prochain du régime en Syrie. Par conséquent, toutes ces rumeurs sont plutôt de nature théorique.

Il serait nécessaire et utile que vous nous éclairciez d'une manière très détaillée sur les vues de Sa Majesté le Roi, ainsi que sur celles du Gouvernement égyptien, au sujet du régime futur en Syrie. Vu les explications ci-haut exposées, nous sommes convaincus qu'il n'y aura pas de divergence de vues entre nous et le Royaume d'Egypte, à l'amitié duquel nous attachons une grande importance. Tout de même, nous croyons que le Gouvernement égyptien appréciera notre désir de voir des relations amicales entre notre voisine la Syrie et la Turquie.

Je vous prie de donner lecture intégrale de cette note à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Enclosure 2 in No. 119.

Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo.

LE Gouvernement royal d'Egypte a accueilli avec un réel plaisir la communication que vous lui avez faite de la lettre qui vous a été adressée par le Gouvernement de la République turque et a vivement apprécié les sentiments qui l'ont dictée.

Imbu de ces mêmes sentiments, mon Gouvernement est tout disposé—malgré que sa première communication ait mis suffisamment en lumière les buts qu'elle se proposait—à donner de plus amples éclaircissements en sus de ceux qui vous ont été donnés en ma présence par son Excellence Sedky Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres, relativement à la candidature de Son Altesse l'Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmy II.

Il serait cependant utile que j'insiste à nouveau sur certaines considérations qui vous ont été fournies quant au point de vue de l'Egypte à ce sujet.

Vu les relations millénaires entre l'Egypte et la Syrie, les liens de religion, de langue et de voisinage, les rapports continuels commerciaux, économiques et autres entre ces deux pays, l'Egypte ne saurait se désintéresser d'un changement de régime qui pourrait éventuellement se faire en Syrie. Et si jamais ce changement se réalisait et qu'une royauté était proclamée en Syrie, l'Egypte, vu ses rapports ci-haut mentionnés, ne pourrait pas abandonner son droit de s'intéresser au choix de la personne qui serait appelée à occuper le trône de Syrie.

Il ne serait pas sans importance de rappeler, tout d'abord, que c'est Son Altesse l'Ex-Khedive qui a fait le premier pas pour arriver à un accord avec le Gouvernement égyptien en affirmant qu'il trouvait que l'activité politique continuelle, et jusque-là stérile, qu'il était obligé de mener le fatiguait et ne s'accordait pas avec un commencement de vieillesse qui exigeait un repos d'esprit et de corps et que par ce fait il était à renoncer à toutes prétentions au trône d'Egypte.

Or, l'activité politique et la propagande qu'il a faites et qu'il ne cesse de faire pour arriver au trône de Syrie sont loin de s'accorder avec les assurances qu'il a données et qui ont été le mobile qui a dicté l'accord intervenu avec lui. Ajoutez à cela que, suivant cet accord, l'Ex-Khedive renonçait non seulement à toutes prétentions au trône d'Egypte, mais acceptait et reconnaissait toutes les lois égyptiennes ainsi que la Constitution actuelle, laquelle lui interdit formellement l'accès de l'Egypte.

On ne saurait vraiment concilier cette restriction, consacrée définitivement et irrévocablement par la Constitution, avec les rapports qui fatalement doivent se nouer avec le Chef d'un Etat voisin, Etat dont les relations intimes avec

l'Égypte sont telles que celles que nous avons indiquées. Son Altesse l'Ex-Khédive doit si bien la comprendre que, pour entreprendre les démarches qu'il a faites, il a évité de consulter au préalable, soit le Chef de la Famille royale, soit le Gouvernement égyptien.

Non seulement Son Altesse l'Ex-Khédive ne s'est pas conformé à ce devoir de courtoisie élémentaire—je dirai même de droit strict—mais il a cherché à travailler dans l'ombre en donnant des démentis à la presse pendant qu'en même temps, il continuait son activité politique et ce malgré l'avertissement qui lui a été envoyé par son Excellence le Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Égypte et malgré la promesse formelle que Son Altesse fit parvenir à son Excellence le Président de mettre un terme à toute activité politique.

Est-il besoin d'ajouter (et ceci est de nature à être particulièrement compris et apprécié par le nouveau régime turc) que la présence à proximité de l'Égypte d'un ancien Souverain et prétendant, qui y conserve encore des attaches et des intérêts, ne peut qu'ouvrir la porte à des menées et à des intrigues que rendra d'autant plus aisées la haute situation et l'influence d'un Chef d'État effectif dont les ambitions sont connues? Nous nous en remettons à cet égard à la loyauté traditionnelle du Gouvernement turc, certain qu'elle l'inspirera dans une attitude qui sera une réponse toute naturelle à notre propre loyauté et aux intérêts évidents de l'Égypte.

[E 904/171/89]

No. 120.

Consul Monck-Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, January 22, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61, Confidential, of the 24th December last on the subject of the Syrian elections of the first degree at Aleppo (alluded to by error as the secondary elections), I have the honour to report that the action of the French authorities can hardly be said to reflect credit upon the integrity of their methods or upon their reputation for sang-froid.

2. Protests made by the Nationalists were many, and took the form of gatherings in front of the houses of the Syrian Governor, the moderate Subhi Bey Barakat, and one or two other "traitors" to the Nationalist cause. A demonstration made by Moslem women was dispersed by cold water from the hose pipes of the town fire-engine, and a similar demonstration made by a mixed crowd in front of Subhi Bey Barakat's house was fired on by a nervous constabulary before it had shown any intention of resorting to violence, one or two demonstrators and a Syrian gendarme being killed and a few people injured. According to information which I have received from a reliable source, much of the formal protest registered was the work of agitators, and not of the leaders of the Nationalist party at all. The latter, indeed, exhorted the people to remain quiet, and a humorous episode of the campaign occurred when a printed sheet circulated by Ibrahim Hanano counselling moderation was seized by the French authorities and copied for further distribution.

3. Since the disturbances of Christmas Day the defence of the public has not been left to the Syrian police and gendarmerie, but entrusted to the military. Rumours of an invasion of the town by Sheikh Mudjhem of the Anazé tribe moved large numbers of the more ignorant Moslem population to remove merchandise from their shops to their homes, but, in general, enlightened opinion has been reassured by the display of military force. The elections in the second degree took place on the 3rd January, and the results were a foregone conclusion. Voters were protected by a strong military force, with artillery and tanks.

4. The Nationalists are of course extremely bitter against the Moderates, who have "won" the game, and it is felt that the prestige of the mandate has suffered by the refusal of the authorities to show the voting urns open before balloting took place, as well as by the methods of intimidation subsequently employed. The elected members are execrated by the mass of the population, and I hear that Subhi Bey Barakat will risk his life in going to Damascus.

5. The attitude towards the election campaign of the French authorities and the civilian French element may be judged by the remark of the assistant

delegate that "the Syrians are like naughty children, they have to be punished," and by the description by a prominent and intellectual French lady, of the former delegate at Damascus, as a person who was not a good administrator—"he managed such and such elections very badly, the Nationalists got in." In sharp contrast to this mentality was the criticism of M. Chauvet, of the French diplomatic career, on a visit to Aleppo, who had nothing but contempt for the methods employed and the officials who employed them. It is characteristic, however, of the prejudices of his nation that he compared the defects of the French mandate, not with the British mandate in Iraq and Palestine, but with the awful possibility of an Italian mandate.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Beirut (No. 4) and to Damascus (No. 1).

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 892/892/89]

No. 121.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 26.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 11, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that a census of the population of the Lebanon was taken on Sunday, the 31st January. It was the original intention of the authorities that the inhabitants should be kept indoors for a period of twenty-four hours beginning at midnight on the Saturday, but, eventually, circulation up to 6 o'clock on the Sunday morning was allowed in the case of those wishing to go to church. Despite gloomy forebodings as to what would happen, the people took their enforced imprisonment quite well, and the police, on their part, behaved with much greater tact than could have been expected.

2. The last census was held in 1922 (see my despatch No. 34 of the 13th March, 1922), so that it seems perfectly normal that, after a period of ten years, a new one should be taken. The general opinion is, however, that the decision of the authorities to hold the census was due rather to considerations of a political nature. The theory widely held was that Sheikh Mohamed-el-Jisr, the President of the Chamber and a very influential person, covets the Presidency of the Republic, which will in a few months become vacant on the retirement of M. Charles Debbas. He wished to prove by the census that the Moslem element is, if not predominant, at any rate so nearly equal in size to the Christians that the selection of a Moslem President would be justifiable. It seems most doubtful whether such an appointment could be made without causing a great outcry on the part of the Maronites and other Christians. Further, the sheikh has been heard to declare quite definitely, and with every appearance of sincerity, that he in no way desires the office of President of the Republic. However this may be, it is a fact that all sections of the population did their best to register in as large numbers as possible. This is in itself striking, as, usually in countries such as this, a census is unpopular and is regarded with suspicion. Religious heads urged the members of their communities to register in full strength, and the advice was followed. Moslem officials were credited with the wish to diminish the number of Christians. In one predominantly Christian quarter of Beirut the Moslem "mukhtar" did actually "forget" to distribute to Christians 420 census forms, representing roughly 2,000 persons. The omission was discovered and rectified by the Christian "mukhtar." The "Belagh," a Moslem newspaper, went so far as to express the opinion that Druses are really Moslems and should be registered as such.

3. When the official figures are issued, I will report them. It is suggested in the press that the population of Beirut is now about 180,000. One paper gives the figures as being: Moslems and Druses, 69,243; Christians (all rites), 89,700; and foreigners, 20,000.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[7797]

M 2

[E 807/15/89]

No. 122

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 27, 1932.

IN paragraph 3 of Foreign Office letter of the 30th January, relative to the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria, it was stated that, in addition to the memorandum on the interpretation of article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, enclosed in that letter, a further memorandum, containing certain proposals for the revision of the frontier as defined in the convention of 1920, was under preparation and would be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

2. I am now directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, for the information of the Council, the further memorandum in question (together with eight copies of the six maps mentioned therein). The Council will no doubt wish to refer it, for examination, as was suggested in the case of the memorandum enclosed in the letter from the Foreign Office of the 30th January, to the commission contemplated in section 2 of the Council's resolution of the 9th December last.

I am, &c.

C. W. BAXTER.

Memorandum containing Proposals for a Revised Frontier between Iraq and Syria.

IT is obvious that the definition of a frontier 400 miles long in five or six lines of print, and with reference to a map avowedly little more than a sketch map, can only be taken as a general indication of the intentions of the framers of the Franco-British Convention of 1920. Even the application of the frontier described from the map used to the ground is likely to present serious problems beyond the competence of an ordinary demarcation commission, and in any case substantial modifications would have to be made in any line on the ground ultimately resulting from the application, unless a totally unworkable frontier were to be imposed on the two States concerned.

2. Attached to this memorandum are the following maps with, drawn in red, a line which, it is considered, would make a satisfactory and workable boundary:—

- (1) Iraq Survey Directorate, 137, 1:126,720. K/SW and L/NW. 1927.
- (2) Bureau topographique des Troupes françaises du Levant: 200,000. Beled Sinjar, 1930.
- (3) Bureau topographique des Troupes françaises du Levant: 200,000. Bouara, 1930.
- (4) Bureau topographique des Troupes françaises du Levant: 200,000. Abou Kemal, 1930.
- (5) Iraq Survey Directorate, 1: 31,680. Country between Al Qaim and Abu Kemal.
- (6) Asia, 1: 1,000,000. Damascus, 1918.

3. The description of the line drawn on the map is as follows:—

First Sector (Reference Map No. 1).

From the starting-point of the frontier between Iraq and Turkey in the valley line of the River Tigris opposite the mouth of the Eastern Khabur the boundary follows the said valley line downstream to the mouth of the Wadi Suffan. The boundary ascends the median line of the Suffan to a point north-east of height 1837 on the map on the crest of the Qara Choq range; it then runs south-west to the said point 1837. From this point the boundary descends the Wadi to the mound of Gir Ziyara and runs thence in a straight line to Tell Jamal (so as to leave the water-holes known as Manba-al-Ma, near Tell Dugirkat,

to Iraq); thence a straight line to Tuwaiba. From Tuwaiba the boundary follows the line of mounds Tell Girhauk, Tell Ali Agha to Tell Sulaiman Sari, where it joins the Wadi Rumaila. The boundary then follows the said Wadi Rumaila to the point where it turns west near Tell Dalsha.

Second Sector (Reference Map No. 2).

4. The line then runs almost due west, passing to the north of Tell Aida and Tell Agha (Tell Ughla) through the complex of depressions to Tell Safra; the line to be eventually demarcated in such a way as to give to the shepherds of the Sinjar villages reasonable access to water. From Tell Safra the line passes to the north of Khatouniye towards El Hol, but rounds the end of the Jebal Juriba to the point marked Kseibe in such a way as to leave to Iraq the agricultural lands of Khatouniye and to Syria those of El Hol.

Third Sector (Reference Maps Nos. 2, 3 and 4).

5. From the point marked Kseibe the boundary follows the Wadi Kseibe southwards and passes southwards through Tell Sfouk to Garat Motteb so as to leave the Wadi Sihil to Iraq and the Wadi Um Ghoreiba to Syria. The boundary then follows the line of the road through Jebal Tchabt, Gaaban, Haddadj, Ragassat, Tell Ragassat, Tell Bargouth, Tlet Biar to triangulation point 204; thence a straight line to Baghouz (Baghuz).

Fourth Sector (Reference Map No. 5).

6. From Baghouz the boundary runs south-west towards the north-eastern extremity of the island Hawijat Baghouz and then follows the valley line of the Euphrates upstream, leaving the whole of the said island to Syria, as far as the boundary between the Hari and Suwaiya lands; here the frontier leaves the river and follows the said boundary to the desert; the boundary then runs by the shortest alignment to a point about 3 miles from Abu Kemal on the straight line from Abu Kemal to Imtan.

Fifth Sector (Reference Map No. 6).

7. From this point the boundary follows the said straight line until it strikes the frontier between Iraq and Transjordan.

8. The above proposals for the boundary are based, firstly, on the Franco-British Convention of 1920, secondly, on the actual topography of the region traversed by the frontier in the light of the latest surveys, thirdly, on considerations of tribal needs and administrative convenience, fourthly, on economic conditions and, fifthly, on considerations of defence.

In estimating administrative convenience and tribal needs, the following principles have been observed as far as possible:—

- (a) Settled villages should have secured to them their fields, grazing grounds and essential watering places.
- (b) Nomadic shepherds of limited range of migration should similarly have secured to them, where possible, their grazing grounds and water.
- (c) No frontier can be drawn which need not be crossed by the Bedouin and similar tribes of wide range of migration; nevertheless, the fewer the sections that have to cross the frontier the better the frontier is.

9. For purposes of the following discussion, the frontier is divided into five sectors as follows:—

- (1) Tigris to Tell Dalsha.
- (2) Tell Dalsha to Qusaiba (Kseibe).
- (3) Qusaiba (Kseibe) to Baghouz (Baghuz).
- (4) The Euphrates at Abu Kemal.
- (5) The Syrian desert.

[7797]

Some account will first be given of the populations affected. This will be followed by a statement of the reasons for the precise alignment suggested.

First Sector (Reference Map No. 1).

(a) The Population Affected.

10. The area enclosed on the east by the Tigris and on the north and west by the proposed boundary may be conveniently referred to as the Zummar area. The population affected comprises the following tribes, partly settled and partly nomadic: Gergeriya, Juhaish, Sherabiyin, Hasnan, Miran, Shammar.

11. The Gergeriya Arabised Kurds number 250-300 houses, and have villages at Al Qusair, Hugna, Kahraiz, Ain Hazwa, Mafri, Tel Mus, and Girfirh in the Tel Afar Qadha. In winter and spring they graze their flocks about the Mosul-Nisibin road, and in summer near their villages.

12. The Juhaish Arabs number about 450 houses. They have villages and a little cultivation in the Tel Afar Qadha at Bogha, south of Awainat, on the Mosul-Nisibin road, and at Gir Shebek, at the east end of the Jebal Sinjar. They are, however, principally shepherds, and 80 per cent. of their sheep belong to owners in Mosul city. In winter and spring they camp along the line of the Mosul-Nisibin road, from Awainat to Chilparat, back to the Jebal Sinjar or south of Tel Afar, according to the grazing. In summer, they camp on the Wadis Suwaidiya and Arur, on the Qara Choq, and sometimes go over to the Suffan.

13. Of the Sherabiyin Arabs, three sections, numbering about 140 houses, are always in Iraq. The Al-Bu Salih (sixty houses) spend winter and spring in the Suwaidiya region; in summer they move towards Kaili Jali, do not themselves cross the Qara Choq watershed, but sometimes send their buffaloes down to Sheker Khaj. The Al-Bu Khaushi and Al-Bu Majid range both sides of the Tigris in the area under discussion, and in Zakho, and as far east as Dohuk. The Al Taha (150 houses) are generally found astride the Wadis Rumailan and Demir Qapu and Rumaila, that is to say, astride the proposed frontier. A fifth section, Al-Bu Muhammad, is always in Syria, away from the frontier region, and a seventh, Al Tufaihiyin, follows the Tai (*q.v.* paragraph 23).

14. The Hasnan Kurds live in the villages of Tel Abu Dhahir, Shaiki, Saiqubba, Muhammad-Ba-Rabban on the Tigris, and number about 400 houses. They have now no contact with the Hasnan of Jazira. They graze in the Zummar country west of their villages, and in spring go up as far as Kail-i-Jali. They do not normally cross to the north of the watershed, though they have done so when the grazing has been good and the Sheker Khaj region empty.

15. The Miran Kurds number about 550 tents and are divided into eight sections, of which two, Musarash Alian and Musarash Chelian, are not true Miran. Before the war they spent the summer in what is now Turkey, and the winter in the area north and south of the Mosul-Nisibin road, as far west as Rumailan. They also, of course, camped for a time during their northward and southward migration in what is now Syria. Their chiefs acquired much property in the neighbourhood of Jazira-ibn-Omar, in what is now both Turkish and Syrian territory. Now that nomads are excluded from Turkey they spend most of their time in Iraq, and cultivate a little at Ras-as-Suwaidiya and Khanzir. They frequently cross the watershed to the Suffan region.


16. The Hajjan Kurds are mostly to be found on the east of the Tigris, but one section spends the spring in the Zummar area. Owing to the Turkish prohibition of the entry of nomads, and the consequent congestion in Zakho and Dohuk, the Hajjan tend to stay in Zummar even longer than formerly.

The villagers of Faish Khabur are accustomed to send their flocks across the river to graze on the Zummar Bank about Khanik.

17.—(a) The Shammar Bedouin Arabs are estimated to number about 5,000 tents, and are affected by the frontier almost throughout its length from the Tigris to the Euphrates, since any frontier between Iraq and Syria must cut across their traditional pastures. In view of the importance of this tribe, it will be necessary to discuss their history and divisions at some length.

(b) The Northern Shammar range over the Jazira, the Mesopotamia desert between the Tigris and the Euphrates, from about parallel 37° N. on the north to 34° N. on the south. In winter, some sections pass with their camels (but not their sheep) south of Bagdad to Diwaniya.

(c) The following tree shows the relationship of the principal personalities of the Jarba' shaikhly family:—



(d) In recent Turkish times the Shammar were divided into two main groups, the Shammar of Dair-az-Zor under Sheikh Faris, and those of Mosul under Sheikh Farhan. The grouping was liable to variation in different years owing to considerations of grazing, feuds, friction with Government and the like; but generally the Faddagha and Amud with the Ammar section of the Thabit were under Faris, while the Abda and Khurusa with the Najm section of the Thabit were under Farhan. A third section of the Thabit (Az Zar'a) divided its time between Iraq and Syria falling sometimes into one group and sometimes into another.

(e) The arrangement was carried on after the war by the two succession Governments; Mishal, son of Faris, was appointed by the Syrian Government chief of the Dair-az-Zor group, and Ajil, grandson of Farhan, was appointed by the Iraq Government chief of the Mosul group. The present *de facto* line, however, in the Rumailan-Khabur area runs rather east of the old rough tribal dividing line. While the Faddagha and Amud of Syria and Abda of Iraq need never (except, possibly, in an abnormal year) cross the frontier line, it cuts across the pastures of the Khurusa, who are generally found astride it. The Syrian Government has therefore appointed another scion of the house of Farhan, his great-grandson Diham. There is a growing tendency for the various sections of the Khurusa to stay definitely on one side or the other, though always in the vicinity, of the existing *de facto* boundary, and this tendency will no doubt become stronger when the frontier is fixed. A large proportion of the flocks with the Abda, Khurusa and Thabit belongs to Mosuli owners.

(f) The critical time for the Iraq Shammar, from the point of view of water, is, of course, the summer. In most years they camp in the Jazira south of the Jebal Sinjar; in years when the grazing there is inadequate they come north of the Jebal Sinjar into the Qara Choq-Rumailan area.

First Sector.

(b) Discussion of the Line Proposed.

18. The first sector provides several difficult problems of application. The boundary of the former vilayets is described in the Convention of 1920 as running from the Tigris "southwards as far as Rumailan Koeui." The map shows a provincial boundary as an almost straight line running south-west from a point opposite Faish Khabur to Rumailan Koeui. On the ground it will be found that a straight line from Faish Khabur to either of the two possible sites of Rumailan Koeui (the village no longer exists) runs east to west and not southwards. To correspond with the wording of the convention and run southwards to either possible site of Rumailan Koeui, the line would have to leave the Tigris at the point where the frontier between Turkey and Syria reaches it, and so cut off Syrian access to the Tigris.

19. A line following the crest of the Qara Choq between the Tigris and point 1837 would probably constitute the closest possible application to the ground of the line drawn on the 1916 map and the wording of the convention, but the peculiar strategic requirements described below justify the proposal to move the frontier about 3 miles northwards to the Wadi Suffan, which, except for the watershed of the Qara Choq, is the only salient topographical feature. The modification is further justified by considerations of tribal needs since on the Iraq side of the watershed the only water available in summer is in wells dug in the Wadis Suwaidiya, Khanzir, Arur, Rumailan and Rumaila and, as mentioned in paragraphs 12 and 13, Iraqi tribes need to drink from the Suffan. No Syrian tribe ever has occasion to cross the watershed or even has real need of the grazing between it and the Suffan; on the Syrian side water is plentiful everywhere.

The precise alignment of the frontier in the neighbourhood of the Tigris is of vital importance to Iraq from the strategical point of view. Particular attention is drawn to the observations of the Mosul Enquiry Commission at p. 74 of the report of the 16th July, 1925, to the Council of the League of Nations:—

“A Turkish army intending to invade Iraq would . . . necessarily find its concentration area in the region of Diarbekr, Bitlis and Mardin, near the railway, which now has its terminus at Nisibin. . . . The main road from Zakho through Mosul, Arbil and Kifri to Bagdad . . . already used by Xenophon and his 10,000 and by the armies of Alexander the Great, has in every age been employed for military operations in this country.”

Any invasion of Iraq from the north must follow the line of the Tigris valley, on either or both banks. The Wadi Suffan and the Qara Choq form on the west bank the pendant to the Eastern Khabur and the Zakho ridge on the east bank. The Qara Choq ridge borders the enclave of Syrian territory, conveniently referred to as the Bec du Canard, on the south. Militarily it would be of no use to Syria, for Syria would never have to repel an attack at this point of Iraq. In the event of an attack from the north Syria could never hold this salient, which is far from her bases across the desert. An advance from the north across the enclave would therefore be unobstructed. It follows that the defence of the line of the ridge is of great military importance to Iraq. If the ridge were undefended a force advancing from the north would have no difficulty in turning the strong Zakho-Faish Khabur position which the Iraqi army might be holding in force. The possession by Iraq of the Qara Choq, even if it were only lightly held, would prevent such a movement and would, moreover, bar the road to any force of irregulars that might attempt to work down the right bank causing disturbances towards Mosul. From it also Iraq might withstand a hostile advance along the Nisibin-Mosul road, either by means of irregulars based on it, or by means of regulars with a bridge of boats behind them at Faish Khabur. If the watershed were not in the possession of Iraq the position of the latter force would be untenable. The ridge is therefore extremely valuable to Iraq with regard to both the probable lines of advance from the direction of Nisibin on Mosul and Jazira-ibn-Omar on Zakho. And its value is purely defensive. The defence of the ridge would be greatly facilitated if the boundary, instead of following the present *de facto* line along the watershed, which admits of no depth in the position, were to be carried northward to the line of the Wadi Suffan.

20. The precise alignment from the point where the boundary leaves the watershed to Tell Dalsha is indicated largely by the water requirements of the Iraqi Shammar. In summer, when the Shammar are obliged to camp north of the Sinjar, sections which never leave Iraq must water at the holes in the Arur, and the Rumailan from Dugirkat downwards and the Rumaila. The Shammar sections which never leave Syria never have need of these wells, water being plentiful on the Syrian side. Elements of the Miran, Sharabiyyin and Khurusa (of Shammar) are the only tribesmen who will frequently cross the proposed line.

Second Sector (Reference Map No. 2).

(a) The Population Affected.

21. The area affected may conveniently be referred to as the Sinjar area.

22. The Jebal Sinjar on the north side from the village of Zirwana (Zirouana) on the east to Tell-al-Arus is inhabited exclusively by Yazidis, living

in forty villages with a total of 1,500 houses. On the south side the population is more mixed. Of sixty villages forty are predominately Yazidi. The different elements are estimated as follows: Yazidis 1,550 houses, Kurds (many converted Yazidis) 650 houses, Arabs 850 houses, Turcomans 240 houses. The most westerly tribe of the Yazidis is the Sammoqa, who occupy the villages of Kaila Mando, Jafariya, Bir Shirin, Bara, Kora Samoka on the north side, and Juriba on the south side. The Sammoqa live in tents for three-quarters of the year and camp in the Juriba, the name of the low western tail of the Jebal Sinjar. The grazing grounds of the Yazidis on the north side extend from the mountain to the depressions of the Radd, where they water at certain seasons of the year. On the south side at the western end the grazing is shared by the Sammoqa and Qiran tribes of the Yazidis, whose western limit is approximately a line from Tell-al-Arus to Badi'al Fauqani.

23. The Tai are a Syrian tribe of mixed cultivating and pastoral elements. The nomadic pastoral sections are Al Rashid and Jawwala, and some of them, numbering about 600 tents, require to come into Iraq for about three months in the winter, when the Wadis of the Khabur are boggy. They enter the area on the north side of the mountain about as far east as Gubbal, though they have been known to mingle with the Juhaish far to the east. Their relations with the Yazidis are on the whole good. They sometimes camp in the Juriba area with the permission of, and by special arrangement with, the Sammoqa.

24. The Jubur of Syria are 90 per cent. cultivators on the Khabur; and the shepherds come out to the Wadi Gusaiba and occasionally cross the proposed line as far as the Wadi Um Adh Dhiban.

Second Sector.

(b) Discussions of the Line.

25. The Jebal Sinjar may be described as a closely-inhabited peninsula in a sea of desert. The area has never, in the whole course of its history, been divided between two administrations. The tribal cohesion and homogeneity of the Yazidis, who form the majority of the population, are even greater than those of ordinary tribesmen, owing to their racial and linguistic difference from the surrounding Arabs and, in particular, to their peculiar religion, which has kept them apart from their Muslim neighbours. The large flocks of all sections mingle at pasture. This homogeneity was emphasised by the Mosul Enquiry Commission in its report of the 16th July, 1925, to the Council of the League of Nations in the following passage (p. 49 of the report):—

“They (the Yazidis) undoubtedly form an entirely distinct element of the population; they are a united organism and they are of some importance in regard to the question under consideration, because they form a compact body and are almost the only settled population in the western desert.”

Any attempt to divide what nature has so clearly designed, and man has hitherto preserved, as a unity could only cause the gravest administrative and economic dislocation. The difficulties that would arise in connexion with nationality, passports and customs are self-evident. The difficulties that would be caused to the police of both sides in dealing with offenders who could easily slip across the frontier in a hundred places are equally obvious. Politically, there would be continual attempts to play off one Government against the other, and malcontents from the territory of one State would inevitably seek refuge in the adjacent territory of the other. Any division of the Sinjar would, moreover, be a direct contravention of the most elementary principles which have been accepted in connexion with redistributions of territory which have taken place since the Great War.

26. The Jebal Sinjar has already been likened to a peninsula. It is connected with Mosul by a chain of villages and separated from Syria by miles of desert. Its associations, historical, religious, social and commercial, are with Mosul and not with Dair-az-Zor.

The 1:1,000,000 Asia map of 1916 shows the Mosul Vilayet boundary as dividing the Jebal Sinjar in two. This was, in fact, incorrect. Other maps, such as that in Cuinet's authoritative French work “*Turquie-en-Asie*,” and the index map to the German 1:4,000,000 sheets of 1918, show the whole of the Jebal Sinjar correctly in the Mosul Vilayet. The actual facts are that up to 1870, *i.e.*, twenty

years after Mosul had been reduced to the status of a mutessariflik, the Jebal Sinjar had always been administered from Mosul. From that year the Jebal Sinjar with Tel Afar, was transferred to Dair-ez-Zor. The experiment was not a success, and it was retransferred to Mosul in 1879, when Mosul became a vilayet, and has remained under Mosul ever since.

The only other compact group of Yazidi villages is in the Sheikhan Qadha north of Mosul; not only does the spiritual head of the community (the custodian of the sacred emblems of the religion and the trustee of the alms of the votaries) live in Sheikhan, but the qadha contains the shrine of Sheikh Adi, the founder of the religion, an obligatory place of pilgrimage. The separation of any part of the Sinjar group by an international frontier would involve a serious interference with the religious life of the community.

27. The frontier line proposed has been drawn in such a manner as to secure to the inhabitants of the Sinjar qadha their camping and grazing grounds and requisite water, as described in paragraph 22. To draw the line south of the Radd depression would be of no advantage to Syria, which has water in plenty, but would deprive the Yazidis of access to water from the northern part of their grazing grounds. Iraqi control of these grazing grounds is essential for the protection of the Yazidis and other villagers of the Sinjar, from the raids and thefts by their predatory nomadic and semi-nomadic neighbours. The pastoral element of the Tai and, perhaps, the Jubur would have to cross the frontier for two or three months a year; this is unavoidable, but would cause little difficulty. Their interests in the area are, in any case, negligible as compared with those of the compact villagers of the Sinjar. From the topographical point of view there is little to be said. With the possible exception of the Radd depression there is no marked feature for the boundary to follow: the Demarcation Commission will doubtless find convenient low *tels* for its line of pillars.

28. The economic relations of the Sinjar Qadha are precisely what would be expected from its geographical situation. The trade of the Sinjar with Syria is almost negligible, as is shown by the figures of import and export duties collected in 1930 and 1931. These figures were as follows: 1930, import duties, rupees 1,713, export duties, rupees 121; 1931, import duties, rupees 1,354, export duties, rupees 957. The smallness of these figures cannot be attributed to the existence of a customs frontier between Iraq and Syria, since there has been no appreciable change in the economic orientation of the Sinjar Qadha since Turkish times. Eighty miles to the east of Balad Sinjar and connected with it by a closely-populated line of country is the great commercial and consuming centre of Mosul with a population of 80,000. On the Syrian side, separated by desert, the nearest town of any size is Dair-ez-Zor, which is 120 miles distant and cannot compare in population or commercial importance with Mosul. Aleppo is over 250 miles away.

The principal products of the Sinjar Qadha not consumed locally are figs, wool, skins and a low grade of cotton. The market for these is and always has been Mosul; before the war even wool destined for Europe was brought to Mosul to be cleaned and prepared for export. For reasons of distance Mosul is obviously the only possible outside market for fresh figs and other fruits. It has already been mentioned that a large proportion of the flocks of the Iraqi Shammar, who camp in the desert area north and south of the Jebal Sinjar, belong to Mosuli owners (see paragraphs 17 (e) and (f) above). Further evidence of the close social and economic ties between the Sinjar and Mosul is furnished by the Tapu registers, which show between 100 and 150 properties registered in the names of Mosuli owners, whereas search has failed to trace a single property registered in the name of an owner resident in Syria.

29. Moreover, the Jebal Sinjar has a definite military value for Iraq for several reasons:—

- (1) The roads to Mosul from Aleppo and Damascus unite at Dair-ez-Zor and continue as a single road which impinges on the Jebal. Here the traveller or raider obtains his first water after passing the Khabur. In possession of this water and in ground strong for defence, quite a small force on the Jebal would prevent the incursions of any raiding parties towards Mosul.
- (2) A force holding the hill could threaten from a flank a hostile advance from Nisibin on Mosul.

A homogeneous body of irregulars organised from the Yazidi inhabitants of the Jebal, would suffice for both these tasks. No regular military or police force would be needed.

Perhaps the main military argument for the allotment of the feature to Iraq is that the latter can only use it defensively; for any offensive use is barred by a complete absence of objective. Westwards lies a wide expanse of desert. On the other hand, though there might be no expressed aggressive intention, the occupation of a part of the hill by Syria would facilitate an offensive movement from the west, for it would furnish a strong *tête de pont* to the desert route, behind which raiding parties might assemble.

30. To sum up, the Jebal Sinjar with its inhabitants forms a racial, religious and economic unit, all of whose connexions lie eastward. To drive a boundary through the middle of such a unit would necessarily cause intense friction, and the inhabitants of the Mosul area would never feel happy if a portion of this dominating feature were in hands other than their own. It is considered, therefore, that in the general interests of peace the Jebal Sinjar, together with the camping and grazing grounds and requisite water, to which reference is made in the first sentence of paragraph 27 above, should be included in Iraq.

Third Sector (Reference Maps Nos. 2, 3 and 4).

31. This sector may be conveniently referred to as the Jazira sector.

(a) The Population Affected.

32. The only tribe affected is the Shammar, which has been fully described in paragraph 17 above.

(b) Discussion of the Line.

33. In drawing this section of the line the object aimed at has been to find a boundary which, while following convenient natural features, need be crossed by as few sections of the Shammar as possible in those summers when they camp on the south side of the Jebal Sinjar. The straight line from Qusaiba (Kseibe) to Garat as Zarga is purely tentative, since, in the absence of all topographical information, it is not possible either to look for a good natural line or determine the position of the grazing grounds of the different sections. Below, the intention has been to leave the Wadis Malha and Sihil with their uglas (depressions containing wells) to Iraq and the Wadis Um Ghuraiba and Um Ghuruba with their uglas used by the Faddagha and Amud to Syria. In some years tribes normally in Iraq used the Rodha, but the ridge between Rodha and Buwara offers an excellent line from the topographical point of view.

Fourth Sector (Reference Map No. 5).

34. This sector may be referred to conveniently as the Euphrates sector.

(a) The Population Affected.

35. The Agaidat is a tribe of cultivators settled on both banks of the Euphrates upstream and downstream of Abu Kemal. Downstream of Abu Kemal the limits of the Agaidat are on the left bank, the Marasimah land opposite Hawijat Baghouz, and on the right bank the Suwaiyah lands immediately upstream of Al Heri lands. (The Agaidat have acquired seven or eight water lifts in the Heri estate among those belonging to the Jughafa and Al Bu Mahal sections of the Dulaim.) The Agaidat shepherds graze in the desert on either side of the river more or less opposite their cultivation and some elements move east in the Jazira as far as 30 miles east of the proposed frontier for a short period each winter.

36. The Dulaim is a homogeneous tribe, comprising both cultivators and camel owners, settled on both banks of the Euphrates from Falluja to the proposed frontier and gives its name to the whole Liwa. The pastoral elements of the Jughafa section graze in the Jazira from east of Hit to the Jebal Sinjar. The pastoral elements of the Al Bu Mahal section graze in the desert on both the

Jazira and Shamiya sides and periodically penetrate for short periods to the area Akash, Djubb, Dukhena on the Syrian side of the frontier in the Shamiya sector (see below).

(b) *Discussion of the Line.*

37. The proposed line has been drawn to correspond with the tribal limits of the Agaidat to the west and the Dulaim to the east. Since the wood supply of the town of Abu Kemal is understood to be largely obtained from the island of Hawijat Baghouz, it has been considered preferable to leave it all to Syria, rather than to bisect it. On the right bank it is intended that the boundary shall correspond with the boundaries of the riverain estates of Suwaiyah of the Agaidat and Heri of the Dulaim. As explained in the note on the population, the pastoral elements of both sides would require to cross the frontier on occasion. The modification now suggested, whereby the town of Abu Kemal and the Agaidat estates downstream of it would be ceded to Syria, is, of course, put forward on the assumption that the proposed frontier as a whole is accepted.

Fifth Sector (Reference Map No. 6).

38. This sector may be conveniently referred to as the Shamiya sector.

(a) *The Population Affected.*

39. Apart from the pastoral elements of the riverain tribes already discussed under the fourth sector, the tribe affected is the purely Bedouin Aniza, of which the Amarat section is Iraqi and the Fid'an, Sha and Ruwalla are Syrian. The *diras* (grazing grounds) of these sections overlap, but, broadly speaking, the Sba and Fid'an camps are found on the northern flank and the Ruwalla on the western flank of the Amarat. The southern half of the Amarat *dira*, the Wadi Ubaiyidh area, contains shrubs (an important item in the camel's diet) and grazing, but no permanent water; the northern half, Wadi-al-Miya, Djubb, Dukhaina to the Bishri, contains ample water but no shrubs. The Sba and the Fid'an at times accompany the Amarat in winter as far south as Judaidat-al-Arar on the Iraq-Nejd frontier, while the Ruwalla penetrate even further south into Nejd. In summer the Amarat follow the Sba up into Syria. The market towns of the Amarat are Hit, Ramadi, Falluja, Kerbala and Najaf, while the principal market town of the Sba is Aleppo, of the Fid'an Dair-ez-zor and of the Ruwalla Damascus.

(b) *Discussion of the Line.*

40. This sector runs throughout its length through high desert, the *dira* of nomadic Bedouin. Although the straight line from Abu Kemal to Imtan up to the Transjordan frontier, which it may for the present purpose be considered to meet at Jebel Tenf, gives Syria a great advantage in the matter of water, yet in view of the purely nomadic character of the population affected it is not suggested that any substantial modification of the straight line should be made. When the survey of the frontier area at present being carried out is completed it should be possible to suggest a line of natural features which the boundary should follow. A reasonable amount of deviation from the straight line on one side or the other may be desirable, and tribal rights to water at various seasons of the year will need definition.

[E 1046/171/89]

No. 123.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 11, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 4th January, I have the honour to transmit a summary report on political events since that date.

2. The military dispositions reported in paragraph 2 of my despatch under reference were not relaxed till about a fortnight later, in consequence of a strike

of students and schoolchildren, declared on the 10th January in protest against the imprisonment of a number of secondary schoolboys for participation in the disturbances of the 20th December. The strike lasted till the 26th January, when it was settled by the Educational Adviser to the High Commissioner, who persuaded the truants to return to their desks. He gave the impression that there would be no reprisals, but a number of ringleaders, mostly under eighteen years of age, have now been sentenced to several weeks of imprisonment.

3. Strong pickets of Senegalese with steel helmets were posted at strategic points to provide against demonstrations.

4. The question of minorities has been the occasion of much ink-spilling during the period under review. The action of His Majesty's Government in recommending the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations aroused violent protestations in the local French press and in particular the Beirut "Orient," which published an appeal to the Syrian Christian and Jewish voters to ensure the election of a Government which would protect them from the fate of the minorities in Iraq, which His Majesty's Government was abandoning to massacre.

5. It has always been the policy of the mandatory Power to stress any differences between Moslems and Christians in Syria, and the Nationalist party have consequently striven to assert the complete union of all religious communities in the ties of patriotism. In the heated discussions that broke out in the press a sharp divergence of opinion became evident in the front ranks of the Nationalists, voiced by the editor of the "Qabas" and the Christian leader, Faiz-el-Khoury. As soon, however, as they perceived that they were playing into the hands of their adversaries they hastened to heal the breach.

6. No date has yet been announced for the elections to be held at Damascus, Hama, Daraya and Douma, nor has the Nationalist party decided whether or not to present candidates. Although it is probable that the Nationalists would secure the whole of the seats if the elections are free, these would only amount to twenty-two in a Chamber of sixty-eight members. Councils are divided as to whether it is better to be an articulate but impotent Opposition or to boycott the elections altogether.

7. M. Ponsot's excursion into activity has been unfortunately conducted. During my stay in Paris last year I gathered that the Quai d'Orsay was as anxious to settle the Syrian question as M. Ponsot to obtain a more comfortable Embassy, and that they were in agreement that a Syrian Chamber should be elected to conclude a treaty that would enable France to look forward to withdrawal from the State of Syria and a corresponding reduction in the unpopular expenditure entailed by that portion of the mandate. This project coincided very closely with the desires of the politically-minded circles of Syria and even with those of the Nationalist party, whose views had been profoundly modified in the course of the last few years.

8. Unfortunately the High Commission is entirely out of touch with popular feeling and derives its information from a very narrow circle of politicians supplemented by an inefficient Service de Renseignements. Although it is most improbable that a freely-elected Chamber would have offered any serious opposition to M. Ponsot's proposals, it would seem that a natural preference to work with a declared pro-French Ministry added to the interested assurances of the present Ministers distorted M. Ponsot's view of the position. Even if the Nationalists had obtained a working majority in the Chamber, their powers to harm the mandatory Government would not have been increased; at the worst, the High Commissioner could have again prorogued the Assembly and pointed out with reason to the League of Nations that the country was not ripe for self-government. At the best, a satisfactory treaty could have been concluded. Above all, the Nationalists themselves would have been subjected to the crucible test of office, which might have welded them into a useful Government or in the contrary event achieved their disintegration. In any case, it would have put an end to their self-assertion as the only pure and incorruptible party.

9. Any of these results would be more acceptable to France than a continuance of the present stalemate. An arrangement concluded with the Assembly without the participation of the Nationalists runs the risk of repudiation if ever that party comes into power. If the treaty is on the lines of our treaty with Iraq, the risk is evidently small; but if it contains clauses, financial or other, which would justify the evident desire of the High Commission to deal with a Francophile Government, the danger is by no means negligible.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 1302/15/89]

No. 124.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

Mandats: Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 14.)

Note du Secrétaire général.

(C.317.1932.VI.)

Genève, le 7 mars 1932.

A LA demande de la délégation française à Genève, le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil une lettre de cette délégation en date du 29 février 1932, transmettant certains documents relatifs à la question du tracé de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak qui a fait l'objet de la résolution du Conseil du 9 décembre 1931.

Lettre de la Délégation française.

Genève, le 29 février 1932.

Au Directeur de la Section des Mandats,
J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer sous ce pli, à l'intention de la Commission syro-irakienne :

1. Trois exemplaires d'un mémoire descriptif de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak qui a été établi par les soins du Haut-Commissariat à Beyrouth; (1)
2. Un dossier contenant neuf cartes (2) auxquelles se réfère ledit mémoire.

En raison de leur volume, les cartes n'ont pu être envoyées qu'en un seul exemplaire. Le Haut-Commissariat français remettra deux collections supplémentaires au Colonel de Reynier et à ses collègues dès leur arrivée à Beyrouth.

R. MASSIGLI.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Mémoire descriptif de la Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak.

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Notes du secrétariat :

(1) Ce document sera communiqué au Conseil ultérieurement.

(2) Un autre jeu des cartes sera incessamment fourni par le Gouvernement français et sera placé aux archives du secrétariat, où il pourra être consulté.

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INTRODUCTION.

LES Gouvernements français et britannique, par lettres des 10 et 11 novembre 1931, ont adressé au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations une requête commune tendant au règlement, par le Conseil de la Société des Nations sur la base de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920, de la question de frontière pendante entre la Syrie et l'Irak.

Faisant état des difficultés qui ont retardé la délimitation de cette frontière, dans les conditions prévues par la convention, la requête commune mentionne :

“ En second lieu, il fut constaté que quelle que pût être l'interprétation donnée à l'article 1^{er} de la convention (définition de la frontière), une frontière tracée en stricte conformité avec cette interprétation serait vraisemblablement peu satisfaisante dans certains secteurs pour des raisons militaires, politiques, administratives, de tribus, économiques, géographiques ou autres.”

Par résolution en date du 9 décembre 1931, le Conseil de la Société des Nations a décidé d'accepter en principe la requête des Gouvernements français et britannique et, conformément à la suggestion qui lui en était faite par ces deux Gouvernements, de constituer une commission “ pour recueillir sur le terrain toutes informations et tous éléments d'appréciation et pour formuler des suggestions de nature à aider le Conseil dans l'élaboration de sa décision sur cette question.”

Le présent mémoire, établi en fonction de la définition de la frontière donnée par la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920, constitue un exposé objectif des considérations de différents ordres mentionnées dans la requête commune.

Chapitre I.—CONSIDÉRATIONS D'ORDRE GÉOGRAPHIQUE.

(A) *Description générale* (voir carte No. 1).

Les territoires sur lesquels porte l'examen de la frontière syro-irakienne appartiennent à quatre grandes régions géographiques :

La vallée du Tigre,
La haute plaine de Mésopotamie ou Djezireh,
La vallée de l'Euphrate,
Le désert de Syrie.

(a) *Vallée du Tigre.*

Aux termes de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, la frontière syro-irakienne suit le cours du Tigre jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul.

Fleuve de régime alpin roulant un volume d'eau considérable le Tigre, à son débouché des montagnes du Kurdistan, creuse sa vallée à travers les seuils rocheux poussés par les contreforts méridionaux de ces montagnes, Elim Dag, Karatchok Dag, Mouchoran Dag à l'ouest, Chichirouk Dag, Djebel Bikhair, à l'est. Elargie par endroits, la vallée se resserre brusquement au passage de ces seuils, formant une série de cuvettes dont le fond, constitué par des terres alluviales, se prête au peuplement et à la culture.

Le lit du fleuve, sujet à des déplacements, est encombré de bancs de sable. Il se divise parfois en plusieurs bras, entre lesquels se trouvent des îles, dont quelques-unes sont cultivées.

La vallée du Tigre est habitée par des sédentaires groupés en villages et par des semi-sédentaires vivant sous la tente.

(b) *Haute-Mésopotamie ou Djezireh.*

Partie la plus septentrionale du plateau mésopotamien qui s'étend au pied des montagnes du Kurdistan, entre le Tigre et l'Euphrate, la Djezireh est traversée par la frontière selon une direction générale nord-nord-est-sud-sud-ouest qui, aux termes de la convention de 1920, quitte le Tigre à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul, suit cette limite jusqu'à Rumelan Keui et de là, laissant à la Syrie l'intégralité du bassin du Khabour occidental, se dirige en ligne droite vers l'Euphrate qu'elle franchit à Abou Kémal.

La région affectée par cette définition ne présente pas une unité géographique absolue. Elle se divise en un certain nombre de régions distinctes qui peuvent se classer comme suit :

Au nord, une zone mouvementée, marquée par les derniers contreforts des montagnes kurdes;

Au sud de cette zone, la haute plaine de Djezireh proprement dite, coupée par un pli montagneux transversal, le Djebel Sindjar.

Au nord du Djebel Sindjar, la plaine mésopotamienne est sillonnée par un grand nombre d'oueds provenant les uns des montagnes kurdes, les autres du Sindjar, et qui vont aboutir, soit au Khabour occidental, soit au Tigre.

Au sud du Sindjar, la plaine, médiocrement arrosée, offre un caractère désertique, et ne retient l'attention que par la présence d'un vaste sillon longitudinal formé par le cours fortement creusé d'un oued descendu du Sindjar, le Ouadi Adjij, et une dépression qui le prolonge : celle des salines de Bouara, Reggassat, Demim, Bargouth, Sadif, Melah et Tchaabi.

En raison de son caractère propre, chacune de ces régions est à étudier séparément.

1. *Région nord (de Rumelan Keui au Tigre) (voir carte No. 4).*

Rebord septentrional du plateau mésopotamien, les chaînes les plus méridionales du Kurdistan, Djebel Tour, Elim Dag, poussent en direction du sud et du sud-est, comme pour accompagner encore quelque temps le Tigre, avant de l'abandonner définitivement à la plaine, un certain nombre de ramifications dont les unes viennent mourir en ondulations plus ou moins marquées, tandis que les autres exhaussées par des convulsions volcaniques ultérieures forment de véritables massifs secondaires. Les ondulations s'avancent jusque vers Demir-Kapou, Roumelan Keui. Elles ont été, à une époque géologique récente, recouvertes de coulées basaltiques qui leur confèrent un aspect particulier; contribuant à distinguer cette région de celle qui lui succède vers le sud. La limite du basalte constitue approximativement la démarcation entre la zone dont il s'agit et la plaine mésopotamienne proprement dite.

Parmi les massifs secondaires poussés par la montagne en direction du Tigre, il convient de citer le Karatchok Dag et le Muchoran Dag.

Long d'environ 25 kilom. et large d'une dizaine, le *Karatchok Dag* domine de ses 813 mètres le relief environnant et notamment la plaine sud, située à

environ 500 mètres d'altitude et qu'il barre jusqu'à la vallée du Tigre, légèrement en aval de Feichkhabour.

De formation volcanique, le Karatchok Dag tient de ce fait un aspect tourmenté. Si son versant nord descend en pentes douces sur la zone vallonnée qui le précède dans cette direction, son versant sud tombe brusquement en escaliers rapides constitués par des masses successives de rochers. Le passage de l'un à l'autre versant ne s'opère que difficilement et en recourant à des sentiers muletiers. Géologiquement, il est constitué par du basalte alternant avec des calcaires et des gypses miocènes. Des nappes de basalte, déjections d'anciens volcans, se propagent jusqu'à plusieurs kilomètres de son pied.

Le *Muchoran Dag*, situé plus au sud, est un petit massif de formation analogue, mais sensiblement moins important.

L'ensemble de cette région est habité par des éléments sédentaires et semi-sédentaires se livrant à l'agriculture et à l'élevage et fréquenté à certaines époques de l'année par des éléments nomades.

2. *Plaine Nord du Sindjar (de Rumelan Keui au Sindjar).*

Comme il vient d'être indiqué, la plaine de Djezireh proprement dite commence là où se terminent les ramifications basaltiques des contreforts du Kurdistan.

Comprise entre deux montagnes relativement peu éloignées l'une de l'autre (environ 62 kilom. entre Rumelan Keui et Snouni, au bas des pentes nord du Sindjar), cette région forme en réalité une sorte de cuvette où viennent se rassembler les eaux de l'une et l'autre montagnes. La majeure partie de ces eaux, obéissant aux lois de la plus grande pente, s'orientent vers l'ouest, en un certain nombre d'oueds constituant le bassin supérieur du Khabour occidental.

Ces oueds sont :

(a) *Provenant des montagnes du Kurdistan et de ses contreforts :*

Le ouadi Ouairis (ou Aouarié—voir carte No. 4), qui descend du Karatchok Dag;

Le ouadi Roumelan, formé de plusieurs branches descendant les unes du Karatchok Dag, les autres du Lailak Dag;

Le ouadi Demir Kapou, qui descend du Djebel Tour;

Le ouadi Khnezir, qui descend du Djebel Tour;

Le ouadi Abbas, qui descend du Djebel Tour;

Le ouadi Djerrahi, qui descend du Djebel Tour;

Le ouadi Brebitch, qui descend du Djebel Tour;

(b) *Provenant du Sindjar :*

Le ouadi Zirouane, qui prend sa source près du village de Zirouane (voir carte No. 5), et plusieurs autres oueds non indiqués sur les cartes existant actuellement.

Tous ces cours d'eau, coulant soit du nord au sud, soit du sud au nord, sont drainés par un collecteur médian, le Radd, lui-même affluent du Jaghagh qui rejoint le Khabour à Hassetché.

En dehors de ce réseau hydrographique, si nettement caractérisé qu'il a retenu l'attention des négociateurs de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920, lesquels ont entendu spécifier qu'il resterait d'un même côté de la frontière, la région considérée est traversée par un certain nombre d'autres cours d'eau. Quelques-uns, de régime intermittent, se perdent dans les parties basses de la plaine. D'autres, ouadi el Meur, ouadi Soueidiyé, ouadi Bir Ibrahim Agha ou Aouenat, vont rejoindre le Tigre, au bassin duquel ils appartiennent. La ligne de partage des eaux entre les deux bassins, celui du Khabour occidental d'une part, celui du Tigre, d'autre part, forme une ligne naturelle dont le tracé exact peut être facilement déterminé.

Au point de vue géologique, la plaine comprise entre les monts du Kurdistan et leurs contreforts méridionaux et le Sindjar est constituée par une couche argileuse provenant de la désagrégation des calcaires et des basaltes et par des alluvions apportées par les cours d'eau. Sur le Radd se rencontrent des parties tourbeuses et gypseuses.

Abondamment arrosé, la bassin supérieur du Khabour se prête à la culture dans presque toute son étendue. Il n'est actuellement habité et cultivé que dans sa partie nord et sur les rives du Radd, à Tell Safra.

Le reste de la plaine considérée forme une zone de pâturage et n'est fréquentée que par des éléments nomades et semi-nomades.

3. *Djebel Sindjar* (voir carte No. 5).

Massif montagneux appartenant à un pli transversal barrant d'est en ouest le plateau mésopotamien entre le Khabour occidental et le Tigre, le Sindjar constitue une région nettement à part et qui tranche sur le relief environnant. Son point le plus élevé atteint 1,602 mètres (Kani Chaib) alors que l'altitude moyenne du plateau, de part et d'autre de ses pentes nord et sud, est d'environ 400 mètres (413 mètres à Tell Bach, 33 kilom. nord de Beled Sindjar, et 404 mètres à Tell-el-Nis, 16 kilom. sud de Beled Sindjar).

Mais s'il est ainsi clairement délimité vers le nord et vers le sud, le Sindjar proprement dit se distingue également avec netteté des mouvements appartenant au même pli et qui le prolongent soit vers l'ouest, soit vers l'est. Vers l'ouest, en particulier, le Djebel Djeribé forme un massif secondaire, d'une altitude sensiblement inférieure (942 mètres au point le plus élevé), et ayant son caractère propre. A l'est une série de collines en éventail, de faible altitude, n'ont avec lui de commun que l'origine.

Défini ainsi qu'il vient d'être dit, entre le col de Samoukha, qui le sépare du Djebel Djeribé, et le col de Zirouane, qui marque approximativement son extrémité orientale, le Djebel Sindjar compte une cinquantaine de kilomètres de longueur et une vingtaine de largeur dans sa partie centrale (méridien de Beled Sindjar). Cette masse montagneuse ne peut être aisément franchie qu'à ses extrémités.

Au point de vue géologique, le Djebel Sindjar est dû à une tension produite dans la plateforme arabe lors de la surrection des chaînes du Kurdistan et de l'Iran. De cette même tension procèdent les montagnes syriennes du Bichri et de l'Abd-ul-Aziz ainsi que la série des plis pétrolifères de Mésopotamie. Le Sindjar se rattache aux formations tertiaires. Schématiquement, il est constitué par un anticlinal évidé en partie et dont subsistent plusieurs rangs de strates qui émergent brusquement de la plaine. Son arête dorsale est constituée par les roches calcaires de l'éocène, tandis que sur ses pentes alternent, avec les précédents, des gypses du miocène et des marnes sénoniennes. La diversité de ces éléments, leur résistance plus ou moins grande aux érosions et aux contractions originelles se traduit par l'existence, de part et d'autre de l'arête centrale, de profondes vallées fortement découpées et séparées les unes des autres par d'importantes saillies rocheuses. Alors que le versant nord tombe abruptement sur la plaine, le versant sud offre une pente plus douce, interrompue par une ligne de bourrelets formant une chaîne secondaire, parallèle à la chaîne principale, le Taug. Entre les deux chaînes court une importante vallée longitudinale. Dans ces vallées et ravins se rencontrent un certain nombre de sources donnant naissance à des oueds qui vont se perdre dans la plaine. Ceux du versant nord, grossis par les pluies hivernales, rejoignent le Radd, affluent du Khabour. La présence de ces eaux, l'existence dans les replis du terrain ou au bas des pentes de couches fertiles, marneuses ou argileuses, permet la culture et favorise le peuplement humain. En fait, le Sindjar est habité par une population sédentaire, concentrée dans ses vallées ou installée au bas de ses pentes, les Yezidiés.

Le Djebel Djeribé, de formations calcaire et gypseuse, est un massif moins important, aux pentes rudes, corrodé et rongé par le vent et la pluie. Ses vallées, élevées et peu profondes, n'offrent que de rares points d'eau et, pour ainsi dire, aucune possibilité de culture. Elles ne se prêtent pas, comme dans le Sindjar, à l'habitat fixe. Seuls fréquentent le Djeribé des éléments nomades qui trouvent sur ses pentes quelques pâturages pour leurs troupeaux.

Au nord ouest et à l'ouest du Djebel Djeribé s'étend une région mouvementée, marquée par un contrefort du Djeribé, le Djebel Tchembé, une dépression occupée par un lac important, le lac de Khatounié, et la vallée marécageuse d'un oued, affluent du Khabour, le ouadi El Hol. Cette région appartient nettement au bassin du Khabour. Ses parties basses se prêtent à la culture. Deux villages sédentaires s'y rencontrent, Khatounié et El Hol, sur le lac et l'oued du même nom.

4. *Plaine sud du Sindjar* (du Sindjar à l'Euphrate).

Au pied des pentes sud du Sindjar s'étend la partie la plus aride du plateau mésopotamien. De caractère désertique, la région qui nous intéresse n'offrirait

aucune particularité remarquable, n'était la présence de l'important sillon nord-sud formé par le cours du ouadi Adjij, la dépression de Roda et les salines de Bouara, Regassat, Demim, Bargouth, Sadif et Tchaabi.

Ce sillon paraît dû à l'érosion des formations gypseuses, très perméables et solubles, du plateau par le ouadi Adjij. Celui-ci, actuellement en voie de résorption, drainait encore, à une époque relativement peu éloignée, les eaux du Sindjar et les portait jusqu'à l'Euphrate, qu'il devait rejoindre non loin d'El Kaim (25 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kémal). Aujourd'hui, il se perd dans la Roda, qui forme, avec les salines ci-dessus mentionnées, une dépression longue d'une centaine de kilomètres.

Le ouadi Adjij est le type des cours d'eau de profil désertique. De régime intermittent, il ne subsiste dans son lit, au printemps, que des flaques d'eau saumâtre. L'entaille qu'il a creusée dans le plateau mésopotamien atteint souvent plusieurs kilomètres de largeur. Ses bords sont constitués par des falaises déchiquetées.

A sec, en partie, pendant l'été, les salines forment en hiver de véritables lacs. La plus importante d'entre elles, Dourara, mesure environ 13 kilom. de longueur et 6 kilom. de largeur. Elle fournit un sel fin, peu chargé en chlorure de potassium, particulièrement apprécié des populations des vallées de l'Euphrate et du Khabour.

La région considérée, malgré la présence de ces salines et ses ressources en eau, n'est pas habitée de façon permanente. Elle est parcourue par des tribus nomades ou semi-nomades qui utilisent, pour leurs troupeaux, ses pâturages, assez abondants en hiver, et s'y ravitaillent en sel.

(c) *Vallée de l'Euphrate* (voir carte No. 6).

Creusée transversalement, d'abord de nord-ouest en sud-est, puis, à partir d'Abou Kémal, d'ouest en est, entre le plateau mésopotamien et le désert de Syrie, dont elle rompt brusquement la monotonie, la vallée de l'Euphrate s'élargit plus ou moins suivant que le fleuve a corrodé profondément ou légèrement les calcaires tendres ou durs qui en forment le rebord.

Immense déversoir à l'origine, l'Euphrate s'est résorbé peu à peu, et on retrouve souvent loin de ses rives actuelles les limites de ses lits successifs. Ces limites sont parfois marquées par des falaises verticales, hautes de 30 à 40 mètres au-dessus du fond de la vallée. Les étendues ainsi abandonnées progressivement par le fleuve forment des cuvettes dont quelques-unes atteignent une grande largeur et qui constituent des zones de peuplement et de cultures importantes. Le fleuve s'attarde en des méandres capricieux et ses eaux permettent une irrigation facile dont tirent parti les populations sédentaires et semi-sédentaires fixées sur ses rives. Il se divise parfois en plusieurs bras, entre lesquels sont comprises des îles. Quelques-unes, assez étendues, sont habitées et cultivées (en face d'Abou Kémal et à Baghouz, à 6 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kémal).

Les cultures cessent et toute trace d'habitat disparaît quand le fleuve, s'étant heurté à des couches résistantes, doit employer toute la force de son courant pour les vaincre. La vallée subit alors un étranglement et les berges du fleuve sont formées par des à-pics de plusieurs mètres de hauteur.

L'alternance de ces cuvettes et de ces étranglements, de ces parties peuplées et cultivées et de ces parties désertiques, donne à la vallée de l'Euphrate une physionomie particulière et, en la fractionnant en biefs distincts, fournit des démarcations naturelles entre les différents intérêts qui s'y sont établis.

(d) *Désert de Syrie*.

Immense plateau calcaire qui s'étend de l'Anti-Liban et de ses prolongements nord-est aux régions montagneuses du Nedjd (Arabie) et s'abaisse dans sa partie sud-est sur le golfe Persique, le désert de Syrie offre l'aspect, dans la partie qui nous intéresse, de vastes étendues légèrement ondulées, se succédant avec monotonie et marquées seulement de quelques vallées d'oueds au lit desséché, et de quelques points d'eau, puits ou sources, généralement contenus dans les plis du terrain.

La frontière définie par la convention de 1920 traverse cette région en ligne droite, de nord-est en sud-ouest, entre Abou-Kemal sur l'Euphrate et le méridien

du Djebel Tenf (rencontre approximative de la frontière syro-transjordanienne), soit sur une distance d'environ 235 kilom. Les seuls accidents remarquables de ce parcours sont constitués par les vallées du ouadi Ratga, du ouadi Akach et du ouadi Souab, affluents de l'Euphrate.

Au sud de cette ligne, mais à quelque distance de son tracé, se trouvent des mouvements plus importants, dont l'un, la Gaara, mérite une mention particulière.

Vaste et profonde dépression, longue d'une cinquantaine de kilomètres, atteignant une vingtaine de kilomètres dans sa plus grande largeur, la Gaara forme un véritable nœud hydrographique, déversoir de plusieurs oueds pourvus d'eau en hiver et alimentant une nappe souterraine abondante à laquelle de nombreux puits permettent d'accéder. Particulièrement riche en pâturages, elle se prête même à la culture qui y a été souvent pratiquée. Elle est un centre d'attraction pour les nomades, en particulier pour un certain nombre de tribus syriennes.

Plusieurs oueds, au lit généralement à sec, mais dont les vallées sont fortement dessinées, partent de cette région pour rejoindre l'Euphrate. L'un d'eux, le ouadi Hauran, est considéré par les populations syriennes comme formant la frontière naturelle entre la Syrie et l'Irak sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate.

Cette partie du désert de Syrie n'est pas habitée de façon permanente. Elle est parcourue par des éléments nomades qui y font paître leurs troupeaux au cours de la transhumance hivernale.

(B) Voies de Communication.

Les régions qui viennent d'être décrites présentent, au point de vue des communications, certaines particularités méritant d'être prises en considération.

(a) La vallée du Tigre forme un couloir de circulation soit du sud vers le nord, c'est-à-dire de la Syrie vers l'Irak, et inversement. Elle est suivie par une piste utilisée dans les deux sens. Quant au fleuve lui-même, son régime alpin, l'instabilité de son chenal, qui chemine entre des îles ou des bancs de sable sujets à des déplacements, le rend impropre à la navigation. Il n'est utilisé que pour le transport de matériaux par le moyen de radeaux ou de barques plates. Les riverains le franchissent soit par des gués, soit en recourant à des barques ou à des outres. Il n'en constitue pas moins une voie de communication d'un intérêt évident pour la Syrie, soit en ce qui concerne ses rapports avec l'Irak, soit en ce qui concerne ses rapports avec la Turquie, et éventuellement la Perse, sur laquelle il ouvre une fenêtre d'accès.

(b) La région comprise entre le Tigre et Rumelan Keui ne compte pas de voies de communication importantes. Bien qu'assez accidentée, elle peut se prêter à la circulation, notamment à la circulation automobile, par temps sec, à condition toutefois d'éviter les ramifications basaltiques poussées vers le sud par les contreforts volcaniques des montagnes du Kurdistan et notamment par le Karatchok Dagh. Celui-ci constitue un obstacle difficilement franchissable du sud au nord et qu'il est nécessaire de contourner.

(c) La plaine nord du Sindjar offre une partie particulièrement difficile à la circulation : celle qui est sillonnée par les affluents nord du Radd. Coulant du nord au sud, ces oueds, qui appartiennent au bassin du Khabour occidental, partiellement à sec en été, roulent en hiver un volume d'eau important et leur franchissement ne peut s'opérer, par les véhicules, qu'en recourant à des gués connus ou aux quelques ponts jetés sur leur lit. Les abords du Radd oriental forment des marécages qu'il importe en tout temps d'éviter.

Les seules pistes permettant de traverser cette région sont :

1. Du nord au sud, la piste Kamechli-Bara (Sindjar), qui franchit le Radd par un gué, praticable en été, mais difficilement praticable en hiver;
2. Du nord-est au sud-ouest, la piste Demir Kapou-Hassetché, qui franchit le ouadi Khnezir par un pont, le ouadi Abbas par un gué et le Radd par un gué praticable en toute saison;
3. D'est en ouest, la piste Mossoul-Demir Kapou-Kamechli (Nissibin), piste aménagée, franchissant généralement les oueds rencontrés par des ponts.

Les deux premières pistes intéressent exclusivement la Syrie. La troisième, grande voie de communication qui rejoint l'Orient-Express à Nissibin, intéresse les deux pays.

En dehors de ces pistes, la circulation automobile ne peut se faire qu'en passant extérieurement au réseau des affluents nord du Radd, par la région située au sud et à l'est de ce cours d'eau. C'est par cette région que peut être établi un itinéraire direct et facile entre Deir-ez-Zor, centre administratif, commercial et militaire dont dépend la Djezireh syrienne et les confins syriens du Tigre.

(d) Le Sindjar oppose, en raison de sa nature montagneuse, de grandes difficultés à la circulation. L'existence d'une arête vive et de vallées fortement cloisonnées en rend le franchissement difficile tant dans le sens du nord au sud que dans le sens de l'ouest à l'est. Dans le premier sens, le seul point de passage praticable à des véhicules ordinaires est le col de Samoukha qui sépare le Sindjar du Djebel Djeribé. Quelques pistes permettent d'accéder aux principaux villages situés dans les vallées latérales notamment à Beled Sindjar qui est relié à la route Mossoul-Deir-ez-Zor par une piste carrossable, longeant les pentes sud de la montagne. Mais, seuls le piéton ou le cavalier peuvent prétendre passer d'un village de la montagne à l'autre sans avoir recours à des trajets détournés.

A noter qu'outre celles mentionnées ci-dessus (Deir-ez-Zor-Beled Sindjar; Hassetché-Beled Sindjar), la Syrie est reliée au Sindjar par un certain nombre de pistes, utilisables par les véhicules, notamment :

- La piste Hassetché-Khatouni-Bara;
- La piste Cheddadi (Khabour)-Oum-el-Diban-Bara;
- La piste Kamechli-Bara.

(e) La plaine sud du Sindjar est propice à la circulation pendant la saison sèche, soit en utilisant les pistes existantes, soit même en dehors de ces pistes, en évitant les obstacles, lits d'oueds trop abrupts, efflorescences rocheuses qui viennent à se présenter. Il n'en est pas de même pendant la saison pluvieuse, les fortes ondes de cette saison suffisant à rendre, en quelques heures, le sol impraticable aux véhicules.

Les voies de communication à mentionner dans cette région sont :

La piste de Deir-ez-Zor à Mossoul par Fadghami (sur le Khabour) et El Biddea;

Les pistes dites "du sel" reliant les localités des vallées du Khabour et de l'Euphrate (Souar, Bessiré, Mayadine, Abou-Kémal) aux salines de Bouara, Reggassat, Bargouth, Tchaabi.

La première piste intéresse à égal titre la Syrie et l'Irak. Les pistes "du sel" intéressent surtout la Syrie. Elles ont été suivies de tout temps par les caravanes transportant le sel destiné à la consommation des populations syriennes. Leur utilisation est nécessaire, été comme hiver, en raison de la nature spongieuse du terrain dans la région des salines.

(f) La vallée de l'Euphrate forme un couloir naturel emprunté par une voie de grande communication (piste aménagée) conduisant de Syrie en Irak. Parfois, la vallée s'étranglant entre des promontoires rocheux, la route, ou piste, doit s'élever sur le plateau voisin en franchissant de véritables défilés.

L'Euphrate constitue lui-même une voie de communication importante, mais la vitesse de ses eaux, son cours capricieux, encombré d'îles et de bancs de sable, son chenal changeant, le rendent difficilement navigable, si ce n'est par les moyens rudimentaires pratiqués par ses riverains : barques plates (chartouches), radeaux et outres. Il est utilisé pour le transport de certains matériaux et denrées et seulement dans le sens de son courant.

(g) Région ouest de l'Euphrate.—Plateau désertique, faiblement ondulé et peu accidenté, cette région est également favorable à la circulation. Celle-ci peut s'effectuer, en saison sèche, par tous les genres de véhicules, sans recourir à des pistes.

Elle est traversée de nord-ouest en sud-est par la piste Palmyre-Bagdad, qui coupe la frontière théorique à environ 145 kilom. au sud-ouest d'Abou Kémal.

Chapitre II.—POPULATIONS.

(A) *Caractères généraux des Populations.*

Les populations intéressées par le tracé de la frontière syro-irakienne appartiennent, par leur genre d'existence, aux trois catégories sociales suivantes :

Les sédentaires,
Les semi-sédentaires,
Les nomades.

Les sédentaires ont une résidence fixe. Ils habitent généralement des maisons de pierre ou de briques de terre formant des villages d'importance plus ou moins grande (Demir Kapou : 200 habitants, Abou Kémal : 2.000 habitants). Ce sont ou des agriculteurs ou des commerçants. Les agriculteurs pratiquent souvent l'élevage.

Les semi-sédentaires, fixés une partie de l'année dans des villages (maisons ou tentes), se livrent, pendant l'autre partie, au nomadisme. Ils sont à la fois agriculteurs et pasteurs. Aux premières pluies de l'automne, laissant quelques-uns d'entre eux à la garde et à l'entretien des cultures, ils se rendent pour la plupart dans la steppe désertique, où leurs troupeaux trouveront jusqu'au printemps d'abondants pâturages. L'époque des moissons les voit réintégrer la zone de leurs villages et de leurs cultures. Les troupeaux des semi-sédentaires se composent principalement de moutons et de chèvres.

Les nomades, habitant la tente, et n'ayant avec le sol qu'une attache passagère, sont exclusivement des pasteurs. Ils sont surtout riches en moutons et en chameaux. En perpétuel déplacement pour assurer la subsistance de leurs nombreux troupeaux, ils circulent pendant la plus grande partie de l'année dans les régions désertiques et ne se rapprochent des lieux habités que quand les chaleurs de l'été ont fait disparaître les pâturages du désert. Ils gagnent alors, aux abords des régions cultivées, une zone où leur cheptel trouvera, aux alentours des points d'eau permanents, à la fois le vivre et l'abreuvoir. Ce mouvement de la zone d'hivernage vers la zone d'estivage et inversement constitue la transhumance. Celle-ci s'effectue suivant des règles déterminées et par des itinéraires qui demeurent au cours des ans à peu près les mêmes pour une même tribu.

La tribu reste en effet la forme sociale des nomades, comme celle de la plupart des semi-sédentaires. Ayant à sa tête un chef ou "cheikh," elle forme un tout qui obéit aux mêmes lois et règle son existence sur un même rythme.

Au point de vue ethnique, les populations dont il s'agit appartiennent à deux races : la race arabe et la race kurde.

Au point de vue religieux, elles appartiennent presque toutes à l'islam sunnite, en dehors duquel ne se comptent que quelques éléments de religion différente : les Yézidiés et les chrétiens.

Le présent chapitre se propose d'étudier séparément, en raison de leurs rapports particuliers avec le problème de la frontière :

Les zones d'habitat,
Les races et langues,
Les religions.

(B) *Zones d'Habitat* (voir cartes No. 2 et No. 3).

Les populations dont les zones d'habitat (habitat fixe ou territoires de parcours) sont affectées par le tracé de la frontière syro-irakienne sont indiquées ci-après, suivant la répartition géographique adoptée au chapitre précédent.

(a) *Vallée du Tigre.*

La partie de la rive droite du Tigre qui nous intéresse ne forme pas à elle seule une zone d'habitat. Elle est le complément des territoires des tribus situées immédiatement à l'ouest du fleuve (Hassénane, Mirane) et qui sont étudiées ci-dessous.

(b) *Djezireh.*

Les zones d'habitat traversées par la frontière entre le Tigre et l'Euphrate sont celles de tribus sédentaires, semi-sédentaires et nomades.

Les sédentaires sont les Yézidiés du Sindjar (race Kurde, religion Yézidié).

Les semi-sédentaires forment les tribus Hassénane (Kurdes), Aliane (Kurdes), Tchitié (Kurdes), Tay (Arabes), Djebbour (Arabes), Cherabiyine (Arabes) et Ogueidat (Arabes).

Les nomades appartiennent aux tribus Mirane (Kurdes) et Chammar (Arabes).

1. *Sédentaires.*

Yézidiés (voir carte No. 5).

Les Yézidiés, agriculteurs sédentaires, se livrant en partie à une transhumance réduite, sont fixés dans les vallées et au bas des pentes du Sindjar. Ils habitent des villages bâtis.

La frontière définie par la convention de 1920 passe à une vingtaine de kilomètres à l'est du col de Samoukha, extrémité ouest de la montagne proprement dite. Les Yézidiés, dont les zones d'habitat sont situées à l'ouest de cette frontière et qui, par conséquent, devraient être rattachés à la Syrie, représentent environ 12.000 individus, sur un total de 25.000 pour tout le Sindjar.

Ces Yézidiés forment plusieurs tribus : Samoukha, Ghiran, Dokhian, Djouanah, Foukkara, Hassekan, Habbabat. Leurs villages, situés à l'ouest de la frontière de la convention, sont au nombre de quinze :

Versant nord du Sindjar : Bara, Samoukha, Djafarié, Halikia, Selli-Mendo,

Kersi, Kandile, Chamikha, Mamissa, Malak, Khan-ez-Zor, Snouni ;

Versant sud : Kherbet-Kaidar, Soukanye, Majnounié.

Bien que les Yézidiés soient des agriculteurs sédentaires, certains de leurs éléments s'adonnent à la transhumance. Se mettant sous la tente, dès les premières pluies de l'automne, ils se déplacent avec leurs troupeaux de moutons et descendent parfois au pied de celle-ci, mais sans guère s'en éloigner.

Il est à noter que ces déplacements hivernaux des Yézidiés de la partie occidentale du Sindjar se font dans la zone de parcours des tribus syriennes Chammar, Tay, Djebbour (voir plus bas). Ces dernières y admettent leur présence, mais, à une époque non encore éloignée, les Yézidiés devaient acquitter pour y pénétrer un droit de vassalité ("Khaoua," protection) aux chefs Chammar des Zors, considérés comme les suzerains de la région.

A l'ouest du Sindjar se trouvent deux groupements de sédentaires, habitant les villages de *Khatounié* sur le lac du même nom) et *El Hol* (sur l'oued du même nom, 7 kilom. sud-ouest du précédent), et qui comptent respectivement 250 et 500 habitants.

Les habitants de Khatounié et de El Hol sont des Arabes originaires des tribus syriennes de la région du Khabour. Ils cultivent aux abords de leur village et font paître leurs quelques troupeaux de moutons dans les pâturages des environs. Ils sont administrés par la Syrie.

2. *Semi-Sédentaires.*

Hassénanes (voir carte No. 4).

Kurdes agriculteurs, habitant des villages bâtis, dans la région comprise entre le Tigre à l'est et le Lailak Dagh à l'ouest. Au nord, leurs territoires s'étendent au delà de la frontière syro-turque. Leurs villages les plus au sud sont ceux de :

Khanik, sur le Tigre (1 kilom. 500 nord-ouest de Fesch Khabour).

Chaker Katch, au nord du Karatchok Dagh.

Hanevi, au nord du Karatchok Dagh.

Robaria, au nord-ouest du Karatchok Dagh.

Khanessere, à l'ouest du Karatchok Dagh.

Guir Ziyarah, au sud-ouest du Karatchok Dagh.

Outre ceux actuellement habités par eux, les Hassénanes occupaient autrefois des villages dont il ne subsiste plus aujourd'hui que des ruines abandonnées.

Cet abandon est dû à l'insécurité qui régnait dans la région, en particulier du fait des nomades Chammar. Par crainte de ces derniers, qui, venant des steppes désertiques du sud, se livraient à d'incessantes agressions contre eux, ils furent amenés à se retirer plus au nord, avec le gros de la tribu. Ces ruines sont susceptibles d'être réoccupées et les terres de culture qui les entourent remises en valeur, dès que la situation se sera stabilisée dans cette région, grâce notamment au règlement définitif de la question de frontière.

Importance de la tribu Hassénane (portion syrienne) : un millier de familles environ ; actuellement trente-six villages bâtis.

Alianes.

Agriculteurs et pasteurs fixés l'été dans des villages bâtis, entre le Lailak Dagh à l'est et le ouadi Djerrahi (affluent du Radd) à l'ouest. Un certain nombre de leurs villages sont également demeurés au nord de la frontière turco-syrienne. Au sud, leur zone d'habitat fixe et de cultures s'étend approximativement jusqu'au parallèle de Demir-Kapou.

Comme les Hassénane, les Aliane habitaient autrefois des villages situés au sud de leur zone d'habitat actuel. Ils durent les abandonner pour les mêmes raisons et se réfugier plus au nord. Ces villages sont également susceptibles d'être reconstruits et leurs terres remises en valeur.

L'hiver, les Aliane se mettent en partie sous la tente et descendent vers le sud jusqu'à une ligne Tell Bahkh (30 kilom. sud-ouest de Demir Kapou), Tell Taache (20 kilom. sud de Demir Kapou), Tell Hamoukar (22 kilom. sud-sud-est de Demir Kapou).

Importance des Aliane de Syrie : environ 600 familles.

Tchities.

Egalement agriculteurs et pasteurs.

La zone de leurs villages et de leurs cultures est située en dehors de la région considérée, dans la partie supérieure du bassin du Radd, entre le ouadi Djerrahi à l'est et le ouadi Brebitch à l'ouest.

L'hiver, les Tchities se mettent en partie sous la tente et descendent avec leurs troupeaux vers le sud de part et d'autre du Radd.

Importance de la tribu : environ 800 familles en Syrie.

Tay.

Importante tribu arabe, dont la zone d'habitat fixe (villages, cultures) est entièrement située en Syrie, dans la région sud-sud-est et est de Kamechlié. Les Tay forment plusieurs fractions qui se comportent en réalité avec plus ou moins d'indépendance les unes vis-à-vis des autres, et dont les territoires sont nettement séparés.

Ces fractions sont :

	Tentes.
Les Assaf	environ 300
Les Rached	300
Les Beni Seba	300
Les Harb	200
Les Hreth	150
Les Djouallah	500
Les Ghanama	100
Les Zbeïd	80
Les Bezgaras	50
Les Maamras	50

soit au total environ 2,000 tentes.

Les Tay passent l'été dans la zone de cultures située à cheval sur le Jaghjagh et ses affluents de gauche. Certains de leurs éléments (Hreth, Ghanama) se sont presque complètement sédentarisés et habitent des villages bâtis (Daadouchie Kseïr, Hamo). D'autres (Assaf, Rached, Beni Seba, Harb, Zbeïd), tout en continuant à vivre sous la tente, pratiquent intensivement l'agriculture. Une des principales fractions, enfin, les Dhouallah, reste plus près de l'état nomade et, ne s'adonnant pas elle-même à l'agriculture, se tient l'été aux abords de la zone cultivée des autres fractions ou tribus, entre le ouadi Abbas et le ouadi Roumelan.

Pour la transhumance hivernale, les Tay se répartissent en groupements qui vont chacun dans une zone déterminée.

Les Assaf, les Hreth et les Zbeïd descendent généralement à travers le bassin du Radd et, traversant ce cours d'eau, se rendent jusque sur les pentes nord du Sindjar (vers Khan-el-Zor).

Les Rached et les Ghanama circulent dans toute la région comprise entre la piste Kamechlié-Mossoul, jusque vers Tchilparat (environ 30 kilom. est-sud-est de Demir Kapou) et le Sindjar. Vers la fin de l'hiver, ils se dirigent généralement vers l'ouest. Le printemps les trouve souvent aux environs du lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord.

Les Beni Seba et les Harb descendent à travers le bassin du Radd jusqu'au Sindjar qu'il leur arrive parfois de franchir par le col de Samoukha pour aller camper plus au sud, dans la région d'Oum-el-Diban, El Bidéa, ouadi El Adjij.

Les Djouallah ont une zone de parcours très étendue. L'automne, ils se rendent généralement dans la région est du ouadi Roumelan, jusque vers une ligne Tell Khanzir (30 kilom. est-nord-est de Demir Kapou), Tchilparat (environ 30 kilom. est-sud-est de Demir Kapou). Certaines années ils poussent même plus loin, et vont camper sur le ouadi Soueidiyé, affluent du Tigre, jusqu'à une faible distance de ce dernier. De cette région, les Djouallah descendent vers le Sindjar, dont ils atteignent les pentes nord vers Kohbol (24 kilom. nord-est de Beled Sindjar) et, se dirigeant vers l'ouest, vont passer par le col de Samoukha pour gagner la région sud du Sindjar (Oum-el-Diban, El Bidéa, ouadi Adjij, ouadi Tidjarié).

Djebbours.

Importante tribu, forte d'environ 3,000 tentes et comprenant un grand nombre de fractions dont les principales sont : les Zobaa, les Soltan, les Hreith, les Mahassen, les Hazim, les Ouled Cheikh Aïssa, les Mohammed Assouni, les Djejeiche, les Bou Maana, les Maamra, les Bou Khattab, les Halebiyine.

Les Djebbours sont établis l'été sur le Khabour, entre Tell Roumman (28 kilom. nord-ouest de Hassetché) et Tell Cheikh Hamed (95 kilom. sud de Hassetché) et sur le Jaghjagh entre Hassetché et Tell Hamidi (27 kilom. sud de Kamechlié). Ils se livrent à la culture sur les rives de ces deux cours d'eau. Une de leurs fractions, les Ouled Cheikh Aïssa (une centaine de tentes) s'est établie depuis environ sept ans dans le ouadi El Hol (affluent du Khabour), qu'elle a défriché et où elle se livre à la culture.

L'hiver, les Djebbours se rendent dans la steppe désertique qui s'étend de part et d'autre du Khabour et du Jaghjagh. Les fractions nomadisent vers l'est atteignant une ligne marquée par :

Tell Archane (31 kilom. nord-nord-est de Khatounié) ;

Le puits de Sifya (non indiqué sur la carte, 27 kilom. nord-est de Khatounié) ;

Le col de Samoukha (Sindjar) ;

Oum-el-Diban ;

El Bidéa ;

Le ouadi Adjij, jusqu'à hauteur de Tell Cheikh Hamed.

Cette ligne forme la limite normale de leur transhumance vers l'est. Toutefois, certaines années, en raison de l'état des pâturages, les Djebbours la franchissent plus ou moins largement.

Cherabiyine.

Tribu importante par le nombre, mais considérée comme de rang inférieur par les autres tribus dont les chefs exercent sur elle une sorte de suzeraineté.

Les Cherabiyine sont dispersés dans toute la Djezireh. Il en existe trois groupements dans la région qui nous intéresse :

Les *Bou Saleh* et les *Bou Hardan* (environ 200 tentes) dans la région voisine du Tigre, mêlés aux Hassenane, dont ils sont les bergers. L'été, ils se tiennent aux abords des villages Hassenane. L'hiver, ils se rendent sur les pentes du Karatchok Dagh et du Mochoran Dagh.

Les *Tahat* (environ 400 tentes) établis l'été sur la partie orientale du Radd, vers Tell Safra, où ils cultivent. L'hiver, ils nomadisent au sud du Radd et jusque sur les pentes nord du Sindjar.

Les *Obeid* (environ 300 tentes) mêlés aux *Djebbours*. L'été ils sont établis sur le *Khabour*, à *Saba Skour* (15 kilom. en aval de *Hassetché*), où ils cultivent. L'hiver ils accompagnent les *Djebbours* dans leurs déplacements au sud du *Sindjar*.

Ogueidat.

Voir ci-dessous, vallée de l'Euphrate.

Les territoires de parcours des *Ogueidat*, dans la région étudiée, s'étendent jusqu'au ouadi *Adjij* et aux salines.

3. *Nomades.*

Mirane (voir carte No. 4).

Les *Miranes*, appelés aussi "*Kotchars*" (en kurde: "*Nomades*") sont des pasteurs vivant sous la tente. Ils possèdent de nombreux troupeaux de moutons et de chèvres.

Ils comptent environ 750 tentes et forment un certain nombre de fractions: *Scenikha*, *Cyurassari*, *Yssika*, *Aléka*, *Barzari*, *Armandaba*, *Moussaracha* et *Barkelai*.

Leurs territoires de parcours sont situés à cheval sur la frontière turco-syrienne. Ils passent l'hiver dans la région du *Karachok Dag*, où certains de leurs chefs et notables sont propriétaires de villages habités par des *Hassenane* (voir plus haut). Le chef de la tribu, *Naieff Agha Ibn Mousto Pacha*, est, en particulier, propriétaire des villages de *Khanik* et *Chelleki*, sur la rive droite du *Tigre*.

L'été, ils traversent la frontière et se rendent dans les montagnes situées au sud du lac de *Van*.

La limite sud des territoires de parcours des *Miranes* est formée par le cours du ouadi *Soueidiyé* (affluent du *Tigre*) jusqu'à son confluent avec le ouadi *Kunezir*, et de là, par une ligne rejoignant le ouadi *Demir Kapou* au point où ce cours d'eau est traversé par le tracé de l'ex-chemin de fer de *Bagdad*, près du lieu dit "*Compagnie allemande*."

Chammar.

Les *Chammar*, l'une des plus importantes tribus nomades de cette partie de l'ancien Empire ottoman, sont répartis dans toute la Mésopotamie et forment un grand nombre de fractions dont les unes relèvent administrativement de la Syrie et les autres de l'Irak. Il en existe même un fort groupement au *Nedjd*, dans la région dite du *Djebel Chammar*.

Les fractions *Chammar* d'allégeance syrienne constituent elles-mêmes deux groupements connus, le premier, sous le nom de "*Chammar des Zors*," le second sous le nom de "*Chammar Khorsas*" ou "*Chammar de Dham*," du nom de son chef *Dham-el-Hadi*.

Chammars des Zors.

Comprennent les fractions qui étaient rattachées, sous le régime turc, au *Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor*, sous l'autorité d'un même chef, intermédiaire entre l'autorité et la tribu.

Ces fractions sont:

	Tentes.
Les <i>Feddagha</i>	environ 700
Les <i>Hamoud</i>	500
Les <i>Thabet</i>	800
Soit au total	2,000

Ces fractions séjournent l'été dans la région du *Haut-Khabour* et de ses affluents, le ouadi *Zergan*, le ouadi *Aouadj* et le *Jaghjagh*. Elles installent leurs campements en bordure des cultures, de la zone habitée par des semi-sédentaires kurdes. Leurs chefs possèdent eux-mêmes des villages et des terres de culture dans cette zone.

Au début de la saison des pluies, les *Chammar*, des *Zors* descendent vers le sud et se rendent les uns dans la région sud du *Djebel Abdul Aziz* (ouest de *Hassetché*), les autres dans la région intéressée par le tracé de la frontière entre

le *Sindjar* et l'Euphrate. Ces derniers, après avoir stationné quelque temps à l'ouest du *Sindjar*, dans le *Djebel Djeribé*, les alentours du lac de *Khatounié*, le ouadi *El Hol*, le *Djebel Tchembe*, circulent dans la région du ouadi *Adjij* et de ses affluents et des salines de *Bouara*, *Raggassat*, &c.

Certaines années, quelques éléments appartenant à ces fractions sont amenées, en raison de l'état des pâturages; à franchir la ligne du ouadi *Adjij* et des salines et à pousser assez avant en territoire irakien.

Chammars Khorsas (ou de *Dham-el-Hadi*).

Ce groupement s'est formé, aux débuts de l'occupation française de la *Djezireh*, d'éléments dont les terrains de parcours paraissaient devoir demeurer à l'ouest de la frontière et qui ont suivi leur chef héréditaire, *Dham-el-Hadi*, venu se fixer en territoire syrien. *Dham-el-Hadi* a des propriétés au village de *Tchilaga* situé à 3 kilom. à l'ouest de *Demir Kapou*.

Les *Chammar Khorsas* appartiennent à des fractions dont une partie se trouve en territoire irakien: *Aleyan*, *Breitch*, *Guechem*, *Hadba*, *Mathlouta*, *Gaet*, *Bheiman*.

Le groupement syrien compte environ 1.500 tentes.

L'été, les *Chammars Khorsas* stationnent sur le *Jaghjagh* et ses affluents, ouadi *Brebitch*, ouadi *Djerrahi*, ouadi *Abbas*, ouadi *Khnezir*, ouadi *Demir Kapou*, ouadi *Roumelan* et jusque sur les pentes sud du *Karatchok Dag*.

A l'automne, passant, comme les *Chammar des Zors*, par la région ouest du *Sindjar* (*Djebel Djeribé*, lac de *Khatounié*, ouadi *El Hol*, *Djebel Tchembe*), ils se rendent également dans la région comprise entre le *Sindjar* et l'Euphrate et particulièrement dans la région du ouadi *Adjij* et des salines. Ils poussent parfois jusqu'aux abords de la vallée de l'Euphrate, à hauteur de *Anah* (95 kilom. est d'*Abou Kémal*).

Comme pour ce qui concerne les *Chammar des Zors*, les *Chammars Khorsas* sont amenés, certaines années, à pénétrer très avant en territoire irakien.

(c) *Vallée de l'Euphrate* (voir carte No. 6).

Les populations de la vallée de l'Euphrate intéressées par le règlement de la frontière comprennent: des sédentaires et des semi-sédentaires.

Les sédentaires sont les habitants du village d'*Abou Kémal*. Les semi-sédentaires appartiennent à la tribu syrienne des *Ogueidat*.

Abou Kémal.

Abou Kémal est mentionné par la Convention de 1920 comme jalonnant la frontière syro-irakienne au franchissement de l'Euphrate.

Importante bourgade, chef-lieu d'un caza syrien qui s'étend vers le sud jusqu'à la frontière *de facto*, à 8 kilom. plus en aval, à la fois centre économique et spirituel (écoles, mosquées) de cette partie de la vallée de l'Euphrate, *Abou Kémal* compte environ 2.000 habitants, pour la plupart arabes musulmans. Ses habitants sont soit des agriculteurs soit des commerçants.

Les agriculteurs cultivent les jardins et les champs qui entourent la ville, ainsi que l'île qui lui fait face. Les commerçants vendent aux semi-sédentaires les objets manufacturés et denrées alimentaires importés de l'intérieur syrien et leur achètent les produits de leurs terres (céréales) et de leurs troupeaux (moutons, beurres, laines, peaux), soit pour un usage local, soit en vue de l'exportation.

Le rayonnement d'*Abou Kémal*, seul centre économique et spirituel de la région, n'est pas limité aux populations syriennes dépendant administrativement du caza dont il est le chef-lieu. Il s'étend aussi aux populations voisines de la frontière *de facto*, actuellement administrées par l'Irak.

Ogueidat.

Les *Ogueidat* sont une importante tribu semi-sédentaire dont la zone de fixation (habitat et cultures) s'étend sur les deux rives de l'Euphrate, de *Tibni* (40 kilom. en amont de *Deir-ez-Zor*), jusqu'à une certaine distance en aval d'*Abou Kémal*; et sur les rives du *Khabour*, de *Tell Cheikh Hamed* (95 kilom. sud de *Hassetché*) au confluent de cette rivière avec l'Euphrate.

La borne *Leachman* (8 kilom. sud-est d'*Abou Kémal*) qui jalonne la frontière provisoire *de facto* entre la Syrie et l'Irak, dans la vallée de l'Euphrate, en

application de l'accord du 5 mai 1920^(*), est parfois considérée comme marquant la limite sud des territoires Ogueidat. Il semble, toutefois, qu'il y ait là une confusion. La borne Leachman marque non pas une limite de tribu, mais une limite administrative.

Les Ogueidat revendiquent, comme appartenant à leurs territoires, la partie de la vallée de l'Euphrate comprise entre la frontière *de facto* et El Kaim (28 kilom. est de Abou Kémal). Cette région, qui était autrefois entièrement habitée par eux, et où leurs chefs avaient des propriétés, comprend encore aujourd'hui des éléments relevant de leur tribu, mêlés à de petites tribus qui leur étaient alliées; Selman, Karabila, Bou-Hardan, Djeraifa et à quelques éléments de la grande tribu irakienne des Dulaim.

Les Ogueidat placés sous l'administration syrienne (de Tibni et Tell Cheikh Hamed à la borne Leachman) comptent environ 10.000 familles et forment un certain nombre de fractions dont les principales sont (du nord au sud): les Bou Seraya (en amont de Deir-ez-Zor), les Bou Khabour, les Bkeyer (sur le Khabour), les Bou Kamel (région de Mayadine), les Choueït, les Choueïtat, les Demin (région de Salahyé, 30 kilom. en amont d'Abou Kémal), les Bougaan, les Bou-Hardan, les Hassoun, les Mechahda, les Madjdaouda (de Salahyé à la borne Leachman).

L'été, les Ogueidat sont installés sur les rives de l'Euphrate et du Bas-Khabour, où ils se livrent à la culture. Ils habitent soit la tente, soit des huttes de briques crues couvertes de branchages et de terre. Tentes et huttes, groupées sur la berge du fleuve, en des emplacements fixes, généralement au centre des cultures, forment de véritables villages, où se retrouvent chaque année les mêmes éléments, fractions ou sous-fractions.

Les villages Ogueidat situés dans la vallée de l'Euphrate, en aval d'Abou Kémal, c'est-à-dire au delà de la frontière définie par la Convention de 1920, *stricto sensu*, sont:

Sur la rive droite:

Souaiyé (environ 100 familles).

Heri (environ 80 familles).

Sur la rive gauche:

Baghouz (environ 120 familles).

Aux premières pluies de l'automne, laissant quelques-uns d'entre eux dans les villages, à la garde et à l'entretien des cultures, les Ogueidat se mettent sous la tente et s'éloignent avec les troupeaux dans la steppe désertique où vont apparaître des herbages.

Les fractions de la rive gauche de l'Euphrate et du Bas-Khabour se déplacent généralement à l'est de ces deux fleuves, les fractions de la rive droite de l'Euphrate à l'ouest et au sud-ouest de ce dernier.

La limite de nomadisation des Ogueidat est formée:

En Djézireh:

Par la ligne du ouadi Adjij et des Salines.

A l'ouest et au sud-ouest de l'Euphrate:

Par une ligne englobant les puits de Gabadjib (52 kilom. sud-ouest de Deir-ez-Zor), Bir Khouder-el-Ma (65 kilom. ouest-sud-ouest de Mayadine) et successivement vers le sud-est, Bir Haouaibe, Bir Djoubaibé, Bir Djoub, Bir Touamar, le Djebel Khakhchat, Garat Tmagel, Bir Ratga et la région sud et sud-est de la borne Leachman, jusqu'à hauteur de El Kaim.

Les fractions de la région d'Abou Kemal et notamment les Hassoun, se rendent fréquemment dans la Gaara.

(d) Région ouest de l'Euphrate.

Cette région, de caractère désertique, n'est pas habitée de façon permanente. Elle forme le territoire de parcours d'un certain nombre de tribus syriennes, les unes nomades, Anézés-Fedaan, Sbaa, Rouallah, les autres semi-sédentaires, Ogueidat. Ces tribus la fréquentent régulièrement, soit qu'elles la traversent au

(*) Voir ci-dessous, Chapitre IV, B, et Annexe No. 3.

cours de la transhumance, soit qu'elles y séjournent durant tout ou partie de la période hivernale.

En outre, plusieurs tribus syriennes, ayant leurs territoires habituels notablement plus au nord ou à l'est, viennent y chercher des pâturages ou des points d'eau, lorsque la sécheresse s'est fait sentir dans leur propre zone. Ces tribus, Haddiyine, Maualis, Faouaras, Beni Khaled, Hassènes, sont amenées comme les précédentes à franchir la frontière définie par la convention de 1920, dans les conditions indiquées ci-après.

1. Tribus nomades traversant régulièrement la frontière Anézés Fedaan.

Importante tribu comptant de 3.000 à 4.000 tentes.

Les Anézés-Fedaan passent l'été tantôt dans la région sud-est d'Alep, au voisinage du lac de Djebbou, tantôt dans la vallée de l'Euphrate, entre Rakka et Meskéné, tantôt sur le Balikh, affluent de gauche de l'Euphrate. L'hiver, ils se rendent généralement dans la Gaara^(*) et dans la région des Oueds, ouadi Hauran, notamment, située au sud-est de cette dernière. Leur déplacement de l'une à l'autre zone, zone d'estivage et zone d'hivernage, se fait habituellement par le Djebel Bechri (nord-ouest de Deir-ez-Zor) et les différents puits compris entre ce dernier et la Gaara.

Sbaa.

Environ 3.000 tentes.

Les Sbaa passent l'été dans la région nord-nord-est de Hama et dans la région de Selemieh (30 kilom. est-sud-est de Hama).

L'hiver, ils se rendent dans la région située à l'est du Djebel Anézé (300 kilom. sud-ouest d'Abou Kémal) et dans la Gaara, en passant par Soukhne (60 kilom. nord-est de Palmyre), les puits de Sedjri (160 kilom. sud-ouest d'Abou Kémal) et la vallée supérieure du ouadi Souab.

Rouallah et satellites.

Les Rouallah et leurs tribus satellites (Saoualmé, Achagea, Ould Aly) comptent environ 4.000 tentes.

Ils passent l'été aux abords de la Ghouta (oasis de Hama). Ils se rendent l'hiver sur les pentes nord, nord-est et est du Djebel Anézé et dans la région située à l'est de ce dernier. Leur migration s'effectue généralement par des itinéraires passant au sud de Palmyre, l'est du Djebel Tenf et l'extrémité sud-ouest du ouadi Souab.

2. Tribus nomades traversant occasionnellement la Frontière.

Haddidyine.

Environ 3.000 tentes.

Zone d'estivage: région sud et sud-est d'Alep et région de Selemieh.

Zone d'hivernage habituelle: région sud-est de Palmyre.

Les Haddidyine franchissent assez fréquemment la frontière, au cours de la transhumance, pour venir camper dans la région du ouadi Souab.

Maualis.

Environ 1.800 tentes.

Zone d'estivage: région de Hama.

Zone d'hivernage habituelle: Djebel Bilas (nord-ouest de Palmyre).

Faouaras.

500 tentes.

Zone d'estivage: région de Homs.

Zone d'hivernage habituelle: région sud de Palmyre.

Beni Khaled.

750 tentes.

Zone d'estivage: région nord-est de Homs.

Zone d'hivernage habituelle: région sud de Palmyre et du Djebel Tenf.

(*) Voir ci-dessus, Chapitre I, A (d).

Hassené.

500 tentes.

Zone d'estivage : région de Homs.

Zone habituelle d'hivernage : région sud de Palmyre.

(C) *Races et Langues* (voir carte No. 7).

Les populations étudiées ci-dessus comprennent, au point de vue ethnique et linguistique, les données ethniques coïncidant en l'espèce avec les données linguistiques, deux grandes divisions : les Kurdes et les Arabes.

Aux Kurdes se rattache un groupement de même race et de même langue, mais de religion différente : les Yezidiés.

Kurdes.

Les Kurdes appartiennent à la race aryenne. Ils parlent une langue indo-européenne.

Leurs origines ont fait, à vrai dire, l'objet de nombreuses discussions. On en trouve un écho dans le rapport présenté au Conseil de la Société des Nations par la commission chargée en 1925 d'enquêter sur place au sujet de la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak (document C 400 M 147, 1925, VII). Après avoir passé en revue toutes les opinions émises et étudié elle-même la question, la commission s'exprime comme suit :

" Pour conclure, l'origine des Kurdes est encore obscure, mais quel que ait été leur passé, ils sont arianisés. Cette arianisation a été assez forte—même si l'apport du sang arien a été restreint—pour qu'ils adoptent entièrement une langue iranienne. Des influences ultérieures et des mélanges avec arabes, turcs et autres ont été nombreux. Mais le fond original semble avoir conservé toujours le dessus ; il est resté vigoureux ; il est encore en état d'expansion.

" Les Kurdes ne sont ni arabes, ni turcs, ni persans. C'est de ces derniers qu'ils sont les plus proches. Ils diffèrent et ils sont nettement à distinguer des Turcs et ils sont encore bien plus loin et bien plus différents des Arabes.

" Bien que très guerriers, indisciplinés et très divisés, ils savent vivre en assez bonne amitié avec les autres peuples habitant leurs territoires. Nous avons pu constater que de tous les mahométans, ce sont les Kurdes avec lesquels les chrétiens vivent dans les meilleurs termes."

Ces conclusions, émises au sujet des Kurdes du vilayet de Mossoul, s'appliquent intégralement aux Kurdes des régions que nous intéressent.

Essentiellement des montagnards, les Kurdes ont essaimé au pied des monts qui portent leur nom (monts du Kurdistan) et où ils constituent l'élément dominant. Vigoureux et travailleurs, ils se sont établis dans la région marquée par les derniers contreforts de ces montagnes. Cette région, qui forme transition entre les monts du Kurdistan et la plaine de Mésopotamie proprement dite, est abondamment arrosée. Les Kurdes, pour la plupart semi-sédentaires, habitant des villages bâtis, s'y livrent à la culture, tandis que leurs troupeaux sont conduits l'hiver, au sud, dans les pâturages de la steppe mésopotamienne.

Comme il est dit ci-dessus, la démarcation entre l'une et l'autre race, la race kurde et la race arabe, là où elles sont au voisinage, est fournie par le relief lui-même. Elle est formée par une ligne naturelle qui laisse aux Kurdes la zone mouvementée et arrosée propice à la culture, et aux Arabes la zone basse, propice à la vie nomade.

Pour mémoire, les tribus kurdes syriennes intéressées par le tracé de la frontière sont :

Les Miranes,
Les Hassenanes,
Les Alianes,
Les Tchitiés.

Yezidiés.

Absolument distincts des autres éléments de la population au point de vue religieux (voir sous-chapitre suivant), les Yezidiés sont, au point de vue ethnique, de proches parents des Kurdes dont ils parlent la langue.

C'est la conclusion à laquelle est parvenue la commission chargée d'étudier le tracé de la frontière turco-irakienne, dans le vilayet de Mossoul, en 1925. Le rapport de cette commission s'exprime à ce sujet en ces termes (page 49) :

" Les Yezidis parlent le Kurde et n'ont pas d'autre langue. Il faut remarquer aussi que, tandis que les quelques livres saints qu'ils possèdent sont écrits en arabe, la prière principale est dite en kurde. La formule du baptême dite par le cheikh est prononcée en kurde, les hymnes sont chantés en kurde et, d'après leur croyance, Dieu parle kurde. On a aussi conjecturé une origine arabe et une kurdisation ultérieure des Yezidis, en se basant sur le fait que leurs livres saints sont rédigés en arabe. Mais il n'y a là aucune preuve. Au contraire, tout tend à réfuter une telle assertion, car la langue arabe a pu être simplement adoptée avec l'écriture, la langue kurde n'ayant jamais jusqu'ici été une langue écrite. D'ailleurs, il n'y a qu'une petite partie des prêtres qui savent l'arabe et qui le lisent. L'arabe est seulement la langue théologique, mais elle n'est pas la langue liturgique."

Les Yezidiés intéressés par la tracé de la frontière syro-irakienne sont fixés dans le Sindjar. L'étude de ce groupement, au point de vue de l'habitat, a été effectuée plus haut.

A noter que s'il existe des Yezidiés en Irak, à l'est du Tigre (région nord et nord-est de Mossoul), il s'en trouve également plusieurs groupements en Syrie. L'un, qui compte environ 10.000 individus, est établi dans le Kurd Dagh, au nord-ouest d'Alep. Un autre, moins important, mais situé beaucoup plus près du Sindjar, est établi dans la région sud de Amouda (95 kilom. nord-ouest de Samoukha) où il compte un millier d'individus habitant trois villages : Kerengo, Kazekatchek et Markab. Il existe, enfin, un certain nombre de Yezidiés mêlés aux Kurdes syriens des tribus Tchitiés, Alianes, Hassenanes et Miranes (environ 500 familles réparties dans les villages kurdes).

A noter également que parmi les Yezidiés du Sindjar se trouvent des éléments arabes (environ 150 familles) et que le village de Beled Sindjar, centre administratif de la montagne, comprend une forte proportion d'arabes musulmans et de chrétiens.

Arabes.

Ils appartiennent à la grande famille des Sémites, dont ils représentent un des types les plus purs et dont ils parlent une des langues les plus répandues.

Les Arabes sont essentiellement des habitants de la plaine. De tout temps, leur présence a été constatée dans les plaines de Mésopotamie et dans le désert de Syrie. De nombreux textes cunéiformes les mentionnent et Strabon, qui écrivait au premier siècle de notre ère a fait d'eux une description qui serait encore valable aujourd'hui. Outre les Arabes nomades vivant sous la tente, il parle des Arabes sédentaires établis le long du Tigre et de l'Euphrate, où ils formaient de petites principautés.

De nos jours, les Arabes restent des habitants des plaines. Comme il a été indiqué ci-dessus, leurs zones d'habitat sont constituées par les parties basses du plateau mésopotamien, la vallée de l'Euphrate et le désert de Syrie.

En Haute-Djézireh, là où ils voisinent avec d'autres éléments ethniques (Kurdes), ces zones sont nettement délimitées. Elles commencent à la ligne de démarcation entre la plaine et les dernières ramifications de la montagne (monts du Kurdistan et ses contreforts méridionaux).

Pour mémoire, les tribus arabes syriennes intéressées par le tracé de la frontière sont :

(a) En Djézireh :

Les Chammars,
Les Tay,
Les Djebbours,
Les Cherabiyine,
Une partie des Ogueidat ;

(b) Dans la vallée de l'Euphrate :

Les Ogueidat ;

(*) Le kurde n'en est qu'à ses premiers pas comme langue écrite. Des essais sont faits pour le codifier depuis quelques années.

(c) Dans le désert de Syrie :

Les Anézès-Fedaan,
 Les Shaa,
 Les Rouallah,
 Les Haddidiynes,
 Les Maoualis,
 Les Faouaras,
 Les Beni Khaled,
 Les Hassené,
 Une partie des Ogueidat.

(D) Religions (voir carte No. 7).

Les populations étudiées appartiennent à trois religions distinctes. Elles comprennent :

Des musulmans de rite sunnite,
 Des Yezidiés,
 Des chrétiens.

Musulmans-sunnites.

Sont de beaucoup les plus nombreux. Ils comptent :

La totalité des tribus arabes, nomades, semi-sédentaires et sédentaires;
 La totalité des tribus kurdes proprement dites (Yezidiés exclus).

Il ne paraît pas nécessaire de s'étendre ici sur la religion musulmane, qui est bien connue.

Yezidiés.

Les Yezidiés, parfois qualifiés "d'adorateurs du diable," forment au point de vue religieux une secte nettement à part et dont les croyances n'ont que de vagues points communs avec les doctrines religieuses actuellement admises dans cette partie du Proche-Orient.

La Commission de Frontière turco-irakienne de 1925, qui a étudié les Yezidiés de près, s'exprime comme suit à ce sujet :

"Leur religion, qui les a tenus à l'écart de tous les autres peuples et qui leur a causé tant de difficultés et persécutions, et pour laquelle ils meurent héroïquement, est une religion composite. Nous y avons trouvé toutes sortes d'éléments dans une curieuse confusion. Personne encore n'a pu approfondir tous les secrets et embrasser dans une description l'ensemble de cette religion. Elle emprunte aux Persans la conception du principe du bien et du mal, et peut-être aussi la croyance à la transmigration de l'âme. Le sacrifice annuel du Taureau blanc, près du Temple de Shems-ed-Dine ou du Soleil,⁽⁶⁾ dérive probablement d'une identification avec Mithra. Du judaïsme, elle a peut-être pris l'identification du principe du mal, d'Ahriman, avec Satan. Ils vénèrent aussi l'Ancien Testament, toute comme ils vénèrent le Nouveau Testament et le Coran. Ils pratiquent la circoncision, qu'ils ont peut-être prise du judaïsme, peut-être du mahométanisme, peut-être—pense Wigram—d'une source commune plus ancienne. Toutefois, il ne faut pas oublier que bien que ce soit une vieille coutume sémite, seuls les Assyriens et les Babyloniens ne la pratiquaient pas. Ils vénèrent Jésus-Christ, ils vénèrent aussi le signe de la croix. Mais ce symbole n'est pas seulement un symbole chrétien, on sait qu'il était antérieur au christianisme. Avec les mahométans, ils partagent la vénération de Mahomet et des lieux saints de La Mecque. Sur les murs de leur temple, on peut lire des vers du Coran. Leur source sacrée, qui prend naissance sous le Temple du Soleil, porte le nom de 'Zem-Zem,' qui est celui de la source sainte de La Mecque, et la tradition rapporte que c'est Cheikh Adi⁽⁷⁾ qui l'a miraculeusement transportée de La Mecque à ces lieux. C'est dans cette source sainte que le Cheikh baptise les enfants. En outre, nous voyons sur les murs

(6) Il s'agit d'un temple situé en Irak, au nord de Mossoul.

(7) Cheikh Yezidié, législateur de la secte, qui vécut au 11^{me} ou au 12^{me} siècle de notre ère.

du Temple le soleil, la lune, les étoiles et, à côté du grand portail, l'image d'un immense serpent noir. Les Yezidiés ont aussi une vénération pour le feu et il y a sûrement une connexion avec la religion zoroastrienne.

"Tout cela sont des éléments étrangers. Il existe aussi des éléments originaux. Les Yezidis croient en un être supérieur, 'le Plus-Haut,' qu'ils appellent 'Yasdan,' et c'est probablement de là qu'ils font dériver leur nom, ce qui est beaucoup plus vraisemblable que les combinaisons avec l'usurpateur Yesid et la province 'Yezd' en Perse. Mais l'être suprême est beaucoup trop haut pour qu'on le vénère directement. Il est dans les cieux et ne se préoccupe point de la terre. De lui sont émanés sept grands esprits, dont le premier et le plus fort est 'Melek Taus,' qui n'est autre que le Diable. Et le second 'Melek Issa,' Jésus. C'est par Melek Taus que Dieu a fait créer le monde, et Dieu le lui a loué ensuite pour 10,000 ans, dont 6,000 se sont écoulés jusqu'à ce jour. Melek Taus est vénéré sous forme d'un paon en bronze qui, à ce qu'il paraît, existe en plusieurs exemplaires, lesquels sont transportés par les kawwals (quatrième caste) de village en village où le peuple les vénère."

Ainsi qu'il a été indiqué ci-dessus, les Yezidiés sont environ 25,000 dans le Djebel Sindjar. Ce nombre comprend, toutefois, un millier de musulmans mêlés aux premiers et habitant avec eux dans les villages de la montagne. Beled Sindjar, centre administratif du Sindjar, comprend une forte proportion de musulmans et de chrétiens.

A rappeler également (voir Chapitre II, (B), (b), 1) qu'il existe des Yezidiés en Syrie, au Kurd Dag, dans la région d'Amouda et chez les Kurdes Tchitiés, Aliane, Hassenane et Mirane.

Chrétiens.

Les chrétiens ne sont qu'un petit nombre dans la région étudiée. Ils font partie de la population sédentaire fixée dans les villages de :

Abou Kémal,
 Demir Kapou,
 Khanik.

Il s'en trouve également un certain nombre dans les villages des Kurdes semi-sédentaires de Syrie : Tchitiés, Aliane, Hassenane.

Ces chrétiens appartiennent à différents rites : syrien-catholique, jacobite, chaldéen-catholique, nestorien, arménien-catholique et arménien-grégorien.

Ainsi que l'a constaté la Commission de Frontière turco-irakienne de 1925, les chrétiens de ces régions entretiennent de bons rapports avec les Kurdes, leurs voisins. Une partie d'entre eux, fixée de tout temps dans la zone d'habitat des Kurdes, présente d'ailleurs le même type ethnique que ces derniers et parle la même langue.

Chapitre III.—CONSIDÉRATIONS D'ORDRE ÉCONOMIQUE (voir carte No. 8).

Les ressources économiques des régions affectées par le tracé de la frontière sont constituées par :

- (a) L'élevage,
- (b) L'agriculture,
- (c) Le commerce,
- (d) Certaines exploitations particulières (sel).

1. *Elevage.*

Il est pratiqué par la presque totalité des populations des régions étudiées, surtout par les semi-sédentaires et par les nomades. Ceux-ci possèdent de nombreux troupeaux de moutons et chèvres et de chameaux. Les semi-sédentaires sont surtout riches en moutons et en chèvres.

L'élevage, tel qu'il est pratiqué par ces populations, implique la disposition de zones de parcours plus ou moins vastes, portions de la steppe désertique décrite ci-dessus et dont les pâturages fournissent au cheptel sa nourriture.

2. Agriculture.

Est pratiquée par les populations sédentaires et demi-sédentaires des régions naturellement arrosées ou susceptibles d'être arrosées : bassin du Khabour, Sindjar, vallée de l'Euphrate.

Les principales productions sont les céréales (blé, orge, sorgho), des légumes, des fruits.

3. Commerce.

Consiste surtout dans la vente aux populations locales des produits manufacturés, généralement importés d'Europe : quincaillerie, tissus, certaines denrées alimentaires, &c., et dans la vente par les populations des produits de l'élevage ou de la culture : moutons, beurre, laines, peaux, d'une part, céréales, légumes, d'autre part.

Les principaux centres commerciaux en rapports avec les populations dont il s'agit sont :

Kamechlié et Demir Kapou, dans la zone nord ;
Hassetché sur le Khabour ;
Deir-ez-Zor, Mayadine, Abou Kémal, sur l'Euphrate.

(a) Kamechlié et Demir Kapou commercent avec les populations kurdes et arabes de la partie nord de la Djézireh : Mirane, Hassenane, Aliane, Tchitié, Tay, Chammar.

(b) Hassetché a pour clientèle non seulement les populations sédentaires, semi-sédentaires et nomades des régions syriennes du Khabour et de ses affluents, mais aussi les Yézidiés de la partie occidentale du Sindjar (fractions Samoukha et Ghiran). Ces derniers fréquentent le marché de Hassetché de préférence à celui de Mossoul, notablement plus éloigné.

(c) Deir-ez-Zor, Mayadine et Abou Kémal sont les centres d'approvisionnement et de vente des semi-sédentaires de la vallée de l'Euphrate (Ogueidat) et des nomades dont les territoires de parcours s'étendent de part et d'autre du fleuve (Anézé-Fedaan, Sbaa, d'un côté, Chammar de l'autre). Le rayonnement commercial d'Abou Kémal ne s'arrête cependant pas à la frontière (frontière actuelle *de facto*) ; il s'étend également aux semi-sédentaires habitant la partie de la vallée de l'Euphrate voisine de la frontière (Dulaim et alliés) et à certains éléments nomades d'Irak (Amarat).

4. Exploitations particulières.

La principale ressource n'entrant pas dans les catégories précédentes est celle qui est offerte par l'exploitation du sel des salines de Bouara, Reggassat, Bargouth, Saadif, Tchaabi, situées entre Abou Kémal et le Sindjar.

Ces salines ont de tout temps approvisionné les populations syriennes des vallées de l'Euphrate et du Khabour et les tribus nomades fréquentant la région.

Elles faisaient, en outre, sous le régime turc, l'objet d'une exploitation régulière organisée et contrôlée par les autorités administratives de Syrie au profit de la dette publique ottomane. On lit encore sur le portail de l'ancien Karakol (poste) de Bouara une inscription attestant qu'à partir de l'année financière 1319 (1903 de notre ère) cette saline et ses dépendances furent "régulièrement administrées, sous l'égide bienfaitrice et civilisatrice de Sa Majesté le Sultan, grâce à l'initiative et au zèle de M. Suleiman Bey, Directeur de la Dette publique à Alep."

Chapitre IV.—CONSIDÉRATIONS D'ORDRE POLITIQUE ET ADMINISTRATIF.

(A) Situation antérieure (voir carte No. 8).

Antérieurement à la conclusion de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, c'est-à-dire sous le régime turc, les régions affectées par le tracé de la frontière syro-irakienne appartenaient à quatre grandes circonscriptions administratives :

Le vilayet de Diarbékirkir, au nord ;
Le vilayet de Mossoul, à l'est ;
Le vilayet de Bagdad, au sud ;
Le sandjak autonome de Deir-ez-Zor, à l'ouest.

Les limites entre ces différentes circonscriptions sont données par la carte anglaise internationale au 1,100,000, qui a servi aux négociateurs de la convention de 1920.^(*)

Pour ce qui nous intéresse, ces limites étaient formées :

(a) Sur le Tigre et en Haute-Djézireh, entre le vilayet de Diarbékirkir et le vilayet de Mossoul,

Par une ligne coupant le Tigre à 2.5 kilom. en aval de Feischkhabour et se dirigeant d'abord vers le sud-ouest pour passer à 1 kilom. au sud de Rumelan Keui, puis se dirigeant vers l'est jusqu'à un point situé à environ 36 kilom. ouest-sud-ouest de Rumelan Keui.

(b) En Djézireh, entre le vilayet de Mossoul et le Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor, Par une ligne se dirigeant, du point précédent (36 kilom. ouest-sud-ouest de Rumelan Keui), sensiblement vers le sud-sud-est, à travers le Djébel-Sindjar, qu'elle coupait à environ 11 kilom. à l'est du village de Samoukha et à environ 20 kilom. à l'ouest de Beled-Sindjar, et aboutissant à un point situé près de Baniat Hamad, à environ 190 kilom. à l'est d'Abou Kémal.

(c) Sur l'Euphrate et de part et d'autre de ce fleuve, entre le Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad,

Par une ligne partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kémal.

Cette délimitation administrative appelle les observations suivantes :

(a) La limite entre les vilayets de Diarbékirkir et de Mossoul coupait le Tigre non pas à Feischkhabour, mais sensiblement en aval de ce point ;

(b) La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor et le vilayet de Mossoul partageait en deux le Sindjar, laissant au Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor une partie importante des villages et terrains de culture des Yezidiés ;

(c) La totalité des territoires des tribus Chammars des Zors, Djebbours, Ogueidat, était rattachée à une même circonscription administrative, celle du Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor.

Les limites ci-dessus indiquées, relevées sur la carte de la convention, ne paraissent toutefois pas avoir été fixées *ne varietur* sous le régime turc. Les documents en notre possession et les renseignements recueillis sur place montrent que des modifications leur ont été apportées à diverses époques. Il semble notamment que la limite entre le vilayet de Diarbékirkir et le vilayet de Mossoul, dans la région du Tigre, ait été fixée pendant longtemps notablement plus au sud. Des cartes administratives de l'Empire ottoman, datant d'avant la Grande Guerre, la font passer à environ 15 kilom. en aval de Feischkhabour. Aux dires des habitants de la région, son tracé à l'ouest du Tigre aurait correspondu à la limite sud des territoires des tribus kurdes Mirane, Hassenane et Aliane qui étaient administrées par le vilayet de Diarbékirkir. Cette dernière limite est formée par une ligne partant du confluent du ouadi Soueidiyé, affluent de droite du Tigre, à 28 kilom. en aval de Feischkhabour, et passant à 13 kilom. au sud du village actuel de Demir Kapou.

De même, la limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, sur l'Euphrate, aurait été tracée notablement plus au sud que celle indiquée par la carte anglaise au 1/1,000,000. D'après les déclarations des habitants de la région de Deir-ez-Zor,^(*) elle aurait été fixée, à une certaine époque, au ouadi Hauran, affluent de droite de l'Euphrate, dont le confluent se trouve à environ 180 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kémal. L'actuel caza de Anah et la région de pâturages de la Gaara (voir chapitres I, (A), (d), et II, (B), (d) 1), auraient fait partie du Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la carte anglaise au 1/1,000,000, dont il est admis que les négociateurs de la convention se sont servis, traduit une situation politique et administrative qui a existé. Le tracé qu'elle porte a été adopté pour définir la frontière entre le Tigre et Rumelan Keui. Les négociateurs de la convention ont également tenu compte, pour définir la frontière entre Rumelan Keui et le Tigre, du fait que le Sindjar était partagé en deux par la limite du vilayet de Mossoul et du Sandjak de Deir-ez-Zor. Ils ont, toutefois, spécifié expressément que le bassin du Khabour devait rester dans son intégralité à la Syrie.

(*) Geographical Section, General Staff, Édition de 1916, révisée en 1918.

(*) Voir en particulier accord du 5 mai 1920, Annexe No. 3.

(B) Situation politique et administrative actuelle.

Aux termes de l'article 2 de la convention de 1920,⁽¹⁰⁾ une commission constituée dans les trois mois qui suivaient la signature de cet acte, aurait dû fixer sur le terrain la ligne décrite à l'article 1^{er} du même texte. Mais, pour les raisons indiquées par la requête commune des Gouvernements britannique et français au Conseil de la Société des Nations,⁽¹¹⁾ et particulièrement en raison de l'incertitude subsistant sur l'attribution définitive du vilayet de Mossoul dont le sort ne devait être réglé que le 16 décembre 1925, et sur le tracé définitif de la frontière entre la Syrie et la Turquie dans la région du Tigre, fixé seulement par le Protocole franco-turc du 22 juin 1929, la délimitation prévue n'était pas effectuée.

Dans l'attente de cette opération, nécessaire pour que les deux parties intéressées puissent connaître les limites exactes jusqu'où leur action respective doit s'exercer, une situation provisoire s'établissait, souvent différente, par suite de circonstances locales, de la situation *de jure*, telle que celle-ci résulte du texte même de la convention.

Cette situation d'attente a donné lieu, au cours des onze années écoulées depuis 1920, à de nombreux échanges de vues entre les autorités de Syrie et d'Irak. Certains ont abouti soit à de véritables accords ayant un caractère durable, soit à des arrangements de caractère temporaire, destinés à régler des difficultés occasionnelles. Sur certains points, enfin, les deux parties se bornaient à des tolérances momentanées, réservant catégoriquement leurs droits jusqu'au règlement définitif de la question de frontière.

Parmi les accords durables, on peut citer, à titre d'exemple :

1. L'accord du 5 mai 1920, fixant la frontière provisoire dans la vallée de l'Euphrate;
2. L'accord du 31 juillet 1922, relatif à la sécurité de la piste Deir-ez-Zor-Mossoul.

Accord du 5 mai 1920 (voir Annexe No. 3).

Conclu entre les représentants du Gouvernement syrien et ceux du Gouvernement irakien, cet accord, qui a fixé, la limite provisoire dévolue à l'administration de l'une et l'autre partie dans la vallée de l'Euphrate, a été observé en fait jusqu'à ce jour. Une borne dite "borne Leachman" (du nom du négociateur irakien, le Colonel britannique Leachman) matérialisait sur le terrain le point de passage de cette limite. Cette borne est située à environ 8 kilom. au sud-est d'Abou Kémal.

Ainsi qu'il a été dit au Chapitre "Populations," la ligne passant par la borne Leachman ne constitue toutefois pas une démarcation exacte des zones d'habitat de la tribu Ogueidat qui ressortit de la Syrie et les Ogueidat n'ont cessé de réclamer une modification de la frontière dans cette région.

Accord du 31 juillet 1922 (voir pièce Annexe No. 4).

Cet accord (dit "Accord Cux-Flaxman," du nom de ses signataires) arrêta les mesures à prendre pour assurer la protection des voyageurs, convois ou caravanes se rendant de Deir-ez-Zor à Mossoul ou inversement. Le fonctionnement d'escortes, à dates déterminées, était institué. Le point de rencontre de ces escortes était fixé à El Bidéa, puits important, sensiblement au sud du Col de Samoukha (Sindjar)—sans toutefois "qu'aucun des Gouvernements intéressés puisse se prévaloir de ce choix pour établir ultérieurement des revendications territoriales."

Malgré cette dernière stipulation, El Bidéa a toujours été considéré comme un point de la frontière *de facto*, et a servi à définir les limites assignées à l'action administrative de l'un et l'autre Gouvernement (voir en particulier le paragraphe suivant, pour ce qui concerne la perception de l'impôt chez les Chammars).

Parmi les arrangements temporaires, il convient de mentionner divers arrangements relatifs à la perception de l'impôt du ouedi chez les Chammars et dont l'un, relatif aux opérations fiscales de l'année 1930, a pris la forme d'accords conclus entre le Délégué-Adjoint du Haut-Commissaire de la République française à Deir-ez-Zor et l'Inspecteur administratif à Mossoul, en date des

⁽¹⁰⁾ Voir Annexe No. 1.

⁽¹¹⁾ Voir Annexe No. 2.

28 février et 24 mars 1930. Ces accords présentent un intérêt particulier en ce qu'ils ont fixé une limite entre les territoires sur lesquels il est admis que la Syrie doit assurer l'administration des Chammars de son ressort et les territoires sur lesquels l'Irak doit assurer l'administration des Chammars de son ressort. Cette limite a été fixée comme suit (du nord vers le sud) :

Tell Roumelan, Ouadi Roumelan, Tell Tash, Col de Samoukha (Sindjar), Oumm-el-Diban, Tell Markab, El Bidéa, Mfallaga, Confluent du Ouadi Adjij et Ouadi Tidjarie, Tell Tchebed, centre de la saline de Bouara, Karakol de Bouara, rebord est de la falaise ouest de la saline de Bargouth, rebord ouest de la saline de Tchaabi.

En dehors de ces stipulations précises et ayant revêtu la forme écrite, un grand nombre de points touchant à l'action politique et administrative de l'une et l'autre partie ont été mis en discussion, au cours des onze années écoulées depuis la signature de la convention. La description complète de la situation qui en est résultée dans la zone frontière ne pourrait être présentée que sous la forme d'un inventaire des nombreux arrangements intervenus et des usages qui se sont établis au cours de cette période.

Chapitre V.—CONSIDÉRATIONS RELATIVES À LA SÉCURITÉ DU TERRITOIRE ET DES POPULATIONS.

Si l'on entendait procéder à l'étude du problème de la défense du territoire, dans cette partie des frontières syriennes, cette étude serait nécessairement dominée par un certain nombre de considérations, parmi lesquelles il convient de mentionner :

- (a) La configuration spéciale de la région connue sous le nom de "Bec de Canard" et qui constitue un accès de la Syrie sur le Tigre;
- (b) L'éloignement de cette région par rapport aux centres syriens (Deir-ez-Zor, Hassetché);
- (c) Le fait que la frontière établie par la convention de 1920, de même que celle résultant des accords franco-turcs, ne sont pas des frontières naturelles, tenant compte de données stratégiques, mais des frontières politiques;
- (d) L'importance, dans une telle situation, des positions dominantes et des possibilités de communication, pour l'organisation de la défense.

Ces mêmes considérations conservent toute leur valeur si l'on étudie le problème du maintien de la sécurité du territoire et des populations dans ces régions.

L'étude de ces différents problèmes comporte des développements qui n'entrent pas dans le cadre du présent mémoire.

Annexe No. 1.

Convention franco-britannique signée à Paris le 23 Décembre 1920.

LES Gouvernements français et britannique respectivement représentés par les plénipotentiaires soussignés,

Désireux de régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats sur la Palestine et sur la Mésopotamie et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés tous trois par le Conseil suprême à San Rémo,

Ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les limites entre les territoires sous mandat français et britannique de Syrie et Liban d'une part, et de Mésopotamie et de Palestine, de l'autre, sont fixées comme suit :

A l'est, le Tigre, depuis Djézireh-ibn-Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul;

[7797]

o 3

Au sud-est et au sud, ladite limite des anciens vilayets vers le sud jusqu'à Rumelan Koeui, de là, une ligne laissant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Kabour occidental et se dirigeant en ligne droite vers l'Euphrate, qu'elle franchit à Abou Kémal, puis une ligne droite aboutissant à Imtar au sud du Djebel Druze.

ARTICLE 2.

Une commission sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront la signature de la présente convention pour fixer sur le terrain la ligne frontière décrite à l'article 1^{er} ci-dessus entre les territoires sous mandat français et sous mandat britannique. Cette commission sera composée de quatre membres. Deux de ses membres seront nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, les deux autres seront nommés respectivement avec l'agrément de la Puissance mandataire par les Gouvernements locaux intéressés des territoires sous mandat français et britannique.

Les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seront portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision sera sans appel.

Les rapports de clôture de la commission donneront la description exacte de la frontière telle qu'elle aura été déterminée sur le terrain; les cartes nécessaires seront annexées et signées par la commission. Les rapports avec leurs annexes seront faits en trois exemplaires, le premier sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, le deuxième sera conservé par la Puissance mandataire et le troisième par l'autre Gouvernement intéressé.

Annexe No. 2.

Requête commune adressée par les Gouvernements britannique et français au Conseil de la Société des Nations en date des 10 et 11 Novembre 1931.

AU mois de décembre 1920, les Gouvernements français et britannique, désireux de régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats sur la Palestine et la Mésopotamie, et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés par le Conseil suprême à San Rémo, recherchèrent d'un commun accord une solution pratique à ces problèmes.

Les négociations engagées à cet effet par les deux Gouvernements aboutirent à la signature de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

L'article 1^{er} de cette convention fixait les limites entre les territoires sous mandat britannique et les territoires sous mandat français.

Aux termes de l'article 2, une commission mixte devait être chargée de reporter sur le terrain les limites ainsi fixées. Ce même article stipulait que les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seraient portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision serait sans appel.

Les deux Gouvernements décidèrent par la suite que la commission se conformerait aux dispositions de l'article 29 du Traité de Sèvres relatives aux lignes à déterminer sur le terrain.

La commission se réunit en juin 1921 et procéda à l'abornement de la frontière depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à El Hammé.

Au delà de ce point, elle se heurta à la difficulté d'établir un tracé qui tint compte des conditions locales. La commission ayant constaté l'impossibilité dans laquelle elle se trouvait de résoudre cette difficulté, suspendit ses travaux qui ne furent pas repris depuis lors.

La reprise de ces travaux supposait l'envoi à la commission de directives concertées entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni, et un examen des conditions d'application de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920 ne pouvait être utilement entrepris entre ces deux Gouvernements avant l'attribution définitive de toutes les parties des territoires auxquels s'appliquait cette convention.

Cette dernière condition s'étant trouvée réalisée du fait de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations, en date du 16 décembre 1925, et de la signature du Protocole franco-turc du 22 juin 1929, le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni procédèrent en commun à une étude du problème de la frontière non encore délimitée, telle qu'elle est définie par la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

La frontière qui reste à délimiter comprend deux sections :

- (a) La frontière entre la Syrie, le Djebel-Druze et la Transjordanie;
- (b) La frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak.

En ce qui touche la section (a), Syrie, Djebel-Druze, Transjordanie, le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni sont parvenus à résoudre les problèmes auxquels ils avaient à faire face, et ils sont tombés d'accord, sous réserve de l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, sur une ligne qui serait abornée sur le terrain par la commission prévue à l'article 2 de ladite convention.

En ce qui touche la section (b), Syrie, Irak, les deux Gouvernements se trouvèrent placés devant des difficultés analogues à celles qui avaient arrêté les travaux de la commission en 1921. Ces difficultés étaient de deux sortes. En premier lieu, des divergences d'opinion existaient au sujet de l'interprétation exacte de la définition de la frontière qui faisait l'objet de l'article 1^{er} de la convention. En second lieu, il fut constaté que, quelle que pût être l'interprétation donnée à l'article 1^{er} de la convention, une frontière tracée en stricte conformité avec cette interprétation serait vraisemblablement peu satisfaisante dans certains secteurs pour des raisons militaires, politiques, administratives, de tribus, économiques, géographiques ou autres.

Le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni considèrent qu'il n'entre pas dans la compétence d'une commission de délimitation, telle que celle qui se trouve visée par l'article 2 de la convention, d'apporter à la frontière définie par l'article 1^{er}, en ce qui touche la Section de Frontière Syrie-Irak, des modifications suffisantes pour faire disparaître les inconvénients mentionnés ci-dessus.

Le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni ne se trouvant pas en mesure, en raison de ces considérations, d'établir pour la commission en ce qui touche la Section de la Frontière Syrie-Irak, des instructions communes appropriées, et animés du désir de favoriser un règlement prompt, définitif et équitable d'une question d'importance primordiale pour les populations des territoires sur lesquels s'exercent leurs mandats respectifs, ont convenu d'inviter le Conseil de la Société des Nations à examiner tous les aspects des difficultés mentionnées ci-dessus et, après avoir établi ses conclusions en ce qui concerne les intentions que traduit l'article 1^{er} de la convention, à indiquer une frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak, définie sur la base de cette convention, mais modifiée, pour tenir compte des considérations susvisées, la définition de la frontière ainsi établie devant être acceptée par toutes les parties en cause comme constituant une solution définitive de la question frontière.

Les deux Gouvernements suggèrent que la tâche du Conseil serait facilitée par la désignation d'une commission qui recueillerait sur le terrain telles informations et ferait telles recommandations qui seraient susceptibles d'aider le Conseil dans l'élaboration de sa décision.

Annexe No 3.

Accord du 5 mai 1920 fixant la Frontière provisoire entre la Syrie et l'Irak dans la Vallée de l'Euphrate.

(Traduit de l'arabe.)

DANS le village d'El Achaharah,

Accord provisoire conclu entre :

Le Kaïmakam, Ali Jaudat Bey, et le Gouverneur militaire en second de Deir-ez-Zor, Muzhar Bey, représentants accrédités du Gouverneur militaire de Deir-ez-Zor, d'une part, et l'Agent politique Lt.-Colonel Leachman, d'autre part;

[7797]

Conformément aux ordres reçus par lui du commandant en chef à Bagdad, le colonel demanda que les limites provisoires entre le Gouvernement arabe de l'ouest et le Gouvernement britannique soient fixées entre Abou Kémal et El Quaim, entre les villages d'El Heri et d'Hasiba sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate, et entre El Baghuz et El Rabt sur la rive gauche. L'Armée britannique se retirera au delà de la frontière provisoire et laissera Abou Kémal au Gouvernement arabe.

A la demande ci-dessus, Ali Jaudat et Muzhar Bey, représentants accrédités du Gouverneur militaire de Deir-ez-Zor, donnèrent leur accord sur cette frontière provisoire.⁽¹²⁾

ALI, Kaimakam.

MUZHAR ARSLAN, 2^{me} Représentant
accrédité du Gouverneur militaire.

COLONEL LEACHMAN,
Agent politique.

Le 5 mai 1920.

Annexe No 4.

Accord du 31 juillet 1922 fixant les Mesures à prendre en vue de la Sécurité de la Piste Deir-ez-Zor-Mossoul.

(Texte français.)

NOUS, soussignés, M. J. M. Flaxman, et Capitaine Coux, représentant respectivement les Gouvernements irakien et syrien et délégués par les autorités de ces deux pays pour étudier les mesures à prendre en vue de la sécurité de la piste de Deir-ez-Zor à Mossoul, avons décidé, après discussion et mise au point de la question, de présenter à ces autorités les propositions suivantes, qui ont été jugées par nous comme les plus susceptibles de s'adapter aux conditions présentes et de donner des résultats :

1. Afin de supprimer l'usage des "khaouas" qui paralyse les transactions commerciales, et d'assurer la protection des caravanes contre les pillards ou les "rezzous," des escortes suffisantes seront désignées pour chacun des deux États intéressés, qui assureront leur service, respectivement dans chacun de leur territoire, les Syriens en Syrie, les Irakiens en Irak.

La protection des voyageurs en automobile, ou des convois automobiles, ne pouvant s'effectuer de même que pour les caravanes, par des escortes à cheval, en raison de leur vitesse, il sera recommandé à ces voyageurs de profiter du passage des escortes dans les zones difficiles ou incertaines, pour traverser, à ce moment, lesdites zones et obtenir, de la sorte, une protection indirecte qui pourra être efficace.

2. Les engagements pris par le Gouvernement irakien vis-à-vis de Cheikh Dahan-al-Hadi reconnaissant à ce seul chef Chammar le droit de percevoir des "khaouas," n'auront aucun effet sur les caravanes escortées. Seulement les automobiles qui passeraient insolément, sans protection d'escorte de caravane, s'exécuteraient, le cas échéant, sur la demande des représentants de ce chef.

Un taux de perception sera fixé ultérieurement par le Gouvernement irakien pour éviter l'arbitraire.

Ce privilège de Dahan-al-Hadi n'est que provisoire et le Gouvernement irakien tendra le plus tôt possible à sa suppression.

Du côté syrien, aucun privilège semblable n'est reconnu à aucun chef.

3. Les escortes et leur départ seront organisés de telle sorte que deux fois par mois, le 5 et le 20 de chaque mois, elles se rencontreront en un point déterminé ci-dessous.

Obligatoirement, il y aura mouvement de ces escortes deux fois par mois, même si au départ elles n'avaient aucune caravane à protéger.

Elles séjourneront jusqu'au 5 et 20 au soir, au lieu de rencontre de manière qu'il y ait liaison effective, échange dans de bonnes conditions et qu'en cas de retard dans la marche d'une escorte, il puisse y avoir un certain battement pour

⁽¹²⁾ La première partie, représentée par Ali Jaudat Bey et Muzhar Bey, réserve ses droits en ce qui concerne la frontière naturelle de Deir-ez-Zor, qui est le Wadi Hauran entre Anah et Hit, et considère cette frontière comme étant provisoire.

ALI, Kaimakam.

MUZHAR ARSLAN, 2^{me} Représentant.

lui permettre d'arriver. En principe, les escortes devront se trouver au lieu de rencontre, le 4 et le 20 de chaque mois avant midi.

4. En considération de la situation désertique, inhabitée et sans eau, du point où la piste coupe la frontière qui sépare les deux pays, l'éloignement considérable (60 à 70 kilom.) de ce point par rapport à tout lieu habité ou habitable, et l'impossibilité d'une rencontre des escortes, le point désigné "El Bidea" sur la carte anglaise au 1/250,000 et appelé "El Badiia" par les indigènes sans, bien entendu, qu'aucun des Gouvernements intéressés puisse se prévaloir de ce choix pour établir ultérieurement des revendications territoriales.

Mossoul, le 31 juillet 1922.

[E 2187/171/89]

No. 125.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

Damascus, April 8, 1932.

Sir,

AT the date of my last political report (despatch No. 17, Confidential, of the 11th February, 1932), the attitude of the Nationalist party towards the proposed elections was still undefined, but inclining on the whole to a boycott: their understanding of parliamentary institutions is extremely limited, and they could not conceive of occupying any position in a Chamber except that of an overwhelming majority, though it is possible that once in Parliament they will not be slow in discovering the privileges of a minority, nor backward in exploiting them.

2. Syrian politicians in Egypt and Geneva preached abstention from the elections, and for some time this simple method of remaining pure and incorruptible in the eyes of the electorate kept its strong appeal to Nationalist politicians: however, a number of their leaders decided for participation, with or without the consent of the party. Prolonged negotiations ensued with the French High Commissioner's delegate, and agreement was reached that the elections would be free if the Nationalists guaranteed not to enter more than six candidates for the nine contested seats, the remainder being reserved for three pro-French Moslem candidates; at the last moment a seventh Nationalist insisted on standing, and in face of a warning from M. Solomiac that his entering would invalidate the compact, one of the official six Nationalists stood down and the primary elections were accordingly held on the 30th March with every circumstance of freedom.

3. The procedure which I had outlined to M. Solomiac on the 23rd December, 1931, and reported in my despatch No. 105 of the same date was applied in full, and complete satisfaction was expressed on all sides. The French military authorities occupied all strategic points with tanks and machine-gun parties, and took other exceptional measures to maintain public security, which are still in force.

4. The secondary elections took place on the 6th April; the same military precautions were taken and somewhat intensified in the square adjoining the municipality, which constituted the only polling station. This square, which was the scene of the riots of the 20th December, 1931, was occupied by a number of tanks and the issues were held by strong detachments of Senegalese.

5. The results are not quite complete: the tenth candidate failed to obtain more than half the total votes cast, and a further ballot will be held to-morrow. The list was inevitably headed by the Jewish Deputy, who was unopposed: six Nationalists follow, and two of the three French nominees. The full results with notes on the personalities are given in an appendix to this despatch. Rikabi Pasha, whom the delegation were most anxious to see elected, is second among the candidates who failed to obtain the requisite number of votes; the first is Nessib Bakri, an ex-leader of revolution turned moderate, but more to the Nationalists' liking than Rikabi, who is hated and feared.

6. Sheikh Taj-ed-Din disregarded the High Commissioner's warning and entered his name as a candidate, and meeting M. Ponsot at the Légion d'Honneur ball a few days later was rewarded by as gross a personal affront as I have ever seen administered. He only succeeded in obtaining 112 votes, and leaves the political arena unregretted by anyone.

7. Monarchist candidates failed to register more than a very few votes, and a monarchist success is not to be expected unless there was some very special circumstance such as an immediate prospect of union with Iraq.

8. Nationalists are in high feather at the results and are already discounting the possibilities of achieving a majority in the Chamber. There are in all sixty-nine Deputies, of whom seventeen are avowed Nationalists returned chiefly by Damascus, Hama and Homs. The great majority of the Deputies are nonentities from the rural constituencies, whom it is hoped to gather into the Nationalist fold, at least when controversial issues are under discussion.

9. The Acting Administrator, Tawfiq-el-Hayani, on whose appointment I commented in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 94 of the 23rd November, 1931, conducted the elections in such a way as to earn universal commendation. Wasseq-el-Muayyad, whom he replaced, is reported to be returning from leave immediately after the elections: it would be regrettable if the latter was again established in a position where his energy provoked such unfortunate results; his talents could be conveniently accommodated at the head of Posts and Telegraphs, which the departure of a French adviser has left vacant.

10. The French delegate, M. Solomiac, may be considered to have achieved a notable personal success in securing the election of Mohamed Ali Beg El Abed and Hakki Beg El Azm, in view of the most unpropitious atmosphere of the last three months, though he may expect small thanks from his countrymen. The High Commissioner does not seem to smile on him, and the French army detests him cordially for his failure to carry the original elections by force on the 20th December, 1931. There is no doubt that he was wise to claim his promotion before he came to Damascus, the grave of so many promising reputations.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, to the British Resident at Amman, and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Appendix.

(NOTE.—There are 649 secondary electors, each of whom must vote for eight Moslems, one Christian and one Jew: the last was unopposed, while the Christian vote was split.)

Yussef Liniado, 607 votes. Jew; his political colour is that of his environment.

Jemil Beg Mardam Beg, 542 votes. Nationalist.

Faiz Beg El Khouri, 530 votes. Christian. Nationalist.

Zeki Beg El Khatib, 518 votes. Nationalist.

Fakhri Beg El Baroudi, 506 votes. Nationalist.

Ihsan Beg El Sherif, 490 votes. Nationalist. (This is the unofficial candidate whose insistence on standing entailed the withdrawal of Said Beg El Ghazzi, a much better man on all counts.)

Mohamed Ali Beg El Abid, 409 votes. Moderate, but regarded by Nationalists as one of themselves.

Hakki Beg El Azm, 333 votes. Moderate and declared pro-Mandate.

The above obtained the requisite absolute majority.

Nessib Beg El Bakri, 284 votes. Moderate, but prepared to become Nationalist.

Rida Pasha Rikabi. Pro-French, or thought by the French to be so. Not Nationalist in any case. 267 votes.

Munif Beg Aidi, 210 votes. Professor in the Faculty of Medicine; contingent Nationalist.

Iklil Muayyad, 122 votes. Landowner; not in politics; probable Nationalist.

Shaykh Taj-ed-Din, 112 votes.

Sherif El Hajjar, 91 votes. Monarchist.

Suleiman Effendi Jokhadar, 88 votes. Ex-President of the Cassation Court. Member of the Reform party.

Nazih El Muayyad, 80 votes. Dr. Shahbander's brother-in-law: turncoat.

Yahya Kazim, 73 votes. Monarchist.

Awni Kudmani, 61 votes. Member of the Reform party.

Daoud Mardini, 48 votes. Independent.

Yussef Issa, 48 votes. Christian. Editor of "Alif Ba" newspaper.

Abdul Kader Sirri, 36 votes. Monarchist. Professor in the Faculty of Medicine.

Ahmad Rateb, 25 votes. Monarchist.

Sami Midani, 20 votes. Independent. Professor of International Law in the School of Law.

Mazhar Abed, 18 votes. Independent.

Assad Abu Shaer, 17 votes. Christian. Ex-President of the Commercial Court. Member of the Reform party.

Izzat Iztaz, 15 votes. Independent.

Habib Kahaleh, 9 votes. Christian. Independent.

Wadi Mallouk, 7 votes. Christian. Independent.

[E 2524/171/89]

No. 126.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 48.)

Sir,

Beirut, May 10, 1932.

FOR some time past the burning question of the hour has been that of the successor to M. Charles Debbas, whose second and final term of office as President of the Lebanese Republic was due to expire on the 25th May.

2. By article 73 of the Constitution the Chamber has to meet to elect the new President at least one month and, at the most, two months before his predecessor's mandate terminates. It has to be convoked by its President to meet for this purpose. Failing a summons within the prescribed time the Chamber assembles "de plein droit" on the tenth day before the President's term of office is due to terminate.

3. It was expected that the Chamber would meet some time towards the end of April. It did not, however, do so, and it was, therefore, assumed that automatically it would assemble on the tenth day as stated above.

4. The failure of the Chamber to meet and do its duty was largely due to the attitude adopted by its President, Sheikh Mohamed-el-Jiar. The latter is a skilled politician who exercises such influence that his support was necessary for any candidate who hoped to succeed. He is an intimate friend of M. Debbas and was considered with the latter to be the power behind the throne. It was at one time believed that he was prepared to play a similar part in regard to M. Beshara-el-Khoury, who was, rightly or wrongly, considered to be the candidate enjoying the support of the French High Commissioner. Then a quarrel occurred, and the sheikh appears to have realised that he could with a good chance of success aspire to the throne itself. He, therefore, came forward as a definite candidate for the presidency. He is, of course, a Moslem, and, although the office of President is technically open to all, the Lebanon is still so deeply wedded to confessional ideas that the appointment of a Moslem President could not but have been most distasteful to the Christians who form the majority of the population. He had interviews with the High Commissioner on several occasions, but if, as is believed, M. Ponsot tried to induce him to withdraw, the attempt was a failure and the sheikh maintained his candidature up to the end. There were numerous other candidates in the field, of whom only one, M. Emile Eddé, was in any way outstanding. He was Prime Minister for some six months in the years 1929-30, but his brusque and violent methods were unsuccessful. He was believed to be distasteful to the High Commissioner, and for that reason to have no chance.

5. As the weeks passed in bargaining and chaffering, criticism, both public and private, of the administration and of the system which had rendered it possible became increasingly pronounced. It seemed to be realised more and more clearly that, whoever the new President might be, things would after his election go on much as before. Such a state of things as has

existed for some time might, if the times were normal, have provoked no greatly marked discontent, but, with the effects of the world economic crisis becoming increasingly felt, dissatisfaction naturally tended to grow apace. For some time past trade has been bad, money has been scarce and the revenue has been seriously falling off. To counteract this numerous increases in the custom duties affecting all classes have been made. This state of things had brought it home to all that a small country like the Lebanon simply cannot afford the costly and cumbersome constitutional equipment with which M. de Jouvenel endowed it. It will be remembered that, when in May 1926 the latter rushed through the Constitution, he took good care to clear out of the country as soon as possible, leaving his successors to face the effects of what was by some at least regarded as a rather poor jest. Quite apart from the cost of the thing, its results—nepotism, undue influence, venality, constant intriguing and interference on the part of Deputies and politicians—were disastrous to the well-being of the country. During the past week or so public demonstrations of protest, in the organisation of which a body known as the "Party of Republican Independence" took a leading part, had occurred. This body sent a deputation to Bkerkeh, to which the Maronite Patriarch expressed in no uncertain terms his dissatisfaction with the present situation. The Maronite Archbishop also expressed himself on the same lines. In general there was a tendency to popular agitation which seemed to be growing.

6. It was presumably this growing agitation which led M. Ponsot, who is accused of being over-slow and over-deliberate, to decide that the time had come when he must act and act decisively. Although there was no special indication on the 8th May that anything unusual was about to happen, on the following day he issued, as I reported in my telegram No. 4 of the 9th May, the two decrees of which copies are enclosed. Under them the Constitution is temporarily and partially suspended, the office of President disappears, and the Ministers and Chamber cease for the time being to function. M. Debbas becomes Chief of the State, retaining his title of President, and is to administer the country with the help of a Council of Directors, i.e., the heads of the different services, finance, public works, and so on, as defined in article 3 of Decree No. L/R 55. Legislative acts have to be approved by the High Commissioner. The country is, therefore, to a large extent back where it was prior to M. de Jouvenel's unfortunate experiment.

7. M. Ponsot's decisive action came as a surprise. His decisions seem to meet with a general measure of approval, and there is a surprising absence of criticism, which shows that he correctly chose the moment for intervention. Criticism will in due course make itself felt, especially as much more than is possible is probably expected. The next few months will probably be a period of calm and presumably also one of preparations for the reorganisation which is now generally recognised to be necessary.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire du 9 mai 1932 No. L/R 55, pris en exécution de l'Acte de Mandat portant, à titre temporaire, Suspension partielle de l'Application du Statut organique de la République libanaise.

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1932,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu le décret du 3 septembre 1926 portant nomination du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu le statut organique promulgué le 14 mai 1930,

Vu l'article 90 de la Constitution de la République libanaise ainsi conçu :

"Les pouvoirs établis par la présente Constitution s'exerceront sous réserve des droits et des devoirs de la Puissance mandataire, tels qu'ils résultent de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et de l'Acte de Mandat."

Attendu que le vœu général de la population du Liban s'est exprimé avec force depuis l'origine de la crise économique qui met aujourd'hui en danger l'équilibre des finances libanaises pour la revision du régime politique actuel dans

le sens d'un allègement notable des charges pesant sur le contribuable du fait d'une organisation qui, à l'usage, s'est révélée trop lourde et trop onéreuse pour les ressources du pays;

Attendu que ce vœu, qui se rattache aux observations formulées dès le mois de juin 1931 à la Société des Nations, au cours de la vingtième session de la Commission permanente des Mandats, s'est fait encore plus pressant à la suite du déséquilibre financier, conséquence dont le caractère mondial ne saurait masquer les causes plus spéciales au Liban;

Attendu que cet appel s'est précisé d'une manière particulière à la veille d'une élection qui dans l'esprit public était de nature à consolider le régime pour une période nouvelle de six ans, en rejetant au second plan les réformes nécessaires;

Attendu qu'en cas d'urgence, il incombe à la Puissance mandataire d'assumer la responsabilité des mesures immédiates propres à sauvegarder, dans l'intérêt du pays, les fins essentielles du mandat, sous réserve d'en rendre compte à la Société des Nations suivant la prévision inscrite à l'article 17 de l'Acte de Mandat;

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. Est suspendue, à titre temporaire, l'application de la Constitution libanaise pour ce qui touche l'organisation et le fonctionnement du pouvoir exécutif et du pouvoir législatif.

Art. 2. Pendant cette période intérimaire, le Chef du Gouvernement désigné par arrêté du Haut-Commissaire exerce le pouvoir exécutif avec l'appui de la Puissance mandataire.

Le Chef du Gouvernement est assisté, à cet effet, du Conseil des Directeurs des Services généraux.

Art. 3. Les Services de l'Etat restent répartis entre les Services généraux suivants : Justice, Intérieur, Finances, Travaux publics, Instruction publique, Agriculture, Hygiène et Assistance publique.

Le Conseil peut s'adjoindre des conseillers techniques et des experts qualifiés.

Art. 4. Le Chef du Gouvernement a qualité, pendant la période intérimaire, pour prendre des décrets ayant force de loi, notamment en matière budgétaire, sur avis conforme du Conseil des Directeurs.

Les décrets de caractère législatif sont pris avec la sanction du Haut-Commissaire, qui les rend exécutoires.

Art. 5. Le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur le jour même de sa promulgation.

HENRI PONSOT.

Beyrouth, le 9 mai 1932.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire du 9 mai 1932 No. L/R 56, relatif à la désignation du Chef du Gouvernement, à l'entrée en fonctions du Conseil des Directeurs et à la cessation des fonctions de la Chambre des Députés et des Ministres, pour la période intérimaire correspondant à la suspension partielle de la Constitution.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'arrêté de ce jour portant, à titre temporaire, suspension partielle de la Constitution libanaise,

Arrête :

Article 1^{er}. M. Charles Debbas est chargé, avec son titre actuel, des fonctions de Chef du Gouvernement dans les conditions prévues par l'arrêté de ce jour portant suspension partielle de la Constitution.

Art. 2. Les Directeurs libanais actuellement en fonctions sont chargés de l'expédition des affaires sous l'autorité directe du Chef du Gouvernement.

Art. 3. Des commissions techniques seront constituées à l'effet de rechercher les mesures propres à alléger sans délai les charges de l'Etat.

Art. 4. Les Ministres en exercice cessent leurs fonctions à partir de ce jour.

Art. 5. Les sessions de la Chambre sont suspendues.

HENRI PONSOT.

D. TETREAU.

Beyrouth, le 9 mai 1932.

[E 2645/171/89]

No. 127.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 7, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit notes on the political situation since the completion of the elections reported in my despatch No. 27 of the 11th April, 1932.

2. Although Nationalist opinion had been sharply divided on the advisability of entering the elections, the success of their candidates furnished the occasion of exuberant rejoicings.

3. It was, however, difficult to sustain the note, and the electorate showed signs of flagging interest as politicians settled down to their "combinazioni" and nothing very much happened. The new Deputies then decided to return the congratulatory visits which they had received on their election, and made triumphal progresses to the different quarters every evening for a fortnight. These were the occasion of inflammatory speeches, most of which I am inclined to believe went a little further than the real sentiments of the orators.

4. Events in Syria increasingly reflect a conflict of opinion between the French delegates at Damascus and Aleppo, both of whom appear to be on excellent terms with their local Deputies. M. Lavastre is here thought to have inspired the creation at Aleppo of the new "Free Constitutional party," the main object of which is to transfer the centre of political activity—and the Chamber itself—to the north. M. Solomiac on the other hand is confidently stated to be completely identified with the Nationalist point of view, and Damascus expects Soubhi Barakat to be discarded like so many of his predecessors. The presidencies of the republic, the Chamber and the council are being dealt and redealt between Mohamed Ali Beg El Abid, Haqqi Beg El Azm and Hashem Beg El Atassy.

5. Parliament is not expected to open before the end of this month nor to sit for more than a few days for the election of these officials. It will then adjourn till M. Ponsot's return from leave.

6. At yesterday's annual commemoration of the "Martyrs"—Syrian patriots executed by Jemal Pasha—the customary speeches and poems were delivered, all tending to complete independence and the expulsion of the European; one of these poems was so affecting as to reduce members of the committee to tears. There is little doubt that these are the real aspirations of the Arabs, though in calmer moments they will admit that in the past they have never been united, except under a foreign domination, and that the withdrawal of French troops would be followed by anarchy.

7. Meanwhile Nationalist leaders are being sharply criticised for their excessive readiness to negotiate with the French, and accused of placing their private advantage before the public interest. It is felt that they were wrong in agreeing to the bargain by which they obtained only six seats out of nine, and they are suspected of consenting to a further deal, by which they will secure two Ministries in the forthcoming Government, at the cost of their independence. Most of the censure is directed on Jemil Mardam Beg, who probably deserves it.

8. More serious is the growing impatience of commercial and agricultural classes, who bear most of the burden of the taxes and derive very little benefit. The existing customs policy is incoherent and capricious and, for one individual who may be assisted by it, the rest of the market is certain to be mulcted.

9. The case of the agricultural classes is far worse, for they have no hope of passing the burden on to others. The system of taxation applied in 1926 has been rendered intolerable by subsequent fluctuations of exchange; since I reported on it in my despatch No. 86 of the 13th June, 1927, the position has in no way improved. As the farming class is unorganised and inarticulate—in short, because it cannot go on strike—its grievances are customarily ignored; for this the Syrian officials are perhaps more to blame than the French.

10. A succession of four bad years has not been compensated by any serious concessions on the part of overstuffed administrations anxious only to assure the payment of their own salaries. Failure of winter rains and a recent ground frost have entirely destroyed hill crops and the grapes in the plains, and whole districts are faced with the prospect of starvation.

11. There are many indications that the limit of endurance of the farmer has nearly been reached.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 3099/171/89]

No. 128.

Vice-Consul Monck-Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Aleppo, May 28, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 22nd January regarding the political situation and the Syrian elections at Aleppo, I have the honour to report that, whereas at Damascus there has been, as I understand, some fraternisation between the extremists and the moderates, this is far from being the case at Aleppo, where the latter are still regarded by the former as traitors to the cause and looked upon with implacable hatred.

2. This hatred, which is inter-Moslem, and not caused by any religious fanaticism, has since the general election taken the form of terrorism. Numbers of Moderate Deputies and adherents have had their lives threatened, attempted, and taken; there have been no less than twenty-six casualties since January last, and the culmination was reached a few days ago when one Omar-ed-Dayeh, a leading member of the Moderate party, who returned with interest the dislike shown towards him by the extremists in his quarter, was murdered at the fourth attempt. Although he was attacked in the street and in broad daylight no one can be found who will inform against the assassin. The murdered man's grave has been guarded, the extremists having threatened to remove the body and throw it into the sewers.

3. As most of the Syrian judicial authorities here are of the Extremist party, it is extremely unlikely that either the murderer of Omar-ed-Dayeh or other political criminals will ever be brought to justice—in any case the judges would be afraid to convict.

4. I understand from a reliable source that the majority of the newly-elected Moderates from the Aleppo area are seriously considering resigning their seats unless the mandatory authorities can guarantee to protect their lives. The délégué-adjoint is much worried, and has done his best to dissuade them from taking a measure which might have far-reaching effects, and make matters very difficult for the mandatory Power.

5. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 3223/171/89]

No. 129.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 8, 1932.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 35 of the 7th May, on political events in Syria, and with particular reference to paragraph 5, I have the honour to report that the first session of the new Parliament took place yesterday.

2. The Deputies were summoned by a decree dated the 2nd June, to meet in extraordinary session on the 7th June, and the agenda laid down exactly: Firstly, election of officials, secondly, election of the President of the Republic, thirdly, approval of the elections of Deputies, and, finally, determination of salaries of the President of the Republic and the Deputies. This business completed, the session to be closed.

3. The Deputies from Aleppo were confined to their hotels, ostensibly as a measure of protection, and every precaution was taken to prevent popular manifestations or disturbances. The military authorities took charge of public security.

4. The session opened at about 9 A.M.; a large number of notables had been invited to attend, but no invitation was extended to foreign representatives.

5. The High Commissioner's delegate and M. Helleu of the High Commissioner's immediate staff were present with a number of other French officials. The text of the decree convening the Parliament was read, and the oldest Deputy, Mohamed Adali of Antioch, assumed the functions of President. Fakhri Baroudi called on the assembly to observe two minutes' silence in memory of Fozi-el-Ghazi (paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 27 of the 29th April, 1930), the author of the Constitution. He then asserted the right of the Deputies to act according to their conscience without fear of external influences. Shaker Nimat Shabani (Aleppo) expressed his agreement.

6. The Acting President then endeavoured to proceed to business, when Zeki-el-Khatib (Damascus) commenced a long oration, and continued to speak in spite of the President's injunctions: Faiz-el-Khourri (Damascus) also joined in, and a general uproar ensued. The President ordered a policeman to remove Faiz-el-Khourri, who refused to leave the tribune, aptly quoting Mirabeau: "Nous sommes ici par la volonté du peuple, et nous n'en sortirons que par la puissance des baïonnettes." The policeman was ejected. The President adjourned the meeting for twenty minutes, until comparative calm was restored.

7. The session was reopened and lemonade was served to the Cabinet. Faiz-el-Khourri protested against the terms of the decree summoning the Parliament, which he stated was contrary to article 45 of the Constitution, and a discussion ensued between him and the High Commissioner's delegate, from which it appeared that the French and Arabic texts do not agree. Nuri-el-Asfari (Idlib, Aleppo) intervened with a suggestion that the House should get on with the election of the President.

8. The result of the first ballot was Soubhi Barakat (Moderate) 28 votes, Hakki-el-Azm (pro-French) 23, Hashem-el-Atassi (Nationalist) 17. None of the candidates having polled half the votes, a second ballot was held. Nationalists abstained and Soubhi Barakat received 30 votes, Hakki-el-Azm 23, and Hashem-el-Atassi 2. Soubhi Barakat took the presidential chair, and stated that he would endeavour to work in harmony with all parties and in particular the Nationalists.

9. Other officials were then elected, the whole of the posts falling to Deputies from the north, with a regular vote of about 30. The officers appointed are: Vice-Presidents, Selim Jambert (Aleppo) and Mohammed-el-Fatih (Deir-ez-Zor); secretaries, Latif Ghanimeh (Aleppo) and Mohamed-el-Joreb (Alexandretta); "Questeurs" (internal administration of Parliament), Aref Jazzar (Jebel Sam'an), Moise der Kaloustian (Antioch), and Minan Niazi (Izaz).

10. The Nationalist Deputies then asked for an adjournment, as it was clear that their candidate for the Presidency of the Republic could not hope for success; Shaker Nimat Shabani (Aleppo) opposed the motion, but Soubhi Barakat suspended the session for half an hour, and when it was resumed Shaker Nimat Shabani withdrew his objections, and it was decided to postpone the election of the President of the Syrian Republic until the 11th June. Soubhi Barakat announced this decision and expressed his desire that Deputies should no longer be imprisoned in their hotels.

11. It is quite impossible to forecast the result.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 35/35/93]

No. 130.

Mr. Morgan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 4, 1932.)

(No. 447.)

Sir,

Angora, December 30, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 430 of the 22nd December, regarding the visit to Turkey of Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, I have the honour to report that he arrived at Angora on the 28th instant, and was met at the station by Ismet Pasha. He has since been engaged in negotiations for the conclusion of commercial, residence and extradition treaties, and in discussion of problems relating to the Turco-Iraqi frontier.

2. He has informed me that the negotiations are proceeding smoothly. He had expected that Turkey would make difficulties about accepting his proposal that Iraqi shepherds should be allowed access with their flocks to Turkish pastures, even though he offered to pay rent for the privilege, and his expectations have proved correct. While not flatly rejecting his proposal, the Turkish negotiators do so in effect, by objecting to the shepherds being either Assyrians or tribesmen.

3. With regard to the security of the frontier, the Turks seem willing to delegate authority to a Turkish gendarmerie officer, to be stationed close to the frontier to act promptly in case of frontier raids in concert with a specially appointed Iraqi frontier officer. Nuri Pasha's suggestion that Turkish troops should be sent to the frontier to close it to followers of Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, who has recently been disturbing the peace in Iraq, was met by the statement that it was impracticable, as no troop movements would be possible in the district concerned until June.

4. The Turkish attitude towards Assyrians is interesting. Although unwilling to allow Assyrian shepherds to enter Turkey, the Turkish Government some years ago raised no objection to the return of about 500 Assyrians from Iraq to their native mountains in Turkey, where they still are, and now urge Nuri Pasha to do what he can to prevent the Assyrians now settled in Iraq near the Turkish frontier from emigrating to Syria, firstly, because they can be used in Iraq to keep their Kurdish neighbours in check, and secondly, because Turkey does not wish that Assyrians should go to swell the non-Moslem minorities already established in Syria close to the Turkish frontier.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 227/35/93]

No. 131.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 8, 1932.

WITH reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 447 of the 30th December, 1931, regarding the Turco-Iraq negotiations at Angora for the conclusion of commercial, residence and extradition treaties, I have the honour to report that Nuri Pasha hopes to reach agreement with the Turkish Government within a day or two.

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2. According to Nuri Pasha the final form of the commercial and residence treaties will call for little comment. As for the Extradition Treaty, he has admitted that the murder of a Prime Minister of Turkey or Iraq shall not be considered a political offence, and has resisted Turkish pressure on him to agree that Iraq should deliver up non-Iraqis—other than Turks—accused or convicted of offences committed in Turkey. He went, however, as far as to promise that Iraq would be willing to deliver up to Turkey Persians or Syrians accused or convicted of offences committed in Turkey, but declined to give this promise in writing, either in the treaty or as an annex to the treaty. With regard to Europeans guilty of offences in Turkey, the Turkish negotiators grumbled at Nuri Pasha's refusal to agree that Iraq should deliver them up to Turkey, and their annoyance found vent in the remark that his refusal was, no doubt, forced on him by Europeans, who, they said, were still unwilling to trust Turkish justice. Coming to the question of expenses incurred in extraditing wanted persons, the two parties would agree that each would abstain from claiming a refund from the other.

3. Other matters treated during the negotiations were—

- (a) Co-operation on the Turco-Iraq frontier, with regard to which it was agreed that special frontier officers should be appointed by both sides to keep in close touch in order to deal promptly with frontier incidents.
- (b) Access of Iraq flocks to Turkish grazing grounds. This question was still unsettled.
- (c) Entry of Iraq dates into Turkey. Turkey had agreed to allow dates to the value of £T.100,000 to enter annually, with a 12 per cent. preferential reduction of customs duty.
- (d) Turkish participation in Iraq oil royalties, with regard to which I am sending a separate despatch.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 260/35/93]

No. 132.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 1. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Angora, 11, 1932.

RESIDENCE Convention and Treaties of Commerce and Extradition between Turkey and Iraq were signed at Angora yesterday. Press states that first two agreements are based on most-favoured treatment and that ratifications will be exchanged at Bagdad.

Texts will be forwarded as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 1, Saving.)

[E 369/9/93]

No. 133.

IRAQ: PROPOSED RELEASE FROM MANDATORY RÉGIME.

(Confidential.)

Memorandum for British Representative on the Council of the League.

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I.—INTRODUCTORY.

(a) Historical and Explanatory.

FROM the time when His Majesty's Government, at the San Remo Conference in April 1920, accepted the invitation of the Principal Allied Powers to assume the position of mandatory for Iraq their aim has been to secure the establishment, as early as possible, of a fully independent and self-reliant State of Iraq, fit for membership of the League of Nations. This is, indeed, in accordance with the spirit and intention of article 22 of the Covenant of the League, in virtue of which the mandate system exists. The administration of Iraq has for eleven years been shaped with the above end in view.

2. There exists, in fact, no formal mandate for Iraq. National consciousness in the country was so highly developed from the outset that direct foreign administration was quickly shown to be unsuited to the circumstances. An attempt to apply the Indian method of direct government was largely responsible for the widespread rebellion of 1920, and, when this had been suppressed, His Majesty's Government decided to embody their relations with the Iraq Government in the form of a treaty of alliance, concluded on equal terms. This treaty, signed in October 1922, was accepted by the Council of the League in 1924, in place of a mandate in the usual form, as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant.

3. Under article 6 of this treaty His Britannic Majesty undertook to use his good offices for the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible; and by a subsequent protocol it was agreed that the treaty should terminate upon Iraq becoming a member of the League, and, in any case, not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey.

4. In 1925 a League commission was sent out to examine the question of the boundary between Iraq and Turkey. The point at issue was the fate of the Mosul vilayet. The commission, in its report, was somewhat guarded. It held that, provided the British mandatory régime was maintained for a further considerable period, the Mosul vilayet ought to go to Iraq, but that it was preferable that it should go to Turkey, if the mandatory régime in Iraq was to come to an early termination. It may be noted, however, that the soundness of this latter conclusion was always open to serious question. On this point, see also Appendix V below.

5. The Council of the League, on the basis of this report, decided to award the entire Mosul vilayet to Iraq, but simultaneously invited His Majesty's Government to conclude a new treaty with Iraq, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the existing mandatory régime, *unless Iraq should be admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period.*

6. The result of this was the conclusion of a new treaty between Great Britain and Iraq in January 1926, extending the period of validity of the 1922 treaty for twenty-five years from December 1925, unless, before the expiration of that period, Iraq should have become a member of the League. This treaty recalled the undertaking in the 1922 treaty to recommend Iraq for admission to the League as soon as possible, and provided that the possibility of making this recommendation should be examined at successive intervals of four years (dating from August 1924).

7. A further stage in the progress of Iraq was marked by the unratified treaty of 1927, by article 8 of which His Majesty's Government undertook to support the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932 (one of the quadrennial dates contemplated in the 1926 treaty), "provided the present rate of progress in Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval." This proviso created much suspicion in Iraq as to the real intention of His Majesty's Government, and, following on representations from successive High Commissioners, the necessity for its retention was re-examined in 1929. The conclusion reached was that Iraq had made such marked and real progress that, in the absence of some really serious and wholly unlooked-for set-back, she would in 1932, judged by the criteria of internal security, sound public finance and enlightened administration, be fit in every way for admission to the League. The High Commissioner was accordingly authorised to inform the Iraq Government, without proviso or qualification, that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League in 1932, and on the 4th November, 1929, the Secretary-General of the League was requested to inform the Council that His Majesty's Government proposed in 1932 to recommend Iraq for admission to the League. It may be added that, in the opinion of the late Sir G. Clayton, who was then High Commissioner for Iraq, unless this unqualified and binding guarantee on the part of His Majesty's Government had been given, it would have been impossible to find any Iraqi Ministry willing to take office or to continue the administration of the country.

(b) *Present Position.*

8. The decision of His Majesty's Government to recommend Iraq for admission to the League does not mean that in their view Iraq has attained an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability. His Majesty's Government have aimed at setting up within fixed frontiers a self-governing State enjoying friendly relations with neighbouring States and equipped with stable legislative, judicial and administrative systems and all the working machinery of a civilised Government. They believe this aim to have been accomplished and consider that Iraq is now capable of conducting her own affairs without mandatory control and advice.

(c) *Importance of securing Admission of Iraq to the League in 1932.*

9. It will be seen from the foregoing that our relations with the Iraqi Government for many years have been conditioned by our promise to recommend Iraq for admission to the League of Nations at an early date. The recent

increasingly satisfactory development of our relations with Iraq has been primarily due to our unqualified undertaking to endeavour to secure the termination of the mandatory régime and the admission of Iraq to the League in 1932. If the Iraqi Government and people were now to be disappointed in their hopes of release from the mandatory régime and admission to the League in the present year, and were to come to the conclusion that His Majesty's Government had failed adequately to implement their undertaking, the whole basis of our relationship with the Iraqi Government and of the present régime in Iraq would be placed in danger of collapse. It is extremely doubtful whether any Iraqi Government could be found willing to continue to administer the country, while the British personnel in Iraq, which has been reduced to very small proportions and has mainly advisory functions, would be quite insufficient to take over the administration. His Majesty's Government might thus be faced with the alternatives either of informing the League that they were no longer able to carry out the responsibilities in regard to Iraq with which they had been entrusted, or of themselves taking over direct administration of the country. For the latter purpose new machinery would have to be improvised at great cost and it would almost certainly be impossible to set it in motion without the support of a strong military force. Even so it might be difficult to avoid a repetition of the events of the 1920 rebellion, with incalculable reactions throughout the Middle East.

II.—LEAGUE ACTION BETWEEN 1929 AND 1931.

10. At its meeting in January 1930 the Council of the League considered the notification which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had made on the 4th November, 1929, of their intention to recommend Iraq for admission to membership of the League in 1932. At that meeting it was pointed out that the matter fell into two parts, since Iraq could not be admitted to membership of the League without involving the termination of the mandatory régime. These two parts were:—

- (a) The question whether the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant should cease to be applicable to Iraq, which was a matter for the Council to decide; and
- (b) The question whether Iraq should be admitted to the League, which was a matter for the Assembly.

11. In order to enable it to deal with the first of these questions, the Council requested the Permanent Mandates Commission to submit any suggestions that might assist the Council in coming to a conclusion regarding "the general conditions which must be fulfilled before the mandatory régime could be brought to an end in respect of a country placed under that régime."

12. The Permanent Mandates Commission duly submitted a report on this question, which was considered by the Council in September 1931. The commission's recommendations may be said to fall under two main heads:—

- (a) The *de facto* conditions which should exist in the country concerned in order to justify the presumption that it is able, in the words of article 22 of the Covenant, "to stand by itself under the strenuous conditions of the modern world."
- (b) Certain guarantees which the country concerned should be called upon to give before being released from the mandatory régime.

13. After considerable discussion the Council in a resolution of the 4th September, 1931, adopted the recommendations of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and requested the commission in the light of that resolution "to submit its opinion on the proposal of the British Government for the emancipation of Iraq."

14. The Permanent Mandates Commission, at its November session, gave effect to the Council's request and examined the specific question of the proposed release of Iraq from the mandatory régime, in the light of the Council's resolution of the 4th September. At its June session it had already examined in great detail a special comprehensive report on the progress of Iraq during the period 1920-31,

which His Majesty's Government had prepared for the commission's assistance, in pursuance of an undertaking given by Mr. Henderson to the Council in January 1931.

III.—REPORT OF PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION.

(a) General Character of Report.

15. The Permanent Mandates Commission has now submitted its report, which is to come before the Council at its impending meeting. A copy of the report is attached (Appendix I⁽¹⁾). It will be seen that, in accordance with the distinction indicated in paragraph 12 above, it discussed the question under two aspects—(a) whether Iraq can be said to satisfy the *de facto* conditions required to justify release from the mandatory régime, and (b), if so, what guarantees Iraq should be called upon to give. An advance copy of the draft report by the Council's *rapporteur* (M. Marinkovitch) on the report of the Mandates Commission is attached (Appendix II⁽¹⁾), but it is still liable to modification.

16. The report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the proposed emancipation of Iraq is as a whole fairly satisfactory. It was the intention of His Majesty's Government that the detailed arrangements for Iraq's release from the mandatory control, and the precise conditions governing that release, should, so far as possible, be left for settlement by the League Council in negotiation with representatives of this country and Iraq. For this reason it was desirable that the Mandates Commission, in its report to the Council, should confine itself to indicating the broad principles which should govern the emancipation of Iraq, and, in the event, the Mandates Commission has to a large extent adopted this course. The report, however, contains certain less satisfactory features which are capable of being exploited at the forthcoming Council meeting by any Government represented on the Council which, for one reason or another, may desire to be obstructive. Moreover, although it may be said that the commission's conclusions justify the assumption that, in general, Iraq satisfies the *de facto* conditions required for the termination of a mandate—and M. Marinkovitch clearly takes this view in his draft report to the Council—these conclusions are framed in the most guarded terms, and are made subject to several reservations and qualifications.

(b) Responsibility of His Majesty's Government.

17. In the first place, the report states that the commission would have been unable to contemplate the termination of the mandatory régime had it not been for a declaration made by the British accredited representative at the 20th session of the Mandates Commission, to the effect that "His Majesty's Government fully realises its responsibility in recommending that Iraq should be admitted to the League, which is, in its view, the only legal way of terminating the mandate. Should Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence which has been placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government."

18. Should prominence be given to this declaration at the impending Council meeting, it is suggested that the British representative should emphasise the point brought out by certain members of the Permanent Mandates Commission during its November session, that any assumption of responsibility by His Majesty's Government for the acts of Iraq after her release from the mandatory régime would clearly be incompatible with the independence of Iraq; but that His Majesty's Government naturally accept full responsibility for recommending Iraq for release from the mandatory régime and admission to the League, on their knowledge of her present condition, and have no doubt that she will justify their confidence.

(c) Italian Attitude.

19. So far as can be foreseen, the quarter from which difficulties are most likely to arise is the Italian Government, and it may be useful here to explain their attitude,

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

20. The Italian Government are particularly anxious to prevent the French Government from establishing a protectorate over Syria in place of the existing mandatory régime, and thus liberating French action in Syria from League control. They have given it to be understood that they have no wish in principle to hinder the release of Iraq from the mandate, but they have made it equally clear that they desire to guard against anything being done in the matter of that release which would, by forming a precedent, prevent them, when the case of Syria eventually comes up, from ensuring either that the mandate in Syria (and incidentally, the right of States members of the League to most-favoured-nation treatment in that territory) shall continue as long as possible, or, alternatively, that, when the mandate ceases, the French shall retain no special privileges and no special position in the country. It is not unfair to add that, apart from their perhaps legitimate anxieties about Syria, the Italians have clearly seen an opportunity of exacting some economic advantage for themselves as the price of not making difficulties about the release of Iraq.

21. When the question of the general conditions for the termination of a mandate was discussed at the meeting of the League Council last September, the Italian representative stressed the need for a direct and searching enquiry by the League into the question of the fitness of a territory for emancipation, and implied that the Council, in reaching a decision in any individual case, should not rely solely upon the evidence produced by the mandatory Power, but should avail itself of independent sources of information and other methods of investigation. It is known that the Italian representative had in mind the despatch of a League Commission to conduct an enquiry on the spot, if only in order to create a precedent for subsequent application to the case of Syria. His views were to some extent reflected in the revised resolution finally adopted by the Council, which stipulated that the Council's decision as to the fitness of a territory for emancipation should only be reached after "a searching investigation of each particular case."

22. On the 23rd September last the Italian Government caused a memorandum to be communicated to King Feisal to the effect that the attitude adopted by the Italian Government at the last Council meeting should not be taken as an indication of Italian opposition to the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq. The memorandum stated that no substantial difficulty would be raised by Italy to the cessation of the mandate over Iraq, "et cela aussi en considération des assurances déjà fournies pour ce qui concerne un accueil favorable aux demandes présentées par certains groupes en vue d'une participation italienne au sujet de la question des pétroles." The sentence quoted no doubt refers to the negotiations now going on in Iraq for an oil concession to a company in which there is an Italian interest.

(d) Possible Proposal for League Commission of Enquiry.

23. In view of the Italian attitude at the September Council meeting, and of the emphasis laid by the Council on the necessity for a searching investigation in each particular case, it is not surprising that the Mandates Commission in applying to Iraq the *de facto* conditions, should have made it clear that practically the only information at their disposal was that supplied to them by the mandatory Power. The emphasis laid upon this fact, particularly in the second and third paragraphs of section 2 of the Commission's Report, will, however, provide an opening for members of the Council to raise the question of sending out a special League Commission to enquire into the situation in Iraq. It is possible that the Italian representative, if not some other member of the Council, will take advantage of this opening.

24. The despatch of a League Commission to Iraq at this juncture would be open to the strongest possible objections. Apart from the obvious objection of introducing a new and serious element of uncertainty, it would render almost inevitable a postponement of the admission of Iraq to the League until next year, and this might have serious results in Iraq. Consequently, if such a proposal is brought forward at the Council meeting, and is seriously pressed, it will be necessary to oppose it, and in that event it is suggested that the British representative should take the following line: His Majesty's Government would be the last to question the right of the League to have any information which it may require in order to come to a decision, or to seek that information in whatever way

it may think fit. But the information which they have themselves supplied in their special report on the progress of Iraq, in the evidence of their accredited representative before the Permanent Mandates Commission, and in their observations on petitions submitted to the League of Nations, is as complete and accurate as possible. The Permanent Mandates Commission itself recognised in its report, which was adopted by the Council at its meeting in September last, that the question whether a people had become fit to stand alone, could only be settled by careful observation of the political, social and economic development of the territory concerned over a sufficient period. It can hardly be supposed that a commission of enquiry would, in the space of a comparatively short visit, be able to produce more complete or more accurate information than the Government of the mandatory Power, with every resource at their disposal. The despatch of such a commission would, in fact, only tend to create the impression that the League felt itself unable to rely on the evidence officially submitted by the responsible authority—the mandatory Power.

25. Moreover, there are serious practical objections to the despatch of a commission, to which His Majesty's Government would feel it their duty to invite the attention of the Council before it comes to a decision. It will be appreciated how easily, in view of the nature of its task, such a commission might become the focus of discontented elements, and how difficult it might, therefore, find it to form a just view of the situation. Its arrival might serve only to rouse political feelings, and to awaken differences which it is hoped are in process of being healed; and local unrest might even result. It might serve to encourage false hopes of autonomy or separation on the part of certain elements in the population with inevitable subsequent disappointment, thus delaying the process of unification and conciliation. For these reasons His Majesty's Government would view the despatch of a League Commission to Iraq with misgiving, and in all the circumstances they feel that if the League decided to despatch such a commission, it would be assuming a grave responsibility.

26. It would, however, clearly be preferable, if possible, to dissuade the Italians in advance from putting forward the proposal for the despatch of a League Commission to Iraq, or at all events from pressing it. It seems possible that the Italian Government would be content to withdraw any demand for a commission of enquiry in the case of Iraq, provided that this could be done without the Council passing any resolution which would render it more difficult for them to revive the proposal in the case of Syria later. Any grounds which could be advanced for differentiating between the cases of Iraq and Syria might, therefore, be most useful. With this object in view it has been suggested that reference might possibly be made to the following two facts:—

- (i) Practically from the beginning, the termination of the mandate in Iraq has been the goal for which both the mandatory and the Iraqi Government have been openly working. Moreover, Iraq has, for all practical purposes, been self-administered for a number of years under her own King and Constitution, and her fitness for independence has thus already been demonstrated. Her independent status has, indeed, already been formally recognised by a number of States. (The fact that the mandate in Iraq has a special character, was brought out by several members of the Permanent Mandates Commission during the commission's November session, and though the idea was opposed by others, the report of the commission itself referred to the mandatory régime in Iraq as being "a régime which, from its inception, has possessed certain special features.")
- (ii) Iraq (unlike Syria) is a unitary State (one Government, one Parliament and one system of administration), and consequently the complicating factors present in the case of the Syrian mandate are absent in that of Iraq.

It has been suggested that such arguments might make it easier for the Italians to refrain from putting forward, or at all events pressing, the proposal for a commission of enquiry in the special case of Iraq, while preserving the general principle unimpaired for later use in connexion with Syria.

27. The foregoing arguments are, however, admittedly not wholly satisfactory. They are not in themselves conclusive since similar considerations

might conceivably apply in the case of Syria when the release of that territory—or part of it—eventually comes before the Council; and moreover, the second argument at all events would have to be used with the utmost caution in order to avoid alienating the French Government, as being too obviously designed to help the Italians in the matter of Syria. The first argument is not, however, open to this objection in quite the same degree, and, it is suggested, could be employed if the occasion demanded. Use might also be made of the argument that it would be unreasonable at this late date to demand the despatch of a commission of enquiry, in view of the fact that it has been quite clear since 1929, and even earlier, that His Majesty's Government intended to recommend Iraq for admission to the League in 1932.

28. From the foregoing it will be apparent that if the proposal for the despatch of a commission of enquiry to Iraq is seriously pressed at the Council meeting, it will be a most difficult and delicate matter to oppose it without either antagonising the Italians or alienating the French. It follows, therefore, that it is in the highest degree desirable that the Italians should be dissuaded in advance from putting forward the proposal at the meeting of the Council. Fortunately, the draft report of the Council's *rapporteur* (Appendix II) gives little prominence to this aspect of the commission's report and consequently if the Italian representative can be persuaded not to raise the question of a commission of enquiry, it is unlikely that any other Member of the Council will do so.

(e) Proposed Guarantees.

29. The commission's recommendations regarding the guarantees to be given by Iraq on release from mandatory control fall into two divisions:—

- (a) Those relating to the protection of racial and religious minorities in Iraq; and
- (b) Supplementary guarantees concerning other matters (*e.g.*, judicial safeguards, commercial equality, &c.).

Two draft declarations to give effect to the Mandates Commission's recommendations, the one dealing with minorities and the other with supplementary questions, have been prepared and communicated to the Iraqi Government for their concurrence. Copies of these draft declarations will be found in Appendix III.

(i) Minorities.

30. The commission's proposals regarding minorities are, generally speaking, unexceptionable. They are based upon the principal provisions of the Declaration made by Albania in 1921 which, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, the British accredited representative recommended to the commission in November as a suitable model for adoption. In one passage of this section of their report, however, the commission suggest the possible need for additional guarantees in the special circumstances of Iraq, that is to say, guarantees which find no place in the existing minority treaties and declarations and for which there is thus no precedent. The Iraqi Government have, however, made it abundantly clear that they would strongly resist any attempt to impose upon them unprecedented guarantees or specially contrived safeguards. They are willing to subscribe to any guarantees that may have already been accepted by free and independent States in the past; further than that they are not prepared to go.

31. From a reading of the minutes of the November session of the Mandates Commission it is clear that the majority of the commission were not satisfied that guarantees such as those already given by European States in the past would afford adequate protection for the racial and religious minorities in Iraq, and in the course of their discussions a number of suggestions for reinforcing these guarantees were put forward. The most important of these were—

- (i) That a special League commissioner should be appointed to reside in Iraq and watch over the interests of the racial and religious minorities; or
- (ii) That the British Ambassador at Bagdad himself should be made responsible to the League for the treatment of the Iraqi minorities.

32. Of these proposals, the first was strongly opposed by Sir F. Humphrys at the June session of the Mandates Commission, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government. A copy of the statement which he made on that occasion will be found in Appendix IV. The second proposal must be regarded as equally unacceptable, both to His Majesty's Government and to the Iraqi Government. It would place the British Ambassador (and through him His Majesty's Government) in an invidious and intolerable position. He would have responsibility without the authority or means of discharging that responsibility.

33. If the League Council shows any disposition to adopt either of these courses, use might be made of the arguments advanced by Sir F. Humphrys in June (Appendix IV) to convince the Council of their impracticability. In any case, it might be well for the British representative, in his statement before the Council, to deprecate strongly any suggestion for the imposition of special safeguards in the case of Iraq. He might point out, in the first place, that there is no evidence in the case of Iraq to justify the imposition of additional safeguards. The history of the country has been one of religious tolerance. Moslems, Jews and Christians have lived together amicably in the same villages for centuries, and there is no reason to assume that the situation will now alter for the worse. His Majesty's Government are confident that, if the League will now show its trust in the good faith of the Iraqi Government by requiring it to enter into only such guarantees as have been in the past assumed by sovereign and independent States, it will not find that trust misplaced. Their experience of Iraqis have led them to the view that encouragement and trust are much more likely to produce the results desired than the most ingeniously devised safeguards against future bad faith. In this matter, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the Council would be well advised to allow itself to be guided by existing and well-tried models; by the various minority treaties and declarations that have been accepted and have worked satisfactorily in the past. Moreover, guarantees that have already more than once been given by free and independent States can be given again without resentment and without discredit, whereas the imposition of fresh guarantees and specially contrived safeguards could not fail to humiliate and wound, and might, by creating lasting resentment, defeat the very object they were designed to serve.

(ii) *Judicial Régime.*

34. In the section of their report dealing with the supplementary guarantees to be given by Iraq, the commission recommend that, if it is decided not to revive the Capitulations in Iraq, the régime established under the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of 1930 should be continued in force for a period of years after the admission of Iraq to the League. This régime provides for the employment by Iraq of nine British legal experts. The report states that the majority of the commission are in favour of the admission of non-British judges to the foreign judiciary in Iraq, and it seems probable that the view of the majority will find expression in the Council. It would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to insist upon the principle that, after Iraq is admitted to the League, the foreign judiciary in that country should necessarily remain exclusively British. Moreover, the abandonment of this principle would in practice involve little sacrifice, since Iraq will in all probability enter the League with a full complement of British judges, and there are unlikely to be any vacancies for several years thereafter, and but few vacancies during the period of ten years for which it is contemplated that the existing judicial régime will continue in force. In all the circumstances, it has been decided to offer no objection to the principle that, subject to the maintenance of existing contracts, non-British judges, as well as British judges, should be considered for appointment to any vacancies in the foreign judiciary that may occur after Iraq's admission to the League.

35. It is, however, important that the actual choice of candidates for the foreign judiciary of Iraq should be left to the unfettered discretion of the Iraqi Government, and that nothing in the nature of a panel of foreign judges to be appointed to vacancies as they occur should be established by the Council. If this matter is raised at the Council meeting, it would be well, therefore, to make it clear that, although His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to the principle of the eligibility of non-British candidates, they could not consent to

any arrangement whereby the appointment of judges to future vacancies would in effect be dictated to the Iraqi Government by the Council.

(iii) *Commercial Equality.*

36. On the question of commercial equality, the Mandates Commission recommend in their report that Iraq should undertake to grant most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to reciprocity, to all States members of the League of Nations for a transitional period, the duration of which should be determined by negotiation with the Council. This recommendation is based on a suggestion which was made in the previous report of the commission on the general question of the termination of mandates, and which was adopted by the Council at their September session. It has been considered by the Iraqi Government, who are understood to be willing to accept it subject to the following two conditions: (1) That the duration of the obligation in question should be limited to two years; and (2) that the obligation should be subject to a proviso entitling Iraq to grant what is known as "super-most-favoured-nation treatment" to Turkey and the countries in Asia which were detached from the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Lausanne.

37. As regards the first condition stipulated by the Iraqi Government, it is evident from the minutes of the meetings of the Mandates Commission at which this question was discussed, that that body, at all events, contemplated that the proposed arrangement for reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment should continue for a substantially longer period than that envisaged by the Iraqi Government. Mention was made in this connexion of a period of ten or fifteen years, and one member even suggested twenty-five years. In all the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Iraqi Government will be successful in limiting the duration of the arrangement to two years, and in the event will probably have to accept a longer period. But it is desirable that the British representative should do what is possible before the Council to support the Iraqi thesis, both on the merits of the case and for reasons of internal Iraqi politics; and it would therefore be well, if opportunity offers, that he should make it clear that His Majesty's Government do not contemplate that this arrangement should extend beyond two years. This period should be sufficient to give effect to what is understood to be the main object of the proviso, *i.e.*, to tide over the period between the mandatory régime, under which Iraq is obliged to accord most-favoured-nation treatment to all States members of the League, and the time when, as in the case of other independent States, the commercial relations of Iraq with other countries shall be regulated by a series of separate commercial treaties. A period of two, or at the most of five, years should be sufficient to enable the various countries concerned to negotiate commercial treaties with Iraq.

38. It should be pointed out that any undue prolongation of the period during which Iraq would be obliged, under the terms of her guarantee to the League, to extend reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment to States members of the League, might operate seriously to Iraq's disadvantage. It is true that the fact that the most-favoured-nation treatment must be reciprocal appears at first sight to give Iraq adequate protection. But, in practice, this protection may amount to very little, as Iraq might easily find herself obliged to extend her minimum tariff to the majority of imports from some country which, owing to the nature of its tariff system, imposed prohibitive tariffs against goods which happened to be the main products of Iraq. For example, the principal export from Iraq at present is dates, which are seriously affected by high import duties in several countries. If Iraq were obliged indefinitely to extend most-favoured-nation treatment to the goods of those countries, she would be deprived of the only means of negotiating with them for a revision of their tariff system in so far as her own exports to them were concerned. Apart from this important consideration, the obligation to extend most-favoured-nation treatment, even on reciprocal terms, to every State member of the League, as a condition of release from the mandatory régime, would inevitably be regarded in Iraq as a derogation of national sovereignty, and, while the Iraqi Government might be persuaded to agree to the obligation as a purely transitional arrangement pending the negotiation of commercial treaties with foreign countries on equal terms, the extension of the obligation beyond two, or at most five, years is likely to lead to much local resentment.

39. As regards the Iraqi Government's second condition, concerning the right to accord what is known as "super-most-favoured-nation treatment" to certain neighbouring States, it should be explained that the principle of allowing to States, which were formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, the right to accord specially favourable treatment to other States which previously formed part of the same Empire, is already well established. Under paragraph 2 of article 11 of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, special customs arrangements may be concluded, on grounds of contiguity, with an adjoining country, without violating the most-favoured-nation obligations of the mandate. A similar provision exists in the final clause of article 18 of the mandate for Palestine, which allows Palestine to conclude a special customs agreement "with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia." The same principle was accepted in article 6 of the Commercial Convention of Lausanne, which allowed Turkey to grant special advantages as regards tariffs and commercial matters to any of the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne. Owing to an oversight, this principle was unfortunately not clearly stated in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, although article 16 of that treaty does allow Iraq to associate itself for customs purposes "with such neighbouring Arab States as may desire it." The omission from the 1922 treaty of the grant to Iraq of the right to give super-most-favoured-nation treatment to Turkey, has already caused considerable difficulty, and delayed the conclusion of a satisfactory commercial agreement between Turkey and Iraq for several years. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government regard it as important to endeavour to secure this right for Iraq now, and in view of the existence of a corresponding right in the Syrian and Palestine mandates and in the Commercial Convention of Lausanne, they cannot believe that the League Council will raise any serious objection thereto. The subsidiary question of the right to establish special customs zones in frontier areas with coterminous States, such as Persia, is based on an even more generally accepted principle, and should lead to no difficulty. In anticipation that the Council will agree on these points, a formula has been prepared for this purpose and incorporated in article 5 of the draft declaration of supplementary guarantees given in Appendix III below. An opportunity will probably be found, when the terms of the guarantees are under negotiations, to secure the acceptance of this or some equivalent formula. But in the meantime, it would be an advantage if the British representative could clear the way by including in his statement at the Council meeting some reference to the need of allowing Iraq to grant specially favourable treatment to Turkey and the other ex-Ottoman States, and to make frontier customs arrangements in the frontier zones with any neighbouring country.

(f) *Judicial Settlement of Disputes Arising out of Guarantees.*

40. In connexion with the guarantees to be given by Iraq on the subject of racial and religious minorities, the commission suggest that Iraq should agree that any difference of opinion arising out of those guarantees between Iraq and a member of the Council should be held to be a dispute of international character under article 14 of the convention and should, at the demand of the other party, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. This recommendation is based upon a provision which is common to all the existing minority treaties and declarations. In this matter, therefore, the commission have adhered to existing precedents. In a later section of their report, however, they ought to apply a similar principle to the supplementary guarantees, and have suggested that any difference of opinion between Iraq and a member of the League relating to the interpretation or execution of these supplementary guarantees shall similarly be submissible to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The suggestion is not unreasonable in itself. Parties to the optional clause of the statute of the Permanent Court, which has been accepted by a majority of the members of the League, recognise as compulsory the jurisdiction of the court in all disputes relating to (a) the interpretation of a treaty, (b) any questions of international law, and (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation. The commission's proposal is, therefore, based upon a well-established precedent, and the Iraqi Government have been recommended to accept it. There is, however, an element of inconsistency between this proposal and that relating to the minority guarantees. In

the case of the latter, it is contemplated that only members of the Council should have the right to bring a dispute with Iraq before the Permanent Court, whereas in the case of supplementary guarantees it is suggested that this course should be open to any member of the League. In his draft report to the Council, the Council's *rapporteur* advocates the adoption of this recommendation by the Mandates Commission, but he has included a phrase in his report the effect of which, if adopted by the Council, would seem to be to limit the right of application to the Permanent Court to members of the Council, and thus to involve a departure from the commission's original recommendation. If this is, indeed, the intention and effect of the phrase in question, then there seems no reason to oppose the suggestion, which, indeed, has much to recommend it.

(g) *Method of Negotiating Declaration of Guarantees.*

41. In his draft report (Appendix II) the Council's *rapporteur* suggests that the task of defining the terms of the undertakings to be entered into by Iraq towards the Council should be entrusted to a small committee consisting of the *rapporteur* for minority questions, the *rapporteur* for questions of international law, the *rapporteur* for mandates questions and the representative of the United Kingdom. This committee would then prepare, in consultation with representatives of the Iraqi Government, and possibly a representative of the Mandates Commission, a draft declaration covering the various guarantees recommended in the Mandates Commission's report, and would submit that draft to the Council at its next meeting. This suggestion would seem worthy of support. It is most desirable that the text of the guarantees should be settled in negotiation with representatives of the Iraqi Government, and that that Government should not be faced with an arbitrary decision in the matter by the Council. The proposal of the *rapporteur* would seem to satisfy this requirement.

IV.—ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF 1930.

(a) *Attitude of Council.*

42. The Council's resolution of the 4th September last contained the following passage: "The Council will naturally have to examine with the utmost care all undertakings given by the countries under mandate to the mandatory Power in order to satisfy itself that they are compatible with the status of an independent State, and, more particularly, that the principle of economic equality is safeguarded in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant and with the recommendation of the Mandates Commission." This resolution was largely inspired by the Italian representative, who, in pressing for a close and critical examination of any undertaking given by a mandated State to the mandatory Power prior to emancipation, is understood to have had French policy in Syria primarily in view. There is some reason to believe that the French Government contemplate ultimately following our example in Iraq and concluding a treaty with Syria, before release from the mandate, which will give them the right to retain French forces in that territory after its admission to the League; and it is understood that the Italian Government would be strongly opposed to the conclusion of a similar arrangement between France and Syria.

(b) *Attitude of Permanent Mandates Commission.*

43. In accordance with the Council's resolution referred to above, the Mandates Commission at their meeting in last November subjected the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 to a very searching examination. They have now reported to the Council that, although certain of the provisions of the treaty are somewhat unusual in treaties of this kind, "the obligations entered into by Iraq towards Great Britain do not explicitly infringe the independence of the new State." The wording adopted by the commission in their reference to the treaty is not, perhaps, all that could be desired; but it is scarcely likely to cause His Majesty's Government undue embarrassment at the forthcoming meeting of the Council. That body will probably regard the commission's statement as a sufficient vindication of the treaty to justify its acceptance without detailed scrutiny, and

particularly so in view of the very close examination to which the treaty was subjected by the Mandates Commission. On the other hand, the guarded wording used by the commission will provide the Italian representative with an opportunity to draw attention to those provisions of the treaty which the Italian Government would not wish to see reproduced in any settlement between France and Syria. It is not anticipated, however, that he will do more than point out that these provisions could only be justified in the special circumstances of Iraq.

(c) *Suggested Attitude of British Representative.*

44. If, contrary to expectation, the treaty should come under serious criticism at the Council meeting, use might be made of arguments founded upon the following considerations. The main criticism advanced against the treaty appears to be based upon the contention that its object is to obtain for the United Kingdom a particularly privileged position in Iraq. In so far as economic or commercial matters are concerned, it will be seen that the 1930 treaty contains no provision on this subject at all, and His Majesty's Government have no intention of concluding with Iraq any economic or commercial agreement before the termination of the mandate. Their position in such matters after the termination of the mandatory régime will, therefore, be the same as that of any other Power. The military and political provisions to the treaty are to be explained by the community of interests existing between the two countries, which is recognised in terms in article 5 of the treaty, and the fact that the Iraqi Government themselves sought a defensive alliance primarily in order to safeguard their future independence. His Majesty's Government were prepared to accept such an alliance—the advantage of which to Iraq is admitted by implication in section 3 (b) of the commission's report—but only on the understanding that it could be brought within the framework of the Covenant of the League. This requirement was secured by articles 3, 4 and 9 of the treaty. Such an alliance, which must obviously entail obligations as well as privileges for both parties, need not imply, and will not be found to imply, any derogation from the complete future independence of Iraq. The subsidiary provisions of the treaty will, upon examination, be found to be the natural corollary of the foregoing considerations. As regards the provision in article 5 for the retention of British forces in Iraq (which came under especially critical examination by the Mandates Commission), it should be appreciated that the forces in question will not be ground forces, but will consist of air forces, together with a few ancillaries; and if it is admitted to be in the interests of Iraq to have an alliance with this country—and the Iraqi Government themselves asked for such an alliance—it can scarcely be denied that it is also in the interests of Iraq that the fulfilment of the terms of the alliance should be made physically possible. Owing to the remote geographical position of Iraq, which is practically landlocked, the retention of a skeleton air force in the country is essential in order to enable His Majesty's Government to discharge the obligations of the alliance in case of need. Air reinforcements could not be sent to Iraq unless there was some nucleus of a British air force and aerodrome organisation on the spot to receive them. Stores, spare parts, repairing workshops must be maintained; and, apart from this, it would clearly be impossible for air reinforcements to set out for Iraq without the assurance that they could land at aerodromes there in safety. Reinforcements could not reach Iraq by sea—that is to say, by the Persian Gulf and Basra—in time to be effective.

V.—PRESENCE AT GENEVA OF SIR F. HUMPHRYS AND OF IRAQI PRIME MINISTER.

45. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha-al-Said, and Sir Francis Humphrys, the High Commissioner for Iraq, will be in attendance at Geneva for the meeting of the Council, and will be available for consultation.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
January 21, 1932.*

APPENDIX I.

Special Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the Council of the League of Nations regarding the Release of Iraq from the Mandatory Régime.

[Not printed.]

APPENDIX II.

Draft Report to the Council of the League, by the Rapporteur for Mandates, on the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission regarding the Release of Iraq from the Mandatory Régime.

[Not printed.]

APPENDIX III.

(A).—*Draft Declaration on the Subject of Minorities to be made by the Iraqi Government to the Council of the League of Nations.*

ARTICLE 1.

The stipulations of this declaration shall be recognised as fundamental laws of Iraq and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2.

Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals. They will have the right to change their religion.

Suitable provision will be made in the case of non-Moslems for regulating family law and personal status in accordance with the usage of their creed.

ARTICLE 3.

All Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

The electoral system of Iraq shall give due consideration to the rights of racial, religious and linguistic minorities.

Differences of religion, creed or confession will not prejudice any Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any Iraqi national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Adequate facilities will be given to Iraqi nationals of non-Arab speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing before the courts.

ARTICLE 4.

Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law, and, in fact, as other Iraqi nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Within six months from the date of the present declaration, detailed information will be presented to the Council of the League of Nations with regard to the legal status of the religious communities, churches, convents, schools, voluntary establishments and associations of racial, religious and linguistic minorities. The Iraqi Government will take into consideration any advice it might receive from the League of Nations with regard to this question.

ARTICLE 5.

Provision will be made in the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the teaching of the official language being made obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an equitable part in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

ARTICLE 6.

The stipulations in the foregoing articles of this declaration, so far as they affect the persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern, and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made in them without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between the Iraqi Government and any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under article 13 of the Covenant.

(B).—*Draft Declaration of Supplementary Guarantees to be made by the Iraqi Government on the occasion of the Release of Iraq from Mandatory Control.*

ARTICLE 1.

The Iraqi Government will recognise and honour any financial obligations regularly assumed on behalf of Iraq by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and any rights of whatever kind legally acquired in Iraq during the currency of the mandatory régime.

ARTICLE 2.

The Iraqi Government will maintain in force for their respective duration all international conventions, both general and special, which have been acceded to either directly by Iraq or by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on behalf of Iraq during the mandatory régime, subject always to such right of denunciation by the parties concerned as may be provided in those instruments.

ARTICLE 3.

The judicial system and organisation set up under the Judicial Agreement between the United Kingdom and Iraq signed on the 4th March, 1931, and described in articles 2, 3 and 4 of that agreement, shall continue in force for a

period of ten years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

[In the event, however, of any vacancies occurring during the said period of ten years in the staff of foreign legal experts provided for in article 2 of the Judicial Agreement, the selection by the Iraqi Government of experts for appointment to such vacancies shall not be restricted to candidates of British nationality, but shall extend to all candidates, of whatever nationality, possessing the necessary qualifications.]

ARTICLE 4.

Religious missions of all denominations shall be free to undertake religious, educational and medical activities, subject to such measures as may be indispensable for the maintenance of public order, morality and effective administration.

ARTICLE 5.

For a period of two years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations all States members of the League of Nations shall enjoy in Iraq the most-favoured-nation treatment on condition of reciprocity, provided, however, that such treatment shall not be regarded as including—

- (a) Any special favours which are or may in the future be accorded by Iraq in customs matters to goods the produce or manufacture of Turkey or of the countries in Asia which were detached from the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923; or
- (b) Favours granted to any coterminous countries to facilitate traffic for certain frontier districts not exceeding 15 kilom. on each side of the frontier.

APPENDIX IV.

Statement made by Sir F. Humphrys to the Permanent Mandates Commission at its XXth Session in June 1931 (p. 140 of printed minutes of 18th meeting).

Suggested appointment of a resident representative of the League of Nations in Iraq for the purpose of supervising the guarantees afforded to the minorities.

THE suggestion has been made in certain quarters that a representative of the League of Nations should reside in Iraq who would be charged with the duty of supervising the guarantees afforded to the minorities. In case there is any prospect of this proposal being seriously considered, I should be glad of an opportunity of giving the commission the views of my Government upon it.

In the first place there is little doubt that such action would be regarded by the Iraqi Government as a derogation of sovereignty, and as an indication that it was not trusted to implement whatever guarantees it might have given. The Iraqi Government would, I think, ask—and in my own opinion it would be perfectly justified in asking—for what reason a predominantly Arab Government was suspected of religious intolerance or of international bad faith. Moslem, Christian and Jew have lived peaceably together in Iraq for centuries and the appointment of a representative of the League of Nations, as an additional measure, beyond the signing of a minorities declaration would appear to the Iraqi Government as an unnecessary and even a provocative measure. It would serve to perpetuate and emphasise the artificial division which has sprung up during the past year between certain of the minorities in Iraq and their compatriots. It would tend to preserve existing suspicions and might even promote new animosities. His Majesty's Government feels, too, that the proposal would defeat its own object by keeping alive a separatist spirit, and that the Iraqi Government might regard it as a move towards eventual separation from Iraq of certain minority elements, and oppose it on that account. The presence of a representative of the League would encourage the minorities to go to him with every real or imaginary grievance instead of applying to the Iraqi authorities, a practice which is open to the objections which have been pointed

out in the special report. The representative of the League would be dependent upon local interpreters for his information, which would necessarily be unreliable and incomplete; his movements, if he moved, would give rise to continual speculation and apprehension among the ignorant, while, if he remained in one place, his presence could not possibly serve any useful purpose.

These are the reasons which lead His Majesty's Government to deprecate this proposal being put forward and I earnestly trust that they will be taken into careful consideration if the proposal is revived. Nothing would be more unfortunate than to take any step which might have a tendency to prevent the minorities concerned from regarding themselves, or being themselves regarded like the Copts in Egypt, as true citizens of their native State, in which lies the only certain hope of their future welfare.

APPENDIX V.

Recommendation of Mosul Frontier Commission that Mosul Vilayet should only be Awarded to Iraq on condition that Mandatory Régime should continue for Twenty-five years from 1924.

THE League of Nations Commission, which in 1924 and 1925 investigated the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier and the fate of the Mosul Vilayet, recommended that the vilayet should be awarded to Iraq provided the mandatory régime should continue for a further twenty-five years, but that if the mandatory régime were to come to an early termination it would be preferable that the vilayet should go to Turkey. As this recommendation, although not ultimately adopted by the Council may be quoted as an argument against the release of Iraq from mandatory control during the present year, it may be desirable to offer some comments on it.

In the first place it should be noted that this recommendation was based on two main arguments, (a) that the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet would prefer to be included in the same territory and subjected to the same government as the Kurds of Eastern Turkey; and (b) that Turkey possessed greater political stability. A third argument, which seems to have been present in the commissioners' minds, was that Iraq might find it difficult without British support to defend the Mosul Vilayet against Turkish aggression, whereas Turkey, as a powerful military State, would be able to hold the vilayet against any of her neighbours.

These arguments, which appeared valid at the time, have now ceased to apply. The Turkish Government in pursuance of their policy of forcible unification, have waged a bitter campaign against the Turkish Kurds, a large proportion of whom have been deported to Western Anatolia, while such of the remainder as survived are treated with great harshness by the Turkish military authorities who administer the eastern areas of Turkey. The Mosul Vilayet of Iraq now in fact contains a large number of Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans and other who have taken refuge there from Turkish persecution, and who clearly prefer the prospect of Iraqi to that of Turkish rule.

As regards security, the situation has completely changed since the date of the commission's report. In 1924 and 1925, Turkey was threatening to attack both Northern Syria and Northern Iraq and hostilities were on several occasions only narrowly averted. In these circumstances it was natural that the commissioners should regard with misgiving the award to Iraq of a disputed area, which it would clearly, at that date, have been far more difficult for Iraq to defend against Turkey than for Turkey to defend against Iraq. They no doubt feared that Iraq, if left unassisted and defenceless with the Mosul Vilayet on her hands, would speedily become a prey to Turkish aggression, so that the true choice would have been one between giving the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey by peaceful award or allowing the vilayet to fall into Turkish hands by conquest with all its attendant hardships.

Chiefly, as a result, however, of the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Angora of 1926, and of subsequent political developments, relations between Turkey and Iraq are now not only friendly, but cordial. Turkey has accepted the northern frontier of Iraq as final, and it can be confidently stated that the risk of Turkish aggression against Iraq is now infinitesimal.

That the League Council regarded the League commissioners' recommendation as based largely on the foregoing consideration is clear from the proviso which the Council itself attached thereto, *i.e.*, that the mandatory régime should only be extended for twenty-five years, as recommended by the commission, *if Iraq should not be admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period.* The Council in attaching this proviso to the commission's recommendation obviously contemplated that Iraq might develop more rapidly than the commission anticipated, and that with the support which would be afforded her by membership of the League she might be able to hold the Mosul Vilayet securely, notwithstanding the risks which appeared so serious at the time of the commission's investigations.

A further protection to Iraq against unprovoked aggression is now also afforded by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which is to come into force as soon as Iraq is admitted to membership of the League.

It is submitted that in view of the remarkable progress of Iraq during the last few years, and still more of the even more remarkable improvement in Turco-Iraqi relations, the recommendation of the Mosul frontier commission on this point is entirely inapplicable to the present situation.

[E 441/155/93]

No. 134.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant, regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the text of the Turco-Iraqi Commercial Treaty signed at Angora on the 10th January, 1932.

2. The treaty provides that each country shall in general grant the other most-favoured-nation treatment, except in regard to advantages accorded by either country to produce of other territories detached in 1923 from the Ottoman Empire, and in regard to border trade conducted within a zone 15 kilom. wide on each side of the Turco-Iraqi frontier. It also stipulates that negotiations are to be opened between Turkey and Iraq with a view to the application of a special tariff on imports from one country into the other.

3. On the signature of the treaty, letters, of which the text has not been supplied to me, were exchanged providing for a reduction by one-third of Turkish customs duty on imported Iraqi dates, and a corresponding one-third reduction of Iraqi customs duty on imported Turkish gall-nuts and firewood. The Turkish authorities agreed also to fix the value of the quota for Iraqi dates during the next season at £T. 100,000. According to officials of the Iraqi Legation, the loss to Iraqi revenue by the reduction of dues on imported Turkish gall-nuts and firewood will be about 3,500 rupees a year. Agreement was also reached outside the treaty as to the opening of certain transit and other trade routes for customs purposes.

4. The mutual concessions stipulated in the treaty cannot be claimed by other nations, for it has been usual for Turkey to obtain in commercial treaties with other Powers the insertion (*e.g.* in article 34 of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of the 1st March, 1930) of clauses exempting from the application of most-favoured-nation treatment any special advantages accorded between Turkey and any country detached from the Ottoman Empire under the Lausanne Treaty of the 24th July, 1923.

5. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, who kindly communicated to me the attached text of the treaty, begs that it may be regarded as confidential until it enters into force.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 134.

Traité de Commerce entre le Royaume de l'Irak et la République turque.

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak, d'une part, et le Président de la République turque, d'autre part, désireux de conserver et de développer leurs relations commerciales et de déterminer le traitement à accorder dans leurs territoires respectifs au commerce de l'autre partie, ont décidé de conclure un Traité de Commerce et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs :

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak :

Son Excellence le Général Nuri Essaid Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak, deuxième Classe de l'Ordre de Rafidein;

Le Président de la République turque :

Son Excellence Mustafa Şeref Bey, Ministre de l'Economie nationale, Député de Burdur;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

En ce qui concerne les droits d'importation et d'exportation, y compris les surtaxes et coefficients de majoration, et tous autres droits et charges ayant trait au commerce et à la douane, ainsi qu'en matière de transit, d'entreposage, des formalités douanières et du régime des échantillons de commis voyageurs, l'Irak accordera à la Turquie et la Turquie accordera à l'Irak le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

Il ne sera donc prélevé sur l'importation ou l'écoulement en Irak de n'importe quels produits naturels ou industriels de la Turquie des droits plus élevés ou autres que ceux qui sont ou seront perçus sur des produits naturels ou industriels de n'importe quel autre pays étranger.

De même, il ne sera pas prélevé sur l'importation ou l'écoulement en Turquie de n'importe quels produits naturels ou industriels de l'Irak des droits plus élevés ou autres que ceux qui sont ou seront perçus sur des produits naturels ou industriels de n'importe quel autre pays étranger.

Egalement, il ne sera pas perçu en Irak ou en Turquie sur l'exportation de n'importe quels articles destinés à l'autre partie des droits plus élevés ou autres que ceux prélevés sur l'exportation des articles similaires à destination de n'importe quel autre pays étranger.

Tout avantage, quel qu'il soit, que l'une des deux hautes parties contractantes pourra accorder à un article quelconque, produit naturel ou industriel de tout autre pays étranger, s'appliquera simultanément et sans que la demande en soit formulée, au même article, produit naturel ou fabriqué, de l'autre haute partie contractante.

Les stipulations de cet article ne s'étendent pas :

- (a) Aux avantages et faveurs spéciales que l'Irak et la Turquie accordent ou qu'ils accorderaient à l'avenir en matière de tarif douanier à des produits provenant d'autres pays détachés de l'ancien Empire ottoman en 1923;
- (b) Au traitement que l'Irak ou la Turquie accorderait au commerce frontalier dans une zone ne dépassant pas 15 kilom. en largeur de chaque côté de leur frontière douanière.

ARTICLE 2.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à appliquer le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne les prohibitions et les restrictions sur les importations et les exportations.

Toutefois, les deux parties, sans être tenues d'accorder le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée se réservent la liberté d'imposer des prohibitions ou des restrictions d'un caractère sanitaire destinées à protéger la vie humaine, animale ou végétale.

ARTICLE 3.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à entamer, dans le plus bref délai possible, des négociations en vue d'arriver à un accord destiné à assurer l'application d'un tarif spécial à l'importation des produits naturels ou industriels de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité, rédigé en langues arabe, turque et française, sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Il entrera en vigueur quinze jours après la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification et restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'il soit dénoncé, cette dénonciation ne pouvant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de trois mois à partir de la date à laquelle elle aurait été notifiée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes.

S'il s'élève un différend quelconque relatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application du présent traité, le texte français fera foi.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara, le 10 janvier 1932.

NURI ESSAID.

MUSTAFA ŞEREF.

[T 1193/146/374]

No. 135.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant, regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the text of the Turco-Iraqi Extradition Treaty signed at Angora on the 9th January, 1932. The Iraqi Legation, to whom I owe the text of the treaty, beg that it may be regarded as confidential until it enters into force.

2. It will be seen that article 1 of the treaty provides that the extradition of persons who are neither Turkish nor Iraqi nationals is subject to the discretion of the State from which extradition is demanded. Article 4, too, is of interest in that it excludes from the class of political offences crimes against the person of the head of the State or against those of members of his family, and also the assassination or attempted assassination of the head of the Government. In article 16 it will be observed that each party assumes liability for expenses incurred on its own territory as a result of extradition proceedings.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 135.

Traité d'Extradition entre le Royaume d'Irak et la République turque.

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak, d'une part, et le Président de la République turque, d'autre part, désirant conclure un traité à l'effet de régler l'extradition des délinquants, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs :

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak :

Son Excellence le Général Nuri Essaid Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak, II^{me} Classe de l'Ordre de Rafidein,

et

Le Président de la République turque :

Son Excellence Mustafa Seref Beyfendi, Ministre de l'Economie nationale, Député de Burdur;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent, conformément aux dispositions du présent traité, à se livrer réciproquement les individus poursuivis ou condamnés par les autorités judiciaires de l'une d'elles, et qui se trouvent sur le territoire de l'autre.

Il reste bien entendu que les nationaux des hautes parties contractantes sont exceptés de l'extradition, et l'extradition des ressortissants étrangers est sujette à la discrétion de l'Etat auquel elle est demandée.

L'extradition n'aura lieu qu'en cas de poursuite ou de condamnation pour une infraction commise hors du territoire de l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée.

ARTICLE 2.

En cas de demande concernant une personne qui est l'objet de poursuites, ou contre laquelle un jugement a été prononcé, l'extradition ne sera accordée que si l'acte dont cette personne est incriminée est puni, d'après la législation des deux pays, d'une peine d'au moins un an d'emprisonnement ou d'une peine plus grave.

Lorsque l'extradition est demandée en vue de l'exécution d'un jugement devenu définitif, elle ne sera accordée que si le délinquant a été condamné définitivement à une peine supérieure à six mois d'emprisonnement, pour un fait punissable, d'après la législation des deux pays, d'une peine d'au moins un an d'emprisonnement, ou d'une peine plus grave.

ARTICLE 3.

L'extradition sera accordée également en cas de tentative ou de participation, sous n'importe quelle forme, et de n'importe quelle nature, au cas où la tentative ou la participation seraient, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2, passibles de peines dans les législations de l'Etat requérant et de l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 4.

L'extradition ne sera pas accordée dans les cas suivants :

- (a) Pour les infractions politiques et les faits connexes;
- (b) Pour les infractions militaires et les faits connexes;
- (c) Pour les infractions de presse;
- (d) Pour les infractions qui ne peuvent être poursuivies que sur la plainte de la personne lésée et dont la poursuite doit être arrêtée par le désistement de celle-ci;
- (e) Si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi par l'Etat requérant pour une infraction prescrite ou éteinte d'après ses lois, celles de l'Etat requis ou celles de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel l'infraction a été commise;

(f) Si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi pour le même fait dans le pays requis, ainsi que s'il y a déjà été définitivement mis hors de cause, condamné, déclaré irresponsable ou acquitté également pour le même fait;

(g) Si les autorités de l'Etat requis sont, d'après les lois de celui-ci, compétentes pour juger l'infraction;

(h) Si, le fait étant commis sur le territoire d'un Etat tiers, les lois de la partie requise n'admettent pas la poursuite pour un tel fait commis à l'étranger.

Cependant, ne seront pas considérés comme une infraction politique ni comme fait connexe à une semblable infraction :

- (1) Tout délit commis contre la personne du chef d'Etat et contre celles des membres de sa famille;
- (2) L'assassinat commis sur la personne du chef de Gouvernement ou tentative d'assassinat ou complicité à ce fait;
- (3) Les actes de brigandage, de torture et de vol accompagné de torture, quel que soit le but pour lequel ces actes ont été commis.

ARTICLE 5.

La demande d'extradition devra toujours être faite par la voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 6.

Dans les cas qui ne comportent pas l'extradition du délinquant et qui sont prévus et énumérés dans l'article 4, l'appréciation de la nature des actes est exclusivement réservée à l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée.

Les parties contractantes sont d'accord pour reconnaître que, quelle que soit la procédure à suivre pour l'examen de la demande d'extradition, le refus d'extradition pour une infraction politique ne pourra être prononcé que par le tribunal compétent désigné par l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 7.

1. La demande d'extradition pour un prévenu ou un accusé doit être accompagnée des documents suivants :

- (a) Un mandat d'arrêt ou un acte d'arrestation émanant d'une autorité judiciaire compétente;
- (b) Un acte indiquant la nature du délit et le texte de la loi applicable à l'infraction dont il s'agit;
- (c) Une déclaration ou une carte d'identité aussi détaillée que possible, indiquant l'identité et le signalement du prévenu ou de l'accusé;
- (d) Les actes de déposition, s'il y en a, certifiés conformes par le juge qui a procédé à l'enquête.

2. Si la demande d'extradition concerne une personne qui a été l'objet d'un jugement par défaut, faute de comparaître ou faute de défendre, la demande d'extradition sera accompagnée, en sus des pièces indiquées dans le paragraphe précédent, d'un résumé du jugement et du texte des articles de la loi sur lesquels ce jugement se base.

3. Si la demande d'extradition concerne une personne condamnée par jugement contradictoire, les pièces suivantes doivent être annexées à la demande :

- (a) Une expédition du jugement;
- (b) Une déclaration ou une carte d'identité indiquant d'une façon suffisamment détaillée l'identité de la personne condamnée;
- (c) Une copie du texte de la loi sur laquelle le jugement se base;
- (d) Un document émanant d'une autorité compétente et déclarant le jugement exécutoire.

4. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'infractions contre la propriété, le montant approximatif du dommage réel ou tenté sera toujours indiqué.

5. Les pièces à produire seront dressées dans la forme prescrite par les lois de l'Etat requérant et expédiées en original ou en copie certifiée conforme par le

tribunal ou par toute autre autorité compétente de cet Etat; elles seront accompagnées d'une traduction dans la langue de l'Etat requis, certifiée conforme par l'agent diplomatique de l'Etat requérant ou par un traducteur assermenté de l'Etat requis.

6. Il est entendu que, tout en se réservant la décision sur la demande d'extradition, les autorités compétentes de l'Etat requis préviendront, aussitôt que celui-ci aura reçu les pièces désignées ci-dessus, par l'arrestation de l'accusé ou par toute autre mesure opportune, l'éventualité d'une évasion, à moins que l'extradition ne paraisse *a priori* inadmissible.

7. Dans le cas où il y aurait doute sur la question de savoir si l'infraction, objet de la demande d'extradition, est comprise parmi les infractions prévues dans le présent traité comme comportant l'extradition, des explications seront demandées au Gouvernement requérant, et l'extradition ne sera pas accordée tant que les explications fournies ne seront pas de nature à écarter ce doute. L'individu arrêté pourra être élargi, ou les mesures prises à son égard pourront être rapportées, si les explications n'ont pas été données à l'Etat requis dans le délai de deux mois à partir du jour où la demande en a été transmise au représentant diplomatique de l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 8.

La haute partie contractante à laquelle l'extradition est demandée ordonnera l'arrestation du délinquant et fera procéder à l'examen nécessaire de l'affaire, si elle se trouve convaincue que l'infraction comporte l'extradition aux termes du présent traité. Elle ordonnera l'extradition si, à l'issue de l'examen, elle acquiert la conviction que le dossier est complet ou suffisant, que la personne dont l'extradition est demandée est bien celle qui a été désignée comme prévenue, accusée ou condamnée, et, en cas de condamnation, que l'infraction qui l'a motivée est de celles qui comportaient l'extradition au moment où le jugement a été rendu.

ARTICLE 9.

Dans le cas où, en attendant la présentation à la partie requise de la demande d'extradition du délinquant et des pièces mentionnées dans le présent traité comme devant accompagner cette demande, l'évasion du délinquant apparaît comme probable, l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée, sans attendre l'arrivée des pièces requises, et sur avis de l'Etat requérant à adresser par voie postale ou télégraphique au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Etat requis, ou sur la démarche à faire par le représentant diplomatique de l'Etat requérant, préviendra l'évasion en procédant à l'arrestation provisoire du délinquant ou à l'adoption de toute autre mesure.

Toutefois, dans ce cas, avis devra être donné concernant le genre et la nature du délit, le degré de gravité de la peine, et notification devra être faite qu'un mandat d'arrêt a été lancé contre le délinquant par l'autorité compétente.

Si la demande d'extradition et les documents s'y rapportant concernant la personne ainsi arrêtée provisoirement, ou à l'endroit de laquelle toute autre mesure a été adoptée, n'ont pas été transmis à l'Etat requis dans le délai d'un mois à partir du jour de l'arrestation ou de l'adoption de toute autre mesure, la personne arrêtée sera libérée ou la mesure adoptée à son égard sera rapportée.

ARTICLE 10.

Les objets dans la possession desquels la personne réclamée est entrée par suite de l'infraction, ou ceux qui ont été saisis sur elle, les instruments ayant servi à commettre l'infraction, ainsi que toute autre pièce à conviction, seront, sous réserve des droits des tiers, et suivant l'application de l'autorité compétente, remis, en même temps que la personne réclamée, au Gouvernement réclamant l'extradition, et cela même dans le cas où l'extradition déjà accordée n'a pu être effectuée par suite du décès ou de l'évasion du coupable.

Cette remise comprendra également tous les objets de même nature, cachés ou déposés par la personne réclamée dans le pays accordant l'extradition, et qui seraient découverts ultérieurement.

ARTICLE 11.

Si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi ou condamné sur le territoire de l'Etat requis pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé la demande d'extradition, son extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à ce que les poursuites aient pris fin ou que l'individu réclamé ait subi sa peine ou enfin qu'il en ait obtenu la remise.

De même, dans le cas de procédure en cours devant les autorités de la partie requise pour un motif autre que l'infraction aux lois pénales et entraînant la comparution forcée ou la détention de l'individu réclamé, l'extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à ce que les poursuites ou la détention aient pris fin.

Néanmoins, si d'après les lois du pays qui demande l'extradition, cet ajournement est susceptible d'entraîner la prescription ou d'autres difficultés importantes en ce qui concerne la poursuite de l'inculpé, sa remise temporaire sera accordée, à moins de considérations spéciales qui s'y opposent, sous l'engagement de renvoyer l'extradé aussitôt que les poursuites dans le pays requérant auront pris fin.

Dans le cas où l'individu réclamé serait impuissant, par suite de l'extradition, à remplir les obligations contractées par lui envers des particuliers, son extradition aura quand même lieu, sauf à ces derniers à faire valoir leurs droits par-devant l'autorité compétente.

ARTICLE 12.

Si l'extradition est accordée, l'individu réclamé sera mis à la disposition de l'Etat requérant à la station-frontière ou au port d'embarquement de l'Etat requis.

Ledit individu pourra être mis en liberté si, dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la notification de la décision d'extradition, l'Etat requérant n'en a pas pris livraison.

ARTICLE 13.

La personne livrée ne peut être jugée que pour le délit ou les délits qui ont motivé sa livraison. L'extradé peut, cependant, être arrêté et jugé pour un délit autre que celui ou ceux qui ont motivé sa livraison, dans le cas où le consentement de l'Etat requis y est acquis, ou encore dans celui où cet individu, ayant eu la possibilité de rentrer dans le pays qui l'avait livré, n'a pas profité de cette possibilité.

L'extradition, à un Etat tiers, d'un individu livré ne pourra également avoir lieu que dans les conditions ci-haut indiquées. Toutefois, si l'individu livré consent à être jugé, le consentement de l'Etat qui l'a livré n'est plus nécessaire; il lui en est seulement donné avis.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas aux infractions commises, après la livraison, sur le territoire de l'Etat qui a demandé l'extradition.

ARTICLE 14.

Si l'individu dont l'extradition est demandée par une des parties contractantes est réclamé également par un ou plusieurs autres Etats, en raison d'autres infractions, il sera livré à l'Etat sur le territoire duquel a été commise l'infraction la plus grave, et, dans le cas où les infractions seraient de gravité égale, à l'Etat dont il est ressortissant.

Lorsque l'individu réclamé ne ressortit à aucun des Etats requérants, et que les infractions sont de gravité égale, il sera livré à l'Etat dont la demande est arrivée la première. La gravité de l'infraction sera déterminée d'après les lois de l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 15.

Si l'extradition d'un délinquant a lieu entre l'une des parties contractantes et une tierce Puissance, et à condition que l'infraction motivant l'extradition ne soit pas comprise parmi les faits prévus dans l'article 4, l'autre partie autorisera le passage en transit à travers son territoire de cet individu et des objets prévus à l'article 10, à moins que l'individu dont il s'agit ne soit un de ses nationaux.

La demande de transit devra être faite par voie diplomatique, avec production en original ou en copie dûment certifiée conforme des actes mentionnés dans l'article 7.

ARTICLE 16.

Les parties contractantes renoncent réciproquement à toute réclamation ayant pour objet le remboursement des frais occasionnés sur leur territoire respectif, par l'arrestation, l'entretien et le transport du délinquant, et par la remise temporaire mentionnée à l'article 11.

Les frais de transit, sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, d'un individu extradé ou remis temporairement à l'autre partie par une tierce Puissance, seront à la charge de l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 17.

Les dispositions en général, et plus particulièrement celles de l'article 9 du Traité de Bon-Voisinage signé entre l'Irak, la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie à Ankara le 5 juin 1926, et qui ont des rapports plus ou moins étroits avec l'objet du présent traité, continueront d'être en vigueur.

ARTICLE 18.

Le présent traité sera ratifié par les deux hautes parties contractantes et les ratifications seront échangées à Bagdad dans le plus bref délai possible.

Le traité entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des ratifications, il sera exécutoire pendant un an, et ne cessera de produire effet que six mois après la date à laquelle l'une des hautes parties contractantes exprimera à l'autre son désir de le dénoncer.

En cas de divergence entre les textes de ce traité, rédigé en arabe, en turc et en français, c'est le texte français qui fera foi.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara, le 9 janvier 1932.

NURI ESSAID.

MUSTAFA ŞEREF.

[E 442/35/93]

No. 136.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant, regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the text of the Turco-Iraqi Residence Convention, signed at Angora on the 9th January, 1932.

2. Points of interest in the convention are (1) that most-favoured-nation treatment is without prejudice to the immigration laws of each country, (2) that Turkey can share only on condition of reciprocity in special passport and visa favours accorded by Iraq to neighbouring Arab countries, and (3) that Turks in Iraq are accorded most-favoured-nation treatment in judicial matters.

3. In communicating this convention to me, the Iraqi Legation begged that the text may be regarded as confidential until it enters into force.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 136.

Convention d'Etablissement entre l'Irak et la Turquie.

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak, d'une part, et le Président de la République turque, d'autre part, également animés du désir de resserrer les liens d'amitié si heureusement existant entre les deux pays et de fixer les conditions dans lesquelles les ressortissants et les sociétés de chacune des deux hautes parties contractantes pourraient s'établir et exercer le commerce dans le territoire de l'autre partie ainsi que de régler les questions ayant trait à la compétence judiciaire et aux charges fiscales, ont décidé de conclure à cet effet une Convention d'Etablissement et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs :

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak :

Son Excellence le Général Nuri Essaid Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres de l'Irak, deuxième Classe de l'Ordre de Rafidein;

Le Président de la République turque :

Son Excellence Mustafa Şeref Beyfendi, Ministre de l'Economie nationale, Député de Burdur;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

En ce qui concerne les conditions d'établissement et de séjour qui seront applicables aux ressortissants et sociétés de chacun des deux pays sur le territoire de l'autre, ainsi qu'en matière des charges fiscales et des questions judiciaires, y compris celle de la compétence, l'Irak accordera à la Turquie et la Turquie accordera à l'Irak le même traitement que celui qui est accordé ou pourrait être accordé au pays tiers le plus favorisé.

Aucune disposition de cette convention ne saurait être interprétée comme ayant une influence quelconque sur les lois et les règlements existants dans chacun des deux pays concernant l'immigration des étrangers ou sur le droit de chacun des deux pays d'édicter des lois et règlements de cette nature.

Quant aux avantages spéciaux accordés ou qui seront accordés par l'Irak aux pays arabes limitrophes, en ce qui concerne les passeports et les visas, la Turquie ne pourra en demander le bénéfice, en invoquant la clause de la nation la plus favorisée, qu'à condition de réciprocité.

En ce qui concerne le droit de propriété immobilière, les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront sur les territoires de l'autre du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, sous réserve des dispositions des lois en vigueur dans les deux pays.

L'application de cette disposition est subordonnée à la condition de parfaite réciprocité.

ARTICLE 2.

La présente convention, rédigée en langue arabe, turque et française, sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Elle entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des instruments de ratification et demeurera obligatoire pendant un an, avec tacite reconduction aussi longtemps qu'elle ne sera pas dénoncée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes.

En cas de dénonciation, elle demeurera encore en vigueur trois mois à partir du jour où l'une des hautes parties contractantes aura notifié à l'autre son intention d'en faire cesser les effets.

S'il s'élève un différend quelconque relatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application de la présente convention le texte français fera foi.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara le 9 janvier 1932.

NURI ESSAID.

MUSTAFA ŞEREF.

[E 443/35/93]

No. 137.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant, regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to report that I have been confidentially informed by Nuri Pasha that the position of certain matters raised during the course of the treaty negotiations is as follows:—

- (a) The Turkish Government accepted his suggestions for the execution of certain preliminary measures to put a stop to brigandage on the Turco-Iraqi frontier. It postponed the settlement of the question of allowing Iraqi flocks to enter Turkish pastures until Iraq entered the League of Nations. It agreed to instruct its officials to arrest the Sheikh of Barzan if found in Turkey, and to deliver him to the Iraqi Government. It also raised no objection to the settlement of Assyrians in the Baradost area.
- (b) Letters were exchanged between Nuri Pasha and the Turkish authorities regarding a readaptation or reinterpretation of article 14 of the Anglo-Turco-Iraqi Treaty concluded at Angora on the 5th June, 1926. This article refers to the Turkish share of royalties received by the Iraqi Government from the (then) Turkish Petroleum Company. The letters exchanged provide that His Majesty's Government (in the United Kingdom) are to be consulted in respect of the negotiations which are shortly to take place with a view to amend article 14.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 1444/35/93]

No. 138.

*The Council of Ministers, Bagdad, to the High Commission for Iraq.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, March 21.)*

(Strictly Secret.)

Bagdad, February 20, 1932.

I AM directed to forward to you herewith, for the information of His Excellency the High Commissioner, copies of the letters exchanged between His Excellency Nuri Pasha and the Turkish Government regarding certain matters which were discussed at Angora last January.

ABDUL QADIR RASHID,

Secretary to the Council of Ministers.

Enclosure 1 in No. 138.

Nuri Pasha to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.)

(Secret.)

Wazir Beg Effendi,

Angora, January 10, 1932.

WITH reference to the conversation we have had together on the subject of the grant of reductions of customs duty on certain products of Turkish origin, I beg to inform your Excellency that my Government will arrange for the necessary legal measures to be adopted for the reduction by one-third of the customs duty at present leviable on afs (gallnuts) and firewood entering (? Iraq) from Turkey, and also for the reduction by one-third of the customs duty on sheep and goats

provided that "that" (? the duty after such reduction, or the reduction of one-third) shall not be less than the "count tax" (*per capita* tax) leviable within Iraq.

I have, &c.

Prime Minister of Iraq,

NURI AS SAID

Enclosure 2 in No. 138.

Turkish Minister of Economics to Nuri Pasha.

(Translation.)

(Secret.)

Hazrat Pasha Rais,

Angora, January 10, 1932.

WITH reference to the conversation we have had together on the subject of Iraqi dates.

I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency that my Government will take legal measures for reducing by one-third the customs duty at present leviable on dates, and (? to state) that my Government have approved of the (? value of the) quota for the date import season of 1932 being fixed at 100,000 liras.

Please accept, &c.

Minister of Economics,

M. SHARAF.

Enclosure 3 in No. 138.

Turkish Minister of Economics to Nuri Pasha.

(Translation.)

Wazir Beg Effendi,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 4th January, 1932, and to state as follows in regard to the matters dealt with therein:—

1. I confirm with gratification that we are agreed that the 10 per cent. share payable by the Iraqi Government to the Government of the Turkish Republic under article 14 of the treaty of 1926 is considered by the Iraqi Government (? to be payable) with effect from the year 1931 for a period of twenty-five years, that it shall be paid on the "condition" (? understanding) that payment shall cover the whole area provided for in the concession agreement of 1925, and that if, for any reason, one or more years shall lapse without payment being made, the share in respect of such years shall be paid separately.

2. Agreement having been reached to accept the year 1931 for the commencement of payment, naturally the extension period of one year, four months and eight days, previously dealt with, is no longer to be taken account of.

3. The year 1931 having been fixed as the commencement of the (period of) twenty-five years under discussion, the fixation of a (date of) commencement subsequent to that date (? 1931) for any share payable by Iraq to Turkey becomes out of question.

4. It is agreed that, apart from all the receipts dealt with in the letter dated the 24th March, 1931, addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), the contents of which were accepted by the said company, and apart from the amounts receivable by the Iraqi Government on account of income tax and of the local fee known in Iraq by the name of "nukus" (*i.e.*, excise fees) and of municipal fees on sales within the frontiers of Iraq by the new company or companies to be formed, the right of Turkey, *i.e.*, its share of 10 per cent. of other receipts, shall be reserved.

5. I suggest that the two Governments should take in hand, at the earliest possible date, the necessary legal steps for the amendment of article 14 of the treaty of 1926.

6. I beg to submit that the date question dealt with in your letter has been settled (in agreement) between us by means of a separate exchange of notes.

Minister of Economics,

M. SHARAF.

January 10, 1932.

Enclosure 4 in No. 138.

Nuri Pasha to Turkish Minister of Economics.

(Translation.)

Wazir Beg Effendi,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 10th January, 1932, and to state as follows in regard to the matters dealt with therein:—

1. I confirm with gratification that we are agreed that the 10 per cent. share payable by the Iraqi Government to the Government of the Turkish Republic under article 14 of the treaty of 1926 is considered by the Iraqi Government (? to be payable) with effect from the year 1931 for a period of twenty-five years, that it shall be paid on the "condition" (? understanding) that payment shall cover the whole area provided for in the concession agreement of 1925, and that if, for any reason, one or more years shall lapse without payment being made, the share in respect of such years shall be paid separately.

2. Agreement having been reached to accept the year 1931 for the commencement of payment, naturally the extension period of one year, four months and eight days, previously dealt with, is no longer to be taken account of.

3. The year 1931 having been fixed as the commencement of the (period of) twenty-five years under discussion, the fixation of a (date of) commencement subsequent to that date (? 1931) for any share payable by Iraq to Turkey becomes out of question.

4. It is agreed that, apart from all the receipts dealt with in the letter dated the 24th March, 1931, addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), the contents of which were accepted by the said company, and apart from the amounts receivable by the Iraqi Government on account of income tax and of the local fee known in Iraq by the name of "nukus" (i.e., excise fees) and of municipal fees on sales within the frontiers of Iraq by the new company or companies to be formed, the right of Turkey, i.e., its share of 10 per cent. of other receipts, shall be reserved.

5. It is, however, natural that the British Government, who is concerned in this question and who is a signatory of the Treaty of Angora of 1926, should be informed and her opinion ascertained as to whether or not she wishes to take part in the discussions which are to take place between us. Upon the receipt of a reply from the said Government, representatives of the two parties will meet at a place to be determined and submit to their respective Governments and Parliaments, as early as possible, the amendments to be introduced into the relevant article of the treaty of 1926 within the bases outlined hereinabove.

6. I beg to submit that the date question dealt with in your letter has been settled (in agreement) between us by means of a separate exchange of notes.

Prime Minister of Iraq,
NURI AS SAID.

January 10, 1932.

Enclosure 5 in No. 138.

Turkish Minister of the Interior to Nuri Pasha.

(Translation.)

Hazrat Prime Minister,

Angora, January 10, 1932.

IN the course of the conversation which took place between us your Excellency suggested, for the purpose of facilitating the maintenance of security and order on the frontier, that the two parties should set up, at the points where the Zab and Khabour came in contact with the frontier and at suitable seasons of the years, a number of "detachments" (sic) each under one officer, the strength of each of which and the place to be occupied by it to be determined on the spot by the frontier commanders and the nearest administrative officials of the two parties, and that these "detachments" should be provided with quick and sure means of communication in order to notify one another and the (public) security and "intizar" (reserve) forces behind them of such events as are likely to occur.

I have the honour to inform his Hazrat the Pasha that the Ministry of Interior has instructed the officials concerned to adopt the necessary measures for co-operation on these lines between the two friendly neighbouring States for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance of security and order on the frontiers.

Minister of Interior,
H. QAYA.

Enclosure 6 in No. 138.

Turkish Minister of Economics to Nuri Pasha.

(Translation.)

A PROPOS of the signature to-day of the treaty of commerce by representatives of Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to make the following statements to your Excellency:—

1. Customs formalities relating to the entry into and exit from Turkey of goods of Iraqi origin passing in transit to the territories of another country, or to goods of foreign origin passing through Turkey in transit to Iraq, will be carried out only in the Nissibin customs-house in Turkey.

It should, however, be pointed out, in addition to the above, that the confining of transit formalities to the Nissibin customs-house shall not prevent import and export formalities and formalities agreed upon provisionally with Iraq being carried out at the said customs-house.

2. The three under-mentioned customs "administrations" (? houses) have been assigned for (the carrying out of) formalities of importation and exportation of goods and formalities provisionally agreed upon with Iraq:—

(a) Jazrah customs-house: for the inland water route Mosul-Faishkhabour-Diarrakr.

(b) Ashuta customs-house (with Kurur as headquarters) or the Sharkijal (with Jal as headquarters) for the Mosul-Dohuk-Amadiyah-Julemark route.

(c) Jazrah customs-house for the Mosul-Zakho-Sanat-Sa'irt or Diarrakr route.

3. The change of the above customs post as may be necessary, the affixation of customs seal and signature on transit certificates at the respective customs-houses and other matters provided for in the customs laws and regulations of the two parties, will be determined in direct communication between the most senior official of the Turkish customs-house and the most senior official of the Iraqi customs-house.

Please accept, &c.

Minister of Economics,
M. SHARAF.

January 10, 1932.

[E 1625/35/93]

Enclosure 7 in No. 138.

Nuri Pasha to the Chief Turkish Plenipotentiary.

(Translation.)

IN connexion with the signature to-day of the treaty of commerce "between" (? by) the delegates of Iraq and Turkey, I have the honour to make the following statements to your Excellency:—

(1) Customs formalities concerning the entry and exit in transit of goods of Turkish origin passing through Iraq to the territories of another country, or of goods of foreign origin passing through Iraq in transit to Turkey, will be carried out in Iraq at the Mosul customs-house only.

To the above should, however, be added that the confining of transit formalities to the Mosul customs-house shall not preclude import and export formalities and (? other) formalities temporarily admissible with Turkey being, in the meantime, carried out at the said customs-house.

(2) The under-mentioned three customs offices are assigned for formalities of the importation and exportation of goods and formalities (? transactions) temporarily admissible with Turkey:—

- (a) Feishkhabour customs-house: for the inland water route Mosul-Feishkhabour-Diarkakir.
- (b) Amadiyah customs-house: for the route Mosul-Dohuk-Amadiyah-Julemark.
- (c) Zakho customs-house: for the route Mosul-Zakho-Sanat-Sairt or Diarkakir.

(3) Any change, as may be necessary, in the customs posts mentioned above and the grant (or exchange: Arabic not clear) of seals and signatures on transit certificates at the respective customs departments and other matters set forth (? provided for) in the customs laws and regulations of the respective parties will be determined in direct communication between the most senior officer of the Iraqi Customs Administration and the most senior officer of the Turkish Customs Administration.

Please accept, &c.

NURI AS SAID,
Chief Iraqi Delegate.

January 10, 1932.

Enclosure 8 in No. 138.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

IN the course of discussion of the extradition treaty between Iraq and Turkey, the question what are the States whose nationals will be extraditable under the said treaty was considered. After agreement had been reached that no national of either high contracting party may be delivered to the other high contracting party, Nuri Pasha, the plenipotentiary of the Iraqi Government, expressed a desire that the extradition of foreigners under the treaty should be optional for the two parties; and, although the treaty was drafted accordingly, he added and affirmed that the Iraqi Government would exercise and apply the right of option in a positive manner, *i.e.*, it will favour the grant of extradition of foreigners unless the same be contrary to its higher interests, and that, in particular, it would adhere to the course of grant of extradition in the case of nationals of the States of Syria and Persia as far as such course might be compatible with the general provisions of extradition treaties.

The Turkish plenipotentiary accepted the point of view of Nuri Pasha, taking the Pasha's statement as a pledge, and in his turn stated that Turkey would exercise the right of option to be obtained by it in this behalf in a positive way, *i.e.*, it would favour the grant of extradition of foreigners unless the same be contrary to its higher interests, and that, in particular, it would adhere to the course of grant of extradition in the case of nationals of the States of Syria and Persia as far as such course might be compatible with the general provisions of extradition treaties.

Consequently, a clause was inserted in article 1 of the extradition treaty providing that extradition will be optional.

M. SHARAF.

NURI AS SAID.

Angora, January 9, 1932.

[E 1783/9/93]

No. 139.

Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister to Sir F. Humphrys.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, April 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Downing Street, April 7, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to address you on the subject of the article entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations," in the draft declaration of guarantees to be made by Iraq on the termination of the mandatory régime. In the second paragraph of that article Iraq will undertake "to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the mandatory Power during the period of the mandate." This clause has now formed the subject of examination, and, in accordance with the request in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 10 of the 11th January last, I enclose herewith, for communication to the Iraqi Government, a list of major financial obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on Iraq's behalf.

2. In the preparation of this list, regard was naturally had to the List of International Instruments referred to in the second paragraph of article 8 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of the 30th June, 1930, which was enclosed in my predecessor's confidential despatch of the 3rd October, 1930; and it may be of assistance to you to know why certain of the items in the latter list have been omitted, whereas others have been retained in the accompanying list of financial obligations.

3. The undertakings given to the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah in respect of their date gardens in Iraq, which was the first item on the List of International Instruments, were entered into in 1914; consequently, they cannot be held to be covered by paragraph 2 of the draft guarantee as being financial obligations assumed during the period of the mandate. This item has, therefore, been omitted from the enclosed list of financial obligations.

4. Of the following two items on the List of International Instruments, the San Remo Oil Agreement of the 24th April, 1920, and the Anglo-French Boundary Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, although the latter was concluded after the assignment of the mandate to His Majesty, the former appears to have preceded the assignment by one day. Whether or not, however, these instruments fall under the draft guarantee in point of time, it is questionable whether they can legitimately be regarded as financial obligations. Articles 2 and 3 of the Boundary Convention provide for the appointment of commissions which might, it is true, give rise to certain expenses, and although the oil agreement contains no specific financial obligations, it may perhaps be premature to assume that all question of obligation to the French Government under clause 7 of that agreement has lapsed, and it is possible that failure to fulfil it might involve a liability to make financial compensation, a result, however, which might follow upon failure to fulfil any international instrument.

On the whole, therefore, it would seem that, although these agreements might in certain circumstances give rise to financial obligations, they cannot themselves justly be described as such, and in all the circumstances His Majesty's Government are of opinion that neither the Boundary Convention nor the San Remo Oil Agreement can properly be regarded as suitable for inclusion in the list to be communicated to the Iraqi Government; but, as you will observe, it has been thought well to include reference to them in a footnote appended to the list.

5. The treaty settlement of Lausanne, which forms the fourth item in the List of International Instruments, has been included in the accompanying list, and is properly so included, in view of its various financial provisions, certain of which apply to Iraq. His Majesty's Government regard mention of the Lausanne settlement as covering any liability arising out of the claim of the Ottoman Tobacco Régie that may be applicable to Iraq in accordance with the arrangement proposed in your note to the Iraqi Prime Minister of the 12th August, 1930, and accepted in his note of the 19th August, 1930. It would be well to make this point clear to the Iraqi Government when communicating the list of financial obligations.

6. The Treaty of Angora of the 5th June, 1926, has also been retained, since, although it was a tripartite agreement, with Iraq as one party, the participation of His Majesty's Government was in the nature of a guarantee of

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the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Iraq in virtue of the exchange of notes appended thereto.

7. His Majesty's Government believe that the accompanying list is complete so far as financial obligations arising from international agreements with third parties are concerned; but there may well be other financial obligations of a less formal character, not arising from international agreements, but connected with, for example, the engagement of officials on behalf of the Iraqi Government, the appointment of commissions, miscellaneous claims, pensions, &c., which have been assumed by His Majesty's Government in virtue of their responsibilities under the treaties and agreements mentioned in article 7 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, which devolve on the Iraqi Government under clause 1 of article 8 of that treaty. No attempt has been made to draw up a list of these obligations, most of which are doubtless of a relatively minor character, since the preparation of such a list would involve difficult and prolonged research, and any list produced would not in all probability be exhaustive. Moreover, the majority of the obligations in question would probably be found to be covered by the first paragraph (acquired rights) of the draft guarantee rather than the second paragraph. In communicating the accompanying list to the Iraqi Government, you should, however, make it clear that miscellaneous obligations of this character have purposely been omitted.

8. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have explained why mention of the undertakings given to the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah in 1914 has been omitted from the accompanying list. Although, however, these undertakings cannot be held to be covered by paragraph 2 (financial obligations) of the draft guarantee, if the view of His Majesty's Government as to the legal effect of the undertakings given is correct, the rights of the two sheikhs would seem to be covered by the first paragraph (acquired rights) of the draft guarantee. While His Majesty's Government have no desire themselves to take advantage of the first paragraph of the draft guarantee to press the claims of the two sheikhs, since they are content that this matter should be left for settlement under article 8 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, there is a remote possibility that the sheikhs themselves may of their own accord seek support for their case against the Iraqi Government from this paragraph of the draft guarantee. I am content to leave it to your discretion whether or not to raise this aspect of the case with the Iraqi Government.

I have, &c.

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 139.

List of Financial Obligations assumed on Iraq's behalf by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom during the Period of Mandate, referred to in paragraph 2 of the Draft Guarantee entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations," adopted by the Committee of the League Council on February 10, 1932.

1. THE Treaty Settlement of Lausanne, July 24, 1923.
2. The Treaty of Angora, June 5, 1926.

NOTE.—The San Remo Oil Agreement of the 25th April, 1930, and the Anglo-French Boundary Convention, the 23rd December, 1920, have not been included, since, although they may indirectly give rise to financial obligations, they are not considered to be strictly covered by the words of paragraph 2 of the draft guarantee.

[E 2241/9/93]

No. 140.

Sir F. Humphrys to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 5.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 21, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for your information, copy of a letter to the Prime Minister, Bagdad (with enclosure), dated the 19th April, on the subject of the declarations to be made by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

Sir F. Humphrys to the Prime Minister, Bagdad.

(Confidential.)

My dear Prime Minister,

Bagdad, April 19, 1932.

PLEASE refer to my letter dated the 18th March, 1932, enclosing an English translation of the draft declaration which it is proposed should be made by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations.

In the second paragraph of the article entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations" Iraq will undertake "to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the mandatory Power during the period of the mandate." I have now received from the Secretary of State a list of major financial obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government on Iraq's behalf, which I enclose for the information of your Excellency.

The Treaty of Lausanne is included in the list in view of its various financial provisions, certain of which apply to Iraq. His Majesty's Government regard mention of the Lausanne settlement as covering any liability arising out of the claim of the Ottoman Tobacco Régie that may be applicable to Iraq in accordance with the arrangement proposed in my note dated the 12th August, 1930, and accepted by your Excellency in your note of the 19th August, 1930.

The Treaty of Angora of the 5th June, 1926, has also been retained, since, although it was a tripartite agreement, with Iraq as one party, the participation of His Majesty's Government was in the nature of a guarantee of the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Iraq in virtue of the exchange of notes appended thereto.

His Majesty's Government believe that the accompanying list is complete so far as financial obligations arising from international agreements with third parties are concerned; but there may well be other financial obligations of a less formal character, not arising from international agreements, but connected with, for example, the engagement of officials on behalf of the Iraqi Government, the appointment of commissions, miscellaneous claims, pensions, &c., which have been assumed by His Majesty's Government in virtue of their responsibilities under the treaties and agreements mentioned in article 7 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, which devolve on the Iraqi Government under clause 1 of article 8 of that treaty. No attempt has been made to draw up a list of these obligations, most of which are doubtless of a relatively minor character, since the preparation of such a list would involve difficult and prolonged research, and any list produced would not in all probability be exhaustive. Moreover, the majority of the obligations in question would probably be found to be covered by the first paragraph (acquired rights) of the draft guarantee, rather than the second paragraph. In communicating the accompanying list to the Iraqi Government, therefore, I wish to make it clear that miscellaneous obligations of this character have purposely been omitted.

Yours sincerely,

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

List of Financial Obligations assumed on Iraq's behalf by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom during the Period of Mandate, referred to in Paragraph 2 of the Draft Guarantee entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations adopted by the Committee of the League Council on the 10th February, 1932."

1. The Treaty Settlement of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923.
2. The Treaty of Angora of the 5th June, 1926.

Note.—The San Remo Oil Agreement of the 25th April, 1920, and the Anglo-French Boundary Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, have not been included, since, although they may indirectly give rise to financial obligations, they are not considered to be strictly covered by the words of paragraph 2 of the draft guarantee.

[E 2475/617/93]

No. 141.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.—(Communicated by the Colonial Office, May 17.)

(Secret. A.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 28, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following brief report on the progress of the operations against Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan.

2. The object of the operations is to bring the Shirwan and Barzan areas under control, and to establish in those areas the machinery of Government in order that the state of lawlessness and insecurity to life and property due to the depredations of Sheikh Ahmad's followers may be brought to an end. The operations were not, therefore, undertaken with punitive intent. Every effort has been made to induce Sheikh Ahmad himself not to oppose the force and orders of the Government, but, while professing obedience and endeavouring thereby to gain time, the sheikh has continued to incite his followers to active opposition of the Iraqi army columns.

3. On the 14th March, while negotiations were still in progress between Sheikh Ahmad and the Mosul authorities, a composite column, including two infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, a section of a mounted battery, and 200 police, moved out from Diana into the Shirwan country, which, according to the approved plan of campaign, was first to be brought under control before any attempt was made to deal with Sheikh Ahmad's headquarters. Aircraft of the Royal Air Force co-operated with the column for reconnaissance purposes, their instructions being to take air action only against hostile tribesmen who were actually engaging and holding up the advance of the Iraqi column. Opposition was first encountered at Merga Sor, on the 19th, where the column was attacked before day-break by a force of Shirwani tribesmen estimated at 300. Though the attacking force succeeded in penetrating the picquet line, it was eventually driven off, the Iraqi army losing six killed and ten wounded.

4. Immediately after this action the prestige of the Iraqi force was high, and a number of local tribal leaders came in to make their submission to the Iraqi political officer accompanying the column. During the days that followed, however, this effect was more than counter-balanced by a series of retaliatory raids, in which Sheikh Ahmad's men attacked the villages of those who had surrendered and carried off their families. In order to restore the Government's prestige, it was decided, at the suggestion of the Iraqi Government, and with the concurrence of the Air Officer Commanding and myself, to take punitive air action against the village of Raizan, which was known to be the headquarters of a Barzani force. It was anticipated that this would convince any doubters among the tribes that the Iraqi troops could count on the assistance of the Royal Air Force, who, except for one occasion, on the 23rd March, when aircraft which were fired on by hostile tribesmen returned their fire, had not hitherto taken an active part in the operations. The bombing of Raizan, which was delayed by bad weather, was carried out on the 2nd and 3rd April.

5. On the morning of the 3rd April, the column met with a serious reverse. I have not yet received a detailed report of the action, but it appears that the

main body, which was then approaching Berisia, had moved too far in advance of its supply train, which was protected by a relatively small escort, and had only reached Wazhi—some 2 miles to the south. The tribesmen launched an attack on the transport, stampeding the mules and throwing the whole train into confusion. The main body turned back to repel the attack, but was unable to prevent almost the entire train, including rations, kit and ammunition, from being looted. As soon as the situation was observed from the air, every available aircraft was summoned, and the rebels were vigorously engaged from the air throughout the day. I regret that in the course of the action Sergeant Hudson of the Royal Air Force was killed. There is no doubt that had it not been for the prompt and effective action taken by the Royal Air Force on this occasion, the position of the Iraqi column, without supplies and its line of communications cut, would have been extremely critical. As it was, the Royal Air Force succeeded in beating off the attack, and supplies of rations, ammunition and blankets were subsequently dropped on the column from the air.

6. This disaster had a demoralising effect on the Iraqi column, and more particularly on the senior officers, whose behaviour on this occasion suggests that merit is not the sole, nor even perhaps the chief, criterion in the filling of military appointments. I have already drawn King Feisal's attention to this question.

7. Three days later, while proceeding to Zhazhok to meet a relief convoy, which was advancing from Merga Sor with a strong ground and air escort, the column was again attacked near Wazhi by a force of rebel tribesmen, who were at once engaged by the escorting aircraft. During the fighting a well-placed bomb caused a panic among the rebels, who broke cover and fled, offering a most vulnerable target to the aircraft, of which the latter took full advantage. This greatly heartened the Iraqi troops, who pressed the retreating army with energy and gallantry, and it is estimated that the rebel losses in this action included 100 killed. The Iraqi column, which has remained at Zhazhok, has since been unmolested by the rebels, except for occasional sniping.

8. In the meantime, it had been decided, in order to strengthen the Government's control in the Bira Kapra district, and to weaken the pressure on the Shirwan column by threatening Barzan, to reinforce the Billeh garrison from Aqrah. An infantry battalion and one section pack battery accordingly joined the battalion already occupying Billeh on the 7th April, and this force was further reinforced a week later by two companies of infantry. This column (known as Bazcol), after carrying out reconnaissance as far as Barzan and meeting with no opposition, occupied Barzan village on the 18th April.

9. By this time, however, it had become evident that it would be impossible to complete the programme of bringing under control not only the Shirwan district south of the Rukuchuk River, but the Barzan and Shirwan in Mazin districts to the north of it, during the present summer, without intensive operations by the Royal Air Force, and an urgent request for intensive air action was now made by the Iraqi Government. After full consideration, the Air Officer Commanding and I agreed that it would be most unsatisfactory to leave these operations unfinished till the end of the summer, particularly in view of the fact that the services of the Royal Air Force may not subsequently be available for such purposes. It was therefore decided to accede to the Iraqi Government's request. As a first step proclamations have been dropped warning the insurgents that air action will be intensified and extended, and will continue until opposition has ceased and the leaders have surrendered; in the meantime, all who submit, except those guilty of specified crimes against individuals, will be pardoned and permitted to return in safety to their villages with their rifles on the conclusion of the operations. These proclamations were dropped on the 26th, and bombing is to begin on the 29th April. The objective is not to cause casualties or avoidable destruction of property, but to interrupt the normal life of the inhabitants continuously over a considerable period, until they consent to accept the terms offered them. There is every reason to believe that, except for an immediate following of about 300 devotees, Sheikh Ahmad's supporters are bound to him not by any bonds of sympathy, but merely by intimidation, and it is hoped that the threat of air bombardment will suffice to detach many of the insurgents from their allegiance.

10. On the 25th April I flew over the Greater Zab River and paid a visit to Diana. Conversations with leading Kurds and with officers of the Royal Air Force and levies convinced me that the handling of the political side of the

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operations, which was entrusted to an Iraqi political officer, left much to be desired. There seemed to be a danger that tactless treatment of tribesmen who surrendered and indiscriminate burning of villages might not only discourage further surrenders, but force loyal tribesmen into the Barzan camp. In view of the fact that the chief burden of the operations is now to be borne by the Royal Air Force I considered myself fully justified in demanding that political control should be placed in the hands of a British officer. The Acting Prime Minister has now agreed to the appointment of Captain Lyon, Administrative Inspector, Arbil and Kirkuk, as political officer in the area of operations against Sheikh Ahmad in the Arbil Liwa, with full executive and administrative authority to direct, under the orders of the adviser to the Ministry of Interior, the policy of the Government towards its inhabitants. Captain Lyon's reports will be repeated to the Air Officer Commanding and myself.

11. I hope that the line of action now adopted will result in the early surrender of the rebel leaders, and will put an end to the tyranny of Sheikh Ahmad, who makes no pretence to be a leader of a Kurdish national movement, and who, in fact, represents no one but his immediate followers. The country will benefit greatly by the improvement of communications represented by the roads which are already being constructed as the troops advance, and the majority of the inhabitants realise it, and will, I am convinced, welcome the advantages of orderly government as soon as the fear of Sheikh Ahmad and his men is removed.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS,
High Commissioner for Iraq.

[E 3102/9/93]

No. 142.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 27, 1932.

IN your letter of the 20th May you enclosed a communication addressed to the Prime Minister of Iraq relative to the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at its session on the 19th May in regard to the termination of the mandatory régime in that country. This letter was duly forwarded to its destination.

2. I am now directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you herewith, in original, a letter addressed to you by Nuri Pasha, together with the original enclosures therein, being the Iraqi Declaration of Guarantees signed by the Prime Minister of Iraq, and the instrument of ratification of that declaration signed by His Majesty King Feisal. I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 142.

Nuri Pasha to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir,

Bagdad, May 30, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 20th May, 1932, transmitting to me, duly prepared for signature, the text of the declaration approved by the resolution adopted on the 19th May, 1932, by the Council of the League of Nations, in regard to the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq, together with the reports relating to this subject which were approved by the Council.

I have the honour to return to you herewith the declaration signed by me as the duly authorised representative of Iraq. I enclose also the instrument of ratification of the declaration.

I beg to request that you will bring the making of the declaration by Iraq to the knowledge of the Council and the members of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

NOURI SAID,
Prime Minister of Iraq.

Enclosure 2 in No. 142.

Feisal, King of Iraq.

WHEREAS a declaration on behalf of the Kingdom of Iraq was signed at Bagdad on the thirtieth day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two by Our Plenipotentiary duly authorised for that purpose, which declaration is, word for word, as follows:—

*Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq
made on the Occasion of the Termina-
tion of the Mandatory Régime in
Iraq.*

*Déclaration du Royaume de l'Irak
faite à l'Occasion de l'Extinction du
Régime mandataire en Irak.*

CHAPTER I.

ARTICLE 1.

Protection of Minorities.

The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as fundamental laws of Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2.

1. Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

2. All inhabitants of Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

ARTICLE 3.

Ottoman subjects habitually resident in the territory of Iraq on the 6th August, 1924, shall be deemed to have acquired on that date Iraqi nationality to the exclusion of Ottoman nationality in accordance with article 30 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty and under the conditions laid down in the Iraqi Nationality Law of the 9th October, 1924.

ARTICLE 4.

1. All Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

2. The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial, religious and linguistic minorities in Iraq.

3. Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public

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CHAPITRE I.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Protection des Minorités.

Les stipulations contenues dans le présent chapitre seront reconnues comme lois fondamentales en Irak. Aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne seront en contradiction ou en opposition avec ces stipulations et aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne prévaudront contre elles, ni maintenant ni à l'avenir.

ARTICLE 2.

1. Il sera accordé à tous les habitants de l'Irak pleine et entière protection de leur vie et de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langage, de race ou de religion.

2. Tous les habitants de l'Irak auront droit au libre exercice, tant public que privé, de toute foi, religion ou croyance, dont la pratique ne sera pas incompatible avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants ottomans établis sur le territoire de l'Irak à la date du 6 août 1924 seront considérés comme ayant acquis, à cette date, la nationalité irakienne, à l'exclusion de la nationalité ottomane, sur la base de l'article 30 du Traité de Paix de Lausanne, et dans les conditions prévues dans la loi irakienne du 9 octobre 1924 sur la nationalité.

ARTICLE 4.

1. Tous les ressortissants irakiens seront égaux devant la loi et jouiront des mêmes droits civils et politiques sans distinction de race, de langue ou de religion.

2. Le système électoral assurera une représentation équitable aux minorités de race, de religion ou de langue en Irak.

3. La différence de race, de langue ou de religion ne devra nuire à aucun ressortissant irakien en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, notamment pour l'admission

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employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions or industries.

4. No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any Iraqi national of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

5. Notwithstanding the establishment by the Iraqi Government of Arabic as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements to be made by the Iraqi Government, under article 9 of the present declaration, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate facilities will be given to all Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 5.

Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Iraqi nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 6.

The Iraqi Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law and personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs and usage of the communities to which those minorities belong.

The Iraqi Government will communicate to the Council of the League of Nations information regarding the manner in which these measures have been executed.

ARTICLE 7.

1. The Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities and authorisation to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of minority religious communities existing in Iraq.

aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs, et pour l'exercice des différentes professions et industries.

4. Il ne sera édicté aucune restriction au libre usage par tous les ressortissants irakiens d'une langue quelconque, soit dans les relations privées ou de commerce, soit en matière de religion, de presse ou de publications de toute nature, soit dans les réunions publiques.

5. Nonobstant l'établissement par le Gouvernement irakien de la langue arabe comme langue officielle, et nonobstant les dispositions spéciales que le Gouvernement irakien prendra en ce qui concerne l'emploi des langues kurde et turque, dispositions prévues à l'article 9 de la présente déclaration, des facilités appropriées seront données à tous les ressortissants irakiens de langue autre que la langue officielle, pour l'usage de leur langue, soit oralement, soit par écrit, devant les tribunaux.

ARTICLE 5.

Les ressortissants irakiens appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, jouiront du même traitement et des mêmes garanties en droit et en fait que les autres ressortissants irakiens. Ils auront notamment un droit égal à maintenir, diriger et contrôler à leurs frais ou à créer à l'avenir des institutions charitables, religieuses ou sociales, des écoles et autres établissements d'éducation, avec le droit d'y faire librement usage de leur propre langue et d'y exercer librement leur religion.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement irakien agréé de prendre à l'égard des minorités non-musulmanes, en ce qui concerne leur statut familial et personnel, toutes dispositions permettant de régler ces questions selon le droit coutumier des communautés auxquelles ces minorités appartiennent.

Le Gouvernement irakien enverra au Conseil de la Société des Nations des renseignements sur la façon dont ont été exécutées ces dispositions.

ARTICLE 7.

1. Le Gouvernement irakien s'engage à accorder toute protection, facilités et autorisations aux églises, synagogue, cimetières, autres établissements religieux, œuvres charitables et fondations pieuses des communautés religieuses minoritaires existant en Irak.

2. Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing councils, in important administrative districts, competent to administer pious foundations and charitable bequests. These councils shall be competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among the community. These communities shall also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans, in accordance with law. The councils referred to above shall be under the supervision of the Government.

3. The Iraqi Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious or charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which may be guaranteed to existing institutions of that nature.

ARTICLE 8.

1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, the Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.

2. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, Municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

ARTICLE 9.

1. Iraq undertakes that in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race.

In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk, where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish.

2. Toutes ces communautés auront le droit de constituer, dans les divisions administratives importantes, des conseils qui auront qualité pour administrer les fondations pieuses ainsi que les legs charitables. Ces conseils auront qualité pour percevoir les revenus produits par ces biens, pour les utiliser conformément aux vœux du donateur ou à l'usage établi dans la communauté. Ces communautés devront également veiller sur les biens des orphelins, conformément à la loi. Les conseils susmentionnés seront placés sous le contrôle du Gouvernement.

3. Le Gouvernement irakien ne refusera, pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux ou charitables, aucune des facilités nécessaires qui seront garanties aux établissements de cette nature déjà existants.

ARTICLE 8.

1. En matière d'enseignement public, le Gouvernement irakien accordera, dans les villes et districts où réside une proportion considérable de ressortissants irakiens de langue autre que la langue officielle, des facilités appropriées pour assurer que l'instruction dans les écoles primaires sera donnée, dans leur propre langue, aux enfants de ces ressortissants irakiens. Cette stipulation n'empêchera pas le Gouvernement irakien de rendre obligatoire l'enseignement de la langue arabe dans lesdites écoles.

2. Dans les villes et districts où réside une proportion considérable de ressortissants irakiens appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, ces minorités se verront assurer une part équitable dans le bénéfice et l'affectation des sommes qui pourraient être attribuées sur les fonds publics par le budget de l'Etat, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d'éducation, de religion ou de charité.

ARTICLE 9.

1. L'Irak agréé en ce qui concerne les Liwas de Mossoul, Arbil, Kirkuk et Soulaïmanié que la langue officielle, à côté de l'arabe, sera le kurde dans les qadhas où la population prédominante est de race kurde.

Toutefois, dans les qadhas de Kifri et de Kirkuk du Liwa de Kirkuk, où une partie considérable de la population est de race turcomane, la langue officielle sera, à côté de l'arabe, soit le kurde, soit le turc.

2. Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish as the case may be.

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in the rest of Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, Iraq undertakes that the officials shall as hitherto be selected, so far as possible, from among Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

ARTICLE 10.

The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Any member of the League represented on the Council shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take such measures and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between Iraq and any member of the League represented on the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under article 13 of the Covenant.

CHAPTER II.

ARTICLE 11.

Most-Favoured-Nation Clause.

1. Subject to reciprocity, Iraq undertakes to grant to members of the League most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the date of its

2. L'Irak agréé que dans lesdits qadhas les fonctionnaires devront, sauf exception justifiée, posséder la langue kurde ou, le cas échéant, la langue turque.

3. Bien que dans lesdits qadhas le critère pour le choix des fonctionnaires soit, comme dans le reste de l'Irak, la capacité et la connaissance de la langue plutôt que la race, le Gouvernement agréé que les fonctionnaires seront choisis, comme jusqu'à présent, autant que possible parmi les ressortissants irakiens originaires de ces qadhas.

ARTICLE 10.

Dans la mesure où les stipulations des articles précédents de la présente déclaration affectent des personnes appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, ces stipulations constituent des obligations d'intérêt international et seront placées sous la garantie de la Société des Nations. Elles ne pourront être modifiées sans l'assentiment de la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Tout membre de la Société représenté au Conseil aura le droit de signaler à l'attention du Conseil toute infraction ou danger d'infraction à l'une quelconque de ces obligations, et le Conseil pourra prendre telles mesures et donner telles instructions qui paraîtront appropriées et efficaces dans la circonstance.

En cas de divergence d'opinion sur des questions de droit ou de fait concernant ces articles, entre l'Irak et l'un quelconque des membres de la Société représenté au Conseil, cette divergence sera considérée comme un différend ayant un caractère international selon les termes de l'article 14 du Pacte de la Société des Nations. Tout différend de ce genre sera, si l'autre partie le demande, déféré à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. La décision de la Cour permanente sera sans appel et aura la même force et valeur qu'une décision rendue en vertu de l'article 13 du Pacte.

CHAPITRE II.

ARTICLE 11.

Clause de la Nation la plus favorisée.

1. L'Irak s'engage à accorder, sous réserve de réciprocité, aux États membres de la Société, le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, pendant une

admission to membership of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any member of the League of Nations, whether such measures are in force at the above-mentioned date or are taken during the period contemplated in the preceding paragraph, be of such a nature as to disturb to the detriment of Iraq the balance of trade between Iraq and the member of the League of Nations in question, by seriously affecting the chief exports of Iraq, the latter, in view of its special situation, reserves to itself the right to request the member of the League of Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance.

Should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months from its request, Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* of the member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the first sub-paragraph above.

2. The undertaking contained in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to any advantages which are, or may in the future be, accorded by Iraq to any adjacent country in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or to those resulting from a customs union concluded by Iraq. Nor shall the undertaking apply to any special advantages in customs matters which Iraq may grant to goods the produce or manufacture of Turkey, or of any country whose territory was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

ARTICLE 12.

Judicial Organisation.

A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, Iraqis and foreigners alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

The judicial system at present in force, and based on articles 2, 3 and 4 of the agreement between the mandatory Power and Iraq, signed on the 4th March, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of ten years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

période de dix ans à compter de la date du jour de son admission comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Toutefois, si les mesures prises par l'un quelconque des membres de la Société des Nations, qu'elles soient en vigueur à cette date susmentionnée ou qu'elles soient prises au cours de la période visée à l'alinéa ci-dessus, étaient de nature à compromettre, au détriment de l'Irak, l'équilibre des échanges entre ce dernier et le membre de la Société des Nations en question, en affectant sérieusement les principales exportations de l'Irak, ce dernier, en considération de sa situation spéciale, se réserve la faculté de demander, au membre de la Société des Nations dont il s'agit, l'ouverture immédiate de négociations en vue de rétablir l'équilibre ainsi rompu.

Au cas où, dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la demande de l'Irak, ces négociations n'auraient pas abouti à un accord, l'Irak déclare qu'il pourra se considérer comme libéré, vis-à-vis du membre de la Société en question, de l'obligation stipulée au premier alinéa ci-dessus.

2. Sont exceptés de l'engagement formulé au premier alinéa ci-dessus les avantages accordés ou qui pourraient être accordés ultérieurement par l'Irak à un pays limitrophe pour faciliter le trafic-frontière, ainsi que ceux résultant d'une union douanière qui pourrait être conclue par l'Irak. Il en sera de même en ce qui concerne les avantages spéciaux qu'en matière douanière l'Irak pourrait consentir aux produits naturels ou fabriqués, originaires de la Turquie ou d'un pays quelconque dont le territoire, en 1914, faisait intégrale-ment partie de l'Empire ottoman en Asie.

ARTICLE 12.

Organisation judiciaire.

Un système de justice uniforme sera applicable également à tous les ressortissants d'Irak et à tous les étrangers. Ce système sera de nature à assurer efficacement tant aux étrangers qu'aux nationaux la sauvegarde et le plein exercice de leurs droits.

Le système judiciaire en vigueur et résultant des articles 2, 3 et 4 de l'accord entre la Puissance mandataire et l'Irak, signé le 4 mars 1931, sera maintenu pour une période de dix années, à compter de l'admission de l'Irak comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by article 2 of the said agreement shall be made by the Iraqi Government. Their holders shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality; they must be fully qualified.

ARTICLE 13.

International Conventions.

Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether by its own action or by that of the mandatory Power acting on its behalf. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by Iraq throughout the period for which they were concluded.

ARTICLE 14.

Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations.

Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of the 15th September, 1925—

1. Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the termination of the mandatory régime by individuals, associations or juridical persons, shall be respected.
2. Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the mandatory Power during the period of the mandate.

ARTICLE 15.

Freedom of Conscience.

Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of public order and morality, Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members.

ARTICLE 16.

Final Clause.

The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international concern. Any member of the League of

Les postes réservés à des juristes étrangers en vertu de l'article 2 dudit accord sont pourvus par les soins de l'Irak. Les titulaires, bien qu'étrangers, sont choisis sans distinction de nationalité; ils doivent réunir les qualifications utiles.

ARTICLE 13.

Conventions internationales.

L'Irak se considère comme lié par tous les accords et conventions internationaux, tant généraux que spéciaux, auxquels il est devenu partie, soit qu'il ait agi lui-même directement, soit que la Puissance mandataire ait agi pour son compte. Sous réserve du droit de dénonciation qu'ils pourraient prévoir, ces accords et conventions seront respectés par l'Irak pendant toute la durée pour laquelle ils ont été conclus.

ARTICLE 14.

Droits acquis et Obligations financières.

En prenant acte de la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations du 15 septembre 1925, l'Irak :

1. Déclare que les droits de toute nature acquis avant l'extinction du régime mandataire par des particuliers, des sociétés ou des personnes juridiques, seront respectés;
2. S'engage à respecter et à exécuter les obligations financières de toute nature assumées pour son compte par la Puissance mandataire pendant la durée du mandat.

ARTICLE 15.

Liberté de Conscience.

Sous réserve des mesures indispensables au maintien des bonnes mœurs et de l'ordre public, l'Irak s'engage à assurer et à garantir, sur toute l'étendue de son territoire, la liberté de conscience et le libre exercice des cultes, ainsi que les activités des missions religieuses de toutes les confessions en matière religieuse, scolaire et d'assistance médicale, quelle que soit la nationalité de ces missions ou de leurs membres.

ARTICLE 16.

Clause finale.

Les dispositions contenues dans le présent chapitre constituent des obligations d'intérêt international. Tout

Nations may call the attention of the Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified except by agreement between Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations acting by a majority vote.

Any difference of opinion which may arise between Iraq and any member of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall by an application by such member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of Iraq, subject to ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of the 19th May, 1932.

Done at Bagdad on this thirtieth day of May, 1932, in a single copy, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

NOURI SAID,
Prime Minister of Iraq.

WE, having seen and considered the declaration aforesaid, have approved, accepted, and confirmed the same in all and every one of its articles and clauses, as We do by these presents approve, accept, confirm, and ratify for Ourselves, Our Heirs and Successors; engaging and promising upon Our Royal Word that We will sincerely and faithfully perform and observe all and singular the things which are contained and expressed in the declaration aforesaid, and that We will never suffer the same to be violated by anyone, or transgressed in any manner, as far as it lies in Our power. For the greater testimony and validity of all which, We have caused Our Great Seal to be affixed to these presents, which We have signed with Our Royal Hand.

Given at Our Court at Bagdad the thirtieth day of May in the Year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two and in the eleventh year of Our Reign.

FEISAL.

membre de la Société des Nations pourra signaler à l'attention du Conseil les infractions à ces dispositions. Ces dernières ne pourront être modifiées que par accord entre l'Irak et le Conseil de la Société des Nations, statuant à la majorité des voix.

Toute divergence d'opinion qui viendrait à s'élever entre l'Irak et l'un quelconque des membres de la Société des Nations représentés au Conseil, au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution desdites dispositions, sera, à la requête de ce membre, soumise pour décision à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

Le soussigné, dûment autorisé, accepte, au nom de l'Irak et sous réserve de ratification, les dispositions ci-dessus, qui constituent la déclaration prévue par la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 19 mai 1932.

Fait à Bagdad, le
en un seul exemplaire, qui sera déposé dans les archives du Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

ANNEX A.

[E 2331/9/93]

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

MANDATES.

IRAQ.

Committee appointed under the Council Resolution of January 28, 1932, to prepare the Draft Declaration to be made before the Council by the Iraqi Government upon the termination of the Mandatory Régime in Iraq.

Report to the Council.

Geneva, May 7, 1932.

ON the 28th January, 1932, the Council adopted the following resolution:—

- "The Council,
 "Having to consider the special case of the termination of the mandate for Iraq;
 "Notes the opinion formulated, at its request, by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the proposal of the British Government;
 "2. Considers that the information available is sufficient to show that Iraq satisfies, generally speaking, the *de facto* conditions enumerated in the annex to the Council resolution of the 4th September, 1931;
 "3. Declares itself prepared, in principle, to pronounce the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq when that State shall have entered into undertakings before the Council in conformity with the suggestions contained in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, it being understood that the right to apply to the Permanent Court of International Justice may only be exercised by members of the League represented on the Council;
 "4. Accordingly requests its *rapporteurs* for minorities questions, questions of international law and mandates, and the representative of Great Britain on the Council, to prepare, in consultation with the representative of the Iraqi Government, and, if necessary, with a representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission, a draft declaration covering the various guarantees recommended in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and to submit that draft to the Council at its next session;
 "5. Decides that, should the Council, after examining the undertakings which would be entered into by the Iraqi Government, pronounce the termination of the mandatory régime over that territory, such decision shall become effective only as from the date on which Iraq has been admitted to the League of Nations."

The committee held meetings, all private, from the 30th January to the 10th February, and from the 25th April to the 7th May, 1932. The first stage of the work was devoted to the preparation of the draft declaration, and the second to the framing of the committee's report.

In accordance with the indication given in the Council resolution, the Prime Minister of Iraq, his Excellency Nuri Pasha, and his Excellency M. Pierre Orts, member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, appointed for this purpose by the chairman of the commission, co-operated with the committee in an advisory capacity.

In performing its task the committee constantly endeavoured, in accordance with the principles clearly laid down in the Council's discussions, to draw up a sufficiently precise and complete draft declaration while remaining strictly within the limits indicated and without imposing on Iraq any obligations likely to hinder her free development as an independent nation.

The committee wishes to express its appreciation of the help afforded to it in its work by the representative of the Iraqi Government and by the representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The committee considers that the draft declaration which it has the honour to submit to the Council, and which has been unanimously adopted by its members, is such as to satisfy the conditions laid down by the Council in its resolution of the 28th January, 1932, and the recommendations contained in the special report of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Furthermore, it is convinced that this text, which was discussed with the Prime Minister of Iraq, and takes full account of the wishes expressed by him, would in every way prove acceptable to Iraq.

In submitting to the Council the draft declaration which is the outcome of its deliberations, the committee has thought it well to add certain explanations defining the meaning of certain provisions, and indicating in other cases the reasons for the omission of stipulations which at first sight had been thought advisable.

According to the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the conclusions of which were adopted by the Council, the Iraqi Government's declaration must provide guarantees on the following points:—

1. The effective protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities;
2. Safeguard of the interests of foreigners in the judicial sphere;
3. Freedom of conscience and the safeguard of the activities of religious missions;
4. Rights acquired and financial obligations contracted by the mandatory Power before the termination of the mandate;
5. Respect for international conventions;
6. Concession to the States members of the League of Nations, under certain conditions, of most-favoured-nation treatment subject to reciprocity.

Lastly, Iraq's declaration must contain a provision giving the members of the League of Nations represented on the Council the right to lay before the Permanent Court of International Justice any difference of opinion arising out of the interpretation or execution of the undertakings assumed by Iraq before the Council.

The draft declaration divides the above-mentioned subjects into two chapters.

The first chapter is exclusively devoted to the protection of minorities. The second chapter contains provisions relating to the most-favoured-nation clause, the situation of foreigners in the judicial sphere, international conventions, acquired rights and the financial obligations contracted by the mandatory Power, freedom of conscience and the activities of religious missions, and the procedure of appeal.

CHAPTER I.

Protection of Minorities.

1. In conformity with the principles laid down by the Mandates Commission and accepted by the Council, the committee thought it necessary to provide for the insertion in the draft declaration concerning the protection of minorities of the provisions of a general character contained in the treaties or declarations already in force in a certain number of countries. The text of these provisions, for which the terms of the Albanian declaration have as a rule served as a model, calls for no observations on the part of the committee.

2. Furthermore, the Mandates Commission had envisaged that Iraq should accede to any special provisions that the Council of the League of Nations, in agreement with the Iraqi Government, might think it necessary to lay down as a temporary or permanent measure to ensure the effective protection of racial, linguistic or religious minorities in Iraq.

3. As regards the guarantee system to be adopted, the committee did not think it necessary for special clauses to be inserted in the draft declaration.⁽¹⁾ It thought it sufficient to insert in article 10 of the draft declaration the general guarantee clause contained in the existing minorities treaties, which is sufficiently elastic to be adjusted in practice to the special circumstances of Iraq.

⁽¹⁾ See § 4, letter (a), para. (i) of the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, approved by the Council on January 28, 1932 (Document C. 830, M. 411, 1931, VI, p. 223).

Furthermore, it is understood that Iraq accepts the rules of procedure adopted by the Council in regard to the protection of minorities.

4. As regards the substantive provisions, the committee desires first to emphasise the satisfaction with which it has noted that many of the constitutional and legislative provisions of Iraq are based on a very liberal conception of the rights to be accorded to racial, linguistic or religious minorities.

It is happy to recall the fact that during the course of the proceedings the Prime Minister made it clear that that conception has as its starting-point the idea that all Iraqi nationals, irrespective of race, language or religion, form part, on a footing of equality, of the body of the State.

5. The committee consider it necessary to insert in the draft declaration the following two special clauses:—

(a) One clause, which figures in article 6, relating to the personal status and family law of non-Moslem minorities. That clause, which, moreover, is not without precedent in the provisions governing the protection of minorities, is explained by the situation of Iraq in regard to non-Moslem communities, a situation of which full account has already been taken in the constitution of Iraq. In the committee's view, article 6 of the draft should be interpreted as giving the term "family law and personal status" the widest sense, in conformity with the provision embodied in article 79 of the Iraq Constitution.

(b) The clause embodied in article 9, which is designed to take into account the situation of the Kurdish minority. After a very thorough examination, the committee adopted the view that it would be sufficient to insert in the draft declaration provisions concerning respectively the use of the Kurdish language, as an official language in the Kurdish districts, and the recruitment of officials. In this connexion the committee noted the explicit and formal declarations of the Iraqi Government regarding its intention to pursue the liberal policy which has already been applied in relation to the Kurdish population, and which ensures the latter's co-operation in the work of the Government and the general administration of the State. On this point the committee desires to refer expressly to the following passages of the letter sent by the Acting President of the Iraq Council of Ministers on the 19th August, 1930, to the Acting British High Commissioner:—⁽¹⁾

"As regards the general question of the appointment of officials in the Kurdish liwas, of which mention is made in the stipulations of the League, I think that I should make clear the policy of the Government. The majority of officials in these districts are Kurds, and will continue to be so, but it has for a long time been realised that to appoint only Kurds in the Kurdish liwas will inevitably tend to bar them from employment in other parts of Iraq. This is detrimental to the general interests of the Administration, and is likely to keep alive feelings which the Iraqi Government hope to see disappear. Accordingly, as soon as the Local Languages Law is approved by Parliament, the Government propose to make a knowledge of the Kurdish language, and not race, a condition of employment in the Kurdish liwas. It is hardly necessary to add that this does not denote any change in its policy of administration, and that care will be taken to choose suitable men. The matter is mainly one of principle, for there are not a great number of Arabs with a knowledge of Kurdish. In the same way, the whole of Iraq will remain open for employment of Kurds who have a knowledge of Arabic. The Iraqi Government maintain that this policy is in the best interests of the Kurds themselves, and does not conflict with the stipulations of the League."

6. Furthermore, as regards article 7, paragraph 2, the committee noted with satisfaction the statement made by Sir Francis Humphrys at the Twenty-First Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (see minutes pp. 98 and 99)⁽²⁾, to the effect that the laws concerning the councils of the Jewish and Armenian communities had been drawn up in consultation with the lay and spiritual advisers of the parties and had given general satisfaction. The committee is confident that the laws regarding the councils of the other religious communities will be drawn up in the same spirit.

⁽¹⁾ See minutes of the 19th Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (Document C. 643, M. 262, 1930, VI, pp. 188-189).

⁽²⁾ See P.V. XXIst Session (Document C. 830, M. 411, 1931, VI, pp. 98 and 99).

CHAPTER II.

Most-Favoured-Nation Clause. (Article 11.)

The preparation of the passage in the draft declaration dealing with the most-favoured-nation clause gave rise to long discussions in the committee. It will be remembered that in the opinion which it submitted to the Council on the general conditions to be fulfilled before a mandate can be terminated, the Mandates Commission recommended that the new State, in so far as it has previously been subject to the régime of economic equality, should consent, as a transitional measure, to grant the States members of the League of Nations most-favoured-nation treatment subject to reciprocity.

In its resolution of the 4th September, 1931, the Council decided to make the subject of this recommendation one of the general conditions for the termination of the mandatory régime.

In pronouncing, in pursuance of the Council's request, on the British Government's proposal for the emancipation of Iraq, the Mandates Commission accordingly stated that Iraq should "formally accept the obligation to grant most-favoured-nation treatment subject to reciprocity to all States members of the League of Nations, for a transitional period, the duration of which would be determined by negotiations with the Council." When, at its meeting of the 28th January, the Council endorsed the conclusions of the Mandates Commission on the particular case of Iraq, various suggestions were put forward with regard to the interpretation of this provision.

The British representative on the Council had expressed the opinion that the duration of Iraq's obligations on this point might be fixed at two years, which he regarded as a sufficient period for the negotiation of treaties of commerce between the States members of the League and Iraq.

In reply to this statement, the Yugoslav representative *rapporteur* on mandates questions, remarked that Iraq could not be launched upon the world as a new State unprovided with any commercial relations. He added that the reduction to two years of the period proposed did not seem to him advisable, since during the troubled times through which the world was passing countries must take into consideration the attitude of other countries in determining their commercial policy. In conclusion, the Yugoslav representative said that it was not conceivable that any member of the League of Nations, after granting Iraq most-favoured-nation treatment, would refuse to accept her products, while retaining the right to import its own products into Iraq.

After a full discussion in which the committee consistently endeavoured to reconcile Iraq's interests, as determined by her special situation in regard to commercial exchanges, with the Council's resolution in this connexion, the duration of the obligation in question was unanimously fixed at ten years from the date of Iraq's admission as a member of the League of Nations.

Having been convinced by the particulars given to it by the representative of the mandatory Power and by the Prime Minister of Iraq of the dangers to which a too rigid formula would expose the economic development of Iraq, the committee thought it well to introduce a reservation into the text which it had drawn up. It considered that it was essential to stipulate that, should measures taken by any member of the League of Nations be of such a nature as to disturb, to the detriment of Iraq, the balance of trade between Iraq and the member of the League of Nations in question by affecting the chief exports of Iraq, the latter, in view of its special situation, should have the right to request the State concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance. The committee stipulated that, should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months from Iraq's request, Iraq might consider herself as freed *vis-à-vis* the said State from the obligation to grant it most-favoured-nation treatment.

The committee noted that at present dates and cereals are Iraq's two chief articles of export.

The second paragraph of the provision dealing with the most-favoured-nation clause is designed to give Iraq the right to conclude a customs union and to grant certain advantages to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic.

The exception regarding frontier traffic, as contained in article 11 of the declaration, is to be found in nearly all commercial treaties. As it has been consecrated by long-standing practice, its interpretation does not seem likely to give rise to any difficulties.

Furthermore, the committee considered that the undertaking entered into by Iraq should not apply to any special advantages that Iraq might grant to goods and produce or manufacture of Turkey, or of any other country whose territory was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

Judicial Organisation. (Article 12.)

The text drawn up by the committee with a view to guaranteeing the interests of foreigners in judicial matters calls for certain comments and explanations.

The solution recommended consists, in accordance with a suggestion put forward both by the mandatory Power and by the Mandates Commission, in maintaining in force for a period of ten years a uniform judicial system applicable to all Iraqi nationals and to all foreigners. This system is based on the essential provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of the 4th March, 1931, which has received the approval of the Council and of the Powers whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire.

Nevertheless, as the acquiescence given at the time by the fourteen Powers concerned was only valid for the duration of the mandatory régime in Iraq, the capitulation system would automatically come into force again on the expiration of the mandatory régime, unless explicitly renounced by the Powers in question.

Hence, the committee first of all considered referring expressly in the draft declaration to the rights of those Powers. It refrained from doing so, however, on the assumption that the mandatory Power would succeed in obtaining the consent of the Governments concerned before the decision putting an end to the mandate for Iraq becomes effective.

In order to facilitate the mandatory Power's task in this connexion, the committee has recommended the Council to ask the Powers in question to renounce on behalf of their nationals, before Iraq's admission as a member of the League of Nations, the former jurisdictional privileges which would no longer be justified under the judicial system proposed for Iraq. It hopes that the Council will introduce a recommendation to this effect in the resolution it adopts with regard to Iraq and will instruct the Secretary-General to communicate it to the Governments of States to which the mandatory Power may have applied with the object mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present report.

The judicial system incorporated in the agreement of the 4th March, 1931, the maintenance of which is suggested by the committee, provides for the presence of nine foreign jurists in the Iraqi magistrature. The draft declaration prepared by the committee takes into account the Permanent Mandates Commission's recommendation that the holders of these posts, who are appointed by Iraq, should be selected without distinction of nationality. It will be remembered that under article 2 of the agreement of the 4th March, 1931, the nine jurists in question were to be of British nationality. As a result of an exchange of views on this question, the committee found that, while in theory the judges of British nationality might, in virtue of their contracts, remain in office until 1941, in practice, according to the statements made by the Iraqi Prime Minister and the British representative, vacancies would occur long before that date, so that foreign judges other than British will be able to present themselves as candidates for appointment by the Iraqi Government.

The committee has every reason to believe that the terms offered to the new judges will not be inferior to those applicable to the present judges, whose contracts are governed by the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, concerning British officials.^(*)

International Conventions. (Article 13.)

As regards international conventions, the committee has confined itself to introducing into the draft declaration a provision whose terms are in conformity with the recommendations of the Permanent Mandates Commission approved by the Council on the 28th January, 1932.

^(*) See Document C. 216, M. 77, 1926, VI, pp. 12 and following.

Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations. (Article 14.)

The provision introduced into the draft declaration with regard to acquired rights and the respect of financial obligations assumed by the mandatory Power on behalf of Iraq is taken from the Council resolution of the 15th September, 1925, which the Permanent Mandates Commission thought it necessary to recall in the conclusions of its report to the Council. This provision does not call for any special comment on the part of the committee.

Freedom of Conscience and Safeguard of the Activities of Religious Missions. (Article 15.)

The committee considered whether the passage in the draft declaration concerning freedom of conscience and the activities of religious missions did not cover the same ground as the provision contained in paragraph 2 of article 2 of the first chapter relating to the protection of minorities.

After a thorough study of the question, the committee came to the conclusion that the passage should be retained, since it embodies a recommendation which figures in the Permanent Mandates Commission's conclusions and which covers a considerably wider field than article 2 of chapter I of the declaration concerning the protection of minorities. Furthermore, it appeared to the committee that the guarantee clause contained in article 10 of chapter I concerning minorities can only be applied in so far as article 2 of the same chapter affects minorities, i.e., Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities. On the other hand, the insertion in chapter II of the declaration, of a special provision on freedom of conscience and the activities of religious missions independently of any consideration of nationality, presents the advantage of placing this provision under the guarantee of the Council of the League of Nations.

Final Clause. (Article 16.)

In its report to the Council, the Permanent Mandates Commission recommended that, except as regards the protection of minorities, for which it had urged that the usual procedure should be adopted, Iraq "should be requested to accept that any difference of opinion arising between Iraq and any member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the execution of the undertakings assumed before the Council may, by an application by such member, be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice." In its resolution of the 28th January, 1932, the Council diverged from the commission's conclusions on this point; it considered that the right of laying before the Permanent Court of International Justice any differences of opinion that might arise with regard to the interpretation or execution of Iraq's declaration should be reserved to the members of the League represented on the Council.

The representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission explained to the committee that it had been the commission's desire to enable the members of the League without distinction to lay before the court any disputes that might arise in connexion with the execution of obligations, the majority of which operated in their favour.

The committee found that the effect of the Council's resolution was not to deprive the States members of the League of all right of recourse. These States will always be able to avail themselves of the relevant provisions of the Covenant to refer to the Council disputes which might arise between them and Iraq. Moreover, the right reserved to the members of the Council to refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice arises out of the fact that the provisions contained in Iraq's declaration will be placed under the guarantee of the Council. It is further evident that if a member of the League represented on the Council decides to refer a question to the court, the differences of opinion which it desires to submit to the latter need not necessarily arise out of a difference of interpretation between it and Iraq, but may well arise between Iraq and a member of the League not represented on the Council.

CONSTANTIN FOTITCH.
MASSIMO PILOTTI.
S. SAWADA.
E. H. CARR.

Geneva, May 7, 1932.

ANNEX B.

67TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Extract from Final Minutes of the 4th Meeting, Public and Private, held on May 19, 1932, Geneva.

3081. *Mandates: Proposal of the United Kingdom Government for the Emancipation of Iraq: Report by the Committee instructed by the Council to prepare the Draft Declaration to be made by the Iraqi Government on the Termination of the Mandatory Régime in Iraq.*

M. Fotitch presented the following report and draft resolution: (*)

"The committee set up by the Council resolution of the 28th January, 1932, consisting of the *rapporteurs* for minorities questions, questions of international law and mandates, and the representative of the United Kingdom, has drawn up, in accordance with that resolution, a draft declaration covering the various guarantees recommended in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

"The general form and the various provisions of this draft declaration are commented on in a report by the committee which has been communicated to the members of the Council. I shall, therefore, not attempt to analyse these texts.

"In my opinion, once it has been accepted by Iraq in a manner constitutionally effective, the draft declaration before us will afford, in accordance with the Council's decisions, the guarantees to which the latter decided that the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq should be subject.

"The passage in the report dealing with judicial organisation is, I think, deserving of special mention here. The committee was in favour of the maintenance of a uniform judicial system applicable to all Iraqi nationals and to all foreigners.

"It also proposed that the judicial system at present in force under articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of the 4th March, 1931, which has received the approval of the Council and of the so-called Capitulatory Powers, should remain in force for a period of ten years from the admission of Iraq to membership of the League. The committee requests the Council to approve by a recommendation the action which the British Government is called upon to take as mandatory Power for the purpose of obtaining the consent of Powers whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire to renounce those rights for the future.

"I do not think that the Council will have any objection to acceding to its committee's recommendation. The new statute contemplated for Iraq renders superfluous the jurisdictional privileges which, in theory, should be revived in favour of the nationals of the so-called Capitulatory Powers as a result of the termination of the mandate.

"It takes account of the peculiar position of Iraq, and at the same time respects its status as an independent State.

"As my colleagues will remember, the Council resolution of the 28th January, 1932, indicates that the Council intended to make the termination of the mandate for Iraq subject to two conditions, namely:—

- "(1) The formal acceptance by Iraq, in conformity with its Constitution, of the proposed declaration;
- "(2) The admission of Iraq to the League of Nations.

"Consequently, the termination of the mandatory régime in that territory will not be effected until Iraq has formally ratified the declaration and has also been admitted to the League in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Covenant.

(*) Document C. 444, 1932, VI.

"I have accordingly the honour to propose to the Council the adoption of the following resolution:—

"The Council,

"Approves the draft declaration and report submitted to it by its committee in accordance with paragraph 4 of its resolution of the 28th January, 1932;

"Approves the report submitted this day by the representative of Yugoslavia, its *rapporteur*;

"Accordingly recommends that the Powers concerned, whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire, renounce, before the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, the maintenance of these former jurisdictional privileges in favour of their nationals in future;

"Requests the Secretary-General to communicate this recommendation to the Governments of the States which the British Government, in accordance with the present resolution, will approach with a view to the proposed renunciation."

Mr. Eden was sure his colleagues would agree that the Council owed a great debt of gratitude to the Yugoslav representative and to the committee over whose deliberations he had so ably presided for the valuable report before the Council. In inviting the committee to frame the guarantees to be given by Iraq, the Council had entrusted it with a delicate and a difficult task, one calling for wide sympathy and tact. The committee had accomplished its task with marked success. In the first place, it had avoided all the pitfalls of controversy and had achieved unanimity, in itself no mean accomplishment. But it had done much more: it had produced a set of guarantees which, while giving the Council all the safeguards that its wide responsibilities demanded, would, he felt confident, be readily accepted and scrupulously observed by the young State of Iraq.

M. Paul-Boncour associated himself with the thanks which the representative of the United Kingdom had just addressed to the members of the committee and the Yugoslav representative. He desired at the same time to make several observations without, however, reopening the discussion on principles.

The French Government's point of view with regard to the undertakings to be entered into by Iraq before its entry into the League of Nations had been placed before the Council by the French representative at the meetings held on the 4th September, 1931, and the 28th January, 1932. M. Paul-Boncour would therefore simply refer to those statements. He merely desired to indicate, in connexion with the drafts before the Council, the points which seemed to him to require special attention.

In the draft declaration, the Council Committee had rightly given first place to the protection of minorities, the special importance of which several members of the Council, including M. Paul-Boncour himself, had emphasised in January last. In congratulating it on having taken this line, he might, perhaps, be allowed to express regret that the Council Committee had hesitated to avail itself of all the opportunities offered it in the report prepared by the Mandates Commission at its twenty-first session.

As Iraq was one of those Near Eastern countries where autonomy was based on traditional ideas, the French representative wondered whether it would not have been possible in the case where the living conditions of the populations permitted it, to institute the minority system in the form of an administrative autonomy; such a system, which was better calculated than any other to ensure the exercise of the rights of the minorities in this country, was not without precedent in the minorities treaties themselves. In making this observation regarding the report before the Council, M. Paul-Boncour had in mind both the very clear recommendations of the Mosul Commission and the good relations between minority and majority populations, as well as the very difficult duty of supervision which would devolve upon the League Council, and which such a system would have facilitated.

With regard to supervision, the Council Committee had confined itself to embodying in its text the general guarantee clause laid down in the minority treaties; but it had stated in the report containing its comments on the declaration that it had not gone further, as invited by the Mandates Commission, because

this clause was "sufficiently elastic to be adjusted in practice to the special circumstances of Iraq."

M. Paul-Boncour desired note to be taken of this observation, which made clear the meaning of article 10 of the declaration drawn up for Iraq. The Council could not fail to observe that the methods which the very general terms of the guarantee clause entitled it to adopt were not necessarily the same in every case. They must, on the contrary, vary in accordance with the concrete problems to be solved. Obviously the Council would take a very different view of the matter in the case of a well-developed State with established traditions, where the minority clauses met the need for adapting circumstances to territorial changes, and a State which, under the collective responsibility of the Council, was being trained for political freedom. It was therefore legitimate, and even essential, to indicate clearly that the Council had special responsibilities in the latter case, that it must avail itself of every means of fulfilling its obligations, and that any decisions it might be called upon to take must not create any precedent affecting the jurisprudence of the protection of minorities in its application to the States he had just mentioned.

Subject to this observation, the French representative accepted the declaration prepared for Iraq, in so far as the protection of minorities was concerned.

With regard to article 11, application of the most-favoured-nation clause, M. Paul-Boncour pointed out that paragraph 1 laid down as a general rule that the most-favoured-nation clause should be maintained, subject to certain reservations contained in the following paragraphs:—

Paragraph 2 said that, should the measures taken by any member of the League of Nations be of such a nature as to disturb, to the detriment of Iraq, the balance of trade, Iraq reserves to itself the right to request the member of the League of Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance. Paragraph 3 added that, should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months, Iraq declared that it would consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* the member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down above.

The idea underlying this reservation seemed equitable, for there could be no question of imposing obligations upon a State which had newly entered the League of Nations without corresponding advantages. This provision might, however, lead to the *de facto* abolition of the general rule if it were left to Iraq to claim that there had been discrimination as contemplated in paragraphs 2 and 3, and if in the event of a dispute the means provided in article 16 were not open to the State at whose hands Iraq alleged she had suffered trade discrimination.

M. Paul-Boncour thought the *rapporteur* could easily give him satisfaction in this respect.

M. Scialoja thought the Council should receive with great satisfaction the resolution submitted by the *rapporteur* and should congratulate itself on the conclusions reached by the committee.

The draft declaration contained appropriate safeguards on all the points which the Council had had in mind in its resolution of the 18th January, 1932.

M. Scialoja drew special attention to the care taken in the draft declaration to ensure the protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities and to guarantee the activities of the religious communities and missions. He also drew attention to the satisfactory solution in regard to the economic equality of States members of the League of Nations in their commercial relations with the new State.

The most-favoured-nation clause as provided for in the draft declaration guaranteed this equality of treatment. The restrictions introduced were such as fairly to protect the interests of Iraq. There was a precedent, moreover, for such restrictions in several commercial treaties, and in particular the exception relating to frontier trade was sanctioned by long tradition and could not give rise to difficulties. As was well known, it was applied to goods traffic in frontier zones intended for the domestic purposes of the inhabitants of the zone, or for their rural enterprises.

The Italian representative was therefore glad to accept the *rapporteur's* proposal, and availed himself of the opportunity of welcoming most

sympathetically the new State, whose co-operation the members of the League hoped soon to have in their great work of civilisation and peace.

M. Zaleski said he had examined very carefully the report of the Council Committee. He had also listened with great interest to the French representative's statement. He supported the latter's observations with regard to minorities. Personally, he would, perhaps, have been glad if the committee, in preparing the declaration submitted to the Council, could have at once taken into account the experience already acquired in the protection of minorities and established a system to prevent the minority clauses from being used for purposes not in accordance with their real object.

Subject to this observation, he was prepared to accept the Yugoslav representative's resolution, and was glad to associate himself in so important a step towards the independence of Iraq.

Count Welczek accepted the report and congratulated the committee on its work.

He also wished to lay emphasis on the regulations proposed for the protection of minorities. That was a matter of the utmost importance from the point of view of the League, which had a special function to fulfil in this sphere. By these regulations, which were the outcome of very careful reflection, the League had again recognised the principle of the protection of minorities as embodied in the relevant treaties and declarations. The German representative therefore felt particular satisfaction that the Powers represented on the Council were given, by adopting the report, an opportunity of renewing their profession of faith in regard to the protection of minorities.

M. Andvord desired most emphatically to endorse the French representative's observations concerning the protection of minorities in Iraq—one of the subjects of the draft declaration the Council had before it.

The Norwegian Government regarded the rôle of the Council in minorities questions as one of its most important attributes and—as the late lamented M. Briand had said to the Council on several occasions—a sacred duty of the League, a duty which must be fulfilled without ambiguity or compromise. The Norwegian Government regretted, therefore, that it had not been possible to use this opportunity to lighten the Council's task by improving the procedure for dealing with these minority problems.

Since the present régime in Iraq, the high moral tone and dignified bearing of which all must admire, and the intentions by which the Iraqi Government was animated, provided the League with a guarantee that the rights of minorities would be respected most scrupulously, he thought he could accept the report, while expressing the ardent hope that the arrangement would be such as to give the very best results.

Mr. Lester, speaking for one of the members of the Council that had taken a special interest in the question of minorities in Iraq, thanked the *rapporteur* and the committee for their work. His Government would most enthusiastically welcome this ancient people into the circle of modern States.

M. Fotitch asked permission to reply to one or two observations, in particular those made by the French representative.

M. Paul-Boncour had expressed regret that the Council Committee had been unable to consider the question of autonomy for certain minorities in Iraq. That matter had not escaped the committee's attention. The committee had noted that its mandate was determined by the Council resolution of the 28th January, 1932, which specified that, as the Council approved the Mandates Commission's report, it was essential to ensure the effective protection of the racial, linguistic and religious minorities. That was the task to which the committee had confined itself.

The committee's work had been greatly facilitated by the provisions of Iraqi law in this matter, and more especially by the unreserved assistance it had received from the Iraqi Prime Minister.

The committee had considered that it was bound by the Council's resolution of the 22nd January, 1931, whereby the Council approved the Mandates Commission's report rejecting a petition from a minority in Iraq in so far as it related to the granting to that minority of its own Government.

For these reasons, the committee had limited itself to drawing up the minorities guarantee clauses based on a declaration that was already in force. If it had not thought it necessary to introduce exceptional new provisions for Iraq, it was because the guarantee clause was, as M. Paul-Boncour had said, sufficiently elastic to enable the Council to exercise its rights and carry out its duties.

In drafting article 11, which referred to the most-favoured-nation clause, the committee had had two aims in view—first, that all members of the League should by the operation of that clause enjoy equality of treatment in their economic relations with Iraq, and, secondly, that Iraq should be safeguarded against an unduly hard and fast formula which might have placed that country in a difficult situation from the point of view of its economic development.

The committee had therefore inserted a reservation which enabled Iraq, in the conditions specified in article 11, to release itself from the obligation to grant the most-favoured-nation clause to a member of the League which might take certain measures and so disturb, to the detriment of Iraq, the economic equilibrium by seriously affecting Iraq's principal exports, and M. Fotitch was glad that the members of the Council who had referred to the matter had recognised the preoccupation of the committee as just and well founded. Any divergence as to the interpretation or application of that article between Iraq and a member of the League represented on the Council would of course be covered by article 16, which provided a general guarantee, and would enable such member to bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Hence, owing to the general clause inserted in article 16, the new State of Iraq would be unable to exercise this power arbitrarily.

In conclusion, he expressed his gratification at the happy conclusion of this very important stage on the road to the emancipation of Iraq, and he hoped that that country, whose economic expansion and political consolidation had been followed by the Council with keen interest and warm sympathy, would become a member of the League at the next Assembly and consequently a free State.

M. Paul-Boncour thanked the *rapporteur* for his explanations, which made it possible for him to associate himself unreservedly with the approval of the documents under discussion.

He expressed his satisfaction at the happy event which the work in question had made possible and his great appreciation of the United Kingdom Government's action, which testified to so proper a conception of the duties incumbent on the mandatory Powers. He congratulated likewise the Council Committee and the *rapporteur*, who had made it possible for the initiative of the United Kingdom Government to have its full effect. Finally, he would be failing to discharge a very pleasant duty if, at the time when Iraq's admission to the League might already be regarded as probable, he omitted to express the French Government's best wishes to the young Iraqi nation which was shortly to enter the League, and to its Sovereign who had guided its destinies and who must find a high reward in that event.

Mr. Eden expressed his Government's deep appreciation of the French representative's references to the part played by the United Kingdom Government in this matter. He assured his colleagues that his Government shared the Council's satisfaction at the outcome of the work, and desired to express its sincere goodwill and good wishes towards the new State which it was hoped would shortly become a member of the League.

The draft resolution was adopted.

The President expressed the satisfaction which the members of the League would feel at seeing a representative of the independent State of Iraq take his place among them as a colleague at no very remote date.

[E 3235/23/93]

No. 143.

High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 29.)

(Secret B.)

Sir,

The Residency, Bagdad, June 9, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 195 of the 7th June, 1932, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the marginally noted despatch from the Air Officer Commanding to the Air Ministry on the subject of the Assyrian situation.

2. The Air Officer Commanding has been in close touch with all developments arising from the presentation of the Assyrian officers' manifesto on the 1st June, and both these and the steps which he has taken to deal with what is up to the present principally a military situation are described fully in his despatch.

3. I have sent for the Mar Shimun and the chief Assyrian leaders to come to see me, and should prefer to reserve a detailed appreciation of future possibilities until I have seen and talked with them.

4. In the meanwhile I trust that the Air Officer Commanding's despatch will supply you with all the information as to facts which you require, and will, I hope, provide a background for the comments and reports which I shall telegraph to you as the situation becomes clearer.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 143

Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command, to Air Ministry.

Sir,

Hinaidi, June 8, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the Assyrian situation, giving the events and circumstances which have led up to the present position:—

Recent Events.

2. On the 31st May I received reliable information to the effect that the Assyrian officers of the Iraq Levies were about to give one month's notice to terminate their contracts. This was the first direct evidence I received of such a movement. The next day the Officer Commanding, Assyrian Levies, received a manifesto, signed by all the Assyrian officers, to the effect that, as the British Government had not safeguarded the interests of the Assyrians, the whole levy force would disband within one month from the 1st June, 1932.

3. It soon appeared that the affair was organised by the tribal leaders and that the Assyrian officers were acting on instructions from outside. I therefore instructed Brigadier J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., Commanding the Iraq Levies, to find out at once the intentions of the leaders and, in particular, the arrangements made for the reception and maintenance of so great a number of unemployed men. After interviewing David Mar Shimun, he left Hinaidi by air on the 3rd June to interview the Mar Shimun himself, whom he eventually found at Zuweita on the road to Amadia. He lunched with Surma Khanim, Mar Shimun's aunt, at Dohuk, finding her, as usual, full of resentment against the British. The Mar Shimun himself was more friendly, but professed to have little knowledge of the manifesto. Brigadier Browne's report of this interview is attached.

The Immediate Causes of the Movement.

4. From these interviews and from other reliable sources the following information was obtained: It appears that early in April, whilst Mar Shimun and Surma Khanim were staying in Hinaidi, all the Assyrian officers in the cantonment were called to a meeting, where they were addressed by Surma Khanim; Mar Shimun was absent through illness. The officers were told that

they must be prepared to resign from the levies when told by their leaders to do so, and that they and their families would then assemble on a date and at a place in Northern Iraq, both of which would be notified later. At this assembly a decision would be made concerning their future movements. My information shows that the manifesto was prepared by Officer Shahim and passed amongst the levy officers in Hinaidi for signature. Some were unwilling to sign, but pressure was brought to bear upon them. The manifesto was then sent for signature to Sulaimani and Diana by hand of Officer Maxherd, and thence to Mosul with a levy convoy. From Mosul it was sent back to Sulaimani because several of the officers there had been unwilling to sign before; a covering letter from the Rab Khalia persuaded them to add their signatures. The manifesto was thus signed by all the officers except Officer Sisko, who was at Ser Amadia. This officer is of Russian origin, and is regarded as unreliable and a British agent.

5. The movement in the levies centres chiefly amongst the Upper Tiari and Lower Tiari tribesmen, and the T'Khuma will probably follow their lead. The remaining tribesmen may or may not join the movement, but there is a reasonable probability that a good percentage of these will prefer to remain in the service of the British. Appendix C shows that roughly half the levies are Tiari and T'Khuma men and that they are divided between the two battalions.⁽¹⁾

6. It is understood that the movement was initiated by the large number of destitute Assyrians in the country. These numbers of unemployed men have been increased recently by discharges from the Iraq Levies and from the Iraqi Petroleum Company (owing to reductions in staff). These people have been for a long time constantly agitating for some drastic action on their behalf.

The Immediate Future.

7. Brigadier Browne, on returning from his mission on the 6th June, reported that the Mar Shimun intends to hold a conference at Ser Amadia on the 15th June to decide what the Assyrians are to do. A scheme will be drawn up and presented to the High Commissioner by the 20th June. Brigadier Browne gathered that the scheme involves the settlement of the Assyrians in an enclave in territory at present occupied by Kurds, and that the Assyrians would willingly remain in Iraq if they could remain as a united body.

8. During Brigadier Browne's visit David Mar Shimun asked that the terms of the manifesto might be extended for a month, and that in the meantime discharges from the levies might be held up, but at a subsequent meeting on the 7th June at Arbil it was confirmed that the officers intended to abide by the original manifesto.

The Situation on June 8, 1932.

9. Unless some unexpected development takes place, the disbandment of the levies will start on the 18th June and will be completed by the end of this month. Measures are being taken to minimise the possibility of trouble arising during and immediately after the actual disbandment. There is no reason at present to anticipate any particular difficulty in carrying out these discharges, and there is even some hope that many Assyrians will re-enlist in the Air Defence Force.

10. Beyond the fact that the Assyrians intend to concentrate in the north, I have been unable to discover anything of their future plans, and I believe that they are still undecided. The extent to which their leaders will be able to house and feed them during the concentration period cannot be gauged at present.

The Temper of the Assyrians and Likelihood of Disorder.

11. At present there are no signs of trouble among the officers or men, and, judging by their whole attitude to the question, I do not think they intend to make trouble, but there are signs that the Assyrian officers have no longer full control of the men, and incidents may occur. It is necessary, therefore, to take every precaution.

12. Rumours are circulating to the effect that men who do not join in the movement will be shot; that many men will join Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan; that Assyrians in the Iraq army and police will join the movement; and that any

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

movements of levies from Sulaimani or Diana will lead to disorders. I attribute these rumours to hot-heads, and I hope that such threats, except possibly the withdrawals from the Iraq army and police, will be met by a timely warning to the Mar Shimun and the maliks that they will be held personally responsible for any lawless acts or coercion of any kind.

Loyalty of the Levy Personnel.

13. Up to the presentation of the manifesto, Brigadier Browne and the British officers were prepared to say that under all conditions the levies would remain loyal to their duty, but this view must now be modified. The Assyrian officers and men in the levies have, during the whole of their service, served two masters, and their loyalty has been given both to the British Government and to the Mar Shimun. So far, the aims of both their masters have not diverged to any extent; but now the officers are faced with disloyalty either to the British Government or to their own patriarch and religious head; under pressure from their people they have chosen to follow their patriarch. It seems to them that they stood to lose everything if they did not sign with their own people, whilst loyalty to the British Government promised only a doubtful future in Iraq. Their aim has always been to keep together.

14. Out of consideration for their commanding officers the Assyrian officers signed the manifesto without asking for permission to do so, and the care with which they kept their secret accounts for the movement coming as such a surprise. They argue that they had to sign the document, and that, if they had consulted their British officers in the first place they would have received orders not to sign; then they would have been placed in the awkward position of having to commit the additional offence of disobeying a definite order, and, as they say themselves, "blackening the face" of the British officers responsible for it. The problem confronting the Assyrian officers has been a serious one for them, and in the circumstances it is difficult to see how they could have arrived at any other decision.

The Underlying Causes of the Movement.

15. The present action of the Assyrians is absolutely consistent with the views and statements they have expressed ever since they heard that Great Britain intended to give up the mandate of Iraq. Nothing we can say or do, short of giving them our protection, can eradicate their fears for the future, if they continue to live in scattered and isolated groups; the instinct of self-preservation urges them to concentrate, and up to the very last they have never really thought that Great Britain would leave them dispersed among Mahometans under a Moslem Government.

16. The Mar Shimun is the direct successor of the line of Nestorian patriarchs whose seat was at Ctesiphon until the Mahometan conquest. These patriarchs had ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the whole of this country, over a large part of Arabia, over Persia, Turkestan, China, parts of India and many of the Asiatic islands. The progress of Islam caused the Nestorians gradually to retreat until they finally took refuge in the Hakkari Mountains. The present remnant represents a great past, and they fear that, if they are left under a purely Islamic Government, they will lose that which they have held so steadfastly for nearly 2,000 years, for they claim that their Church was founded in the 1st century.

17. The fact that the present situation has been created by the poverty-stricken and discontented unemployed must not be allowed to obscure the real importance of the movement in the eyes of the more fanatical tribesmen. They are adamant in their determination to preserve the unity and integrity of their nation and of their religion, and they intend now to stake everything in one last attempt to realise their aims. Their ultimate destination is as yet undecided; it might be any one of the following: Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Persia, Russia (Caucasus); they may approach each of these countries in turn.

18. The old Assyrian Hakkari territory, which is at present reported to be at least partly unoccupied, was left to Turkey by the decision given by the Council of the League of Nations in December 1925, in the face of the strongest opposition on the part of Great Britain, who represented very clearly the necessity for including this territory in Iraq as the only means by which to

achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Assyrian question. As a result of this decision of the Council, Great Britain has been faced with a problem that has, so far, proved insoluble, and has now led the Assyrian people, in desperation, to seek their own salvation.

I have, &c.

E. R. LUDLOW HEWITT, *Air Vice Marshal,
Commanding Iraq Command.*

*Notes on the Interview with Lady Surma D'Beit Mar Shimun and the
Mar Shimun on Friday, June 3, 1932.*

FOUND Lady Surma at Dohuk. Told her of the decision of all the Assyrian officers to resign. She said she knew of it. Went on and gave a long list of what Assyrians had done and failure of Great Britain to do anything for them. She said many were destitute, and that these had forced the rest, including officers and the Mar Shimun, to take some action.

I asked what they would do. She said she did not know. "Possibly some join the Sheikh of Barzan." This I regarded as a flash of temper, as it is unlikely for several reasons. Went on to Zawita and found the Mar Shimun at a picnic with the Kaïmakam Medi Beg, the Bishop Mar Ablahad, Malik Khoshaba and Dr. Baber. The Agha of Zawita was also there. The Mar Shimun went off with me and we had about an hour's talk. A good deal of what the Assyrians had done was repeated.

He explained that the Assyrian officers had not resigned their commissions in any mutinous spirit. They had decided that, now that Iraq was about to become independent, and that nothing more would be done for the Assyrians, the time was come to throw in their lot altogether.

I told him that the Air Defence Force was to be formed, and that there would be this detachment of 600 Assyrians there for many years as a link with the British and to provide pay for themselves and dependents. He asked what we would do if we did not get Assyrians, and I said we should then get other people.

He finally asked: "What do you want me to do?" and I told him I wanted him to use his influence as Mar Shimun to get the officers to withdraw their resignations.

After some questions he then said: "Well, I will tell them the truth." I told him that, as he could not possibly get round in time, I wanted him to authorise his father to speak to the officers for him, and that he should meet as many as he could. I told him I should send his father up to him for this purpose.

J. G. BROWNE, *Brigadier,
Commanding Iraq Levies.*

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 342/342/31]

No. 144.

Sir John Simon to M. Mameli.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 28, 1932.

SIGNOR BORDONARO put forward in his note No. 4135 of the 26th September last the views of the Italian Government on several questions concerning the administration of Palestine. The various issues raised have necessitated consultation with the Government of Palestine, and although I am not yet in a position to send a reply on every subject raised by his Excellency, the necessary material now available in regard to a number of the points raised therein enables me to deal with them without further delay in the present note.

2. In section 3 of his note Signor Bordonaro drew attention to the fact that no reply had been returned to the observations which he had put forward in his note of the 5th September, 1928, regarding two draft ordinances, published in the "Palestine Official Gazette," of the 1st July, 1928, namely, "The Exemption from Taxation (Religious and Charitable Institutions and Government Departments) Ordinance, 1928," and "The Charities, Exemption from Customs Ordinance, 1928."

3. I regret that his Excellency's note of the 5th September, 1928, on this point should have remained so long without reply. The delay is due to the great complexity of the questions at issue. As you are no doubt aware, the two ordinances have not been put into force, and the complaints which were made against them have been the subject of careful and sympathetic consideration by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in consultation with the Government of Palestine, with a desire to ensure that nothing in the ordinances, as eventually passed into law, shall "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" or "obstruct or interfere with the enterprise" of "religious or eleemosynary bodies" in Palestine more than is essential for the purpose of "exercising such supervision . . . as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government" without any discrimination on grounds of religion or nationality.

4. As a result of this further examination of the question, it has now been decided to modify the draft ordinances in certain important respects. The textual amendments required to give effect to the decision are still under consideration in Palestine and it is therefore not possible for me at present to furnish you with detailed information regarding them. I shall not, however, fail to acquaint you with the amendments ultimately decided upon, and I feel confident that they will be found by the Italian Government to meet the objections to the previous drafts raised by Signor Bordonaro in his notes of the 5th September, 1928, and the 26th September last.

5. In section 3 of his note his Excellency also referred to the question of the compatibility with the Palestine mandate of certain draft legislation relating to education in that territory.

6. This question was first raised by the Italian Embassy in a memorandum dated the 28th December, 1927, in which Count Rogeri put forward the objections of the Italian Government to those provisions of the draft Education Ordinance, as published in the "Palestine Official Gazette" of the 16th October, 1927, which concerned the degree of Government control over teachers in foreign educational establishments. On the 20th April, 1928, Signor Bordonaro was informed by Sir Austen Chamberlain in his note that it had been decided to amend the draft ordinance in a manner which, it was hoped, would meet the objections raised in the above-mentioned memorandum.

7. The amendments were embodied in the revised version of the draft ordinance published in the "Palestine Official Gazette" of the 15th July, 1928, and it is with pleasure that I infer from Signor Bordonaro's note of the 26th September that they were regarded as satisfactory by the Italian Government. In that note, however, further objections were raised by his Excellency to the draft ordinance in connexion with a different section, namely, 7 (1), which read

as follows: "The Director, a District Commissioner, any Inspector of the Department of Education, and any other officer authorised in writing by the Director, may at all times enter and inspect any school; and the manager, or the person for the time being in charge of the school, shall furnish any information which the inspecting officer may demand with regard to the care and tuition of pupils, the general management of the school, and the names and qualifications of the teachers."

8. I have the honour to inform you that, with a view to meeting the criticisms which have been put forward in regard to the modified draft ordinance, as published on the 16th July, 1928, it is proposed to revise it still further on a number of points. The revised ordinance has not yet passed into law, but I am happy to be able to inform you that one of the modifications proposed concerns the section quoted above, and that the general effect of the new text will be (subject, of course, to the retention of such powers of supervision as the High Commissioner may be compelled to exercise for the maintenance of public order and good government) to replace the power of entry and inspection, in the case of non-assisted schools established or maintained by a religious association, by a power of visit only. Visits will only be made by the Director and the Deputy-Director of Education, and after reasonable notice has been given to the manager. It will still be the duty of the manager or the person for the time being in charge of the school to furnish at the visit, or at other times, any information which the Director or Deputy-Director may require, with regard to the care and tuition of pupils, the general management of the school and the names and qualifications of the teachers. But any apprehension felt by your Government about the type of information which these officers may require will, I feel confident, be dispelled by the further provision which it is proposed to add, that the Director shall not be entitled to demand any change in the curriculum or internal administration of a school of this category.

9. I shall be grateful if you will communicate the above information to the Italian Government with an expression of the hope of His Majesty's Government that they will recognise that the ordinance as now to be amended will provide only for such a measure of control as is necessary, having regard to the obligations of the mandatory and to the administrative responsibilities of the Government of Palestine under the Palestine mandate, and more particularly under article 15 of that instrument, in accordance with which the Government of Palestine have the right and duty to require that these schools shall conform to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of Palestine may impose, and to take steps to see that they do so.

10. Among the other questions discussed in his note of the 26th September Signor Bordonaro reverted to that of the immunities and privileges of consular officers in Palestine, which formed the subject of my predecessor's note of the 8th September last.

11. In that note the Marquess of Reading explained the inability of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to give effect to two requests which the Italian Embassy had first put forward in 1929 and 1930 respectively, and which were reiterated in your memorandum of the 25th June last. These requests were that a higher position in the table of precedence should be accorded to the Italian consul-general in Palestine and that consular officers in Palestine should be granted exemption from the payment of motor car licence duty.

12. In his note of the 26th September Signor Bordonaro advanced certain considerations in the light of which he suggested that the question of consular immunities and privileges in Palestine might be reconsidered.

13. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have studied his Excellency's observations in connexion with the provisions of the Palestine mandate, but have been unable to discover anything in the mandate entitling consular officers in Palestine to receive any privileges or immunities greater than, or even as great as, those which they at present enjoy in that territory. The argument to the contrary, advanced in the note of the 26th September, appears to be based on article 8 of the mandate, which reads as follows:—

"The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

"Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on the 1st August, 1914, shall have previously

renounced the right to their re-establishment or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned."

It is true that this article contemplates the re-establishment in certain circumstances of privileges and immunities enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the former Ottoman Empire, but it expressly provides that, during the continuance of the mandate, these privileges and immunities "shall not be applicable in Palestine." It is clear therefore that so long as the mandate for Palestine continues in operation no argument can be founded on article 8 in favour of the view that there is any obligation to grant any immunity or privilege to consular officers in Palestine in excess of the immunities and privileges normally granted to consular officers in other territories under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government. The situation which may arise regarding these matters in the future, if and when the mandate comes to an end, is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, a consideration irrelevant to the present situation when the mandate is in force.

14. Nevertheless, while unable to admit that consular officers in Palestine are entitled, as of right, to expect treatment of a specially favourable nature, His Majesty's Government are not unmindful of the special position which used formerly to be held by consular officers in the Near and Middle East under the régime of the Capitulations, and of the political advantages of maintaining their prestige in Middle Eastern territories in so far as this can be done without prejudice to the legal position. The privileges and immunities at present accorded to consular officers in Palestine have therefore been fixed, as a matter of courtesy, on a liberal scale, and are, in fact, considerably greater, especially in fiscal matters, than those enjoyed by consular officers in the United Kingdom or in British colonies. It is possible that the Italian Government may not be fully aware of the extent of these immunities and privileges, and I therefore take leave to enclose an explanatory memorandum on the subject.

15. I have already made it sufficiently clear that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the position as described in this memorandum is not open to valid objection, and that no legal case can be made out for the increase of existing privileges and immunities. Nevertheless, animated by a sincere desire to meet the Italian Government as far as possible, His Majesty's Government have once more examined, in consultation with the Government of Palestine, the practicability of granting the specific requests for additional privileges put forward in your memorandum of the 25th June and reiterated by implication in Signor Bordonaro's note of the 26th September.

16. As regards the question of the precedence assigned to the Italian consul-general in Palestine, you will observe, from the enclosed memorandum, that an enhanced precedence was granted in 1930 to all consular officers *de carrière*. Re-examination of the matter has shown that it is impracticable still further to raise their position, and I regret therefore that on this point it is impossible for me to add anything to the notes addressed to Signor Bordonaro on the 6th March, 1930, and the 8th September, 1931.

17. On the other hand, I am happy to be able to inform you that it has been decided to meet the other request of the Italian Government by adding exemption from motor car licence and registration fees, as a matter of courtesy, to the fiscal privileges already enjoyed by foreign consular officers *de carrière* in Palestine. This concession will take effect as from the 1st January, 1932.

18. I shall not fail to address you further regarding the other questions dealt with in his Excellency's note of the 26th September as soon as their examination by His Majesty's Government, in consultation with the Government of Palestine, has been completed.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Memorandum respecting Privileges and Immunities of Foreign Consular Officers in Palestine.

THE following immunities are enjoyed by consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls and other foreign consular officers *de carrière* in Palestine:

(A.)—*Exemption from Certain Personal and Financial Charges.*1. *Customs.*

Under section IV of the Customs Duties Exemption Ordinance, 1928, a very complete measure of exemption is allowed to foreign consular officers. Exemption is granted in respect of—

- (i) Any articles and effects intended for the personal use of consular officers appointed in Palestine who belong to the regular consular service and are not engaged in any other business or profession.
- (ii) Uniforms of consular officers, including the necessary arms, badges and equipment appertaining thereto.
- (iii) Articles for the use of the public service of the consulate.

It should be noted that these exemptions are granted at any time during the consul's residence in Palestine, and not only during a certain period after his first arrival, as is the practice in many countries. The Palestine authorities have, moreover, been instructed to interpret liberally the provisions of the customs ordinance, and to ensure that articles for the personal use of a consul's family are also immune from duty.

A further privilege is assured to foreign consular officers by the instructions which have been issued to the local authorities to refrain from opening sealed mail bags addressed to consular officers. Other parcels or packages are also, as a general rule, released without examination, on the strength of a declaration by the consular officer.

2. *Immigration Fees.*

Consular officers and their wives and children are exempt from the payment of fees under the Immigration Ordinance of 1925.

3. *House and Land Tax and Municipal Rates and Taxes.*

Although there is no legal right to exemption, it has been customary not to enforce collection from consular officers.

(B.)—*Judicial Immunities.*

The inviolability of consular archives is fully recognised in Palestine.

While foreign consular officers in Palestine have no immunity as such from process or proceedings, care is taken to show to consular officers every reasonable consideration that is not inconsistent with the due course of justice, and to avoid any unnecessary disturbance to them in the exercise of their official duties.

Further, as regards the liability of consuls in Palestine in respect of matters coming within the scope of their official duties, it would not appear possible that a foreign consul could be liable in the courts of Palestine in respect of any omission of any part of his consular duties, in view of the fact that Palestinian law does not command the fulfilment by foreign consuls of the duties entrusted to them by their Governments. On the other hand it need not be supposed that any act done honestly in the ordinary course of proper consular duties would be likely to be contrary to Palestinian law, as it is the practice of Governments not to impose duties on their consular officers which would be inconsistent with the law of the country where they reside, and to frame their instructions accordingly.

(C.)—*Precedence.*

In 1930 it was decided to raise the precedence of consuls-general and consuls *de carrière* from the fifteenth to the tenth place. It may be noted that foreign consular officers in the United Kingdom are granted no precedence, and it is considered that the relatively high position which consuls-general and consuls *de carrière* now occupy is a not inconsiderable contribution to the prestige of the consular body, especially as, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and, in particular, the large number of high ecclesiastical dignitaries residing there, the table of precedence in Palestine is unusually long.

Foreign Office, January 28, 1932.

[E 938/342/31]

No. 145.

Sir John Simon to M. Bordonaro.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, March 23, 1932.

IN my note of the 28th January to M. Mameli I dealt with a number of the points raised in your Excellency's note of the 26th September last concerning the administration of Palestine, and I now have the honour to acquaint you with the replies of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the remaining questions.

2. I will first take that of the execution of public works in Palestine. In a memorandum which M. Mameli left at the Foreign Office on the 25th June last doubt was expressed whether the manner in which public works were carried out in Palestine was compatible with the letter and the spirit of the Palestine mandate.

3. In your note of the 26th September your Excellency made specific mention of the cases of the Haifa Harbour Works, the projected Haifa-Bagdad Railway, and the drainage of the town of Haifa, and you questioned whether the procedure which the Italian Government understood had been followed in these cases, even if in conformity with the letter of the assurances given in the memorandum enclosed in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 29th April, 1926, to the Marquis della Torretta, was in accordance with the spirit of those assurances or of the Palestine mandate. The contention was also advanced that, according to the principles which governed the grant of the mandates, all works of a certain importance must be thrown open to competitive offers by public tender, and that the direct assumption by the Palestine Administration of such works was contrary to the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and detrimental to Italian interests.

4. I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, according to the information in my possession, the facts with regard to the three cases mentioned in your note of the 26th September do not appear to be in all respects as described therein. No scheme for the drainage of the town of Haifa has, in fact, been undertaken. As regards the projected Haifa-Bagdad Railway, Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton (not Messrs. Palmer, Harrison and Tritton, as given in the note) have been employed to effect the necessary preliminary survey of the route, but no decision has been taken as to the eventual construction of the line.

5. The special reasons which made it necessary to carry out the Haifa Harbour works departmentally were fully explained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 31st January, 1929. The works have not been entrusted to Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, or to any other firm, but are being carried out by a department of the Palestine Government, Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton's connexion with the work consisting only in the fact that they are employed by the Government of Palestine as consulting engineers. In order to maintain a close liaison between the Harbour Construction Department at Haifa and the consulting engineers in London, a member of the staff of the consulting engineers is from time to time attached to the department, becoming for such period a Government servant, and at certain times two members of the engineers' staff have been so attached; but, with this exception, no members of the Harbour

Construction staff are connected with the firm of Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot admit that there is anything in this arrangement which contravenes either the letter or the spirit of the mandate, or of the assurances contained in the memorandum enclosed in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 29th April, 1926.

6. On the point of principle raised by your Excellency, His Majesty's Government much regret to find themselves in disagreement with the Italian Government. They cannot, however, share the opinion that the principle of the departmental execution of public works in Palestine is contrary to any of their international obligations in respect of that territory, or that either the spirit or the letter of the mandate or of the assurances contained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 29th April, 1926, requires that all works "of a certain importance" shall be thrown open to competitive offers by public tender. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to admit that either the mandate or the assurances in question have had the effect of depriving the Administration of Palestine of the right, which must obviously be possessed by every Government, to decide whether particular public works should be carried out by the Government itself or by private enterprise, and in their opinion the second paragraph of article 11 of the mandate is clearly consistent with the right of the Administration to judge whether, in the light of all relevant circumstances, it is in the best interests of Palestine that any particular public works shall be carried out by public tender or otherwise. I need scarcely say, however, that where it is decided that work shall be carried out departmentally, it is still the intention of His Majesty's Government, as was explained in the case of the Haifa Harbour Works, in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 31st January, 1929, that there shall be no discrimination between suitable British and foreign firms in the allocation of such contracts as may be let out locally for the supply of materials or the execution of sections of the work.

7. Another complaint put forward by your Excellency concerned the treatment of Italian employees of the Palestine Administration.

8. In the third paragraph of section 4 of your note you alluded to a representation made by the Italian Embassy, the result of which, in the words of your note, "was merely the transmission by the Foreign Office on the 12th November, 1930, by way of information, of circular No. 41, the very document against the provisions of which the objections had been raised." I assume that your Excellency had in mind the oral representations which the counsellor to the Italian Embassy made in June 1930, but, if so, there appears to be some misunderstanding both as to the nature of those representations and as to the sequence of events in the matter. According to the records of the Foreign Office, M. Mameli asked that the position in Palestine regarding the pension rights of employees of the Palestine Government might be ascertained, since the Italian Government had received a report that foreign employees of the Palestine Government were not entitled to pensions. M. Mameli enquired whether such a state of affairs would not constitute discrimination within the meaning of article 18 of the mandate, and he was informed that there appeared to be nothing in the terms of that article which would entitle a foreign employee of the Palestine Government to claim treatment identical with that accorded to British or Palestinian employees. No specific regulation of the Palestine Government appears to have been mentioned during the course of the conversation, and M. Mameli was asked to ascertain, before investigations were made, whether the Italian Government had any concrete case in mind. A few days later he confirmed by telephone that the Italian Government had no concrete case in mind, but were anxious to know the position.

9. As a result of this enquiry, the competent Department of His Majesty's Government was asked to supply copies of the regulations governing the pension rights of Government employees in Palestine, and on the 21st August a copy of the Palestine Pensions Ordinance, 1925, with the regulations scheduled thereto, was forwarded to M. Mameli, with an expression of the hope that these documents would give all the information which the Italian Government required. Some little time afterwards, and independently of the Italian Embassy's enquiry, it was brought to the notice of Mr. Arthur Henderson that the Administration of Palestine had issued a circular (Circular No. 41) bearing on this subject, on the 17th July, 1929, and a copy of it was immediately and spontaneously sent to

M. Mameli on the 12th November, 1930, with the object of ensuring that the information, for which the Italian Embassy had asked, might be complete.

10. From the above account the Italian Government will appreciate the fact that, in spontaneously sending to your Embassy a copy of Circular No. 41, my Department were actuated purely by a desire to supply the Italian Government with the full information which, they understood, it had been the sole object of M. Mameli's visit to seek. Indeed, they remained unaware that the Italian Government took exception to the circular until they received the memorandum which M. Mameli left here on the 25th June last. That document was, in accordance with the usual procedure, referred for observations to the High Commissioner for Palestine, but before Sir J. Chancellor's report arrived your Excellency's note of the 26th September reached me.

11. Therein you expressed the view of the Italian Government that article 7 of the circular issued by the Palestine Government on the 17th July, 1929, was contrary to "the general legal theory of the establishment of the mandate" and to the specific provisions of article 18 of the mandate. This article states that the mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State member of the League of Nations as compared with those of the mandatory or of any foreign State in certain matters, among which the Italian Government contend that, by analogy, paid employment must be included. For these reasons the Italian Government regard it as contrary to the international obligations of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that pensions should be refused to Italian employees of the Palestine Government of some years' service, and, in any case, to those serving from a date prior to the 17th July, 1929.

12. While the Government of Palestine are ready, as will be seen from the succeeding paragraphs of this note, to give the most sympathetic consideration to the cases of foreign nationals in their employ, I take leave to point out that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the provisions of article 18 of the Palestine mandate, relative to discrimination between the nationals of States members of the League of Nations, do not cover employment in the public service of the Palestine Government, and that, in their view, the Government of Palestine are consequently fully within their rights in confining the pensionable branches of the public service to Palestinian citizens and British subjects.

13. Although it is not the intention of the Government of Palestine to appoint foreigners, i.e., persons of other than British or Palestinian nationality, to pensionable posts in the future, no foreigner now employed in a pensionable post is ineligible for pension by reason of his nationality; and should a non-pensionable post already held by a foreigner be declared pensionable, in the event of the introduction of new pensionable cadres, the holder will not be debarred upon the ground of nationality from becoming eligible for pension. There is in fact no distinction as regards pensionability, and there is no intention of making such distinction between members of the same grade of the public service. In order, however, to clarify the position and to remove misapprehension, it had been decided to amend article 7 of Circular No. 41 of the 17th July, 1929, and a copy of the amending circular which was issued accordingly by the Palestine Government on the 19th December last is enclosed herein.⁽¹⁾

14. In regard to the specific case of an Italian subject, Luigi di Bella, employed in the Junior Service in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, I understand that this officer applied in February 1931 to be allowed to exercise the right of option for a reduced pension and gratuity under regulation 14 in the schedule to the Palestine Pensions Ordinance, 1925. This application was refused on two grounds; firstly, that there was as yet no pensionable cadre for the Junior Service in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs; and secondly, that, being neither a Palestinian citizen nor a British subject, he was not eligible for pensionable employment. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so; but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been made clear to the competent department of the Palestine Administration that no foreign national at present employed in the service of the Palestine Government would be debarred upon the ground of his nationality from becoming eligible for pension, and that there is no objection to noting the desire to opt for a reduced pension and gratuity on the part of an officer who, though not yet

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

pensionable, is likely to become so on the introduction of the appropriate pensionable cadre.

15. As regards the further question mentioned in your Excellency's note, regarding the alleged refusal to Italian employees of the gratuity of £50 upon discharge granted to British and Palestinian employees of the same category. I have the honour to inform you that this gratuity is payable only to officers employed in one of the classified grades of the Railway Department; it is not payable to officers not classified in a grade, whatever their nationality. There are in all five Italian subjects employed on the Palestine railways, of whom three are classified in the grades of the Junior Service and two are unclassified. The services of two of these Italian subjects, one a classified officer in grade 1 of the Junior Service, and the other an unclassified officer paid at a daily rate, are being dispensed with in pursuance of a measure of economy. The unclassified officer, in accordance with the procedure described above, and in common with all unclassified personnel, of whatever nationality, employed by the Palestine railways on daily rates of pay, will receive no gratuity upon discharge. The classified officer in question, however, will receive a retiring gratuity of £P. 67, and there is no suggestion that it should be withheld from him; the treatment which is being accorded to these two officers is exactly similar to that which would be accorded to any other foreign national, British subject or Palestinian citizen employed in a similar position.

16. In the memorandum which M. Mameli left here on the 25th June last, he stated that it appeared that Italian subjects employed in the Palestine railways were not granted the expatriation allowance of £50 accorded to employees of the same category and rank who are of British or Palestinian nationality. I am not sure whether M. Mameli was then referring to the gratuity with which I have dealt in the preceding paragraph, or to the expatriation allowance, mentioned in article 1 of Circular No. 41 of the 17th July, 1929. The matter has been examined, however, on the assumption that reference to the latter was intended, and the position in regard to it is as follows:—

17. The persons eligible for expatriation allowance are defined in section 2 of the Palestine Pensions Ordinance, 1925, as being persons who are not natives of, or domiciled in, Palestine or certain other countries close to Palestine. This rule is applied in practice to both the Senior Service and the higher grades of the Junior Service, but in the clerical grades of the Junior Service, to which Circular No. 41 refers, its application has hitherto only arisen in the case of British nationals, and to this fact the wording of article 1 of the circular is no doubt due. It has, however, been decided to amend the article so as to make it clear that, in the grades to which Circular No. 41 applies, no discrimination will be made between British and other foreign nationals who may be eligible for expatriation allowance under the terms of section 2 of the Palestine Pensions Ordinance, 1925. I have pleasure in enclosing a copy of the amending circular,⁽¹⁾ which was issued by the Palestine Government on the 9th January.

18. There are in the Palestine railways only two Italian employees in grades to which the allowance is applicable and both are ineligible for it owing to the fact that they are domiciled in Palestine. They are in this respect in the same position as British or other nationals in that grade who are domiciled in Palestine, and there is no discrimination against them.

19. In his note of the 27th January M. Mameli drew my attention to what the Italian Government believed to be a fresh case of discriminatory treatment between British and Italian employees. The facts of that case are being investigated, and I shall not fail to address to you a further communication on the subject in due course.

20. In section 6 of your note, your Excellency stated that the Italian Government had observed a certain reluctance on the part of the British authorities in Palestine to accede to the requests made by the Italian consul-general in that country with a view to safeguarding general or particular Italian interests, and, as an instance of this reluctance, your Excellency drew attention to the fact that an alleged anti-Italian newspaper campaign in Palestine had not been prevented or repressed by those authorities.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

21. In the first place, I take leave to explain that, according to information which has reached me, the articles in the Palestine press, of which I understand the Italian Government to complain, were for the most part merely quotations from articles originally published in newspapers in other countries. It appears, in fact, that the Arab press in Palestine did not in any way initiate a campaign, but merely reproduced material which had already received a wide circulation elsewhere.

22. I am confident, moreover, that there has been some misapprehension as to the attitude of the British authorities in Palestine, both in this and other matters, towards requests made by the Italian consul-general. Such requests have always received and will continue to receive full and sympathetic consideration.

23. The Italian Government are no doubt aware that in Palestine, as in other territories under British jurisdiction, the power of the Government to interfere with the freedom of the press is restricted within narrow limits. When, therefore, the request made in M. Gabrielli's letter of the 11th August last to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Palestine came to be examined, the position in which the Palestine Government found themselves was that there was no provision of the existing law in Palestine under which they could take action against the publishers of the offending articles in the "Jamia-al-Arabia"; and the High Commissioner had no option but to inform M. Gabrielli accordingly.

24. This was not the case, however, in the matter of the suspension for two weeks from the 29th August last of the newspaper "Carmel." This suspension followed on the appearance in the paper of an article which was held to be likely to endanger the internal security of the country. Action was accordingly taken under section 23 of the Ottoman Press Law of the 29th July, 1910, which provides that newspapers or pamphlets which issue publications of a nature to endanger the internal or external safety of the State may be suspended if that course is deemed necessary for the preservation of peace and public order. It was not considered that the articles in the "Jamia-al-Arabia," of which M. Gabrielli complained, were covered by the provisions of section 23 of the Press Law of the 29th July, 1910.

25. In my note of the 28th January and in the present note, I have replied to the six specific complaints put forward in your Excellency's note. The nature of the replies will, I feel sure, convince the Italian Government that their representations have been considered in the most friendly spirit, with an earnest desire to remedy grievances and to eschew controversy, and thus to preserve, unimpaired, that atmosphere of mutual sympathy and friendly collaboration to which your Excellency referred in the last paragraph of your note, and to which His Majesty's Government, like the Italian Government, attach the utmost importance.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 2616/375/31]

No. 146.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 28.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, May 27, 1932.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th December, 1930, I am directed by Secretary Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir John Simon, a copy of the general instructions which he has now issued to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I am, &c.

O. G. R. WILLIAMS.

Enclosure in No. 146.

Instructions to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.

BY mandate entrusted to him, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, has authority in that part of Palestine known as Transjordan.

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2. The responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland arising out of the acceptance by His Majesty of a mandate for Transjordan are as follows:—

- (1) The duty of developing self-governing institutions and the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants, irrespective of race and religion.
- (2) The duty of encouraging local autonomy.
- (3) The duty of securing freedom of conscience, free exercise of worship subject to the maintenance of public order and morals, and of preventing discrimination of any kind between the inhabitants of Transjordan on the ground of race, religion or language; and the further duty of maintaining the territorial integrity of Transjordan.
- (4) The control of the foreign relations of Transjordan.
- (5) The duty of safeguarding the interests of foreigners in judicial matters, and the prevention of discrimination against nationals of any member of the League of Nations, and of any State to which by agreement His Majesty has accorded rights that are the same as those of members of the League of Nations.
- (6) The duty of securing respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities, and for their religious interests, including the administration of Awqaf, in accordance with the religious law and the dispositions of the founders.
- (7) The duty of safeguarding international rights in Transjordan, of adhering on behalf of Transjordan to certain international conventions approved by the League of Nations and of securing the performance of international obligations by Transjordan, of which the following are included among those specifically mentioned:—

Freedom of transit across Transjordan territory.

Non-interference with the enterprise of religious, or charitable bodies of all faiths, subject to the measures required for the maintenance of public order and good government.

The enactment and execution of a Law of Antiquities.

Co-operation in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

It is the duty of the High Commissioner, subject to the direction of His Majesty's Government, to secure the performance of all the obligations set out above, which have been undertaken by His Majesty's Government towards the Governments and nationals of other States.

Moreover, it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate, and to communicate with the report copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year.

The High Commissioner then must cause such annual report to be prepared in such form and containing such information and material as the Council may from time to time properly require, and must ensure that copies of all laws and subordinate legislation are furnished with the report.

3. His Majesty is also responsible for ensuring—

- (1) That the interests of foreigners are adequately protected.
- (2) That the financial interests of His Majesty's Government are safeguarded.
- (3) That a prudent use is made of the resources of the country.
- (4) That within the financial limits available the administration of the country conforms generally to the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government.

4. His Majesty, by means of an agreement concluded with His Highness the Amir of Transjordan on the 20th February, 1928, has recognised the existence in Transjordan of an independent Government under the rule of His Highness

the Amir of Transjordan, such Government being constitutional and placing His Majesty in a position to fulfil his international obligations in respect of the territory.

5. At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held on the 1st September, 1928, in the course of a discussion on the Transjordan Agreement, the representative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom pointed out that His Majesty's Government still remained responsible to the Council for the proper application in Transjordan of the mandate for Palestine, except in so far as certain of its provisions were, under article 25 and in virtue of the decision of the Council of the League of the 23rd September, 1922, excluded from operation in Transjordan. The Council, on the same day, adopted a resolution taking note of this declaration and acknowledging that the Transjordan Agreement was in conformity with the principles of the mandate, which remained fully in force.

6. The High Commissioner for Transjordan is the representative of His Majesty in Transjordan, and His Majesty's Government will look to him as their principal officer for securing the due fulfilment of all the obligations which they have undertaken.

7. The powers of legislation and of administration entrusted to His Majesty as mandatory are to be exercised in Transjordan by His Highness the Amir through the Constitutional Government defined and determined in the Transjordan Organic Law. It being an obligation on the mandatory to ensure that legislation is adapted to the needs of the country under progressive and enlightened government, and that the administration is conducted to give due effect to such legislation, it is for the High Commissioner to exercise control over the legislation of the Transjordan Government. This control is to be exercised in two ways: first, by seeing that the positive responsibilities and obligations are carried into effect at all times, and secondly, by preventing the adoption or making of laws and rules that may hinder the full discharge of international responsibilities and obligations.

8. Since His Highness the Amir has undertaken to be guided by the advice of His Majesty in all matters concerning foreign relations, and in all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations of His Majesty, the High Commissioner must satisfy himself that His Highness the Amir follows such an administrative, financial and fiscal policy in Transjordan as will ensure the stability and good organisation of the Transjordan Government and its finances. For that purpose the High Commissioner must keep himself informed of the measures proposed to achieve those objects, and must ensure that the measures adopted do, in fact, tend towards these objects. The manner in which revenue is raised and collected, and the authorities for the expenditure of the public revenues are, therefore, matters in which the High Commissioner must arrange to keep himself fully informed.

Moreover the High Commissioner must be satisfied that the revenues of Transjordan are insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of administration as approved from time to time, including any expenditure on local forces for which Transjordan is liable, before submitting to His Majesty's Government any request from the Transjordan Government to be assisted by His Majesty's Treasury by way of grant or loan in aid of the revenues of Transjordan.

The High Commissioner shall satisfy himself that no alteration in the system of control over the finances of the Transjordan Government shall be made unless the prior consent of His Majesty's Government has been obtained.

With regard to expenditure required for the defence of Transjordan, the Amir of Transjordan has recognised the principle that such expenditure is a charge on the revenues of the country.

From the 1st April, 1930, the charge is as follows:—

- (a) In respect of the Transjordan Frontier Force, one-sixth of the total cost.
- (b) In respect of the excess cost of the Royal Air Force stationed in Transjordan over the cost of such force if stationed in Great Britain, one-half of the excess cost of the Royal Air Force together with the capital cost of works services in Transjordan.

Having regard to the fact that the revenues of the country are insufficient to meet the costs under (a) and (b), such cost will, for the present, be borne by His Majesty's Government.

The territory, as soon as its financial resources permit, is to bear the whole cost of any forces raised for Transjordan alone.

His Majesty's Government will require to be assured that these obligations are being fulfilled.

9. In order to secure specific performance of certain of the obligations set out in the preceding instructions, His Highness the Amir has agreed that he will refer for the advice of His Majesty the annual budget law and any law concerning matters which are the subjects of the agreement which His Highness has concluded with His Majesty. The High Commissioner then must make arrangements whereby all laws proposed for Transjordan shall be scrutinised in draft form so that he may be in a position to advise his Majesty's Government if any law proposed concerns matters that are the subjects of the agreement. In particular, the High Commissioner must submit to the Secretary of State as long as possible before they are submitted to the legislative body in Transjordan drafts of laws falling in the following classes:—

- (1) The annual budget law.
- (2) Any law affecting the currency of Transjordan or relating to the issue of bank-notes.
- (3) Any law imposing differential duties.
- (4) Any law whereby persons who are nationals of any State member of the League of Nations or of any State to which His Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as it would enjoy if it were a member of the League of Nations, may be subjected or made liable to any disabilities to which persons who are British subjects or nationals of any foreign State are not also subjected or made liable.
- (5) Any special law providing for succession to the Amir's throne or for the establishment of a Council of Regency.
- (6) Any law whereby the grant of land or money or other donation or gratuity may be made to the Amir.
- (7) Any law under which the Amir may assume sovereignty over territory outside Transjordan.
- (8) Any law concerning the jurisdiction of the civil courts over foreigners.
- (9) Any law altering, amending or adding to the details of the provisions of the Transjordan Organic Law.

10. As soon as any law or regulation has been enacted, the High Commissioner must arrange to be furnished with a copy thereof together with an English translation. And when such law or regulation concerns any of the matters that are the subjects of the preceding instruction, the High Commissioner must furnish such copy and translation to the Secretary of State with due despatch.

11. The High Commissioner may approve proposals of the Transjordan Government to incur additional expenditure in amounts not exceeding £P.100 on any one service up to a total not exceeding £P.2,000 in any one year, provided always that—

- (a) The foregoing authority shall not apply to proposals affecting (1) the numbers and the emoluments of personnel, and (2) non-effective charges, such as pensions, gratuities, awards, injury grants and compassionate allowances.
- (b) For non-recurrent items the limit of £P.100 shall be regarded as applying to the total cost and not merely to the cost within the financial year.
- (c) The sanction of any such additional expenditure by the High Commissioner will not result in the authorised deficit for the year being exceeded.
- (d) This authority shall not be employed to approve items involving commitments for future years in such a way as to fetter the control by the Secretary of State of the annual estimates.

Subject to the conditions above mentioned, the High Commissioner may, in his discretion, delegate such part of the above authority as circumstances may demand to the British Resident, Transjordan.

The High Commissioner will furnish a quarterly schedule of sanctions issued by him, in accordance with the powers delegated to him above, with

adequate explanations of the individual cases and particulars of the savings available whether by reduction of expenditure or by increase of revenue.

12. The prior authority of the Secretary of State is required for any remission of taxes, cancellation of arrears of revenue, or abandoned claims, the amount of which in any one case exceeds £P.100.

13. The High Commissioner may approve the writing-off of losses of public money (including overpayments) or of any sum which has appeared as an asset in previous accounts, not exceeding £P.100 in any one case. The prior authority of the Secretary of State is required if the amount involved exceeds £P.100 in any one case.

14. The High Commissioner may approve the writing-off of stores lost or deficient not exceeding £P.100 in any one case. In such cases where the loss does not exceed £P.50, the High Commissioner may, if he so desires, delegate his authority to the British Resident.

Where the loss is due to fraud or negligence, and it is desired to relieve the responsible officer of any part of his liability, the High Commissioner may authorise relief not exceeding £P.50. The sanction of the Secretary of State is necessary in cases where it is desired to grant relief exceeding £P.50.

15. The Transjordan Government should seek the prior authority of the British Resident for the condemnation of stores as unserviceable.

16. His Majesty's Government have to consider the financial obligations resting upon Transjordan in connexion with the payment of contributions from Transjordan towards the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, and other financial obligations devolving on Transjordan in virtue of various international arrangements, in particular liabilities in respect of the extinction of the monopoly granted to the Ottoman Régie cointéressée des Tabacs and the administration and maintenance of the Hejaz Railway. His Majesty's Government, therefore, look to the High Commissioner to give them complete and early information from time to time on all financial measures proposed in Transjordan, so that they may form a considered opinion upon the whole financial position of Transjordan.

17. The High Commissioner must submit to the Secretary of State all questions concerning the grant of concessions, the exploitation of natural resources, the construction and operation of railways, and the raising of loans. In particular, the High Commissioner must keep His Majesty's Government informed of all developments in the utilisation of mineral resources in the Dead Sea and of the financial circumstances of the Hejaz Railway, and must arrange that all profits from the operation of the latter shall be carried to a suspense account.

18. In order that His Majesty's Government shall be constantly assured that the Transjordan Government are following an administrative, financial and fiscal policy such as will ensure the stability and good organisation of the country and its finances, the High Commissioner must arrange to call for reports from the British advisers attached to the Transjordan Ministers as to actions done or actions contemplated.

When it appears to the High Commissioner from these reports that actions contemplated affect the international and financial obligations and interests of His Majesty's Government, he must require the Transjordan Government to submit to him the draft proposals of the actions contemplated, and he should report forthwith to the Secretary of State for instructions any matters in which the Transjordan Government fail to take such legislative and administrative steps as may be necessary to enable His Majesty's Government to fulfil their international and financial obligations.

If the action contemplated be legislative in character the High Commissioner will consider whether or not it is concerned importantly with the obligations and responsibilities of His Majesty's Government. If it be not so concerned, the High Commissioner may allow it to be laid in due time before the legislative body. If it be otherwise, the High Commissioner must submit the proposals to the Secretary of State for consideration by His Majesty's Government.

If the action contemplated be administrative in character and affect importantly the international and other responsibilities and obligations of His Majesty's Government, the High Commissioner must endeavour, through the British advisers to the Ministers to secure that the proposal shall not be carried into effect, and on the method failing, the High Commissioner shall then formally tender advice to the Transjordan Government under article 5 of the agreement

with Transjordan with a view to the cancellation of the proposal or to reference of it to His Majesty's Government for consideration.

19. The High Commissioner must see that the salaries and expenses of his representative in Transjordan, the British Resident and his staff, are voted annually by the legislative body in Transjordan, and that quarters are provided for the accommodation of the British members of the Resident's staff. He must refer to the Secretary of State any proposal to employ any officer of European nationality in the service of the Transjordan Government, and must also ensure that British officers serving under the Transjordan Government are adequately remunerated, and that their service is regulated by lawful agreement.

20. His Majesty may maintain armed forces in Transjordan, and may raise, organise and control in Transjordan such armed forces as may be necessary for the defence of the country and to assist His Highness the Amir in the preservation of peace and order. On the other hand, His Highness the Amir has undertaken not to raise or maintain in Transjordan or allow to be raised or maintained any military forces without the consent of His Majesty. With regard to His Majesty's forces, the High Commissioner must ensure that the Officer Commanding is kept fully informed as to political and strategic developments in Transjordan and in neighbouring territories.

With regard to armed forces which His Majesty may raise in Transjordan, the High Commissioner must ensure that the command of such forces shall vest in a British officer, who shall be under the orders of the Officer Commanding for strategical and tactical purposes. The High Commissioner must also secure that he is kept informed of any orders or measures proposed in regard to the administration and economy of such forces by the Transjordan Government, and must make arrangements so that monies voted for the forces are properly expended and brought to account.

The High Commissioner must further secure for both the Imperial and local forces raised by His Majesty immunity of officers and other ranks from civil process and exemption from customs dues of all stores and material imported for the use of the forces, and of the effects of the members of such forces.

The High Commissioner must also give instant notice to His Majesty's Government of any desire on the part of His Highness the Amir or others in Transjordan to raise and maintain armed forces, and must secure that no such forces shall be raised and maintained without the approval of His Majesty's Government.

21. In the event of disaffection or grave threat to public order and peace in Transjordan the High Commissioner must decide if the circumstances are such as to require the proclamation of martial law in all or any part of Transjordan, and if martial law be proclaimed then he must provisionally nominate and cause His Highness the Amir to appoint an officer or officers of His Majesty's forces to administer Transjordan or parts thereof under martial law. The name of any person so appointed must be submitted forthwith to the Secretary of State with a full report on the circumstances in which the appointment was made. The High Commissioner must further ensure that on the re-establishment of civil government laws are enacted indemnifying all or any of the forces maintained by His Majesty for all acts done or omissions and defaults made under martial law.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 1837/1837/65]

No. 147.

Consul Monck-Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Aleppo, March 31, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 26th instant relative to a proposed more rapid train service between London and Tehran, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the new train-and-motor time-table which, as from the 22nd May next, will much shorten passenger and mail connexions with Iraq, Persia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt.⁽¹⁾ This time-table should be treated as confidential at present. Copies are also enclosed of a circular⁽²⁾ issued by the Compagnie des Wagons-Lits regarding the new Tehran itinerary, given me by the local manager of the company, with no mention of their being confidential.

2. It is to be observed that provision is made for reaching Haifa on the same day as that on which Aleppo is left; and there would seem to be no reason why the overland service to Cairo should not be shortened still further eventually by the suppression of the nights spent at Aleppo and Haifa.

3. I learn from the Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits that the motor connexion twice weekly between Khanikin and Tehran has been assured since the 16th March by Graham Page four-seater cars. Between Kirkuk and Khanikin there is a "voiture-couche."

4. The motor-service between Kirkuk and Khanikin are to be suspended during the hot months of July and August, and also in December, January and February, when roads are impassable.

5. I am told that the Soviets are straining every nerve to obtain the favour of the public for their own alternative route to Persia via Baku and Enzeli. The price of the journey via Russia is cheaper, though the time taken is longer.

6. The Bozanti-Alep-Nissibin and Prolongements and the Damas-Hama and Prolongements have acquired a controlling interest in the Compagnie auto-routière, which, after a good beginning, soon lost ground, partly as I understand owing to the number of claims made against the company for damage caused by reckless driving. New auto-routière services are to be developed, notably a daily one to Alexandretta via Antioch.

7. During the past year much work has been done on the Aleppo-Deir-ez-Zor road, which for the first time was passable throughout the winter, though it cannot yet, I think, be considered proof against a really rainy season. This road will probably be developed in the near future.

8. Since the completion of the bridge over the Euphrates at Deir-ez-Zor, the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibin and Prolongements has suffered much from the competition of lorries which transport goods to the Duck's Bill via Deir-ez-Zor and Hassetché at rates unapproachable by the railway company. The acquisition of an interest in the Auto-Routière Company by the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibin and Prolongements should enable the latter to compete in some measure with road traffic in the Euphrates region.

9. I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus and to the British vice-consul at Alexandretta.

I have, &c.

G. MONCK-MASON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Sir John Simon to Mr. R. H. Campbell (Paris).

(No. 970.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1932.

IN my despatch No. 373 of the 16th February was enclosed an extract from the minutes of a meeting on the 30th January last of the Council of the League of Nations during its 66th session, at which the Anglo-French Agreement of the 31st October, 1931, concerning the frontier between Transjordan and Syria and the Jebel Druze was discussed. You will have observed from these minutes that, at the close of the discussion, the delegate of the United Kingdom stated that he had just been told that the formal approval of the Council had never been sought for the frontier dividing Palestine from Syria and the Lebanon, which was delimited in 1922-23. Lord Cecil added that His Majesty's Government would lose no time in examining this question in consultation with the French Government, and that if any necessary measures had been overlooked, the appropriate action would be taken in agreement with the French Government to remedy the omission at a future session of the Council. The President of the Council, as representative of France, associated himself with Lord Cecil's statement.

2. Just prior to the 66th session of the Council, M. Catastini, an Italian member of the League Secretariat, had pointed out privately that, according to the preambles to the mandates for Palestine and Syria, the principal Allied Powers (*i.e.*, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) appeared to be the competent authorities for the definition of the boundaries of the respective mandated territories. In subsequent conversations at Geneva, M. Catastini implied that as the principal Allied Powers had ceased to exist as a body, the Council of the League might now be regarded for this purpose as succeeding them. He suggested that as the line laid down in the 1920 convention had not been specifically approved by the principal Allied Powers, it ought to be formally approved by the Council, and he urged that the section between the Mediterranean and El Hamme, as well as the Syria-Transjordan sector, should be submitted to the Council for approval. In these circumstances, Lord Cecil, after consultation with the French delegate, as well as with M. Catastini, agreed to make the statement referred to in the preceding paragraph.

3. For your confidential information, the status of the principal Allied Powers and of the Council of the League in this matter is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, as follows:—

4. At the San Remo Conference in 1920, at which the "A" mandated territories were allotted, it was decided that the principal Allied Powers should not only select the mandatories, but should also determine the boundaries of the territories concerned. This principle was subsequently embodied in section VII of the unratified Treaty of Sèvres, and at a still later date was reproduced in the first recital in the preamble to the Palestine mandate, and in the corresponding section of the preamble to the Syrian mandate, these mandates being confirmed by the Council of the League, and entering into force, before the Treaty of Sèvres had been abandoned. The Treaty of Lausanne, which eventually superseded that treaty, was silent on the subject of the mandated territories. It provided (article 3) for the determination of the frontiers between Syria and Turkey, and between Iraq and Turkey, but otherwise the only relevant provisions regarding the territories lying beyond these frontiers is contained in article 16 of the treaty, which states that "Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present treaty . . . the future of these territories . . . being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned." The effect of article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne on the question of the determination of the boundaries of the "A" mandated territories is not entirely clear. It might be argued perhaps that the phrase "parties concerned" means the parties directly concerned in a particular frontier, and that the task of determining the frontiers was thus removed from the principal Allied Powers. But it is doubtful whether so important a change can be assumed from the employment of such ambiguous and general words in a general article, applicable to all the territories detached from Turkey, and in strict law the principal Allied Powers probably remained, after

the Treaty of Lausanne, the competent authorities for the determination of the boundaries. Whether this is true in the case of Iraq, as well as in that of Syria and Palestine (including Transjordan), is perhaps more uncertain. There is nothing in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 corresponding to the relevant passages in the preambles to the mandates for Syria and Palestine. Nevertheless, in view of the San Remo decision, the legal position in regard to Iraq is possibly the same as in regard to Syria and Palestine.

5. In practice, however, in the case of all the mandated territories, the various boundaries have been fixed, after considerable difficulty and delay in some cases, by direct negotiation between the parties immediately concerned, without reference to the principal Allied Powers, the part assigned to the latter having come to be regarded, with the lapse of time and in changed circumstances, as a dead letter. The principal Allied Powers have long ceased to act as a body, and no individual member has ever claimed to intervene.

6. There were special reasons for approaching the Council of the League in connexion with the Iraq-Syria and the Transjordan-Syria sectors of the frontier laid down in the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920. In the case of the Iraq-Syria sector, His Majesty's Government and the French Government were unable to reach agreement on the exact delimitation of the frontier, and the Franco-British Convention of 1920 stipulated that in such an event recourse should be had to the Council of the League. Reference to the Council in the case of the Transjordan-Syria sector was necessary, because the Anglo-French Agreement of the 31st October, 1931, involved a definite modification of the frontier laid down in 1920, and therefore the mandatories clearly required covering sanction in view of article 5 of the Palestine mandate and article 4 of the Syrian mandate, under which the mandatories are responsible for seeing that no part of the respective territories is ceded to, or placed under the control of, a foreign Power. The same considerations do not apply in the case of the Palestine-Syria sector. That frontier was demarcated on the basis laid down by article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, by the commission provided for in article 2 of the same convention. The report of the commission was formally accepted by His Majesty's Government and the French Government in an exchange of notes, dated the 7th March, 1923, and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 2 of the 1920 convention, a copy of the report was deposited, with copies of the notes exchanged, in the archives of the League of Nations on the 6th February, 1924. His Majesty's Government therefore consider that no further action, *vis-à-vis* of the League, is called for in this case. The Council of the League, as such, is not responsible for the original determination of the frontiers of mandated territories, and the substance of the exchange of notes of the 7th March, 1923, no more appears to require their formal approval, therefore, than any other international instrument which the mandatories, vested by the mandates with control over the foreign relations of the respective territories, may conclude on their behalf, except on the assumption that the Council has succeeded to the rights of the principal Allied Powers. His Majesty's Government, for their part, do not regard this assumption as legally sound, and would prefer not to commit themselves to it.

7. It will, however, be best to deal with the somewhat complicated situation described in the preceding paragraphs in the light of common sense and good tactics, rather than on a strictly legal basis. The question of approval has so far only been raised in regard to the Palestine-Syria frontier, but the danger of admitting the necessity of obtaining approval for this frontier lies in the possible creation of a precedent applicable to all the frontiers of the "A" mandated territories (other than those with Turkey, which were definitely provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne). An element of uncertainty would thus be introduced in regard to frontiers hitherto regarded as fixed, and the intervention of third parties might complicate relations with the foreign neighbours of the mandated territories. Moreover, an opportunity would be given to the Powers whose approval was sought to create difficulties and to extract advantages for themselves as the price of approval. A further consideration in the case of Iraq is the time factor, in view of the possible connexion of the question with that of Iraq's admission to membership of the League in September next.

8. For all these reasons His Majesty's Government would prefer not to have to seek the approval of the Council for the Palestine-Syria frontier. But they

do not wish, by denying the Council's competence, to raise the question of that of the principal Allied Powers. They propose, therefore, to take no action unless pressed to submit the matter to the Council, and in that event the best course seems to be to acquiesce without prejudice, and to seek the approval of the Council in such a manner as to commit themselves as little as possible to any principle of general application regarding the necessity of doing so.

9. In these circumstances I request that you will inform the French Government, in such a manner as you think best, that His Majesty's Government have examined the question of the frontier dividing Syria and the Lebanon from Palestine as promised by Lord Cecil, and have come to the conclusion that no necessary measures have been overlooked. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, propose to take no further action unless and until the point is again raised by some member of the Council or by the League Secretariat. In the event of it being so raised they would propose to state that in their view no submission to the Council is necessary. Nevertheless they would naturally be prepared, always without prejudice to that view, to seek the formal approval of the Council for that frontier should any member of that body press them to do so.

10. I shall be glad to learn whether the French Government concur in the procedure proposed.

11. The considerations which have influenced His Majesty's Government in this matter and which are set out in paragraphs 4 to 7 of this despatch should, as I have stated, be regarded as confidential and are primarily for your own information. I am content, however, to leave it to your discretion to make such use of the material contained therein as you think fit in discussing the question with the French Government, should they display any reluctance to agree to the course which His Majesty's Government wish to follow. I recognise that the question may not have the same importance for them as it has for His Majesty's Government, since no question of the approval of the frontiers between Syria and Turkey and between Syria and Iraq arises, while that of the frontier between Syria and Transjordan has already been disposed of, so the submission of the Palestine-Syria frontier to the Council or to the principal Allied Powers would not, therefore, have the same inconvenience as a precedent. It seems possible, however, that the French Government will agree with His Majesty's Government that there is no legal foundation for regarding the Council of the League as taking the place of the principal Allied Powers for the purpose of determining the frontiers of the "A" mandated territories.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

[E 2372/9/93]

No. 149.

Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 1023.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 12, 1932.

AS you are aware, the Council of the League is at present considering the question of the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq, and has before it the report presented by the committee set up in virtue of the Council's resolution of the 28th January last for the purpose of preparing a declaration on the subject of the engagements to which Iraq should subscribe as a condition of her release from that régime. This committee has now proposed to the Council the adoption of the draft resolution, a copy of which is enclosed herein.

2. As a result of preliminary discussions regarding this resolution, it has been ascertained that the French Government will only be willing to accept it, and thus commit themselves to the renunciation, in respect of Iraq, of the capitulatory rights which were enjoyed by French citizens in the former Ottoman Empire, on condition that His Majesty's Government for their part undertake to adopt the same attitude in regard to the question of capitulatory rights, if and when the question of the admission into the League of Nations of the States of the Levant under French mandate arises in conditions analogous in particular in so far as the judicial régime is concerned.

3. Sir Francis Humphrys has now succeeded in obtaining from the French delegation an assurance that the French Government will accept the resolution,

provided an exchange of notes first takes place giving the French Government the assurance they desire, and has obtained from the French delegation the enclosed draft⁽¹⁾ of the note which the French Government would propose to address to His Majesty's Embassy.

4. After due consideration I have decided that an assurance in the terms of the attached draft may safely be given to the French Government in reply to their note.⁽¹⁾ Your Lordship will appreciate that it is essential that this assurance should only be given on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I shall be glad if you will approach the Quai d'Orsay accordingly, and arrange with them for the desired exchange of notes to take place at the earliest possible moment. It is of the utmost importance that the agreement of the French Government in the draft Council resolution should be secured by Tuesday, the 17th May, as the discussion of the Iraq question is to be concluded at Geneva by the 18th or 19th May, and that the proposed exchange of notes should therefore be completed not later than the 16th May. As soon as the exchange has been completed your Lordship should inform the British delegation at Geneva direct by telegram.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 149.

Draft Resolution.

LE Conseil,

Approuve le projet de déclaration et le rapport qui lui ont été présentés par son comité conformément au paragraphe 4 de sa résolution du 28 janvier 1932;

Approuve le rapport que le représentant de la Yougoslavie, son rapporteur, lui a soumis ce jour;

Exprime, en conséquence, le vœu que les Puissances intéressées, dont les ressortissants jouissaient de droits capitulaires dans l'ancien Empire ottoman, renoncent, avant l'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations, à ce que ces anciens privilèges de juridiction soient maintenus à l'avenir en faveur de leurs ressortissants;

Invite le Secrétaire général à faire part de ce vœu aux Gouvernements des Etats auxquels le Gouvernement britannique, conformément à la présente résolution, se sera adressé en vue de la renonciation envisagée.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2437/2436/93]

No. 150.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 686.)

Sir,

Paris, May 19, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I yesterday exchanged notes with the French Government, in obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch No. 1023 of the 12th instant. Under the terms of these notes, which follow the wording of the drafts with which you were so good as to furnish me, the French Government agree to renounce the maintenance of their capitulatory rights in Iraq in advance of the admission of that State to membership of the League of Nations, but ask in return for an assurance that His Majesty's Government will adopt the same attitude as regards their capitulatory rights if and when the question arises in similar conditions of the admission to the League of Near Eastern States at present under French mandate; His Majesty's Government, on their side, give the desired assurance.

2. The French note is enclosed herein in original, together with a certified copy of my reply to it. Owing to the absence from Paris of the competent officials, it was not possible to effect the exchange by the 16th, as directed, but the 18th was time enough, since it was not till the 19th, so I ascertained, that the Council was due to consider the resolution relating to the engagements to be undertaken by Iraq before admission to the League, the French assent to which was conditional on the receipt of the assurance contained in my note. As soon

as the exchange had been effected, the British delegation at Geneva was so informed by telephone.

3. After we had carried out the formality, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs said that the French Government would be grateful to receive an assurance that, if and when the French Government desired to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, His Majesty's Government would adopt the same benevolent attitude as the French Government had adopted towards the emancipation of Iraq. I replied that the French Government need have no fear that we should make unnecessary difficulties, but that I doubted whether the assurance which they sought, and which could necessarily only be very general in character, was such as any Government could put into writing. M. Berthelot said that he fully realised that, and that his Government would be content with an oral assurance in quite general terms. The request appears to me in the circumstances to be a reasonable one, and I beg leave to recommend that I be authorised to give the desired assurance.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the British delegation at Geneva.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 150.

M. Berthelot to Lord Tyrrell.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 18 mai 1932.

J'AI pris connaissance du projet de résolution destiné à être soumis au Conseil de la Société des Nations au cours de sa présente session en vue de régler la question de l'extinction du régime mandataire en Irak. Ce projet exprime en particulier le vœu que les Puissances intéressées, dont les ressortissants jouissaient de droits capitulaires dans l'ancien Empire ottoman, veuillent bien, avant l'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations, renoncer à ce que ces anciens privilèges de juridiction soient maintenus, à l'avenir, dans cet Etat, en faveur de leurs ressortissants.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence, en me référant à la note qu'elle a bien voulu adresser à mon Département le 14 janvier 1931, que le Gouvernement de la République est, pour sa part, disposé à renoncer, avant l'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations, au maintien des droits susvisés, mais qu'il souhaiterait recevoir dès maintenant du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'assurance que celui-ci adoptera la même attitude dans la question des capitulations le jour où la question de l'admission dans la Société des Nations des Etats du Levant sous mandat français se posera dans des conditions analogues, notamment en ce qui concerne le régime judiciaire.

Veillez, &c.

Pour le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
étrangères, et par délégation, l'Ambassadeur
de France, Secrétaire général,
BERTHELOT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 150.

Lord Tyrrell to M. Tardieu.

M. le Président,

Paris, May 18, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 18th May relating to the renunciation by the Government of the Republic of its capitulatory rights in Iraq, and, upon the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to give you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the assurance referred to in the second paragraph of your note.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL OF AVON.

[E 2575/1614/65]

No. 151.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 714.)

Sir,

Paris, May 24, 1932.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 970 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs agree to the line which you propose should be adopted by the two Governments in the matter of the claim raised during the 66th Session of the Council of the League of Nations that the boundary dividing Palestine from Syria and the Lebanon, as delimited in 1922-23, should have been submitted to the Council for approval. The Ministry think it probable, however, that the matter will be referred to again, and that the two Governments will be obliged sooner or later to explain the reasons why they consider that no necessary formality has been neglected.

2. I regret the delay in replying to your despatch, which was due to the absence from Paris of the competent official at the Ministry.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

R. H. CAMPBELL.

[E 2437/2436/93]

No. 152.

Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 1209. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 6, 1932.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 686 of the 19th May, in which your Lordship reported the desire of the French Government to receive an oral assurance in regard to the attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt in the event of the French Government wishing to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the States of the Levant under French mandate.

2. I approve the reply which you returned to M. Berthelot's enquiry on this subject, as reported in paragraph 3 of your despatch. For your confidential information, I may explain that His Majesty's Government would be most reluctant to give to the French Government any assurance on the subject more positive than that which you yourself have already given to them in that reply, more particularly as His Majesty's Government cannot accept the French Government's apparent assumption that they have placed His Majesty's Government under an obligation in connexion with the question of the emancipation of Iraq from the mandatory régime, and have thus a claim to some corresponding concession on the part of His Majesty's Government in return. Indeed, I am unaware of any instance in which the French Government have rendered positive assistance to His Majesty's Government in regard to the question of the emancipation of Iraq. None the less, in the wider interests of Franco-British relations, I am anxious to go as far as possible towards meeting the desiderata of the French Government.

3. You are therefore authorised to inform the French Government in writing that the terms of your reply, as reported in paragraph 3 of your despatch, to the effect that the French Government need have no fear that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will make unnecessary difficulties if and when the French Government desire to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, have been approved by His Majesty's Government. I shall be glad to receive in due course a copy of such communication as you may address to the French Government on this subject.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 2345/2436/93]

No. 153.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 823.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to M. Herriot respecting the emancipation of Near Eastern territories from the mandatory system.

Paris, June 9, 1932.

Enclosure in No. 153.

*Lord Tyrrell to M. Herriot.**June 9, 1932.*

M. le Président,

WHEN on the 18th May last notes were exchanged with your Excellency's predecessor relating to the renunciation by the Government of the Republic of its capitulatory rights in Iraq previous to the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, it was intimated to me that the French Government would welcome an assurance that, if and when the French Government desired to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would adopt the same benevolent attitude as the French Government had adopted towards the emancipation of Iraq.

2. I duly acquainted His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with the desire of the French Government, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that I am instructed to acquaint you that the terms of the reply which I then gave, to the effect that the French Government need have no fear that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will make unnecessary difficulties if and when the French Government desire to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, have received the approval of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.